Experimental Economics (實驗經濟學)

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NTU (Spring 2013)

Time: Friday, 9:00-12:10pm, at 社科2   

Office Hour: Friday 12:10-1pm (after class) or by Email appointment

Course Syllabus



    1. Kagel and Roth (1995, 2012), Handbook of Experimental Economics, Vol.1, and selected Vol.2 chapters, Princeton UP.
    2. Cassar and Friedman (2004), Economics Lab: An Intensive Course in Experimental Economics, Routledge (EL)
    3. Holt (2007),
Markets, Games and Strategic Behavior, [
雙葉代理] (undergraduate textbook)
 Riley (2012), Essential Microeconomics, Cambridge University Press. (EM)

Class Topics:

 1. [ 2 /22] Experimental Economics and Behavioral Game Theory (BGT, Ch.1, Wang notes) [Intro1]
               Experiment 1: The Pit Market
               Experiment 2: Ultimatum Game

 2. [ 3 / 1 ] Basic Principles of Experimental Design (BGT, A1.2) [Intro2]
               Experiment 3: p-Beauty Contest

               關於 presentation 的一些想法
(aka "How to Prepare a 20-minute Presentation" by Wei-jen Hsu)
outube: Life After Death by PowerPoint (with Chinese caption); 2010 updated version 
outube: Principles of economics, translated  (Transcription)  
                    10 most common presentation mistakes
                    Graphic Representation of Data: 1812
(originally by Minard)

 3. [ 3 / 8 ] Risk and Time Preferences [old slides] [Intro3]
Experiment 4: Decision under Uncertainty (A), (B), (C)

               Student Presentation: 林政澤
                            Andreoni and Sprenger (2012a), Estimating Time Preferences from Convex Budgets, American Economic Review, 102(7), 3333-3356.
                   Andreoni and Sprenger (2012b), Risk Preferences Are Not Time Preferences, American Economic Review, 102(7), 3357-3376.

               Further Reading:  
                      Shadow Prices (EM 1.2) and Envelope Theorem (EM 1.3) [Theory1]
    Theory of Risky Choice (EM 7.1) and Aversion to Risk (EM 7.2) [Theory2]

 4. [ 3 /15] Mixed Strategy Equilibrium and Quantal Response Equilibrium [old slides] (BGT, Ch.3, Ostling et al., 2011) [Strategic1]
Experiment 5:
LUPI game

Book Chapter 1 Presentation: TBA
               Student Presentation: Ralf Counen
    (Review) Goeree, Holt and Palfrey (2012), “Quantal Response Equilibrium,” New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics.

               Further Reading:
               Strategic Equilibrium (EM 9.1) [Theory3]

 5. [ 3 /22] Level-k Thinking and Dominant Solvable Games [old slides] (BGT, Ch.5 and Crawford et al., JEL 2013) [Strategic2]
               Experiment 6: Hide and Seek Game

               Book Chapter 2 Presentation: 陳嘉瑋、陳正庭
               Student Presentation: 林彥竹、吳奎慶
    Ho and Su (2013), A Dynamic Level-k Model in Sequential Games, Management Science, forthcoming.

               Further Reading:

               Games with History (EM 9.2) [Theory4]

 6. [ 3 /29] Learning [old slides](BGT, Ch.6; new Handbook chapter) [Strategic3]

               Book Chapter 2B Presentation: 劉郁辰、吳宗翰、陳端駿
               Student Presentation: 葉明仁、李穆先、陳乃宣
                   Chen, Liu, Chen and Lee (2011), Bounded Memory, Inertia, Sampling and Weighting Model for Market Entry Games, Games, 2(1), 187-199. (Learning) 

 7. [ 4 /12] Coordination and Equilibrium Selection [old slides] (BGT, Ch.7) [Strategic4]
               Experiment 7: Presidential Nomination Game
               Experiment 8: Minimum Effort Game
               Experiment 9: Price/Quantity Market

               Book Chapter 3 Presentation: 張凱杰、王璽維
               Student Presentation: 劉郁辰、吳宗翰、陳端駿
Cason, Savikhin and Sheremeta (2012), Behavioral Spillovers in Coordination Games, European Economic Review, 56, 233-245.

 8. [ 4 /19] Coordination and Equilibrium Selection (continued)

               Book Chapter 4 Presentation: 林建勳、鄭庭安
               Student Presentation: 彭陸洋、賴俞安、鍾幸辰
Kagel, Lien and Milgrom (2013), Ascending Prices and Package Bidding: Further Experimental Analysis, mimeo.

               Further Reading:

               Games of Incomplete Information (EM 10.1) [Theory5]

 9. [ 4 /26] Auctions [old slides] (EL, Ch.9; new Handbook chapter) [Strategic5]

               Book Chapter 5 Presentation: 林政澤、Ralf Conen、陳柏文
               Student Presentation:
Drouvelisa, Müller and Possajennikov (2012), Signaling Without a Common Prior: Results on Experimental Equilibrium Selection, Games and Economic Behavior, 74(1), 102–119.

               Further Reading:

               Refinements of Bayesian Nash Equilibrium (EM 10.2) [Theory6]

10.[ 5 / 3 ] Auctions (continued)

               Book Chapter 6 Presentation: 彭陸洋、賴俞安、鍾幸辰
               Student Presentation: 林建勳、鄭庭安
Vespa and Wilson (2012), Communication with Multiple Senders: An Experiment, under revision for Econometrica.

11.[ 5 /10] Signaling, Reputation and Cheap Talk (BGT, Ch.8) [Strategic6]
Experiment 10: Pull or Push

               Book Chapter 7 Presentation: 葉明仁、李穆先、陳乃宣
               Student Presentation: 王璽維
(Review) Johnson and Mislin (2011), Trust Games: A Meta-Analysis, Journal of Economic Psychology, 32(5), 865-889.
                    (Review) Engel (2011),
Dictator Games: a Meta Study, Experimental Economics, 14(4), 583-610.
                    (Review) Oosterbeek, Sloof and Van de Kuilen (2004), Cultural Differences in Ultimatum Game Experiments: Evidence from a Meta-Analysis, Experimental Economics, 7(2), 171–188.

12.[ 5 /17] Neuroeconomics: fMRI and Eyetracking (Wang Handbook chapter) [old slides] [Topic1]

               Book Chapter 8 Presentation: 蘇孟謙、吳怡軒、謝富文
Dean (2012), What Can Neuroeconomics Tell Us About Economics (and Vice Versa)? mimeo.
                    (Review) Chen and Goeree, NOBEL 2012 Economics: Stable Allocations and Market Design, Nature, 492, 54-55 (06 December 2012).

13.[ 5 /24] Social Preferences (BGT, Ch.2; new Handbook chapter) [Topic2]

               Book Chapter 9 Presentation: 唐恩信
               Student Presentation: 唐恩信
Pathak and Sönmez (2013), School Admissions Reform in Chicago and England: Comparing Mechanisms by their Vulnerability to Manipulation, American Economic Review, 103(1): 80-106.
                    Budish and Cantillon (2012), “
The Multi-unit Assignment Problem: Theory and Evidence from Course Allocation at Harvard,” American Economic Review, 102(5): 2237-71.

14.[ 5 /31] Bargaining (BGT, Ch.4) and Field Experiments [old slides] (Harrison and List, 2004) [Topic3]

               Book Chapter 10 Presentation: 林彥竹、吳奎慶
               Student Presentation: 張凱杰陳柏文
Balafoutas, Beck, Kerschbamer and Sutter (2013), What Drives Taxi Drivers? A Field Experiment on Fraud in a Market for Credence Goods, Review of Economic Studies, forthcoming.

15.[ 6 / 7 ] Prediction Markets and Asset Bubbles (EL, Ch.8; MGS, Ch.34) [Topic4]
               Experiment 11: Asset Market Experiment

               Student Presentation: 蘇孟謙、吳怡軒、謝富文
Hanson, Oprea and Porter (2006), Information aggregation and manipulation in an experimental market, Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, 60(4), 449-459.
                    Tung, Chou, Lin and Lin (2011), Comparing the Forecasting Accuracy of Prediction Markets and Polls for Taiwan's Presidential and Mayoral Elections, Journal of Prediction Markets, 5(3), 1-26.

               Further Reading:

               Robinson Crusoe Economy (EM 5.1) and Equilibrium and Efficiency (EM 5.2) [Theory7]
Equilibrium Future Prices (EM 5.6) and Arrow-Debreu Equilibrium (EM 8.1) [Theory8]
               Security Market Equilibrium (EM 8.2) [Theory9]

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Last modified on May 29, 2013