



# Aversion to Risk

Joseph Tao-yi Wang

2009/12/25

(Lecture 16, Micro Theory I)






# Dealing with Uncertainty

- Preferences over risky choices (Section 7.1)
- One simple model: Expected Utility

$$U(c_1, c_2) = \pi_1 v(c_1) + \pi_2 v(c_2)$$


- How can old tools be applied to analyze this?
- How is “risk aversion” measured?
- What about differences in risk aversion?
- How does a risk averse person trade state claims? (Wealth effects? Individual diff.?)




# Dealing with Uncertainty

- Two states:  $s=1$ : KMT wins;  $s=2$ : DPP wins
- $\pi_s$ : Prob. of state  $s$      $c_s$ : consumption in state  $s$

$$U(c_1, c_2) = \pi_1 v(c_1) + \pi_2 v(c_2)$$







# Risk Aversion: Concave $v(c)$

- Upper contour sets of  $U(\cdot)$  is convex

$$U(c_1, c_2) = \pi_1 v(c_1) + (1 - \pi_1)v(c_2) \leq v(\bar{c})$$

- Prefers certain bundle to risky ones with same EV






# Risk Aversion: Concave $v(c)$


$$c_2 > c_1 \Rightarrow v'(c_1) > v'(c_2)$$

$$MRS(c_1, c_2) = \left. \frac{dc_2}{dc_1} \right|_{U=\bar{U}} = \frac{\frac{\partial U}{\partial c_1}}{\frac{\partial U}{\partial c_2}} = \frac{\pi_1 v'(c_1)}{\pi_2 v'(c_2)}$$

$$< \frac{\pi_1}{\pi_2} \text{ if } c_2 < c_1$$




# Extremely Risk Loving: Convex $v(c)$




- Upper contour sets of  $U(\cdot)$  is convex

$$U(c_1, c_2) = \pi_1 v(c_1) + (1 - \pi_1)v(c_2) \geq v(\bar{c})$$

- Prefers most risky bundles (weird!)





# Jensen's Inequality


- For any probability vector  $\pi$  and consumption vector  $c$ , if  $v(c)$  is concave, then

$$\sum_{s=1}^S \pi_s v(c_s) \leq v(\bar{c}) \text{ where } \bar{c} = \sum_{s=1}^S \pi_s c_s$$

- Proof:
- Easy if  $v(c)$  is continuously differentiable, since

Concavity implies  $v(c_s) \leq v(\bar{c}) + v'(\bar{c})(c_s - \bar{c})$

$$\sum_{s=1}^S \pi_s v(c_s) \leq v(\bar{c}) + v'(\bar{c}) \cdot \left( \begin{array}{c} 0 \\ \vdots \\ 0 \end{array} \right) \underline{\text{QED}}$$



# Measure Risk Aversion


- Let:  $M = MRS(c_1, c_2) = \frac{dc_2}{dc_1} \Big|_{U=\bar{U}} = \frac{\pi_1 v'(c_1)}{\pi_2 v'(c_2)}$
- Then:

$$\ln M = \ln v'(c_1) - \ln v'(c_2) + \ln \left( \frac{\pi_1}{\pi_2} \right)$$

- So,  $\frac{\partial}{\partial c_1} \ln M = \frac{v''(c_1)}{v'(c_1)}$ ,  $\frac{\partial}{\partial c_2} \ln M = -\frac{v''(c_2)}{v'(c_2)}$

- Thus,  $\frac{1}{M} \frac{dM}{dc_1} = \frac{\partial}{\partial c_1} \ln M + \frac{\partial}{\partial c_2} \ln M \frac{dc_2}{dc_1} \Big|_{U=\bar{U}}$   
 $= \frac{v''(c_1)}{v'(c_1)} - \frac{v''(c_2)}{v'(c_2)} \cdot \left( -\frac{\pi_1}{\pi_2} \right)$







# Measuring Risk Aversion

- At  $(\bar{c}, \bar{c})$ , 
$$\frac{1}{M} \frac{dM}{dc_1} = \frac{v''(\bar{c})}{v'(\bar{c})} \cdot \left( 1 + \frac{\pi_1}{\pi_2} \right)$$

- Bev's indifference curve bend more rapid if






# Measuring Risk Aversion


- Absolute Risk Aversion  $A(c) = -\frac{v''(\bar{c})}{v'(\bar{c})}$
- Relative Risk Aversion  $R(c) = -\frac{cv''(\bar{c})}{v'(\bar{c})}$
- Indifference curve bend more rapid if  $A(c)$  high
- Can also obtain:
- $A(c)$  higher  $\rightarrow$  acceptable gambles set smaller
  - But need to first establish the relationship between two people's (risk averse) utility functions...

# Proposition 7.2-1: Differences in Risk Aversion



- Two (von Neumann-Morgenstern) expected utility functions:  $v_A, v_B$
- Then 
$$A_B(c) = -\frac{v_B''(c)}{v_B'(c)} \geq -\frac{v_A''(c)}{v_A'(c)} = A_A(c)$$
- iff the mapping  $f(\cdot) : v_A \rightarrow v_B$  is concave.
- Proof:
- First, note that the mapping is monotonic since  $v_A, v_B$  are increasing, or  $f'(c) > 0$

# Proposition 7.2-1: Differences in Risk Aversion



- Proof: (Continued)
- $v_B(c) = f(v_A(c))$  implies  $v'_B(c) = f'(v_A)v'_A(c)$
- Hence,


$$\frac{\partial}{\partial c} \ln [v'_B(c)] = -\frac{v''_B(c)}{v'_B(c)} = -\frac{f''(c)}{f'(c)}v'_A(c) - \frac{v''_A(c)}{v'_A(c)}$$

- Since  $f'(c), v'_A(c) > 0$
- We have  $-\frac{v''_B(c)}{v'_B(c)} \geq -\frac{v''_A(c)}{v'_A(c)}$  iff  $f''(v_A) \leq 0$

# Proposition 7.2-2: Risk Aversion & the Set of Acceptable Gambles




- If 
$$A_B(c) = -\frac{v''_B(c)}{v'_B(c)} \geq -\frac{v''_A(c)}{v'_A(c)} = A_A(c)$$
- and both start with the same wealth  $\bar{c}$ . Then,
- The set of acceptable gambles to  $B$  is a subset of the set of gambles acceptable to  $A$ .
- Proof:
- Homework (J/R 2.33)



# Trading in State Claim Markets

- $y_s$ : Endowment in state  $s$ ,  $y_1 > y_2$
- $p_s$ : current price of unit consumption in state  $s$
- Budget Constraint:  $p_1 c_1 + p_2 c_2 = p_1 y_1 + p_2 y_2$

$c_2$  45° certainty line (Here: Partial insurance against a DDP victory)



# Wealth $\uparrow$ , how would riskiness of optimal choice change?




- Move from  $(c_1, c_2)$  to  $(c_1 + x, c_2 + x)$

$$\ln M = \ln v'(c_1 + x) - \ln v'(c_2 + x) + \ln \left( \frac{\pi_1}{\pi_2} \right)$$

$$\frac{\partial}{\partial c} \ln M = \frac{1}{M} \frac{dM}{dc_1} = \frac{v''(c_1 + x)}{v'(c_1 + x)} - \frac{v''(c_2 + x)}{v'(c_2 + x)}$$

= 0 if CARA

< 0 if DARA




# Wealth $\uparrow$ , how would riskiness of optimal choice change?



- In words, with CARA,
- Wealth  $\uparrow$  implies parallel shift; MRS same!
  - Optimal choice is as risky as original choice
- With DARA,
- Wealth  $\uparrow$  : Point lower than CARA; MRS  $\uparrow$ 
  - Optimal choice is more risky than original choice
- Similar for IARA...




# Simple Portfolio Choice: Riskless vs. Risky



- Alex can invest in either:
  - Riskless asset:  $1 + r_1$
  - Risky asset:  $1 + \tilde{r}_2$
- If Alex is risk averse, how high would the “risk premium” ( $r_1 + \tilde{r}_2$ ) need to be for Alex to invest in the risky asset?
- Zero! (But risk premium affect proportions)

# Simple Portfolio Choice: Riskless vs. Risky



- Using state claim formulation:
  - Risky asset yields  $1 + \tilde{r}_{2s}$  in state  $s$
  - Probability of state  $s$  is  $\pi_s$ ,  $s = 1, \dots, S$
- Invests  $x$  in risky asset,  $(W - x)$  in riskless one
- Final consumption in state  $s$  is

$$c_s = W(1 + r_1) + x\theta_s \quad (\theta_s = r_{2s} - r_1)$$

- Alex's utility:

$$U(x) = \sum_{s=1}^S \pi_s v(W(1 + r_1) + x\theta_s)$$

# Simple Portfolio Choice: Riskless vs. Risky



- Marginal Gains from increasing  $x$


$$U'(x) = \sum_{s=1}^S \pi_s v'(W(1+r_1) + x\theta_s) \cdot \theta_s$$

- So, there is a single turning point since

$$U''(x) = \sum_{s=1}^S \pi_s v''(W(1+r_1) + x\theta_s) \cdot \theta_s^2 < 0$$

- Should choose  $x$  so that  $U'(0) = 0$

# Simple Portfolio Choice: Riskless vs. Risky




- Since (unless infinitely risk averse)

$$U'(0) = v'(W(1+r_1)) \sum_{s=1}^S \pi_s \theta_s > 0 \Leftrightarrow \sum_{s=1}^S \pi_s \theta_s > 0$$

- Alex will always buy some risky asset!
- Intuition:
- When taking no risk, each MU weighted with the same  $v'(W(1+r_1))$ , as if risk neutral!
- Not true for any  $x > 0$ 
  - Depends on degree of risk aversion...

# Would a more risk averse person invest less risky?




- Yes!
  - Choose smaller  $x$  if everywhere more risk averse
- Proof:
- Consider Bev:  $v_B(c) = f(v_A(c))$ ,  $f$  concave
- If Alex's optimal choice and consumption be

$$x^* \text{ and } c_s^* = W(1 + r_1) + \theta_s x^*$$


- Then, 
$$U'_A(x^*) = \sum_{s=1}^S \pi_s v'(c_s^*) \cdot \theta_s = 0$$

# Would a more risk averse person invest less risky?



- Claim:  $U'_B(x^*) < 0$  (And we are done!)
- Proof:
- Order states so  $\theta_1 \geq \theta_2 \geq \dots \geq \theta_S$
- Let  $t$  be the largest state that  $\theta_s = r_{2s} - r_1 > 0$
- Then,  $v_A(c_s^*) \geq v_A(c_t^*)$  for all  $s \leq t$   
 $v_A(c_s^*) < v_A(c_t^*)$  for all  $s > t$
- And, (by concavity of  $f$ )  
 $f'(v_A(c_s^*)) \geq f'(v_A(c_t^*))$ ,  $s \leq t$   
 $f'(v_A(c_s^*)) < f'(v_A(c_t^*))$ ,  $s > t$

# Would a more risk averse person invest less risky?




- Hence,

$$U'_B(x^*) = \sum_{s=1}^S \pi_s f'(v_A(c_s^*)) v'_A(c_s^*) \cdot \theta_s$$

$$< \sum_{s=1}^t \pi_s f'(v_A(c_t^*)) v'_A(c_s^*) \cdot \theta_s$$

$$- \sum_{s=t+1}^S \pi_s f'(v_A(c_t^*)) v'_A(c_s^*) \cdot (-\theta_s)$$

$$= f'(v_A(c_t^*)) \sum_{s=1}^S \pi_s v'_A(c_s^*) \cdot \theta_s = f'(v_A(c_t^*)) U'_A(c^*) = 0$$



# Summary of 7.2

- Von Neumann Morganstern Utility Function
- Jensen's Inequality
- Absolute or Relative Risk Aversion
- Bev is more risk averse than Alex implies:
  - Mapping from  $v_A$  to  $v_B$  is concave
  - Bev will not accept gambles that Alex rejects
- State Claim Market
  - Wealth effect; Risk averse people invest less risky
- Homework: Riley-7.2-2, 5-8; J/R-2.25, 2.33-35