Behavioral and Experimental Economics Discussion Group
(行為與實驗經濟學討論會)
Books for Background Reading:
1.
Neuroeconomics (2008), edited by Paul Glimcher,
Colin Camerer, Ernst Fehr and
Russell Poldrack, three of which have visited Taiwan during
our colloquium series. (NTU library has
online book
chapters just like online journal articles.)
2.
Handbook of Experimental Results (2008), edited by Charles Plott and Vernon
Smith. (NTU library has
online book
chapters just like online journal articles.)
3.
Behavioral Game Theory (2003), by Colin Camerer.
(Princeton UP has
chapter 1 online.) See also Colin's
Pinkel
lecture on this.
4.
Handbook of Experimental Economics, Vol.1 (1995) and Vol.2 (forthcoming),
edited by John Kagel and Alvin Roth. (Summary of Vol. 1 and Chapters of
Vol.2 are on
Al
Roth's website.)
Estimating and discounting the light field: perception of
surface color in three-dimensional virtual scenes
(估計與折算光場：人類如何感知3D虛擬實境的表面色彩):
9/19 (三)
2:20-4pm
at NTU Psychology (心理系北館視聽教室-N100)
ABSTRACT:
In everyday scenes, the
intensity and chromaticity of
the light absorbed by a matte
surface depends on its location
and orientation. I will first
describe recent experiments
intended to investigate surface
color and lightness perception
in 3D rendered scenes. We found
that the visual system partially
compensates for changes in
illumination due to changes in
location and orientation of test
surfaces. We show that, in
carrying out these experimental
tasks, observers effectively
represent the spatial
distribution, chromaticities and
relative intensities of light
sources in the scene. I’ll
describe additional experiments
where we assess how the visual
system estimates the
distribution of light in scenes
(the light field) and how it
used this information in
estimating surface colors.
Imperfectly optimal animals: Bayesian decision theory and the planning of
action
(人是最佳化不完全的動物：貝氏決策理論與計畫行動):
9/20 (四)
3:30-5pm
at Yang-Ming University (陽明大學活動中心第一會議室)
ABSTRACT:
The movement we plan is
not always the movement we
execute. Any discrepancy is the
consequence of own intrinsic
motor uncertainty. I will first
describe a model of movement
planning based on Bayesian
decision theory that takes our
own visual and motor uncertainty
into account in selecting
movement strategies and present
experimental evidence suggesting
that human movement planners
deviate slightly but
systematically from optimal in
many tasks (Schüür et al, under
review; Wu et al, 2009, 2011;
Zhang et al, under review; Zhang
& Maloney, 2012). While human
performance is impressive in all
of the tasks considered, it is
not optimal, and deviations from
optimality are potentially a
valuable source of information
concerning how humans represent
and make use of information
about uncertainty (Zhang &
Maloney, 2012).
Anticipatory Affect and the Neural
Prediction of Choice
(用預期心理的神經機制來預測人的選擇):
7/12 (四)
2:00-3:30pm
at Yang-Ming University (陽明大學圖資大樓839室)
ABSTRACT:
Affect occurs not only in
response to choice outcomes, but
also can precede and influence
choice. The spatial and temporal
resolution of functional
magnetic resonance imaging
(FMRI) now allows investigators
to visualize changes in neural
activity seconds prior to
choice. I will review efforts in
our laboratory to use FMRI to
visualize neural correlates of
"anticipatory affect," and then
to use that activity to predict
upcoming choice in domains
ranging from investing to
shopping. While current findings
suggest that neural activity
related to anticipatory affect
can be used to predict choice,
future optimizations of design
and analyses promise to improve
these predictions.
Related Readings:
1. Knutson, B., Greer, S. M. (2008).
Anticipatory affect: Neural correlates and consequences for choice. Philosophical
Transactions of the Royal Society B, 363, 3771-3786.
2. Knutson, B., Rick, S., Wimmer, G. E., Prelec, D., Loewenstein, G. (2007).
Neural
predictors of purchases. Neuron, 53, 147-157.
(I)
Sustaining Delay of Gratification: Potential
Cognitive and Neural Mechanisms
(如何延遲滿足？可能的認知與神經機制): 6/14 (四)
1:30-3:30pm
at NTU Economics (社科院第28教室)
ABSTRACT:
Persistence in the pursuit of
long-run outcomes is an
important dimension of
self-control. Decision-makers
often fail to persist: they
initially choose a larger, later
outcome, wait a period of time,
and then abandon this initial
choice in favor of a smaller,
immediate reward that had always
been available. Explanations for
this kind of dynamic reversal
usually assume that the timing
of outcomes is known with
certainty, but this is rarely
the case in the real world. When
outcome timing is uncertain, a
rational decision-maker should
continually update their
estimate of the remaining delay.
The value of continued
persistence therefore hinges
critically on the
decision-maker's prior
expectations regarding the
temporal uncertainty. We first
show that, with respect to
several self-control dilemmas,
decision-makers hold temporal
expectations that would
rationalize persistence failure
at some point. In a series of
behavioral experiments, we then
demonstrate that people adapt
their degree of persistence
depending on the statistics of
the environment, waiting longer
for delayed rewards when
persistence is profitable, and
exhibiting a reduced willingness
to wait when reversals are
merited. Finally, we show that
when individuals wait for
delayed rewards, BOLD activity
in medial prefrontal regions
reflects a continually updated
estimate of the delayed reward's
value. This activity varies
depending on the timing
statistics of the environment,
and predicts whether an
individual will abandon the
delayed outcome or continue to
persist. These results
demonstrate the critical role of
temporal expectations in
persistence, and suggest that
shaping these expectations could
encourage persistence when this
is desired.
(II)
When you keep changing your mind:
Psychological and neural mechanisms of preference reversals
(當你一直改變主意：偏好逆轉的心裡與神經機制):
6/17 (日) 2:45-3:45pm
at Yang-Ming University (陽明大學活動中心第三會議室)
ABSTRACT:
Systematic
inconsistencies
in people's
decisions
provide a
central
challenge to
rational choice
theories. A
classic example
is the
"preference
reversal
phenomenon": for
two gambles
matched in
expected value,
people
systematically
choose the
higher-probability
option but
provide a higher
bid for the
option that
offers the
greater amount
to win. Here we
use eye-tracking
and functional
brain imaging to
help better
understand the
mechanism
underlying such
reversals. We
find that the
preference
reversal
phenomenon is
accompanied by a
shift in visual
attention to
different
attributes, with
people fixating
probabilities
more during
choices and
payoffs more
during bids. We
also find a
corresponding
change in the
influence that
different
attributes have
on neural
signals linked
to the
computation and
comparison of
subjective
values. These
findings support
a "contingent
weighting"
explanation of
preference
reversals, which
locates the
source of the
reversal in a
task-dependent
change in the
weight given
different
attributes in
the valuation
process.
(I)
Imperfect Perception: An Integrated Approach
to Theory and Measurement (Andrew Caplin)
(不完全知覺：整合理論與測量的蹊徑):
3/13 (二) 3:30-5:30pm at Yang-Ming
University (陽明大學活動中心第一會議室)
ABSTRACT:
Psychologists and economists
share an interest in how
perceptual constraints impact
choice behavior. The talk
outlines a new approach to this
subject in which theory and
experiment are tightly
integrated. The results to date
provide a proof in principle
that this new approach produces
valid insights into the link
between attentional effort and
decision making mistakes. The
potential for richer measurement
to enhance our understanding of
this linkage is stressed.
(II)
The Human Brain Behind Financial Skill (Peter
Bossaerts)
(理財的大腦):
3/14 (三) 2:30-4:00pm
at NTU Psychology (心理系北館視聽教室)
ABSTRACT:
The talk
explores the
neurobiological
foundations of
human decision
making under
uncertainty.
What is the role
of emotions? How
does the brain
value uncertain
prospects? How
exactly do
important
neuromodulators
such as dopamine
and
norepinephrine
influence
assessment of
risky outcomes?
Are social risks
encoded
differentially,
or even
separately? What
algorithms does
the brain use to
learn risks
through
experience? Is
problem
complexity the
right way to
define the
limits of human
rationality?
(III)
Dialogues on Doing Research on Neuroeconomics: Values and
Challenges (Both)
(神經經濟學研究經驗談：展望與挑戰):
3/15 (四) 1:30-3:30pm
at NTU Economics (社科院第28教室)
DESCRIPTION:
In this roundtable discussion,
Dr. Caplin and Dr. Bossaerts
will share with us their
experience in doing research on
neuroeconomics and in
collaborating with
neuroscientists. In particular,
they will discuss, from the
perspective of someone whose
original training was in
economics or finance, the value
of meeting neuroscience and
psychology and the challenges
neuroeconomics as an
interdisciplinary field faces.
Researchers and students from
all areas of research are
welcome to attend. We especially
encourage students with
economics background to join us
on this roundtable discussion.
(I) Foundations of Economic
Analysis and the Neural Representation of Utility
(經濟分析之基礎與效用的神經表現):
12/15 (四) 1:30-3:30pm
at NTU (社科院經大講堂)
ABSTRACT:
Over the past decade there has
been a significant debate about
how economics and neuroscience
will influence each other. In
this presentation I will argue
that a meaningful synthesis of
these disciplines will emerge
only when serious economic
theory is used to guide
neurobiological inquiry. If this
occurs I argue that it will
yield a new class of economic
theories that make both economic
and neurobiological predictions,
both of which can be
meaningfully tested. To that end
I will describe an axiomatic
analysis of the neural
representation of utility
shocks. Based on fMRI data I
will argue for the existence of
a utility-like representation in
a specific brain area. I will
then show that a set of neural
measurements in this brain area
can predict later choice data.
Differences between economic
utility and the cardinal object
we refer to as "subjective
value", and the implications of
these findings for cardinal
theories of utility will be
discussed.
(II) The Neurobiology of Choice and the Evolving Standard
Model
(決策的神經生理學與「變動標準」模型):
12/16(五)
1:30-3:30pm
at Yang-Ming
University (陽明大學活動中心第三會議室)
ABSTRACT:
There is
now broad agreement in the neurobiological community about the basic features of
the neurobiological mechanism for human and animal decision making. I will
review this emerging standard model and then present two specific studies. They
will show how economic theory can inform neurobiological studies of brain
mechanisms in a highly valuable way - modifying existing neurobiological theory.
The second will show the reverse: neurobiological data that makes fundamentally
novel predictions about inconsistent human choice behavior.
(I)
Cognitive Neuroscience and Game Theory
(認知神經科學與賽局理論):
10/18 (二) 3:30-5:30pm at Yang-Ming
University (陽明大學活動中心第三會議室)
ABSTRACT:
Game theory provides a
vocabulary of canonical
strategic interactions that are
important in human social,
political, and economic life.
However, game theory has not
been applied in cognitive
neuroscience very much. This
talk will discuss some recent
studies using fMRI and disorders
(autism) to illustrate how game
theory might be useful in
cognitive neuroscience.
(II) When Game Theory Predicts Well and Badly: Evidence
from Lab, Field, and Chimps
(賽局理論的預測力：從實驗室內、田野現場與黑猩猩所得到的證據):
10/20(四) 1:30-3:30pm at NTU (社科院經大講堂)
ABSTRACT:
There is mixed
evidence of how
accurate game
theoretic
predictions are
compared to
human behavior.
Cognitive
hierarchy models
can reconcile
this evidence
systematically,
since they
sometimes
predict large
deviations and
sometimes
predict small
deviations. This
will be
illustrated with
lab behavior,
eyetracking, and
field data from
a Swedish
lottery. An
unusual domain
in which game
theory may work
surprisingly
well is when a
particular
species has
evolved a
special
niche-dependent
adaptation for
certain types of
fitness-enhancing
games. This is
addressed by
comparing humans
and chimps.
(I)
Bridging Risky Decision Making and Decision Under Risk
(「有風險的決策」與「風險下的決策」):
5/19 (四)
1:30-3:30pm
at NTU (社科院經大講堂)
ABSTRACT:
Neuroeconomics has provided
substantial insights into the
processes underlying economic
concept of "decision under
risk." However, this work has
largely failed to provide
insights into "risky decision
making", a lay concept with
significant public health
implications. I will discuss
the relation between these
concepts, and outline how
dynamic decision making tasks
provide the potential to bridge
the gap between these two
concepts.
(II) Towards a Semantic Infrastructure for Cognitive
Neuroscience: The Cognitive Atlas Project
(認知神經科學圖譜):
5/24 (二)
3:30-5:30pm
at Yang-Ming
University (陽明大學活動中心第三會議室)
ABSTRACT:
We are drowning in results from neuroimaging studies, but starving for an
understanding of how these results inform brain function. In order to integrate
across this wealth of research findings, I propose that we need a formal
semantic infrastructure similar to those developed in other areas of bioscience
such as genomics. I will first describe a set of informatics tools that mine
literature and neuroimaging databases to characterize the relation between
neural and mental function. I will then describe the Cognitive Atlas project (www.cognitiveatlas.org),
which aims to develop a knowledge base for mental structure. Finally, I will
outline a proof of concept showing how such a database could be used to extract
the latent structure of brain processes that underlie mental function.
2011/
6 / 24 - 7 / 4
: Tai-Wei Hu (MEDS, Northwestern) - Mini-course on Game Theory (at NTU)
課程介紹：本課程分為五堂課，第一堂課回顧並介紹賽局理論的背景知識，第二堂課開始，從混和策略和奈許均衡的解讀出發，討論決策理論與賽局理論目前最新的研究發展和未來方向，希望能啟發同學對此一研究方向的興趣。
1.
(6/24, 2-5pm)
Expected Utility Theory
2.
(6/27, 9am-12pm)
Zero-sum Games
3.
(6/30, 9am-12pm)
Nash Equilibrium
4.
(7/ 1, 9am-12pm)
Knowledge
5.
(7/ 4, 9am-12pm)
Epistemic Logic
References:
Nash (1951), Kuhn (1953), Hu (2010), Kaneko and Kline (2008), Hu and Kaneko
(2011).
2008-09 SPECIAL GUEST SPEAKER SERIES:
2009/5/25-26:
Filip Vesely (UW-Milwaukee)
(II) Voluntary Separation as a Discipline Device for
Long-Term Cooperation: Theory and Experiment
(自願隔離如何維持長期合作：理論與實驗): 5/26
9:10am-12pm at Sinica (中研院經研所B110會議室)
Vesely,
Lei and Drewianka (2007), "Do
Separation Laws Matter? An Experimental Study of Commitment," working paper.
Eeckhout (2006), "Minorities
and Endogenous Segregation," Review of Economic Studies, 73(1), 31-53.
Fujiwara-Greve and Okuno-Fujiwara
(2009), "Voluntarily
Separable Repeated Prisoner's Dilemma," Review of Economic Studies,
forthcoming.
Rob and Yang (2009), "Long-Term
Relationship as Safeguards," Economic Theory, forthcoming.
ABSTRACT: We develop a game-theoretic model and an
experiment to investigate the scope and patterns of cooperation in voluntary and
thus potentially long-term bilateral partnerships. In our environment, agents
must first play a prisoner’s dilemma game and then decide if they want to
continue playing the game with the same partner for at least one more period or
with a new counterpart. A separation can be unilaterally determined by one of
the two partners and as such long term partnerships must be formed endogenously
by mutual agreement. We observe decisions consistent with simple strategies as
of Rob and Yang (2009) and Fujiwara-Greve and Okuno-Fujiwara (2009), as well as
more complex strategies involving sequences in which subjects alternate periods
of cooperation and defection. We find that because the conditional cooperation
payoff-dominates the unconditional defection, the threat of unilateral
separation serves as a discipline device for cooperation in the long-term.
2009/5/8:
Vivian Lei (UW-Milwaukee)
2009/2/23-27:
Yan Chen (Michigan), Flyer
(I) Social identity in
economics (社會認同): 2/23 9-12pm at NTU (社科院經大講堂)
(slides)
Chen and Li
(2008),
Group Identity and Social Preferences, American Economic Review,
forthcoming.
(SOM)
Chen and Chen (2008), The
Potential of Social Identity for Equilibrium Selection.
Time: Every other Monday 12:15-1:15pm
(presentation) & 1:15-2:15pm (free discussion)
Place: 台大社會科學院行政大樓第二會議室
(臺北市徐州路21號行政大樓二樓第二會議室)
Contact: Joseph Tao-yi
Wang (josephw "at" ntu.edu.tw)
Cheng-Chen Yang (ccyang "at" econ.sinica.edu.tw)
Chen-Ying Huang (chenying "at" ntu.edu.tw)
Format: One hour
presentation on papers in behavioral and experimental economics, followed by free discussion.
Lunch will be provided to
those who sign up in advance by emailing Joseph Tao-yi Wang.
Topics:
[12/17] Organization Meeting and
Introduction
Paper: Camerer (2003), Behavioral Game Theory, Ch. 1
Presenter: Joseph Tao-yi Wang
[12/31] Dominance-Solvable Games
Paper: Camerer (2003), Behavioral Game Theory,
Ch. 5.
Presenter: Cheng-Chen Yang
[ 1 /14] Mixed Strategy Equilibrium
Paper: Camerer (2003), Behavioral Game Theory,
Ch. 3.
Presenter: Chen-Ying Huang
[ 1 /28] Learning
Paper: Camerer (2003), Behavior Game Theory, Ch.
6.
Presenter: Joseph Tao-yi Wang
[ 2 /18] Guest Lecture (Special Location: 台大社會科學院行政大樓第一會議室
)
Paper:
Wise Crowds or Wise Minorities (with C.
Brunner)
Presenter: Jacob K. Goeree (Div. of Humanities and Social Sciences, Caltech)
[ 2 /25] Guest Lecture
Paper: Visual Pattern Analysis in the Ventral
Stream of the Human Occipital Cortex
Presenter: C. C. Chen (Dep. of Psychology, NTU)
[ 3 /31] Guest Lecture
Paper: How to make machine learn and learn
effectively?
Presenter: Fu Chang (Institute of Information Science, Academia Sinica)
[ 4 / 9 ] Guest Lecture
Paper:
Experiments in Open Contents
Presenter: Benjamin Chiao (School of Information, University of Michigan)
[ 4 /14 ] Special Guest Lecture (Special Place:
社法25)
Paper: Systemic Rationality (12:00-1:45)
Paper:
An exploratory analysis of composite choices: Weighing rationality over
irrationality (2:00-3:30)
Presenter: Bijou
Yang Lester (Drexel University)
[ 5 /19] Social Preferences
Paper: Camerer (2003), Behavioral Game Theory,
Ch. 2.
Presenter: Cheng-Chen Yang
[ 6 / 2 ] Student Presentation
Paper:
A Window of Cognition: Eyetracking the Decision-Making Process in Graphical
Beauty Contest Games
Presenter: Chun-Ting Chen (NTU)
NOTE:
This project is sponsored and supported by the National Science Council and the Public Economics Center of NTU
to promote research in
behavioral and experimental economics.
Last
modified on
九月 24, 2012