Behavioral and Experimental Economics Discussion Group
(行為與實驗經濟學討論會)
2012/ 3 /13-15:
Peter Bossaerts (California
Institute of Technology) and Andrew Caplin
(New York University)
(TBA)
2011/12/15-16:
Paul Glimcher (New York
Unversity)
(I) Foundations of Economic
Analysis and the Neural Representation of Utility
(經濟分析之基礎與效用的神經表現):
12/15 (四) 1:30-3:30pm
at NTU (社科院經大講堂)
ABSTRACT:
Over the past decade there has
been a significant debate about
how economics and neuroscience
will influence each other. In
this presentation I will argue
that a meaningful synthesis of
these disciplines will emerge
only when serious economic
theory is used to guide
neurobiological inquiry. If this
occurs I argue that it will
yield a new class of economic
theories that make both economic
and neurobiological predictions,
both of which can be
meaningfully tested. To that end
I will describe an axiomatic
analysis of the neural
representation of utility
shocks. Based on fMRI data I
will argue for the existence of
a utility-like representation in
a specific brain area. I will
then show that a set of neural
measurements in this brain area
can predict later choice data.
Differences between economic
utility and the cardinal object
we refer to as "subjective
value", and the implications of
these findings for cardinal
theories of utility will be
discussed.
(II) The Neurobiology of Choice and the Evolving Standard
Model
(決策的神經生理學與「變動標準」模型):
12/16(五)
1:30-3:30pm
at Yang-Ming
University (陽明大學活動中心第三會議室)
ABSTRACT:
There is
now broad agreement in the neurobiological community about the basic features of
the neurobiological mechanism for human and animal decision making. I will
review this emerging standard model and then present two specific studies. They
will show how economic theory can inform neurobiological studies of brain
mechanisms in a highly valuable way - modifying existing neurobiological theory.
The second will show the reverse: neurobiological data that makes fundamentally
novel predictions about inconsistent human choice behavior.
2011/10/18-20:
Colin F. Camerer (California
Institute of Technology)
(I)
Cognitive Neuroscience and Game Theory
(認知神經科學與賽局理論):
10/18 (二) 3:30-5:30pm at Yang-Ming
University (陽明大學活動中心第三會議室)
ABSTRACT:
Game theory provides a
vocabulary of canonical
strategic interactions that are
important in human social,
political, and economic life.
However, game theory has not
been applied in cognitive
neuroscience very much. This
talk will discuss some recent
studies using fMRI and disorders
(autism) to illustrate how game
theory might be useful in
cognitive neuroscience.
(II) When Game Theory Predicts Well and Badly: Evidence
from Lab, Field, and Chimps
(賽局理論的預測力：從實驗室內、田野現場與黑猩猩所得到的證據):
10/20(四) 1:30-3:30pm at NTU (社科院經大講堂)
ABSTRACT:
There is mixed
evidence of how
accurate game
theoretic
predictions are
compared to
human behavior.
Cognitive
hierarchy models
can reconcile
this evidence
systematically,
since they
sometimes
predict large
deviations and
sometimes
predict small
deviations. This
will be
illustrated with
lab behavior,
eyetracking, and
field data from
a Swedish
lottery. An
unusual domain
in which game
theory may work
surprisingly
well is when a
particular
species has
evolved a
special
niche-dependent
adaptation for
certain types of
fitness-enhancing
games. This is
addressed by
comparing humans
and chimps.
(I)
Bridging Risky Decision Making and Decision Under Risk
(「有風險的決策」與「風險下的決策」):
5/19 (四)
1:30-3:30pm
at NTU (社科院經大講堂)
ABSTRACT:
Neuroeconomics has provided
substantial insights into the
processes underlying economic
concept of "decision under
risk." However, this work has
largely failed to provide
insights into "risky decision
making", a lay concept with
significant public health
implications. I will discuss
the relation between these
concepts, and outline how
dynamic decision making tasks
provide the potential to bridge
the gap between these two
concepts.
(II) Towards a Semantic Infrastructure for Cognitive
Neuroscience: The Cognitive Atlas Project
(認知神經科學圖譜):
5/24 (二)
3:30-5:30pm
at Yang-Ming
University (陽明大學活動中心第三會議室)
ABSTRACT:
We are drowning in results from neuroimaging studies, but starving for an
understanding of how these results inform brain function. In order to integrate
across this wealth of research findings, I propose that we need a formal
semantic infrastructure similar to those developed in other areas of bioscience
such as genomics. I will first describe a set of informatics tools that mine
literature and neuroimaging databases to characterize the relation between
neural and mental function. I will then describe the Cognitive Atlas project (www.cognitiveatlas.org),
which aims to develop a knowledge base for mental structure. Finally, I will
outline a proof of concept showing how such a database could be used to extract
the latent structure of brain processes that underlie mental function.
2011/
6 / 24 - 7 / 4
: Tai-Wei Hu (MEDS, Northwestern
University) - Mini-course on Game Theory (at NTU)
課程介紹：本課程分為五堂課，第一堂課回顧並介紹賽局理論的背景知識，第二堂課開始，從混和策略和奈許均衡的解讀出發，討論決策理論與賽局理論目前最新的研究發展和未來方向，希望能啟發同學對此一研究方向的興趣。
1.
(6/24, 2-5pm)
Expected Utility Theory
2.
(6/27, 9am-12pm)
Zero-sum Games
3.
(6/30, 9am-12pm)
Nash Equilibrium
4.
(7/ 1, 9am-12pm)
Knowledge
5.
(7/ 4, 9am-12pm)
Epistemic Logic
References:
Nash (1951), Kuhn (1953), Hu (2010), Kaneko and Kline (2008), Hu and Kaneko
(2011).
2008-09 SPECIAL GUEST SPEAKER SERIES:
2009/5/25-26:
Filip Vesely (UW-Milwaukee)
(II) Voluntary Separation as a Discipline Device for
Long-Term Cooperation: Theory and Experiment
(自願隔離如何維持長期合作：理論與實驗): 5/26
9:10am-12pm at Sinica (中研院經研所B110會議室)
Vesely,
Lei and Drewianka (2007), "Do
Separation Laws Matter? An Experimental Study of Commitment," working paper.
Eeckhout (2006), "Minorities
and Endogenous Segregation," Review of Economic Studies, 73(1), 31-53.
Fujiwara-Greve and Okuno-Fujiwara
(2009), "Voluntarily
Separable Repeated Prisoner's Dilemma," Review of Economic Studies,
forthcoming.
Rob and Yang (2009), "Long-Term
Relationship as Safeguards," Economic Theory, forthcoming.
ABSTRACT: We develop a game-theoretic model and an
experiment to investigate the scope and patterns of cooperation in voluntary and
thus potentially long-term bilateral partnerships. In our environment, agents
must first play a prisoner’s dilemma game and then decide if they want to
continue playing the game with the same partner for at least one more period or
with a new counterpart. A separation can be unilaterally determined by one of
the two partners and as such long term partnerships must be formed endogenously
by mutual agreement. We observe decisions consistent with simple strategies as
of Rob and Yang (2009) and Fujiwara-Greve and Okuno-Fujiwara (2009), as well as
more complex strategies involving sequences in which subjects alternate periods
of cooperation and defection. We find that because the conditional cooperation
payoff-dominates the unconditional defection, the threat of unilateral
separation serves as a discipline device for cooperation in the long-term.
2009/5/8:
Vivian Lei (UW-Milwaukee)
2009/2/23-27:
Yan Chen (Michigan), Flyer
(I) Social identity in
economics (社會認同): 2/23 9-12pm at NTU (社科院經大講堂)
(slides)
Chen and Li
(2008),
Group Identity and Social Preferences, American Economic Review,
forthcoming.
(SOM)
Chen and Chen (2008), The
Potential of Social Identity for Equilibrium Selection.
Time: Every other Monday 12:15-1:15pm
(presentation) & 1:15-2:15pm (free discussion)
Place: 台大社會科學院行政大樓第二會議室
(臺北市徐州路21號行政大樓二樓第二會議室)
Contact: Joseph Tao-yi
Wang (josephw "at" ntu.edu.tw)
Cheng-Chen Yang (ccyang "at" econ.sinica.edu.tw)
Chen-Ying Huang (chenying "at" ntu.edu.tw)
Format: One hour
presentation on papers in behavioral and experimental economics, followed by free discussion.
Lunch will be provided to
those who sign up in advance by emailing Joseph Tao-yi Wang.
Topics:
[12/17] Organization Meeting and
Introduction
Paper: Camerer (2003), Behavioral Game Theory, Ch. 1
Presenter: Joseph Tao-yi Wang
[12/31] Dominance-Solvable Games
Paper: Camerer (2003), Behavioral Game Theory,
Ch. 5.
Presenter: Cheng-Chen Yang
[ 1 /14] Mixed Strategy Equilibrium
Paper: Camerer (2003), Behavioral Game Theory,
Ch. 3.
Presenter: Chen-Ying Huang
[ 1 /28] Learning
Paper: Camerer (2003), Behavior Game Theory, Ch.
6.
Presenter: Joseph Tao-yi Wang
[ 2 /18] Guest Lecture (Special Location: 台大社會科學院行政大樓第一會議室
)
Paper:
Wise Crowds or Wise Minorities (with C.
Brunner)
Presenter: Jacob K. Goeree (Div. of Humanities and Social Sciences, Caltech)
[ 2 /25] Guest Lecture
Paper: Visual Pattern Analysis in the Ventral
Stream of the Human Occipital Cortex
Presenter: C. C. Chen (Dep. of Psychology, NTU)
[ 3 /31] Guest Lecture
Paper: How to make machine learn and learn
effectively?
Presenter: Fu Chang (Institute of Information Science, Academia Sinica)
[ 4 / 9 ] Guest Lecture
Paper:
Experiments in Open Contents
Presenter: Benjamin Chiao (School of Information, University of Michigan)
[ 4 /14 ] Special Guest Lecture (Special Place:
社法25)
Paper: Systemic Rationality (12:00-1:45)
Paper:
An exploratory analysis of composite choices: Weighing rationality over
irrationality (2:00-3:30)
Presenter: Bijou
Yang Lester (Drexel University)
[ 5 /19] Social Preferences
Paper: Camerer (2003), Behavioral Game Theory,
Ch. 2.
Presenter: Cheng-Chen Yang
[ 6 / 2 ] Student Presentation
Paper:
A Window of Cognition: Eyetracking the Decision-Making Process in Graphical
Beauty Contest Games
Presenter: Chun-Ting Chen (NTU)
NOTE:
This project is sponsored and supported by the National Science Council and the Public Economics Center of NTU
to promote research in
behavioral and experimental economics.
Last
modified on
January 31, 2012