Behavioral and Experimental Economics Discussion Group



       Home                               Research                            Teaching                            6:24                           TASSEL

Books for Background Reading:

1. Neuroeconomics (2008), edited by Paul Glimcher, Colin Camerer, Ernst Fehr and Russell Poldrack, three of which have visited Taiwan during our colloquium series.  (NTU library has online book chapters just like online journal articles.)

2. Handbook of Experimental Results (2008), edited by Charles Plott and Vernon Smith.  (NTU library has online book chapters just like online journal articles.)

3. Behavioral Game Theory (2003), by Colin Camerer. (Princeton UP has chapter 1 online.)  See also Colin's Pinkel lecture on this.

4. Handbook of Experimental Economics, Vol.1 (1995) and Vol.2 (forthcoming), edited by John Kagel and Alvin Roth.  (Summary of Vol. 1 and Chapters of Vol.2 are on Al Roth's website.)

2011-16 NEUROECONOMICS COLLOQUIUM SERIES: (jointly held with Chen-Ying Huang, Wen-Jui Kuo, Chun-Yi Yeh and Shih-Wei Wu)


2016/10/18-19: Sarah F. Brosnan (Georgia State Univ)

The Evolution of (un)Fairness
     ((不)公平偏好的演化): 10/18 () 2-4pm at Yang-Ming University (陽明大學活動中心第一會議室)

The human sense of fairness is an evolutionary puzzle; why do we put so much value on what we receive relative to others? One answer to this question emerges from studying other species. Although fairness itself is empirically intractable, it can be translated empirically into responses to reward distribution, and studying other species’ reactions can tell us something about the evolution of our own behavior. Indeed, humans are not alone in disliking inequity in reward distributions; many species protest receiving less than a partner for the same task, and this tendency occurs primarily in species that cooperate outside kinship and mating bonds, indicating a link between the two behaviors. However, a full sense of fairness requires not only this, but also that individuals notice and seek to equalize outcomes to their own detriment.  There is less evidence of this latter reaction nonhuman species, although it has been documented in our closest relatives, the apes. This reaction probably reflects an attempt to forestall partner dissatisfaction with obtained outcomes and its negative impact on future cooperation. Therefore, it is likely that the evolution of this response, combined with advanced abilities at inhibition and planning, allowed the development of a complete sense of fairness in humans, which functions not to provide equality for its own sake, but for the sake of continued success in cooperation.

The Evolution of Coordination
     (協調行為的演化): 10/19 () 2:30-4pm at NTU Psychology (心理系北館視聽教室N100)  

Humans routinely confront situations that require coordination between individuals, from mundane activities such as planning where to go for dinner to incredibly complicated activities, such as international agreements. How did this ability arise, and what prevents success in those situations in which it breaks down? To understand how this capability has evolved, my lab uses the methodology of experimental economics to address these questions in a cross-species fashion.  Experimental economics is an ideal mechanism for this approach, as it is a well-developed methodology for distilling complex decision-making in to a series of simple decision choices, allowing these decisions to be compared across species and contexts. We have used this approach to investigate coordination and anti-coordination in New World monkeys, Old World monkeys, and great apes, including humans, using identical methodologies.  We find that there are remarkable continuities of outcome across the primates, including humans; all species are able to coordinate and, to our surprise, in at least some circumstances, all species were able to find the Nash Equilibrium in an anti-coordination game. On the other hand, there are also differences in outcomes across the primates, and studies using simulated opponents indicate that even when the same outcome is reached, there are important differences in the mechanisms each species uses to reach these outcomes.  I consider both the similarities and differences and what these can tell us about the evolution of coordination across the primates.


2014/7/2-4 Symposium on Neuroscience and Behavioral Economics


This is a three day symposium featuring Philippe Tobler, Charles Sprenger and Tian-Ming Yang and four local speakers. 

The conference schedule is here.  Below is the invitation message in Chinese:



今年,在科技部人文社會科學中心的經費支持下,我們舉辦「神經科學與行為經濟學」學術研討會,為期三天。研討會邀請國內外神經科學、行為或實驗經濟學等領域之專家,分享當下神經科學與經濟學跨領域整合之成果與未來發展趨勢。  探討議題包含:

1. 經濟理論與大腦:經濟理論的組成元素 (如獎賞大小、機率、風險等)在神經生理上的證據
2. 違背理性選擇的大腦:情境式價值評估 (context-dependent valuation) 和誘餌效應 (decoy effect) 的神經計算機制
3. 價值評估 (valuation) 的神經系統:不同種類下之經濟選擇的運算機制
4. 決策成形 (decision formation) 的動態歷程:序列假設檢驗 (sequential hypothesis testing) 的神經計算機制
5. 決策與老化 (decision making and aging):決策在老年族群的個別差異
6. 金錢買得到的正義:人們願意犧牲多少金錢來換取窮人「立足點」的平等 (例如:教育機會)?重新解讀羅斯「正義論」的「差異原則(difference principle; maximin rule)」
7. 跨期選擇 (intertemporal choice) 下的當下偏誤 (present bias):奬賞來源如何影響跨期選擇之動態不一致性 (dynamic inconsistency) 在此誠摯邀請您一同參與這場跨領域的交流!

2013/12/16-20: Ian Krajbich (Ohio State Univ)

A Common Mechanism Underlying Value-based Decision Making
     (各種用價來做的決策背後的共通機制): 12/19 () 10:10-11:30am at Yang-Ming University (陽明大學活動中心第三會議室)

People make numerous decisions every day including perceptual decisions like walking through a crowd, decisions over primary rewards like what to eat, and social decisions that require balancing own and others’ benefits. The unifying principles behind choices in various domains are, however, still not well understood. Mathematical models that describe choice behavior in specific contexts have provided important insights into the computations that may underlie decision making in the brain. However, a critical and largely unanswered question is whether these models generalize from one choice context to another. Here I show that a model adapted from the perceptual decision-making domain and estimated on choices over food rewards accurately predicts choices and reaction times in three independent sets of subjects making social decisions. The robustness of the model across domains provides strong evidence for a common decision-making process in perceptual, primary reward, and social decision making. I also provide evidence that visual attention is a critical variable in this process.

Benefits of Neuroeconomic Modeling: New Policy Interventions and Predictors of Preference
    (神經經濟理論的價值:政策建議與偏好預測): 12/19 () 1:45-3:15pm at NTU Economics (社科院第2教室)  

From its inception, neuroeconomics has promised to use knowledge from neuroscience and psychology to improve models of economic decision making. Here we deliver on this promise by introducing a biologically-plausible (drift-diffusion) model of decision making that is able to predict behavior, with fixed parameters, in random groups of individuals across very different tasks. The model also goes beyond the traditional economic approach because it is able to predict not only choices but reaction times as well. But why should economists care about modeling reaction times? For one, as predicted by the model, we consistently observe that people spend too much time on irrelevant choices for which they are nearly indifferent. In a world of time constraints, time spent on unimportant decisions represents an opportunity cost, namely time not spent on more important decisions. To help subjects overcome this inefficient allocation of time, we designed an intervention that puts a time limit on subjects’ choices. This simple intervention substantially improved subjects’ welfare in a time-constrained choice experiment. Second, the precise relationship between reaction times and choice probabilities implies that reaction times can be used to predict indifference points and the strength of preferences. We demonstrate this ability using data from an Ultimatum Game experiment. Overall, we show that better understanding the process by which people make decisions can explain the basis for stochastic choice behavior and help us do both normative and positive economics.

2013/ 2 /20-22: William Newsome (Stanford)

Value, Choices and the Brain: Toward a Neurobiology of Decision-Making
價值、選擇與大腦:建構決策的神經生理學): 2/20 () 2:30-4pm at NTU Psychology (心理系北館視聽教室-N100)

Value, Choices and the Brain: Toward a Neurobiology of Decision-Making
價值、選擇與大腦:建構決策的神經生理學): 2/21 () 3:30-5pm at Yang-Ming University (陽明大學活動中心第三會議室)

Decision-making is a critical cognitive capacity that links perception to action. Sensory physiologists emphasize the effects of sensory inputs on our decisions, but psychologists and economists have long known that decisions are also strongly influenced by prior experience concerning the “value” of alternative choices, expressed in terms of likely positive or aversive consequences. Thus, brain circuitry that mediates decision-making should reflect both sensory and value influences. We have recently been able to demonstrate both effects in neurophysiological recordings from the frontal and parietal lobes of awake, behaving animals. I will review these empirical data and consider their implications for understanding how the brain makes decisions.

Rethinking Gating: Selective Integration of Sensory Signals Through Network Dynamics
再思守門者:透過網路動態選擇性加入感知訊號): 2/22 () 2-3:30pm at Yang-Ming University (陽明大學圖資大樓839教室)

A hallmark of decision-making in primates is contextual sensitivity: a given stimulus can lead to different decisions depending on the context in which it is presented. This kind of flexible decision-making depends critically upon gating and integration of context-appropriate information sources within the brain. We have analyzed neural mechanisms underlying gating and integration in animals trained to perform a context-sensitive decision task. Surprisingly, both relevant and irrelevant sensory signals are present within frontal lobe circuits that form decisions, implying that gating occurs very late in the process. Dynamical systems analysis of the neural data, combined with a dynamical recurrent network model, suggests a novel mechanism in which gating and integration are combined in a single dynamical process.

2012/ 9 /19-25: Laurence T. Maloney (NYU)

Estimating and discounting the light field: perception of surface color in three-dimensional virtual scenes
估計與折算光場:人類如何感知3D虛擬實境的表面色彩): 9/19 () 2:20-4pm at NTU Psychology (心理系北館視聽教室-N100)

In everyday scenes, the intensity and chromaticity of the light absorbed by a matte surface depends on its location and orientation. I will first describe recent experiments intended to investigate surface color and lightness perception in 3D rendered scenes. We found that the visual system partially compensates for changes in illumination due to changes in location and orientation of test surfaces. We show that, in carrying out these experimental tasks, observers effectively represent the spatial distribution, chromaticities and relative intensities of light sources in the scene. I’ll describe additional experiments where we assess how the visual system estimates the distribution of light in scenes (the light field) and how it used this information in estimating surface colors.

Imperfectly optimal animals: Bayesian decision theory and the planning of action
人是最佳化不完全的動物:貝氏決策理論與計畫行動): 9/20 () 3:30-5pm at Yang-Ming University (陽明大學活動中心第一會議室)

The movement we plan is not always the movement we execute. Any discrepancy is the consequence of own intrinsic motor uncertainty. I will first describe a model of movement planning based on Bayesian decision theory that takes our own visual and motor uncertainty into account in selecting movement strategies and present experimental evidence suggesting that human movement planners deviate slightly but systematically from optimal in many tasks (Schüür et al, under review; Wu et al, 2009, 2011; Zhang et al, under review; Zhang & Maloney, 2012). While human performance is impressive in all of the tasks considered, it is not optimal, and deviations from optimality are potentially a valuable source of information concerning how humans represent and make use of information about uncertainty (Zhang & Maloney, 2012).

2012/ 7 /12: Brian Kuntson (Stanford)

Anticipatory Affect and the Neural Prediction of Choice
用預期心理的神經機制來預測人的選擇): 7
/12 () 2:00-3:30pm at Yang-Ming University (陽明大學圖資大樓839室)

Affect occurs not only in response to choice outcomes, but also can precede and influence choice. The spatial and temporal resolution of functional magnetic resonance imaging (FMRI) now allows investigators to visualize changes in neural activity seconds prior to choice. I will review efforts in our laboratory to use FMRI to visualize neural correlates of "anticipatory affect," and then to use that activity to predict upcoming choice in domains ranging from investing to shopping. While current findings suggest that neural activity related to anticipatory affect can be used to predict choice, future optimizations of design and analyses promise to improve these predictions.

Related Readings:
1. Knutson, B., Greer, S. M. (2008). Anticipatory affect: Neural correlates and consequences for choice. Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society B, 363, 3771-3786.
2. Knutson, B., Rick, S., Wimmer, G. E., Prelec, D., Loewenstein, G. (2007). Neural predictors of purchases. Neuron, 53, 147-157.

2012/ 6 /14-17: Joseph Kable (UPenn)

(I) Sustaining Delay of Gratification: Potential Cognitive and Neural Mechanisms
    (如何延遲滿足?可能的認知與神經機制): 6
/14 () 1:30-3:30pm at NTU Economics (社科院第28教室)

Persistence in the pursuit of long-run outcomes is an important dimension of self-control. Decision-makers often fail to persist: they initially choose a larger, later outcome, wait a period of time, and then abandon this initial choice in favor of a smaller, immediate reward that had always been available. Explanations for this kind of dynamic reversal usually assume that the timing of outcomes is known with certainty, but this is rarely the case in the real world. When outcome timing is uncertain, a rational decision-maker should continually update their estimate of the remaining delay. The value of continued persistence therefore hinges critically on the decision-maker's prior expectations regarding the temporal uncertainty. We first show that, with respect to several self-control dilemmas, decision-makers hold temporal expectations that would rationalize persistence failure at some point. In a series of behavioral experiments, we then demonstrate that people adapt their degree of persistence depending on the statistics of the environment, waiting longer for delayed rewards when persistence is profitable, and exhibiting a reduced willingness to wait when reversals are merited. Finally, we show that when individuals wait for delayed rewards, BOLD activity in medial prefrontal regions reflects a continually updated estimate of the delayed reward's value. This activity varies depending on the timing statistics of the environment, and predicts whether an individual will abandon the delayed outcome or continue to persist. These results demonstrate the critical role of temporal expectations in persistence, and suggest that shaping these expectations could encourage persistence when this is desired.

(II) When you keep changing your mind: Psychological and neural mechanisms of preference reversals
6/17 () 2:45-3:45pm at Yang-Ming University (陽明大學活動中心第會議室)

Systematic inconsistencies in people's decisions provide a central challenge to rational choice theories. A classic example is the "preference reversal phenomenon": for two gambles matched in expected value, people systematically choose the higher-probability option but provide a higher bid for the option that offers the greater amount to win. Here we use eye-tracking and functional brain imaging to help better understand the mechanism underlying such reversals. We find that the preference reversal phenomenon is accompanied by a shift in visual attention to different attributes, with people fixating probabilities more during choices and payoffs more during bids. We also find a corresponding change in the influence that different attributes have on neural signals linked to the computation and comparison of subjective values. These findings support a "contingent weighting" explanation of preference reversals, which locates the source of the reversal in a task-dependent change in the weight given different attributes in the valuation process.

2012/ 3 /13-15: Peter Bossaerts (Caltech) and Andrew Caplin (NYU)

(I) Imperfect Perception: An Integrated Approach to Theory and Measurement (Andrew Caplin)
3/13 () 3:30-5:30pm at Yang-Ming University (陽明大學活動中心第一會議室)

Psychologists and economists share an interest in how perceptual constraints impact choice behavior. The talk outlines a new approach to this subject in which theory and experiment are tightly integrated. The results to date provide a proof in principle that this new approach produces valid insights into the link between attentional effort and decision making mistakes. The potential for richer measurement to enhance our understanding of this linkage is stressed.

(II) The Human Brain Behind Financial Skill (Peter Bossaerts)
3/14 () 2:30-4:00pm at NTU Psychology (心理系北館視聽教室)

The talk explores the neurobiological foundations of human decision making under uncertainty. What is the role of emotions? How does the brain value uncertain prospects? How exactly do important neuromodulators such as dopamine and norepinephrine influence assessment of risky outcomes? Are social risks encoded differentially, or even separately? What algorithms does the brain use to learn risks through experience? Is problem complexity the right way to define the limits of human rationality? 

(III) Dialogues on Doing Research on Neuroeconomics: Values and Challenges (Both)
3/15 () 1:30-3:30pm at NTU Economics (社科院第28教室)

In this roundtable discussion, Dr. Caplin and Dr. Bossaerts will share with us their experience in doing research on neuroeconomics and in collaborating with neuroscientists. In particular, they will discuss, from the perspective of someone whose original training was in economics or finance, the value of meeting neuroscience and psychology and the challenges neuroeconomics as an interdisciplinary field faces. Researchers and students from all areas of research are welcome to attend. We especially encourage students with economics background to join us on this roundtable discussion.   

2011/12/15-16: Paul Glimcher (NYU)

(I) Foundations of Economic Analysis and the Neural Representation of Utility
12/15 () 1:30-3:30pm at NTU (社科院經大講堂)

Over the past decade there has been a significant debate about how economics and neuroscience will influence each other. In this presentation I will argue that a meaningful synthesis of these disciplines will emerge only when serious economic theory is used to guide neurobiological inquiry. If this occurs I argue that it will yield a new class of economic theories that make both economic and neurobiological predictions, both of which can be meaningfully tested. To that end I will describe an axiomatic analysis of the neural representation of utility shocks. Based on fMRI data I will argue for the existence of a utility-like representation in a specific brain area. I will then show that a set of neural measurements in this brain area can predict later choice data. Differences between economic utility and the cardinal object we refer to as "subjective value", and the implications of these findings for cardinal theories of utility will be discussed.

(II) The Neurobiology of Choice and the Evolving Standard Model
     (決策的神經生理學與「變動標準」模型): 12/16
() 1:30-3:30pm at Yang-Ming University (陽明大學活動中心第三會議室)

There is now broad agreement in the neurobiological community about the basic features of the neurobiological mechanism for human and animal decision making. I will review this emerging standard model and then present two specific studies. They will show how economic theory can inform neurobiological studies of brain mechanisms in a highly valuable way - modifying existing neurobiological theory. The second will show the reverse: neurobiological data that makes fundamentally novel predictions about inconsistent human choice behavior.

2011/10/18-20: Colin F. Camerer (Caltech)

(I) Cognitive Neuroscience and Game Theory
10/18 (二) 3:30-5:30pm at Yang-Ming University (陽明大學活動中心第三會議室)

Game theory provides a vocabulary of canonical strategic interactions that are important in human social, political, and economic life. However, game theory has not been applied in cognitive neuroscience very much. This talk will discuss some recent studies using fMRI and disorders (autism) to illustrate how game theory might be useful in cognitive neuroscience.

(II) When Game Theory Predicts Well and Badly: Evidence from Lab, Field, and Chimps
     (賽局理論的預測力:從實驗室內、田野現場與黑猩猩所得到的證據): 10/20
() 1:30-3:30pm at NTU (社科院經大講堂)

There is mixed evidence of how accurate game theoretic predictions are compared to human behavior. Cognitive hierarchy models can reconcile this evidence systematically, since they sometimes predict large deviations and sometimes predict small deviations. This will be illustrated with lab behavior, eyetracking, and field data from a Swedish lottery. An unusual domain in which game theory may work surprisingly well is when a particular species has evolved a special niche-dependent adaptation for certain types of fitness-enhancing games. This is addressed by comparing humans and chimps.

2011/ 5 /19-24: Russell Poldrack (UT Austin)

(I) Bridging Risky Decision Making and Decision Under Risk
5/19 () 1:30-3:30pm  at NTU (社科院經大講堂)

Neuroeconomics has provided substantial insights into the processes underlying economic concept of "decision under risk."  However, this work has largely failed to provide insights into "risky decision making", a lay concept with significant public health implications.  I will discuss the relation between these concepts, and outline how dynamic decision making tasks provide the potential to bridge the gap between these two concepts.

(II) Towards a Semantic Infrastructure for Cognitive Neuroscience: The Cognitive Atlas Project
     (認知神經科學圖譜): 5/24 () 3:30-5:30pm
at Yang-Ming University (陽明大學活動中心第三會議室)

We are drowning in results from neuroimaging studies, but starving for an understanding of how these results inform brain function.  In order to integrate across this wealth of research findings, I propose that we need a formal semantic infrastructure similar to those developed in other areas of bioscience such as genomics. I will first describe a set of informatics tools that mine literature and neuroimaging databases to characterize the relation between neural and mental function. I will then describe the Cognitive Atlas project (, which aims to develop a knowledge base for mental structure. Finally, I will outline a proof of concept showing how such a database could be used to extract the latent structure of brain processes that underlie mental function.

2011/ 6 / 24 - 7 / 4 : Tai-Wei Hu (MEDS, Northwestern) - Mini-course on Game Theory (at NTU)
    1.     (6/24, 2-5pm) Expected Utility Theory
2.     (6/27, 9am-12pm) Zero-sum Games
3.     (6/30, 9am-12pm) Nash Equilibrium
    4.     (7/ 1, 9am-12pm) Knowledge
5.     (7/ 4, 9am-12pm) Epistemic Logic
References: Nash (1951), Kuhn (1953), Hu (2010), Kaneko and Kline (2008), Hu and Kaneko (2011).


2009/5/25-26: Filip Vesely (UW-Milwaukee)

(I) Introduction to z-Tree (The Popular Experimental Software)
     (實驗軟體z-Tree簡介): 5/25 2:10-5pm at  Sinica (中研院經研所B110會議室)
Fischbacher (2007), z-Tree: Zurich toolbox for ready-made economic experiments, Experimental Economics, 10(2), 171-178.
        See also the z-Tree website, Tutorial and Reference Manual for Version 2, and the latest Version 3 Wiki.

(II) Voluntary Separation as a Discipline Device for Long-Term Cooperation: Theory and Experiment
     (自願隔離如何維持長期合作:理論與實驗): 5/26 9:10am-12pm at  Sinica (
            Vesely, Lei and Drewianka (2007), "Do Separation Laws Matter? An Experimental Study of Commitment," working paper.
        Eeckhout (2006), "Minorities and Endogenous Segregation," Review of Economic Studies, 73(1), 31-53.
        Fujiwara-Greve and Okuno-Fujiwara (2009), "Voluntarily Separable Repeated Prisoner's Dilemma," Review of Economic Studies, forthcoming.
        Rob and Yang (2009), "Long-Term Relationship as Safeguards," Economic Theory, forthcoming.

        ABSTRACT: We develop a game-theoretic model and an experiment to investigate the scope and patterns of cooperation in voluntary and thus potentially long-term bilateral partnerships. In our environment, agents must first play a prisoner’s dilemma game and then decide if they want to continue playing the game with the same partner for at least one more period or with a new counterpart. A separation can be unilaterally determined by one of the two partners and as such long term partnerships must be formed endogenously by mutual agreement. We observe decisions consistent with simple strategies as of Rob and Yang (2009) and Fujiwara-Greve and Okuno-Fujiwara (2009), as well as more complex strategies involving sequences in which subjects alternate periods of cooperation and defection. We find that because the conditional cooperation payoff-dominates the unconditional defection, the threat of unilateral separation serves as a discipline device for cooperation in the long-term.

2009/5/8: Vivian Lei (UW-Milwaukee)

Experiments (Laboratory and Field) on Growth and Development 
     (經濟成長與經濟發展的實驗): 5/8 12:35-3:25pm at NTU (社科院經大講堂)
        Abbink, Irlenbusch, and Renner (2006), "Group Size and Social Ties in Microfinance Institutions," Economic Inquiry, 44(4), 614-628.
        Cassar, Crowley, and Wydick (2007), "The Effect of Social Capital on Group Loan Repayment: Evidence from Field Experiments," Economic Journal, 117, F85-F106.
        Gina and Karlan (2008), "Peer Monitoring and Enforcement: Long Term Evidence from Microcredit Lending Groups With and Without Group Liability," working paper.
        Lei and Noussair (2007), "Equilibrium Selection in an Experimental Macroeconomy," Southern Economic Journal, 74(2), 448-482.
        Lei, Tucker, and Vesely (2007), "Foreign Aid and Weakest-Link International Public Goods: An Experimental Study," European Economic Review, April 2007, 51(3), 599-623.
        Lei and Noussair (2002), "An Experimental Test of an Optimal Growth Model," American Economic Review, 92(3), 549-570.

2009/3/2-3: Shachar Kariv (UC-Berkeley), Flyer

(I) Substantive and procedural rationality in decisions under uncertainty (slides)
     (從風險決策看本質理性與過程理性): 3/2 2-5pm at NTU (社科院經大講堂)
        Choi, Fisman, Gale and Kariv (2007), Revealing Preferences Graphically: An Old Method Gets a New Tool Kit, American Economic Review, Papers & Proceedings,  97(2), 153-158.
        Choi, Fisman, Gale and Kariv (2007), Consistency and Heterogeneity of Individual Behavior under Uncertainty, American Economic Review, 97(5), 1921-1938.
        Ahn, Choi, Gale, and Kariv (2007), Estimating Ambiguity Aversion in a Portfolio Choice Experiment.
        Choi, Fisman, Gale and Kariv (2006), Substantive and Procedural Rationality in Decisions under Uncertainty.

(II) Confronting theory with data and vice versa: experimental studies of social learning (slides)
       (用資料檢驗理論:社會學習實驗): 3/3 9-12pm at  Sinica (中研院經研所B110會議室)
    Gale and Kariv (2003), Bayesian Learning in Social Networks, Games and Economic Behavior, 45(2), 329-346.
    Çelen and Kariv (2004), Observational Learning Under Imperfect Information, Games and Economic Behavior, 47(1), 72-86.
    Çelen and Kariv (2004), Distinguishing Informational Cascades from Herd Behavior in the Laboratory, American Economic Review, 94(3), 484-497.
    Çelen and Kariv (2005), An Experimental Test of Observational Learning under Imperfect Information, Economic Theory, 26(3), 677-699.

Academic Seminar - Piercing the veil of ignorance (穿透無知之幕) 3/3 2:30-4pm at Sinica (中研院經研所B110會議室) (slides)

2009/2/23-27: Yan Chen (Michigan), Flyer

(I) Social identity in economics (社會認同): 2/23 9-12pm at NTU (社科院經大講堂) (slides)
         Chen and Li (2008), Group Identity and Social Preferences, American Economic Review, forthcoming.
         Chen and Chen (2008), The Potential of Social Identity for Equilibrium Selection.

(II) Online field experiments (網路現地實驗): 2/27 12-3pm at NTU (社科院經大講堂) (slides)
        Chen, Harper, Konstan and Li (2008), Social Comparisons and Contributions to Online Communities: A Field Experiment on MovieLens.
        Chen, Ho and Kim (2008), Knowledge Market Design: A Field Experiment on Google Answers.

Academic Seminar - Behavioral Spillovers in Multiple Games 2/24 10:30-12pm at Sinica (中研院經研所B110會議室)

2008/10/6-7: Vincent Crawford (Level-k Thinking): Flyer1, Flyer2 [Lecture Notes]

Time: Every other Monday 12:15-1:15pm (presentation) & 1:15-2:15pm (free discussion)

Place: 台大社會科學院行政大樓第二會議室 (臺北市徐州路21號行政大樓二樓第二會議室)

Contact:  Joseph Tao-yi Wang (josephw "at"

                Cheng-Chen Yang (ccyang "at"

                Chen-Ying Huang (chenying "at"

Format: One hour presentation on papers in behavioral and experimental economics, followed by free discussion. 

Lunch will be provided to those who sign up in advance by emailing Joseph Tao-yi Wang.



[12/17]  Organization Meeting and Introduction
                Paper: Camerer (2003), Behavioral Game Theory, Ch. 1
                Presenter: Joseph Tao-yi Wang

[12/31] Dominance-Solvable Games
                Paper: Camerer (2003), Behavioral Game Theory, Ch. 5.
                Presenter: Cheng-Chen Yang

[ 1 /14] Mixed Strategy Equilibrium
                Paper: Camerer (2003), Behavioral Game Theory, Ch. 3.
                Presenter: Chen-Ying Huang

[ 1 /28] Learning
                Paper: Camerer (2003), Behavior Game Theory, Ch. 6.
                Presenter: Joseph Tao-yi Wang

[ 2 /18] Guest Lecture (Special Location: 台大社會科學院行政大樓第會議室 )
                Paper: Wise Crowds or Wise Minorities (with C. Brunner)
                Presenter: Jacob K. Goeree (Div. of Humanities and Social Sciences, Caltech)

[ 2 /25] Guest Lecture
                Paper: Visual Pattern Analysis in the Ventral Stream of the Human Occipital Cortex
                Presenter: C. C. Chen (Dep. of Psychology, NTU)

[ 3 /17] Postponed (You are encouraged to go to Reinhard Selten's lecture at NCCU.)


[ 3 /24] Guest Lecture
                Paper: An Experimental Study of Decision-Making under Uncertainty – Individual, Group and Panel Data (Slides)
                Presenter: Chinn-Ping Fan (Dep. of Economics, Soochow Univ., joint with Mei-Hua Tsai and Bih-Shiow Chen)

[ 3 /31] Guest Lecture
                Paper: How to make machine learn and learn effectively?
                Presenter: Fu Chang (Institute of Information Science, Academia Sinica)

[ 4 / 9 ] Guest Lecture
                Paper: Experiments in Open Contents
                Presenter: Benjamin Chiao (School of Information, University of Michigan)

[ 4 /14 ] Special Guest Lecture (Special Place: 社法25)
                Paper: Systemic Rationality (12:00-1:45)
                Paper: An exploratory analysis of composite choices: Weighing rationality over irrationality (2:00-3:30)
                Presenter: Bijou Yang Lester (Drexel University)

[ 5 / 5] Experimental Design and Data Analysis
                Presenter: Joseph Tao-yi Wang

[ 5 /19] Social Preferences
                Paper: Camerer (2003), Behavioral Game Theory, Ch. 2.
                Presenter: Cheng-Chen Yang

[ 6 / 2 ] Student Presentation
                Paper: A Window of Cognition: Eyetracking the Decision-Making Process in Graphical Beauty Contest Games
                Presenter: Chun-Ting Chen (NTU)


NOTE: This project is sponsored and supported by the National Science Council and the Public Economics Center of NTU to promote research in behavioral and experimental economics.

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Last modified on 十月 06, 2016