

THE DUTCH PERIOD IN TAIWAN HISTORY:  
A PRELIMINARY SURVEY

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Note: Many passages can be expanded  
by re-reading GM sources,  
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In the period of Dutch rule in Taiwan, four great movements of commercial-military maritime expansion -- Chinese, Japanese, Dutch, and Spanish -- confronted each other and interacted with each other and with the complex aboriginal societies of Taiwan. The full study of this period, requiring some degree of understanding of all sides of these interactions and the full use of the great resources of the General State Archives (Algemeen Rijksarchief) in The Hague,<sup>1</sup> will be a formidable and immensely rewarding task. In the following pages I will offer a preliminary narrative account of this period and suggest some hypotheses about it that may be useful to future students. This essay is based on my explorations of the work of other scholars and my own work on the Cheng family and on the Dutch East India Company's relations with China after 1662. I have scanned some of the large mass of Dutch archival materials on the Cheng conquest of Taiwan but have made little or no use of them for this paper, and have studied thoroughly the archival materials on the Dutch re-occupation of Keelung from 1664 to 1668. For earlier periods I have used secondary works, Chinese sources, and Dutch printed sources, the latter already substantial but only the tip of the archival iceberg.<sup>2</sup>

The understanding of the Taiwan aboriginal background of this period presents especially formidable difficulties for the historian. Dutch and Chinese information on the aborigines, although sometimes of high quality,<sup>3</sup> must be examined carefully for cultural bias. Institutional and cultural change and migration since the early Dutch period make it very hard to establish a pre-conquest base-line. Ferrell's and Chang Yueh-ch'i's studies of Taiwan<sup>4</sup> and Keesing's<sup>1</sup> studies of the related cultures and somewhat analogous problems of northern Luzon<sup>5</sup> demonstrate how formidable these problems can be. In all this the historian will have to acquire a good background in anthropology, to become more than a passive consumer of anthropological theory and generalization, so that he can recognize important data when he finds it in the Dutch archives and other records. This may take some time, but should be very rewarding intellectually, since anthropology is in many ways the most relevant and rewarding of the social sciences for the pre-modern historian.

The other sides of these interactions present somewhat less formidable problems. Japanese overseas expansion has been quite thoroughly studied by Japanese historians.<sup>6</sup> The story of the Spanish at Keelung and Tamsui is a small-scale extension of the history of the Spanish in the Philippines. Modern studies by Schurz, Chaunu, Phelan, Keesing, and De La Costa, to name

only a few, offer very stimulating starting points, and there is much food for thought in the vast Blair and Robertson collection of translations and in the compendious Spanish histories of the religious orders in the Philippines.<sup>7</sup> For Dutch colonial history we have an admirable survey by Boxer and a large body of solid scholarship in Dutch,<sup>8</sup> but the quantity of work in this field has declined sharply since Indonesia gained its independence, and only in a few areas have Asian scholars begun to take up the slack. Dutch policy in a particular area was shaped by European politics, changes in the internal politics of the Dutch East India Company at Batavia, and shifts and strains in the Company's network of sea-power and trade from Yemen to Nagasaki, and frequently it is hard to get a connected picture of how these changes interacted. The best approaches for Taiwan or any seventeenth-century topic are through Stapel's narrative survey and Coolhaas' edition of the "General Letters" of the Company.

We are still a long way from having an integrated picture of Chinese maritime expansion in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, but we have some very useful starting points. Wiethoff and Ch'en Wen-shih have given us clear summaries of Ming maritime policy down to the opening of trade in 1567, and Wiethoff has given us some stimulating generalizations on the role of "China's Third Frontier" in Chinese history, but much remains to be done on the confused period between 1567 and 1620.<sup>9</sup> The evolution and organization of naval power in Chinese seas in this period involved both the "Japanese pirates" of the sixteenth century, many of whom were Chinese, and the militia forces that were organized to oppose them: we have useful explorations of both sides, but nothing that tries to fit them together as aspects of one developing structure of maritime power.<sup>10</sup> Studies of capital accumulation and commercial expansion in this period of Chinese history have been advanced by the research of Chinese and Japanese Marxist scholars and partly discredited by some of their tendentious interpretations. Agricultural responses to commercial opportunity, very important in the history of Taiwan, have been very ably studied by Rawski.<sup>11</sup> The spectacular growth of Chinese maritime trade in this period must be seen in the context of general commercial expansion, but the extraordinary risks and extraordinary profits of maritime trade make it a very special case, ~~xxx~~<sup>whose</sup> relations to the general growth of commercial capitalism will remain doubtful and debatable. Much can be done in using European records of trade with Chinese to supplement the rather scattered evidence in Chinese, but it will not be easy work. Another side of Chinese commercial expansion is the

well-known growth of the overseas Chinese communities in this period.<sup>12</sup> The growth of these communities in turn stimulated further expansion by providing centers of refuge, capital accumulation, and experiment with new forms of organization outside China. Cheng Chih-lung rose to power in an organization based in Japan and Taiwan, and his family kept much of its capital in Japan. ~~And as we shall see, the first Chinese headman at Batavia contributed substantially to the agricultural development of Taiwan.~~ And as we shall see, the first Chinese headman at Batavia contributed substantially to the agricultural development of Taiwan.

The Dutch had become aware of the great attractions of trade with China almost as soon as they began to sail Asian seas, but for its first twenty years the Dutch East India Company paid little attention to China and got no access to direct trade with it.<sup>13</sup> Already in 1604, the pattern that finally would emerge in 1624 had been anticipated. Two Dutch ships anchored in the Pescadores, their commanders hoping to work out a trade agreement with the eunuch in charge of trade in Fukien. A fleet of fifty war junks came to tell the Dutch to leave the Pescadores, which were a part of the empire. The commander told the Dutch they would be allowed to trade if they could find a harbor outside Chinese territory, and loaned them pilots to scout the coast of Taiwan, which was not part of the empire. But they could find nothing they considered suitable, and sailed away.

The world war against the Iberian Empire provided a more substantial stimulus to Dutch involvement in Far Eastern waters. The conquest of Manila and Macao, recommended by Jan Pieterszoon Coen in 1614, would remove the Spanish threat to the centers of clove production south of the Philippines, and deprive Spain and Portugal of the great profits of Far Eastern trade. Repeated Dutch attacks on the Philippines between 1609 and 1619 got nowhere. In 1618 Coen was made governor-general and authorized to take measures to blockade Chinese trade to Manila and divert a share of it to Jakarta, soon to be re-named Batavia. In 1621 he was authorized to continue this blockade and try to conquer Macao. The Dutch attack on Macao on June 24, 1622<sup>14</sup> was beaten off, and the Dutch went on to occupy the Pescadores and use them as a base for efforts to cut off Chinese trade with Manila and to attack ships and towns along the coast in order to "force the Chinese to trade".<sup>15</sup> Chinese envoys hinted several times that the Dutch might be allowed to trade if they would withdraw to Taiwan. The Dutch were not willing to settle for this, and began to take ships and burn towns along the Fukien coast. The Dutch commander soon realized that he could do no really serious damage to the Ming Empire and could not "force it to trade", and agreed to withdraw to Taiwan if Chinese merchants were permitted to come there to trade. But this agreement was rejected in both Peking and Batavia,

hostilities began again, and from February to July 1624 a large Chinese force occupied all the Pescadores except the peninsula on which the Dutch had built their fort. They were forced to agree to withdraw to Taiwan. Li Tan, the famous "Captain China" of Hirado, an important figure in Sino-Japanese trade via Taiwan in these years, was a key mediator in this agreement.<sup>16</sup> It is very unlikely that the Ming court ever gave formal permission for trade with the Dutch on Taiwan, but it seems that the provincial authorities did grant regular passes for it and levy tolls on it at some times.<sup>17</sup>

Our picture of the situation on Taiwan at the beginning of the Dutch period is very fragmentary. The aboriginal population was quite thin. The largest figures in any Dutch census of the island are in the 1650 census, which probably covered most of the plains areas.<sup>18</sup> (Much of this area had only the most nominal relation to the Dutch government.) It lists 315 aboriginal villages containing 68,675 people, for an average population of a little over 200. A few villages, like Mattauw and Favorlang, seem to have had a population of several thousand. In some areas chiefs had considerable authority and there might be several villages under one chief, but each of the villages in the key area near the Dutch settlement was independent and was ruled by a village council, not a chief. Rice and vegetables were grown by primitive methods, and protein was obtained mostly by fishing and hunting. The fertile, thinly-populated western plains teemed with deer; the Dutch exported fifty to one hundred thousand deer hides a year for twenty years before they began to notice a decline in the supply.<sup>19</sup>

The harbors of Taiwan had served as centers for Sino-Japanese trade at least since the 1570's, when government passes were given to junks going to trade at Keelung and Tamsui.<sup>20</sup> "Japanese pirates" occupied its harbors several times and were driven out by a Ming expedition in 1603.<sup>21</sup> Tokugawa Ieyasu, very much interested in everything connected with maritime trade, sent Arima Haranobu on an exploratory expedition to Taiwan in 1609, but he returned without having been able to get much information from the inhabitants. Murayama Tōan, a powerful and wealthy official in charge of foreign trade at Nagasaki, outfitted a fleet of eleven or thirteen ships to invade Taiwan in 1616, but it was dispersed by a storm, only one ship reached Taiwan, and its crew committed suicide when attacked and surrounded by aborigines.<sup>22</sup>

The Chinese presence was somewhat more substantial. There were many Chinese in the aboriginal villages along the coast. One Dutch report of a visit to the village of Soulang, near Tainan, in 1623 says that there were some Chinese in every house, trading with the aborigines, bullying them, threatening to cut

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off their supplies of salt if they didn't do as they were told. <sup>23</sup> Other Chinese hunted deer or fished in the rich coastal waters. Stories of the rise of Cheng Chih-lung describe councils of "pirate" chiefs on Taiwan choosing their own leaders, and there probably is some truth in this; as late as the 1650's the Chinese community under the Dutch was ruled by ten headmen, quite unlike the Chinese tradition of one-man rule and the "headman" systems of the Chinese communities at Batavia and Firado. <sup>24</sup> Sino-Japanese trade was quite regular and well-organized, Li Tan handling much of the Japanese end and his associate Hsu Hsin-su 許心素 the Chinese end. It does not seem, however, that there was much large-scale emigration or development of Chinese agriculture on Taiwan until the late 1620's. As long as conditions were reasonably stable in China, the highly commercialized labor-intensive agriculture of Fukien could absorb a great deal of increase in population. <sup>25</sup> Taiwan, with its head-hunting aborigines, tough and lawless Chinese frontiersmen, and occasional dreaded Japanese, had few attractions for the Chinese peasant. Until Cheng Chih-lung rose to power in the mid-1620's, there was no organization that had the combination of military power, capital, and connections in China necessary to make a large-scale colonization project succeed.

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Immediately in 1624 the Dutch began to build crude fortifications on the sand-bar where Casteel Zeelandia would rise a few years later. Land for a town on Taiwan itself across from the sand-bar was bought from the aborigines of the village of Sinkan (Esin-chiang 新港) for a total of 39 cangans (bright-colored cotton shawls.) In 1625 there were already thirty to forty Chinese houses there. An interpreter for the Dutch, and probably one of Li Tan's agents there, was Cheng Chih-lung. <sup>26</sup>

In all lines of trade, and especially in the China-Japan trade, the Dutch were the competitors of established Chinese and Japanese traders who had been using Taiwan as a rendezvous for some years, and the potential for competition and conflict was very real. For the time being, however, the Dutch were not altogether unwelcome. They would help make Taiwan safe for traders and settlers, would provide large supplies of pepper, sandalwood, and other tropical goods, and would invigorate all lines of trade with new capital. Moreover, in the 1620's the political future of Japanese foreign trade was becoming increasingly uncertain, and Chinese trade was disrupted by the political chaos of the T'ien-ch'i period and by the rapid growth of piracy along the south China coast. In the circumstances the Dutch settlement, an island of commercial stability, should have had ten years of clear sailing. But its commanders so completely mismanaged things that they had ten years of conflict and disruption of trade.

Always restive when dealing with an Asian monopoly, in 1625 they crossed over to China to complain that I'su Hsin-su<sup>1</sup> was too slow in delivering silk and was not allowing other merchants to trade with them. This got I'su in trouble with the authorities, who still saw the Dutch as the pirates and town-burners of 1622-1624 and did not want to see them on the coast again. In 1627 they accepted Hsu's invitation to assist the authorities against the rising power of Cheng Chih-lung, but did not allow Hsu to go along with their squadron, and accomplished nothing except to make enemies of both Cheng and I'su. In 1628 they managed a gradual rapprochement with Cheng Chih-lung, now victorious and negotiating with the Ming authorities for his "surrender" and appointment as a naval commander to suppress the other pirates. But they protested when he did not allow all merchants to come to trade with them, and held him captive aboard a Dutch yacht until he agreed to allow all merchants to come to them and agreed to sell them a large quantity of silk every year. Cheng probably never trusted a Dutchman again, but he did seek and obtain their help against his enemies in 1629 and 1630. The Dutch were seeking improved trading privileges in return for "helping the empire put down the pirates", but probably accomplished nothing except to reinforce the Chinese conviction that they were pirates and their own conviction that the Chinese authorities could not be trusted to keep their agreements. According to Chinese sources they even fought Cheng Chih-lung in the summer of 1630, but Dutch and Chinese sources are very hard to reconcile here. <sup>27</sup>

In 1632 they were restive again, complaining that the trade was monopolized by Cheng Chih-lung and his associates. Part of the trouble was that Cheng was facing a new challenger for maritime supremacy, Liu Hsiang, and the authorities were restricting maritime trade in anticipation of the impending conflict. In 1633 a bellicose Dutch commander delivered an ultimatum to Cheng demanding relaxation of restrictions on trade, sailed off to Batavia without waiting for his reply, which was conciliatory, and returned in July to attack the fleet of the astonished Cheng Chih-lung. After two months of small actions and Dutch marauding along the coast Cheng finally assembled his fleet for a full-scale attack on the Dutch squadron off Quemoy on October 21. One Dutch ship was blown up and the rest retreated to Taiwan. The Dutch had been trying to cooperate with Cheng's rivals, but now rejected new overtures from Liu Hsiang, who attacked Casteel Zeelandia in April 1634 but was beaten off. By 1636, Cheng Chih-lung had finished off his challengers, Chinese trade with the Dutch began to expand rapidly, and continued to flourish until the catastrophes of 1644-1646. <sup>28</sup>

Dutch bumbling was also responsible for a smaller conflict with the Japanese which briefly jeopardized the survival of the Dutch settlement on Taiwan and the continuation of Dutch trade with Japan. Japanese merchants came to Taiwan in 1625, 1626, and 1627 with valuable cargoes which they promptly invested in Chinese silks in direct competition with the Dutch. The Dutch tried to levy duties on their trade, backed down when they protested, but still encountered increased hostility in Japan because of the attempt. They saw that they had to tolerate Japanese trade on Taiwan and forego duties on it if they did not want to jeopardize their own very important trade in Japan. Even the formidable J.P. Coen, in 1627, ordered only that the Taiwan authorities should try to persuade the Japanese to pay tolls by pointing out the substantial sums the Dutch were spending to make Taiwan safe for all traders. The Japanese, like the Dutch, were having trouble with slow delivery of goods by the Chinese merchants, and in 1627 demanded that the Dutch convoy them to the Chinese coast or help them to hire Chinese junks to go there and collect their debts. The Dutch refused. The Japanese then left, taking with them a delegation of aborigines from Sinkan who apparently were going to offer sovereignty over their village to the Japanese government. The offer was rejected by the Shogunate. When the Japanese returned to Taiwan in 1628 they came heavily armed, and Pieter Nuyts, the new and inexperienced governor, insisted on searching their junks and removing all weapons, and imprisoned the returning Sinkan delegation. He tried to be conciliatory on another issue, agreeing that they might hire junks to go to the Chinese coast, but the Chinese junk owners refused to take them, knowing the drastic penalties for helping Japanese enter the country. Then they wanted to go to the Chinese coast themselves, but Nuyts, fearing that they would carry their complaints to Japan, decided to detain them until ships from Batavia called on their way to Nagasaki, so that he could be sure that the Dutch case would be presented along with their complaints. This action, of course, gave the Japanese far more to complain about than they had had before. The Japanese then surrounded Nuyts' house and held him and his small son hostage at sword point until the Dutch governing council agreed to release the Japanese, give them hostages, deliver to them the silk they had been unable to collect from the Chinese merchants, and so on. The Tokugawa authorities were so incensed by this conflict that they imprisoned the Dutch at Hirado, stopped their trade, and demanded that the Dutch leave Taiwan. They showed some signs of relenting in 1630, but it was not until 1632, when Nuyts was sent to Japan and turned over to the authorities there to serve a term in prison, that trade was completely re-opened. <sup>29</sup>

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The sphere of influence of the Dutch in their first years on Taiwan was limited to four big villages on the plains just north of Casteel Zeelandia (An-p'ing-chen 安平鎮 near modern Tainan), and a few satellite and smaller villages. The four are among the few place names in Dutch accounts that can be identified in Chinese sources and located with any precision: Sinkan, Soulang (Hsiao-lung 蕭士龍), Baccalawan (Mu-chia-liu-wan 目加溜灣), and Mattauw (Ma-tou 麻豆).<sup>30</sup> It was in Sinkan that Dutch missionaries had their first uncertain experiments and their first substantial successes. Soon the Dutch were helping the people of Sinkan in their battles against Soulang and Mattauw. Then in 1629 fifty-two Dutch soldiers who had been sent off to the north in search of some Chinese pirates who had gone inland were murdered by Mattauw people who were helping them cross a river, Mattauw was attacked and burned in retaliation, and Mattauw people were reported raiding down into the Sinkan area. This conflict apparently simmered until 1635, when a force of 475 fresh soldiers from Batavia burned Mattauw to the ground, and its elders came to the Castle to sue for peace. This same force made several more expeditions to the north and south of the Castle in 1635 and 1636, and by the end of 1636 many more villages had made peace with the Dutch, extending their sphere of influence north to Tirozen (Chu-lo-shan 諸羅山, at modern Chia-i) and south to the end of the island. North of Tirozen the large and powerful village of Favorlang, somewhere in the vicinity of modern Hsi-lo, continued to cause a great deal of trouble. In the south powerful chiefs at Pangsoia (Fang-so 放索) and Longkiau (Lang-ch'iao 狼山寮), each of whom had ten to fifteen villages under his control, made peace with the Dutch and sought to use Dutch power and influence against their enemies.<sup>31</sup>

The Dutch expansion to the north had been motivated partly by reports that the Spanish were expanding south into the same area from their outposts at Keelung and Tamsui. The Spanish experience in northern Taiwan presents some very interesting contrasts to that of the Dutch.<sup>32</sup> Although the establishment of the outpost at Keelung in 1626 was seen as a strategic move against Dutch dominance in the area and as an effort to provide a center where Chinese merchants might come to trade with the Spanish without Dutch interference, clerical influence there was very substantial there from the beginning. Six Dominicans accompanied the founding expedition, and went to work immediately among the local aborigines. The Dominicans used Keelung as a way-station and language training center for their missions in China. They and the Franciscans who soon joined them did such good work that in 1664, when the Dutch re-occupied Keelung, they found that more aborigines spoke Spanish than Dutch, some had Spanish names like Domingo and Barnabe, and many of them sought

the services of a Dominican priest who had come with the Dutch from Foochow.<sup>33</sup> The sixteen years of Spanish missionary effort apparently had had more effect on the aborigines than the nineteen years of Dutch control (1642-1661) that ensued. Perhaps this was partly because Roman Catholicism with its processions, singing, and so on appealed more to the aborigines than did the austerities of Calvinism. But surely it was also because the Spanish had gotten there first, because the Spanish Crown was incomparably more generous in its support of missions than was the Dutch East India Company, and because the Roman Catholic tradition of a celibate priesthood stimulated a far larger supply of highly motivated missionaries at lower cost than did Calvinism with its married ministers and village schoolteachers of very doubtful commitment.

The Spanish established another outpost at Tamsui in 1629, and soon the Dutch were worrying about the expansion of their missionary efforts down the west coast of Taiwan. The Spanish built a very solid stone fortress at Keelung and fairly substantial fortifications at Tamsui, and in 1628 were reported to have 200 Spanish and 400 Filipino soldiers at Keelung, certainly more than the Dutch could muster at Casteel Zeelandia at that time.<sup>32</sup> The Chinese did come to Keelung to trade, but in 1630 they found the Spanish had very little cash on hand with which to buy there silk; again, a sharp contrast to Dutch policies and priorities. In 1633 the Spanish were able to buy as much silk as the Dutch had in some of their first years in Taiwan, but they were finding Keelung so unhealthy that about 100 Spanish and 20 Portuguese left for Manila later that year. In 1636 the aborigines in the Tamsui area revolted against Spanish efforts to levy taxes of chickens and rice from every household and attacked the Spanish fort at night. Tamsui was abandoned in 1638, and aborigines from that area made the area around Keelung unsafe until the Dutch took Keelung in 1642.<sup>34</sup> The authorities in Madrid had been sceptical about the Keelung enterprise from the beginning, and were not about to reinforce it now, despite the protests of the missionaries against the abandonment of their converts and their way-station to China. In August 1642 a force of 591 Dutchmen took it, encountering little resistance from a decrepit garrison of 115 Spaniards and 155 Filipinos.<sup>35</sup>

The Dutch took advantage of the troops that had been sent from Batavia for the attack on Keelung to extend their power in other parts of the island. Favorlang was burned and Longkiau cowed even before the expedition to Keelung, and another expedition visited the Favorlang area at the end of the year. Tenuous relations were established with villages in the Kabolang (modern I-lan) and Pinaba (modern T'ai-tung) areas on the east side of the island. Then early

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in 1645 a Dutch force marched overland from Tamsui to Casteel Zeelandia for the first time, establishing some measure of formal sovereignty for the Company over the entire plains area. It seems clear, however, that this sovereignty remained purely nominal between Favorlang and Tamsui. <sup>36</sup>

The number of villages over which the Dutch claimed sovereignty went from 44 in 1644 to 217 in 1646, 251 in 1648, and 315 in 1650. <sup>37</sup> Under the vigorous governorship of Francois Caron, 1644-1646, a set of uniform and controllable political institutions were imposed on the aborigines within the Dutch sphere. One to four headmen, according to the size of the village, were named as village elders. Where there were several elders one or more was to be replaced each year, as in the council of a Dutch city. All the elders were to rule over the whole village, not each over his own segment as in the past. No native preachers were to be named as elders, and vice-versa. The village elders of a region (north of the Castle, south of it, and sometimes also Pinaba on the east coast) were to assemble once a year for a regional council (landdag or landsdag) where the Dutch explained Company policy to them and tried to settle conflicts among the villages. The elders were urged to speak out freely and frankly at these councils. <sup>38</sup> The influence of Dutch values and institutions is remarkably clear here; freedom of speech, separation of church and state, municipal councils and provincial assemblies of their representatives. But these institutions also built on aboriginal traditions of village rule by council and of free, extensive, and eloquent debate in the discussion of important problems. <sup>39</sup> In the most important villages just north of the Castle there were no chiefs, no permanent village elders, but a system in which each common-house, which may have been equivalent to a lineage, had a temporary chief who held office for only two years. All the chiefs in the village were considered to be the same age, which would seem to suggest some kind of age-set system. <sup>40</sup> Within this kind of diffused authority system, the Dutch could choose some of these common-house chiefs as elders within their system without either challenging or becoming dependent on a pre-existing focussed authority system. In the villages where the Dutch presence was most substantial Dutch preachers, schoolteachers, and political agents worked closely with the village councils, and the councils became the effective institutions of government. The regional councils occasionally were effective as instruments of conciliation among villages. But while the Dutch claimed authority over 250-300 villages, the maximum attendance at the regional councils in any one year seems to have been about 140 villages. <sup>40</sup>

The Dutch missionary effort among the aborigines was an even more interesting and complex example of an effort to apply European values and institutions to an alien culture.<sup>41</sup> After an early experiment by the Reverend Robertus Junius in Sinkan with baptizing the aboriginal priestesses and using them as proselytizers for Christianity, the general strategy seems to have been one of frontal assault on local beliefs and customs, requiring a total break with past custom, re-settling converts in the mostly Christian village of Sinkan and keeping them there by force. But the Dutch missionaries frequently complained of backsliding into pagan customs, outbreaks of inter-village warfare and head-hunting, and so on. Many of them became convinced that true Christianity would come only with a generation raised in the faith, and they accordingly devoted a great deal of attention to a system of village schools and to the translation into native languages, written in the Roman alphabet, of basic religious works for use in these schools.

Despite the many difficulties the missionaries encountered, it can be argued that Taiwan aboriginal society was rather susceptible to the kind of religious transformation the Dutch sought, as it was to the political transformation discussed above. Dutch demonstrations of military power sometimes led directly to requests for instruction in Christianity; probably in this way the aborigines hoped to tap the sources of the magic "power" of the Dutch. Taiwan had few "rice Christians" but a good many "blunderbuss Christians." The elaborate structure of taboos could be gravely shaken by the example of the first few Christian converts who violated them without spoiling the crops or otherwise bringing disaster on the community. Although males served as chiefs and were treated with awe when they had taken heads in a battle, the most important religious functionaries were female shamans, who were completely displaced by male preachers in the Christian communities. The aboriginal culture had no literate tradition of its own to counter the new magic of the written word and the Word of God taught in the Dutch schools. It is also interesting to notice that the cultural and political changes encouraged by Cheng and Ch'ing rulers — appointment of village headmen, encouragement of ancestor worship with its explicit male supremacy and partilineality, formal education of the young as a leading instrument of cultural change — were structurally similar to and in many ways continuations of changes begun by the Dutch.<sup>42</sup>

By about 1650, political control, village schools, and some degree of nominal Christianity spread from the Favorlang area in the central plains all the way to the southern end of the island. Evangelism and political control

were both most successful in the pre-1636 core area north of the Castle, and there the aborigines generally were at peace with each other and with the Dutch. In the Favorlang area efforts were hampered by a language different from that of the core area and a heritage of conflict with the Dutch. In the south the Dutch faced the same obstacles, plus endemic disease that killed most Europeans within a year and constant marauding by unpacified mountain aborigines. There were only about 140-170 Dutch soldiers at Keelung and Tamsui, and the Tamsui villages were almost as restive under Dutch control as they had been under Spanish. There were even more tenuous outposts, with small detachments of soldiers, at Cabolang and Pinaba on the east coast.<sup>43</sup> In every area the situation became less stable in the late 1650's, for reasons that will be discussed below.

The Dutch East India Company was notoriously unwilling to spend money where it saw no prospects of profit, and certainly it did not support all this activity for the sake of the deer hides brought in by the aborigines. It was trade with China and the activities of Chinese immigrants in Taiwan that made Taiwan profitable to the Dutch. Here too 1635 and 1636 were the first watershed. Cheng Chih-lung, having put down his last important challenger, resumed peaceful trade with the Dutch. Chinese trade with Japan now expanded rapidly in a number of channels.<sup>44</sup> The end of the Macao-Japan trade in 1640 opened new opportunities to both the Dutch and Cheng Chih-lung. In that year, perhaps because he was under increasing pressure from the Ming Court to send his fleet to the coast of Liaotung against the Manchus and thus found his position in Fukien less secure, Cheng offered the Dutch a joint monopoly of trade between China and Japan, but when he raised his terms for the contract the Dutch broke off negotiations.<sup>45</sup> Apart from this, Cheng and the Dutch competed in the China-Japan trade until the Ming collapse in 1644-1646. Some or all of them may have been Cheng's agents, but I have no hard information on this point and have not been able to identify any of them in Chinese sources.

It was also in 1635 that the Dutch noticed a sharp increase in Chinese immigration to Taiwan, and when Batavia sent troops in that year to widen the zone of Dutch control it was with glorious visions of "as splendid a colony as the Portuguese ever had in the Indies ..... outside the jurisdiction of any powerful potentate, inhabited by a boorish and stupid heathen people, but situated close to the mighty Chinese Empire, from which as many poor, industrious people shall flow to this colony as one could ever want."<sup>46</sup>

Some of these immigrants went into "frontier" occupations Chinese had pursued on Taiwan since before the Dutch came; fishing, deer-hunting, trading with the

aborigines. The Dutch levied a variety of taxes and license-fees on these activities, and tried to keep the Chinese engaged in them from causing trouble with the aborigines. Beginning in 1645 monopolies of trade with various aboriginal villages were distributed to local Chinese under a competitive bidding system that produced considerable revenue for the Company and considerable trouble for all concerned in the 1650's.<sup>47</sup> But the main occupation of the Chinese immigrants was agriculture, primarily sugar and rice, and this agriculture, unlike European herding and extensive cultivation, was incompatible with an unsettled, individualistic "frontier" way of life. Large-scale operations would facilitate land-clearing and water-control, and hired labor, when it was available, was useful at the very intensive labor periods characteristic of both sugar and rice. Thus substantial and concentrated capital investment and a highly disciplined labor force both facilitated the development of this kind of agriculture. In the first years of expansion of Chinese agriculture in Taiwan, several big merchants did a great deal of investing and organizing, setting up "parks" or plantations of about 20 morgen (45 acres) each.<sup>48</sup> The most interesting figure among these was Su Ming-kang, the first "Captain" of the Chinese community at Batavia, who resigned that post in 1635, came to Taiwan, and built himself a fine stone house there.<sup>49</sup> I have no evidence for direct involvement by Cheng Chih-lung in this development, but it seems rather likely that he was involved in some way. Soon after his "surrender" to the Ming in 1628, he reportedly submitted a proposal to the governor of Fukien for the transportation and settlement in Taiwan, with subsidies of oxen and silver, of thousands of famine refugees from the Fukien coast. Our source says this proposal was carried out, but it is not completely reliable, for it goes on to say that all this happened before the Dutch came to Taiwan.<sup>50</sup>

After 1644 a wave of refugees from the Ming-Ch'ing wars came to Taiwan. Some of them returned to the mainland after about 1648 as the fighting in the southeast began to die down, but there was another surge in the 1650's as Cheng Ch'eng-kung consolidated his power base on the Fukien coast and the Ch'ing increased their efforts to drive him out. Much of this population was a floating population of single males who remained only for the growing season and then returned to their homes on the mainland; this pattern remained important in Taiwan through the eighteenth century.<sup>51</sup> There were a few gentry refugees, but the two on whom we have information were litterateurs and recluses, leaving political leadership to the commercial and agricultural entrepreneurs, some of whom had substantial ties with Cheng Ch'eng-kung. As I mentioned above, the Chinese community had ten headmen; in 1651 some Chinese complained to the Dutch

that this meant they had to give more presents than in a single-headman system like Batavia's. <sup>52</sup>

The Dutch saw the long-run threat of the growing Chinese population to their control on Taiwan, but they also reaped the benefits of expanded agriculture. Available figures on these developments are summarized in the following table. I cannot explain the wild fluctuations in the sugar production figures. Probably they are not very reliable. But they do suggest a continued expansion in the late 1650's.

TABLE A  
CHINESE POPULATION AND AGRICULTURAL EXPANSION <sup>53</sup>

| Population | Rice                      | Sugar | Other | Total   | Sugar production<br>(in piculs) |
|------------|---------------------------|-------|-------|---------|---------------------------------|
|            | (all in morgen= 2½ acres) |       |       |         |                                 |
| 1636       |                           |       |       |         | 1220                            |
| 1640       | 3568                      |       |       |         | 4000?                           |
| 1645       | 1713                      | 612   | 161   | 2486    |                                 |
| 1646       |                           |       |       | 10,000? |                                 |
| 1647       |                           |       |       | 8000    |                                 |
| 1648       | 14,000-                   |       |       |         |                                 |
| 1649       | 15,000-                   |       |       |         | 5300                            |
| 1650       |                           |       |       |         | 12,000?                         |
| 1651       |                           |       |       |         | 35,000                          |
| 1652       | 4539                      | 1314  | 74    | 5927    | 8000                            |
| 1653       | 3731                      | 1334  |       | 5065    |                                 |
| 1654       | 2923                      | 1309  |       | 4232    | 7457?                           |
| 1655       |                           |       |       |         | 4500                            |
| 1657       | 6026                      | 1668  | 376   | 8070    | 27,300                          |
| 1658       |                           |       |       |         | 9000?<br>17,300?                |
| 1659       |                           |       |       |         | 12,000                          |

Taiwanese sugar and the Dutch trade with China and Japan played an important role in the complex commercial system of the Dutch East India Company. Sugar found substantial markets in India, Persia, and even in Europe until the market there was undercut by the revival of the Brazilian sugar industry in the late 1650's.<sup>54</sup> Imports of tropical goods, principally pepper and incense woods, to China were paid for in gold, raw silk, silk goods, and so on. The silk and silk goods found markets not only in Europe but in Japan, where they were paid for in large part by exports of gold, silver, and copper. The metals from China and Japan then were shipped from Taiwan to India to pay for the enormous Dutch purchases of Indian textiles, not only to sell in Europe but to exchange in Indonesia for pepper, cloves, and nutmeg.

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In addition to its importance in this chain of exchanges, profits on the exchange of tropical goods for Chinese silks and gold made Taiwan one of the most profitable Asia posts of the Dutch East India Company in the late 1640's. (Most of the enormous profits of the spice trade appeared in the Company's European balances.) But we must be very cautious in our use of these figures. They depended heavily on tricky calculations of the value of Chinese gold in a world of shifting exchange rates. Also, the Company's bookkeeping system had no way of accounting for the cost of shipping in a particular line of trade.<sup>55</sup> These costs must have been relatively high for the Taiwan trade, because many ships were lost or damaged in the terrible typhoons and the shallow and treacherous channel at Casteel Zeelandia. As the following table shows, even these dubious profits became less dependable in the changing situation of the 1650's.



TABLE B  
COMPANY BALANCES IN TAIWAN 56

(in thousands of guilders)

|      | Trade profits | Tolls, head taxes, etc. | Expenses | Balance | Shipments to India (mostly bullion) |
|------|---------------|-------------------------|----------|---------|-------------------------------------|
| 1636 |               |                         |          | +91     |                                     |
| 1637 |               |                         |          | -49     |                                     |
| 1638 |               |                         |          | -84     |                                     |
| 1640 |               |                         |          | +14     |                                     |
| 1641 |               |                         |          | +15     |                                     |
| 1642 |               |                         |          | -61     |                                     |
| 1643 |               |                         |          | +196    |                                     |
| 1644 |               | 117                     |          | +65     |                                     |
| 1645 |               |                         |          | -38     |                                     |
| 1646 |               | 122                     |          | -26     | 878                                 |
| 1647 |               | 135                     |          | +156    | c.800                               |
| 1648 | 561           | 245                     | 806 236  | +570    |                                     |
| 1649 | 411           | 362                     | 773 306  | +467    |                                     |
| 1650 | 494           | 388                     | 882 360  | +522    | c.600                               |
| 1651 | 436           | 278                     | 714 344  | +370    |                                     |
| 1653 | 382           | 286                     | 668 329  | +339    | 2,500                               |
| 1654 | (total: 594   | )                       | 375      | +219    |                                     |
| 1655 | 276           | 291                     | 563      | + 4     | 1,205                               |
| 1656 | (total: 536   | )                       | 419      | +117    |                                     |
| 1657 |               |                         |          | - 75    |                                     |
| 1658 | (total: 930   | )                       | 528      | +402    |                                     |

↓  
Tolls as % of total  
1648 - 30.4  
1649 - 46.8  
1650 - 43.9  
1651 - 38.9  
1653 - 42.7

Some of the bad years in the 1650's were direct results of Cheng Ch'eng-kung's interference with trade and of increased expenses for fortifications in Taiwan, but other factors may have been involved. The Dutch reported that the great flow of gold to Taiwan in the late 1640's was partly a result of the efforts of Ming loyalists along the coast to profit from their hoards of gold by investing them in tropical goods to be sold in China. <sup>57</sup> Some capital of this kind also may have been invested in the expansion of agriculture in Taiwan. But by the early 1650's there cannot have been much new capital of this kind, and most of the early multiplicity of loyalist centers of wealth and power had given way to the centralized regime of Cheng Ch'eng-kung. The flow of gold to Taiwan was declining, and Taiwan Chinese were beginning to borrow from the Dutch Company and individual Dutchmen in order to keep their farms and other enterprises going. <sup>58</sup>

The deterioration of the Dutch situation in Taiwan in the 1650's was a many-sided thing. The Company was at war in many parts of Asia, <sup>59</sup> and had few resources to spare to reinforce Taiwan as the danger of Chinese attack grew increasingly clear. Dutch administration in Taiwan was disrupted by serious factional disputes that seem to have had their origins in issues of church-state relations as well as in the usual claustrophobia, drunkenness, and foul climate. Beginning about 1643 the Company set up political agents ("politijquen") in various aboriginal areas, depriving the missionaries of their duties as secular agents of the Company. The missionaries never ceased to protest this and to argue with the political agents over local issues. Moreover, in the early 1650's Governor Nicolaes Verburgh and a majority of his Council thought the missionary effort was too thinly spread, and recommended that the Favorlang and southern areas be abandoned. This was vehemently opposed by the missionaries and by a minority of the Council, including Fredrik Coyet. Verburgh became a member of the Council of the Indies in Batavia, the ruling body of the Company in Asia, in 1655, and Coyet became governor in 1656. Verburgh was accepted as Batavia's expert on Taiwan, and constantly criticized the reports and recommendations of his old enemy Coyet, even those on the danger of a Chinese invasion and the necessity of reinforcing Taiwan. <sup>60</sup>

The Dutch in Japan had picked up hints of Chinese plans for an invasion of Taiwan as early as 1646, and from 1652 on there were more specific rumors that Cheng Ch'eng-kung planned to conquer Taiwan as a refuge from the Ch'ing. <sup>61</sup> Although the danger of cooperation between an invading force and the growing Chinese population was obvious, the Company's response was not very vigorous. In 1650 its ruling council in the Netherlands ordered that the Taiwan garrison be increased from less than 900 to 1200, but in 1655 it still was only about

1000.<sup>62</sup> Noting the profit figures and the losses of shipping, the Batavia authorities began to explore alternative arrangements for Chinese trade, including shifting the center from Casteel Zeelandia to Keelung, which had a less hazardous harbor and a smaller hinterland to defend, and opening trade in ports controlled by the new Ch'ing dynasty. An embassy was sent to Peking in 1655, but obtained only very limited trading privileges. Taiwan remained essential to trade with China and thus to the Company's commercial system, but less and less likely to merit a large new commitment of the Company's thinly-spread resources. <sup>63</sup>

The rather shaky Taiwan garrison, along with 1000-2000 aborigine auxiliaries, proved sufficient to suppress the first Chinese threat, a large but poorly-armed uprising of the Taiwan Chinese led by Kuo Huai-i 郭懷一 — On September 7-13, 1652. The Dutch, warned by seven of the headmen of the Chinese community, had only one night to muster their forces. The next morning Kuo's forces, over 4000 strong, plundered the Dutch settlement at Saccam (Ch'ih-k'an 赤嵌) across the harbor from the Castle, and killed and mutilated eight Dutchmen and some slaves. But then they broke and fled before the discipline and firepower of only 150 Dutch musketeers, and never again offered coherent resistance. The Dutch and aborigines hunted out the fugitives, including one large group that was camped in the mountains, and "killed between 3000 and 4000 rebel Chinese in revenge for the spilled Dutch Christian blood."<sup>64</sup> Apart from general and long-standing Chinese resentment of Dutch economic and political control, it is not easy to understand why this rebellion broke out at this time. Some of the village monopoly merchants were in financial difficulties, but the sugar economy was still quite healthy. Some of the leaders of the rebellion claimed, when tortured, that a fleet of 3000 junks with 30,000 men, presumably sent by Cheng Ch'eng-kung, was scheduled to land at Tancoya (modern Kao-hsiung) on September 17, but Cheng Ch'eng-kung was completely engaged in a siege of Chang-chou at this time, and there is no evidence in sources concerning him of any such plans. The easy and brutal suppression of the rebellion left a heritage of fear and hatred between the Chinese and the Dutch and of disastrous Dutch over-confidence; in 1661 they seem to have expected that Cheng Ch'eng-kung's highly disciplined troops would break and run before a musket volley as Kuo Huai-i's peasants had done. *specific source on this?*

*for information of the Dutch... of the... case.*

After the Kuo Huai-i rebellion the economic position of the Taiwan Chinese deteriorated steadily for a number of reasons. As early as 1650, Chinese merchants had paid more for the monopolies of the aboriginal villages than they could earn from them, and the Company had to remit one-fifth of the contracted payments

in order to save them from bankruptcy.<sup>65</sup> Probably competitive bidding for these monopolies had intensified as the Chinese population on Taiwan had increased in the late 1640's. The higher payments increased the pressure on the merchants to get all they could out of the aborigines by fair means and foul. In this situation the Dutch could not win; their efforts to control the Chinese and mitigate the effects of their monopolies<sup>66</sup> probably antagonized the Chinese, while the aborigines must have seen the Chinese as agents of the Dutch. The Chinese sugar economy also was encountering difficulties. The planters complained that wages rose steeply in periods of peak demand. They began to borrow from the Dutch in order to meet their need for cash, and by 1655 bad trade and some poor harvests had put them all deeply in debt. The Company had paid the Chinese a fixed price of seven reals per picul for all their sugar, but in 1658 this was reduced to five; increasing production in Taiwan and the undermining of the European market for Asian sugar by the revival in Brazil seem to have made the higher price untenable.<sup>67</sup> Other Chinese who had contracted with the Company to collect certain taxes and tolls in return for fixed payments also found themselves badly in debt. The Dutch granted some reductions in their payments and limited the rate of interest that anyone could charge a Chinese borrower to  $1\frac{1}{2}$  per cent per month.<sup>68</sup> Ho Pin, when he deserted to Cheng Ch'eng-kung in 1659, left behind debts to the Company of over 17,000 reals and to Dutch and Chinese private individuals of over 50,000 reals.<sup>69</sup> (The reader who converts these reals into taels will not go far wrong.) His information about the riches of Taiwan and the best invasion routes was invaluable to Cheng. The economic situation that had contributed to Ho's decision to flee was another asset to Cheng; to the Taiwan Chinese the Dutch must have appeared more and more as usurers and oppressive tax-collectors, and Cheng Ch'eng-kung as their prospective liberator and debt-cancellor.

No doubt the massacres of 1652 and the deteriorating economic condition of the Taiwan Chinese contributed to Cheng Ch'eng-kung's antagonism toward the Dutch, but the more immediate irritants were Dutch efforts to interfere with Chinese shipping in Southeast Asia in order to safeguard their own pepper monopolies, and sharpening competition between Cheng and the Dutch in all lines of trade. In 1655-1656 Cheng cut off almost all Chinese trade with Taiwan, ostensibly because of the poor treatment of his junks there and elsewhere. This was not his only reason; he was trying to bring all Chinese trade under his control, tax other merchants heavily, and increase his own investment in direct trade with Japan, Vietnam, and so on. If the Dutch could be deprived

of Chinese goods their competition with him in these areas would be seriously undermined. In 1656 Cheng ordered all Chinese under his authority to leave Taiwan; some did so, and more would have if the Dutch had not stopped them. In 1657 Coyet sent the interpreter Ho Pin to offer Cheng an annual payment of silver and war supplies and passes to the pepper ports. Cheng re-opened trade to Taiwan, but soon was protesting new incidents of Dutch plunder of his junks coming from Cambodia and from Johore on the Malay Peninsula. <sup>70</sup>

Relations with the aborigines were not nearly as important as relations with the Chinese in the changes in the Dutch situation in the 1650's, but here too the deterioration and Dutch loss of control was clear. We have already noticed the irritation caused by the exploitation of the villagers by the Chinese merchants. Other sources of irritation were the village schoolmasters, usually soldiers on detached service, often Germans or other non-Dutchmen, rarely devout, often dissolute and inclined to exploit for personal profit the people they were supposed to be leading toward Christianity. The Dutch authorities recognized the problem, but apparently could do little about it as long as the missionaries insisted on maintaining such a wide field of missionary enterprise. <sup>71</sup> Still another irritant was Chinese encroachment on land which belonged to but was not farmed by the aboriginal villages. The Company finally agreed to allow the leasing of some of these fields to Chinese, but not their permanent alienation. <sup>72</sup> The aborigines of the areas to the south and around Tamsui were restive and required an occasional punitive expedition. It might have made good sense for the Company to cut its losses by withdrawing from these areas completely, but it did not do so. In the south and near the Castle, it sought to control some of the troublesome villages by moving their entire populations and amalgamating them with villages that were reliable friends of the Dutch. Some of these people promptly ran away, and this policy probably contributed more to aborigine confusion and resentment than it did to Dutch security. <sup>73</sup>

In 1660-1661 Dutch Taiwan was overtaken by events beyond the control of the Company, to which the Company responded with another amazing display of bungling and internal dissension. After Cheng Ch'eng-kung's defeat at Nanking in 1659 rumors that he planned to conquer Taiwan as a refuge became increasingly prevalent. In 1660 the authorities at Batavia decided to send 600 soldiers on twelve ships to reinforce the Taiwan garrison if the threat of a Cheng invasion made this necessary, but if, as the Batavia Council expected, the threat had disappeared, the ships and troops were to be used for an attack on Macao. Joan van der Laen, who had gained fame as a bitter enemy of the

Portuguese in Ceylon and would always welcome a chance to attack his old enemies elsewhere, was placed in charge of the expedition. When Van der Laen's fleet arrived, he saw no immediate threat, but Coyet and his Council still wanted the reinforcements. An envoy was sent to Cheng to try to sound out his intentions, and Cheng of course denied any intention of attacking Taiwan. Finally Coyet managed to obtain the soldiers and four of the ships to strengthen his defenses, and Van der Laen, deprived of sufficient forces for an attack on Macao, returned to Batavia. There his complaints against Coyet and Verburgh's influence led to the decision, on June 10, 1661, to dismiss Coyet because of his "credubity and ungrounded fears of Coxinga's coming." <sup>74</sup>

Meanwhile, Coyet had aggravated an already bad situation by his security measures against the Taiwan Chinese. He imprisoned <sup>some</sup> of their elders for ten months and tortured one in an effort to get information about Cheng Ch'eng-kung's plans. He drove Chinese farmers from outlying districts into Saccam and burned their grain stores in order to deprive the enemy of them. <sup>75</sup> When the attack finally came on April 30, 1661, Dutch rule in most of Taiwan ended in a few days. The small garrisons at Keelung and Tamsui were evacuated to Nagasaki in June. The defenders of the Castle could do nothing but fend off Cheng attacks, receive some reinforcements from Batavia, and wait as Cheng Ch'eng-kung consolidated his control of the island, put many of his soldiers to work farming, and even collected from the Taiwan Chinese the debts they had owed to the Dutch. Some Sinkan aborigines had aided the Dutch briefly, but then all the aborigines went over to the Chinese and their chiefs received Chinese robes and caps to replace their Dutch staffs and tricolor flags. South of the Castle many villages openly rejoiced in their liberation from Dutch schools and Christianity. Only in the Favorlang area to the north did the Chinese encounter much resistance, but this was an area that had often resisted Dutch power in the previous decades. <sup>76</sup>

The Dutch re-occupation of Keelung from 1664 to 1668 was a sort of comic epilogue in which some of the main themes of this story were repeated. Keelung was re-occupied as an outpost for trade with the Ch'ing and maritime warfare against the Cheng regime, but accomplished nothing in either respect. The garrison of less than 300 suffered from endless personal quarrels and united only in the face of an attack by 3000-6000 Cheng troops in May 1666. The Cheng forces, apparently surprised to encounter any resistance against such odds and probably not provided with rations for a long siege, withdrew after ten days, but the Dutch position was increasingly undermined by quarrels with the aborigines and the infiltration of the aboriginal villages by Cheng village agents based in Tamsui. The Dutch finally blew up the remains of the old Spanish fort and

withdrew in October 1668.<sup>77</sup>

Taiwan had had its brief years as a meeting-point of great cultures and great thrusts of expansion. After 1662 it became more and more thoroughly Chinese, after the Ch'ing conquest in 1683 it had almost no contact with the non-Chinese world, and by 1703 it was so little known in Europe that George Psalmanazar could present himself in England as a "Formosan" without fear of exposure.<sup>78</sup> On the other hand, later Chinese residents of Taiwan seem to have been very little interested in its Dutch past. There are a few curious tales about the Dutch in Taiwan folklore, most notably the story of "Dark Bay" (An-ao 暗澳), where a Dutch ship landed in a beautiful but uninhabited country. It left a party there, and when the ship returned the next year everything was dark, and no one could be found; only a message on a rock saying that in that place there was only one day and one night in the year, and when night came it was ruled by evil spirits. Surely this is some kind of third-hand re-telling of some of the early Dutch accounts of Arctic exploration, probably of the winter passed on Novaya Zemlya by Willem Barentsz and his party in 1596-1597.<sup>79</sup> The remains of the old forts, of course, were further reminders of the Dutch past.<sup>80</sup> Chinese and Western observers noticed that some of the aborigines continued to write their own languages in the Latin alphabet and preserved a few vestiges of Christianity until well into the nineteenth century.<sup>81</sup> But Chinese sources have remarkably little to say about the most enduringly important side of Dutch Taiwan, its growing Chinese population.

Given the scarcity of Chinese sources and the concentration of the Dutch sources on trade and other immediate concerns of the Dutch, our knowledge of the Taiwan Chinese in this period is likely to remain very spotty. I wish to close by offering very tentatively for discussion and criticism by my conference colleagues some suggestions about characteristics of Taiwan Chinese society which probably had their origins in the Dutch period.

- 1) An agriculture highly responsive to commercial incentives.
- 2) A large commercial element in the elite of the society.
- 3) A tendency toward collective, not one-man, forms of community leadership.
- 4) A large number of transient farmers.
- 5) A tendency not so much to well-organized rebellion as to desperate and ill-armed uprising.

These suggestions are even more tentative and debatable than the rest of this paper. But I wish to emphasize that every statement in this paper is highly tentative, and cannot be otherwise until solid work is done in the Dutch archival sources.

NOTES

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<sup>1</sup> For an introduction to these collections see my "Ch'ing Relations with the Dutch, 1662-1690", in John K. Fairbank, ed., The Chinese World Order (Cambridge, Mass., Harvard University Press, 1968), pp. 225-256, 368-380, at pp. 372-373, and the other surveys cited there.

<sup>2</sup> In these notes the following abbreviations are used for the main printed Dutch sources and the best collection of Chinese sources:

Coen: H.T. Colenbrander and W.Ph. Coolhaas, eds., Jan Pietersz. Coen, Bescheiden Omtrent zijn Bedrijf in Indië, 7 vols. (J.P.C., documents concerning his activities in the Indies; The Hague, M. Nijhoff, 1919-1953)

CDNI: J.E. Heeres and F.W. Stapel, eds., Corpus Diplomaticum Neerlandico-Indicum, 6 vols. (The Hague, Nijhoff, 1907-1955)

DR: Dagh-register gehouden in 't Casteel Batavia, 1628-1682, 31 vols. (Day register kept in Batavia Castle, 1628-1682; Batavia, 1887-1931)

GM: W. Ph. Coolhaas, ed., Generale Missiven van Gouverneurs-Generaal en Raden aan Heren XVII der Verenigde Oostindische Compagnie (General letters of the governors-general and councils to the Gentlemen Seventeen of the United East India Company), 4 vols. so far, 1610-1638, 1639-1655, 1655-1674, and 1675-1685 (Rijks Geschiedkundige Publicatien [State Historiographical Publications] Large Series, Vols. 104, 112, 125, 134, The Hague, Nijhoff, 1960, 1964, 1968, 1971).

MacLeod: N. MacLeod, De Oost-Indische Compagnie als Zee-Mogendheid in Azië, 2 vols. (The East India Company as a sea power in Asia; Rijswijk, 1927)



TW: T'ai-wan wen-hsien ts'ung-k'an 臺灣文獻叢刊 (Collection of sources on [the history of] Taiwan; Taipei, 1958 et seq.)

<sup>3</sup> See, for example, the account by the Rev. Georgius Candidus translated in William Campbell, Formosa Under the Dutch (London, 1903, Taipei reprint, 1967), pp. 9-25, and Laurence G. Thompson, "Formosan Aborigines in the Early Eighteenth Century: Huang Shu-ching's 黃叔瓚 Fan-su liu-k'ao 番俗六考", Monumenta Serica 28:41-147 (1969).

<sup>4</sup> Raleigh Ferrell, "The Formosan Tribes: A Preliminary Linguistic, Archeological, and Cultural Synthesis", Bulletin of the Institute of Ethnology, Academia Sinica, 21:97-130 (1966); Raleigh Ferrell, Taiwan Aboriginal Groups: Problems in Cultural and Linguistic Classification (Institute of Ethnology Monograph Series, No. 17, Taipei, 1969); Raleigh Ferrell, "Paiwanic Ethno-Linguistic Groups of the West-Central Taiwan 'Black Pottery' Culture Area", Bulletin of the Institute of Ethnology, Academia Sinica, 28:159-196 (1969); Chang Yueh-ch'i 張耀銜, "P'ing-p'u-tsu she-ming tui-chao-piao" 平埔族社名對照表 (A comparative name-list of the plains aboriginal villages), Wen-hsien chuan-k'an Vol. 2, Nos. 1 and 2, Separate, Taipei, 1951).

<sup>5</sup> Felix M. Keesing, The Ethnohistory of Northern Luzon (Stanford University Press, 1962)

<sup>6</sup> See for example Iwao Seiichi 岩生成一, Nanyō Nihon-machi no kenkyū 南洋日本町の研究 (Studies of the "Japanese towns" of Southeast Asia; Tokyo, 1943); Iwao Seiichi, Shuin-sen boeki no kenkyū 朱印船貿易の研究 (Studies of the trade of the red-seal ships; Tokyo, 1962).

<sup>7</sup> W.L. Schurz, The Manila Galleon (New York, 1939, paperback, 1959); Pierre Chaunu, Les Philippines et le Pacifique des Iberiques (XVIe, XVIIe, XVIIIe Siecles): Introduction Methodologique et Indices d'Activite (Ports -- Routes -- Trafics, 11, S.E.V.P.E.N., Paris, 1960); John L. Phelan, The Hispanization of the Philippines (Madison, U. of Wisconsin, 1960); H. de la Costa, S.J., The Jesuits in the Philippines, 1581-1768 (Cambridge, Mass., Harvard University Press, 1961); E.H. Blair and J.A. Robertson, eds., The Philippines Islands, 55 vols. (Cleveland, Ohio, A.H. Clark, 1903-1909). For an example of the ecclesiastical histories that contains an account of the Spanish at Keelung see Juan Ferrando, Historia de los PP Dominiccos en las Islas Filipinas y en sus Misiones del Japon, China, Tung-kin, y Formosa, 6 vols. (Madrid, 1871-1872).

<sup>8</sup> C.R. Boxer, The Dutch Seaborne Empire, 1600-1800 (New York, Knopf, 1965); W.Ph. Coolhaas, A Critical Survey of Studies on Dutch Colonial History

(Koninklijk Instituut voor Taal-, Land- en Volkenkunde, Bibliographical Series, 4; The Hague, Nijhoff, 1960). The best narrative survey in Dutch on the East India Company in the seventeenth century is F.W. Stapel, ed., Geschiedenis van Nederlandsch Indie, 5 vols. (History of the Netherlands Indies; Amsterdam, "Joost van den Vondel", 1938-1940), Vol. 3.

<sup>9</sup> Ch'en Wen-shih 陳文石, Ming Hung-wu Chia-ching chien ti hai-chin cheng-ts'e 明洪武嘉靖間的海禁政策 (The Seafaring Prohibition Policy in the Early Ming Dynasty; History and Chinese Literature Series, Taiwan University, Taipei, 1966); Bodo Wiethoff, Die chinesische Seeverbotspolitik und der private Überseehandel von 1368 bis 1567 (Mitteilungen der Gesellschaft für Natur- und Völkerkunde Ostasiens, Vol. 45, Hamburg, 1963); Bodo Wiethoff, Chinas Dritte Grenze: Der traditionelle chinesische Staat und der küstennahe Seeraum (Veröffentlichungen des Ostasien-Instituts der Ruhr-Universität Bochum; Wiesbaden, 1969).

<sup>10</sup> Ch'en Mao-heng 陳懋恒, Ming-tai wo-k'ou k'ao-lueh 明代倭寇考略 (The invasion of China by Japanese pirates during the Ming Dynasty; Yen-ching Journal of Chinese Studies, Monograph Series, 6, Peiping, 1934); Li Kuang-ming 黎光明, Chia-ching yü-wo Chiang-che chu-k'o-chün k'ao 嘉靖禦倭主客軍考 (The repulse of the Wo pirates by provincial and extra-provincial armies in the provinces of Kiangsu and Chekiang during 1551-1561; Yen-ching Journal of Chinese Studies, Monograph Series, 6, Peiping, 1933)

<sup>11</sup> Albert Feuerwerker, "From 'Feudalism' to 'Capitalism' in Recent Historical Writings from Mainland China", Journal of Asian Studies, 18:107-115 (1958); Evelyn S. Rawski, Agricultural Change and the Peasant Economy of South China (Harvard East Asian Series, 66; Cambridge, Mass., Harvard University Press, 1972).

<sup>12</sup> Victor Purcell, The Chinese in Southeast Asia, 2d ed. (London, Oxford University Press, 1965).

<sup>13</sup> W.P. Groeneveldt, De Nederlanders in China, Eerste Deel: De eerste bemoeingen om den handel in China en de vestiging in de Pescadores (1601-1624) (The Dutch in China, Part One: The first efforts to open trade with China and the settlement in the Pescadores (Bijdragen tot de Taal-, Land-, en Volkenkunde van Nederlandsch Indie, 1898, also published separately, The Hague, Nijhoff, 1898); Chang Wei-hua 張維華, Ming-shih Fo-lang-chi, Lü-sung, Ho-lan, I-ta-li-ya ssu-chuan chu-shih 明史佛郎機呂宋和蘭意大里亞四傳注釋 (A commentary on the four

chapters on Portugal, Spain, Holland, and Italy in the History of the Ming Dynasty; *Yenching Journal of Chinese Studies*, Monograph Series, 7, Peiping, 1934), pp. 107-146.

<sup>14</sup> C.R. Boxer, Fidalgos in the Far East, reprint (New York, London, and Hong Kong, Oxford University Press, 1968), Ch. 5.

<sup>15</sup> See the sources cited in Note 13, Ming-chi Ho-lan-jen chin-chú P'eng-hu ts'an-tang 明季荷蘭人侵據澎湖等檔 (Archival sources on the occupation of the Pescadores by the Dutch in the late Ming; TW, No. 154), and DR 1624-1625, pp. 1-26, 40-42, 139-146.

<sup>16</sup> Iwao Seiichi, "Li Tan, Chief of the Chinese Residents at Hirado, Japan in the Last Days of the Ming Dynasty", Memoirs of the Research Department of the Toyo Bunko 17:27-83 (1958); "Relação da fortaleza, poder e trato com os chinas, que os olandeses tem na Ilha Formosa dada por Salvador Diaz natural de Macao que lá esteve cativo e fugio em huma soma em Abril do anno de mil e seiscentos e vinte e seis", Documentação Ultramarina Portuguesa, 5 vols. (Lisbon, Centro de Estudos Históricos Ultramarinos, 1960 et seq.), Vol. 2, pp. 61-68.

<sup>17</sup> GM . . . 1638, p. 705.

<sup>18</sup> GM . . . 1651, p. 455; see also Chang Yueh-ch'i.

<sup>19</sup> DR 1644, pp. 148-152; DR 1645, p. 163; Nakamura Takashi 中村孝志, "Shih-ch'i shih-chi T'ai-wan lu-p'i chih ch'u-ch'an chi ch'i tui-Jih mao-i" 十七世紀臺灣鹿皮之出產及其對日貿易 (The production of deer hides in Taiwan in the seventeenth century and their export to Japan), T'ai-wan ching-chi-shih pa-chi 臺灣經濟史八集 (The economic history of Taiwan, eighth collection; T'ai-wan yen-chiu ts'ung-k'an, No. 71) pp. 24-42.

<sup>20</sup> Liu Chien-shao 劉建韶, Fu-chien t'ung-chih cheng-shih lueh 福建通志政事略 (Essays on governmental affairs for a general gazetteer of Fukien; manuscript, Harvard-Yenching Library, n.d.), 14:14a-b.

<sup>21</sup> For a convenient collection of texts on Ming contacts with Taiwan see Liu-ch'iu yü Chi-lung-shan 流求與奚島龍山, TW, No. 196. On pirates there and Ming efforts to drive them out see especially pp. 88, 92, 94, 98, 103, and Shen Yu-jung 沈有容, Min-hai tseng-yen 閩海贈言 (Words of praise from the Fukien sea; TW, No. 56).

<sup>22</sup> Iwao Seiichi 岩生成一, "Shih-ch'i shih-chi Jih-pen-jen chih

T'ai-wan chin-lueh hsing-tung" 十七世紀日本人之臺灣侵略行動  
(The Japanese invasion of Taiwan in the seventeenth century), T'ai-wan  
ching-chi-shih pa-chi, pp. 1-23. I have found very little information  
about Japanese trading on Taiwan before the coming of the Dutch. Lin  
Ch'ien-kuang 林謙光, T'ai-wan chi-lueh 臺灣紀略 (A brief  
record of Taiwan), in Wang Hsi-ch'i 王錫祺, ed., Hsiao-fang-hu chai  
yü-ti ts'ung-ch'ao 小方壺齋輿地叢書 (Collected geographical  
essays from the Hsiao-fang-hu studio; 1877, supplements to 1897), Ninth  
Collection, pp. 136-137, says Pei-hsien-wei 北綫尾, the Dutch  
Baxemboy, the sand-bar just north of Casteel Zeelandia, was one of the centers  
of their trade.

23 DR 1624, pp. 23-24.

24 Chiang Jih-sheng 江日昇, T'ai-wan wai-chi 臺灣外記  
3 vols. (Unofficial history of Taiwan; TW, No. 60), p. 15. See Note 52  
below on the ten headmen system.

25 Rawski, 9-14, 142-144.

26 Iwao, "Li Tan", pp. 77-81; DR 6 and 9 Apr 1625, pp. 139-146; Coen,  
Vol. 7, Part 2, p. 1714.

27 The most reliable Chinese sources on this period are Cheng-shih  
shih-liao ch'u-pien 鄭氏史料初編 (Historical sources  
on the Cheng family, first collection; TW, No. 157) and Ts'ao Lü-t'ai 曹履泰,  
Ching-hai chi-lueh 靖海紀略 (Brief record of pacification of  
the sea; TW, No. 33). Chiang Jih-sheng obviously is important but must be  
used with great caution. For a good English summary of Cheng Chih-lung's  
career with much about his relations with the Dutch see C.R. Boxer, "The Rise  
and Fall of Nicholas Iquan", T'ien-hsia Monthly, 11.5:401-439 (April-May 1939).  
Dutch sources are extensive: MacLeod, I, 507-525; Coen, V, 71-72, 87, 100,  
159-162, 168-169, 259-274, 313-328, 486-499, 835, VII, Part 2, 1233-1255,  
1474-1488, 1529-1535, 1689-1758; CDNI, I, 214-217, 237-239, 243-244; GM, I,  
206-207, 229-232, 252-256; DR, 1625, p. 246, 1628, pp. 334, 337-338, 1631,  
pp. 8-11; W. Ph. Coolhaas, "Een Indisch Verslag uit 1631, van de Hand van  
Antonio van Diemen" (An Indian report from 1631, from the Hand of A. van D.),  
Bijdragen en Mededelingen van het Historisch Genootschap te Utrecht (Contributions  
and communications of the Historical Society at Utrecht), 65:1-237 (1947),  
at 37-41, 45-74.

28 Mac Leod, II, 19-40; GM, I, 311-314, 352-355, 375-378, 438; DR,

1632, pp. 61, 73, 118-119; 1633, pp. 147-149, 160-161, 163-164, 186-187; 1634, pp. 232-234, 252-255, 282-285, 292-293, 296-297, 303-307, 311-312, 426-433, 446-449.

<sup>29</sup> Coolhaas, "Indisch Verslag", 16-17, 74-92; W. Ph. Coolhaas, "Een Lastig Heerschap tegenover een Lastig Volk" (A troublesome rule and a troublesome people), Bijdragen en Mededelingen van het Historisch Genootschap te Utrecht, 69:17-44; GM, I, 187-190, 229-232, 252-256, 271-273, 414; Coen, V, 284-286; VII, Part 2, 1233-1255, 1689-1758; Francois Valentyn, Oud en Nieuw Oost-Indien, 5 vols. (Old and new about the East Indies; Dordrecht and Amsterdam, 1724-1726), Book 4, Ch. 1, 51-63, translated in Campbell, 38-51. Campbell's translations generally get the sense of the passage but are not really exact. ]!

<sup>30</sup> For the locations of the villages in this paragraph see Chang Yueh-ch'i, 6-15, and Ch'ing-ch'u hai-chiang t'u-shuo 清初海疆圖說 (Maps and explanations of seacoast areas in the early Ch'ing; TW, No. 155), 102, 106.

<sup>31</sup> MacLeod, II, 35-40, 307-308; Coolhaas, "Indisch Verslag", 42-45; Coen, V, 35-37; VII, Part 2, 1804; CDNI, I, 272-276, 439-441; GM, I, 271-272, 518-522, 658, 705, 742-743; DR, 1634, p. 284; 1636, pp. 18-21, 74, 76, 286-287; 1637, pp. 34-39.

<sup>32</sup> F.R.J. Verhoeven, Bijdragen tot de oudere koloniale geschiedenis van het eiland Formosa (Contributions to the earlier colonial history of the island Formosa; The Hague, 1930), Ch. 4-7; Jose Maria Alvarez, O.P., Formosa, Geografica y Historicamente Considerada, 2 vols. (Barcelona, 1930), I, 20-90; Ferrando, II, 121-126, 439-446; Blair and Robertson, XXII, 168-177, 181-186, 199-201; J.S. Cummins, ed., The Travels and Controversies of Friar Domingo Navarrete, 2 vols. (Hakluyt Society, Second Series, Vols. 118-119, Cambridge, 1962), I, 53.

<sup>33</sup> See the Dutch sources in Note 77 below and Jose Maria Gonzalez, O.P., Un Misionero Diplomático: Vida del Padre Victorio Riccio (Madrid and Buenos Aires, 1955), 71-74.

<sup>34</sup> Much of the information in this paragraph is drawn from Dutch reports on the Spanish situation; Coen, VII, Part 2, 1484-1485; Coolhaas, "Indisch Verslag", 42; DR, 1634, p. 284; 1636, p. 287-288; 1640, pp. 110-120; 1645, pp. 128-129; GM, I, 229-230, 271-273, 709.

<sup>35</sup> Blair and Robertson, XXXV, 128-162; GM, II, 173-174; DR, 1642, p. 167; CDNI, I, 368-370, 386-388.

36 GM, II, 197-198; DR, 1642, pp. 97-99, 146-153; 1644, 28-29; 1645, pp. 130-133, 169-171.

37 GM, II, 357, 455.

38 DR, 1645, p. 125.

39 Campbell, 15.

40 GM, II, 607.

41 Starting points for the study of this complex subject are William Campbell, Missionary Success in Formosa, 2 vols. (London, 1889), I, 15-214; Campbell, Formosa Under the Dutch, 89-379. The latter is a collection of translations of documents collected in J.A. Grothe, Archief voor de Geschiedenis der Oude Hollandsche Zending (Archives for the history of the old Dutch missions), 6 vols. (Utrecht, C. van Bentum, 1884-1891), Vols. 3 and 4.

However, Campbell's translations are not always exact, and there are many omissions and strange readings in Grothe; L. Knappert, "Hollandsche Pioniers op Formosa" (Dutch pioneers on Formosa), Nederlandsche Archief voor Kerkgeschiedenis, 19:97-121, at 104. Another solid study citing archival material is W.A. Ginsel, De Gereformeerde kerk op Formosa (The Reformed Church on Formosa; Leiden, 1931).

42 It is also interesting to notice some possible points of similarity between these aboriginal cultures and Eberhard's "Thai" culture, especially in the character and positions of the female shamans and in house-forms and the house as the center of the worship of the dead; W. Eberhard, The Local Cultures of South and East China (Leiden, E.J. Brill, 1968), 304-308, 317-319, 334. This would suggest that we should look carefully for similarities between the long and very important process of the Sinicization of the tribal peoples of southern China and the more recent Sinicization of the Taiwan aborigines.

43 Basic sources on 1644-1650 are DR, 1644, pp. 144-152; 1645, pp. 123-176; GM, II, 224-225, 278-280, 297-299, 304-311, 321-323, 332, 352-357, 362-364, 391-394, 444, 452-456, 471-475, 534-543.

44 GM, I, 487.

45 MacLeod, II, 307-308; GM, II, 104-105, 172; DR, 1641, p. 59.

46 GM, I, 520.

47 DR, 1645, p. 137.

48 DR, 1637, pp. 37-39.

49 DR, 1636, pp. 152-153; 1637, pp. 37-39; B. Hoetink, "So Bing Kong, Het Eerste Hoofd der Chineezzen te Batavia." (Su Ming-kang, the first chief of the Chinese at Batavia), Bijdragen tot de Taal-, Land-, en Volkenkunde van Nederlandsch Indië, 73:344-415 (1917), 79:1-44 (1923).

50 Huang Tsung-hsi 黃宗羲, Tz'u-hsing shih-mo 貝易姓始末 (Complete record of Cheng Ch'eng-kung; TW, No. 25), 6.

51 GM, II, 81, 393.

52 GM, II, 540. For short biographies of two gentry refugees see Yü Wen-i 余文儀, Hsu-hsiu T'ai-wan fu-chih 續修臺灣府志, 6 vols. (Revised gazetteer of Taiwan prefecture; TW, No. 121), 491-492.

53 MacLeod, II, 308-312, 363-366; DR, 1641, p. 62; 1645, p. 172; GM, I, 582, II, 209, 299, 307, 391-395, 613, 706, III, 1, 197, 277-281.

54 Kristof Glamann, Dutch-Asiatic Trade, 1620-1740 (The Hague and Copenhagen, 1958), 156-158; GM, III, 56.

55 Glamann, Ch. 12.

56 MacLeod, II, 308-312, 363-366; GM, II, 298-300, 308, 356, 364, 392, 444, 542, 704-705, 787, III, 54-63, 115, 198.

57 GM, II, 322.

58 GM, II, 535.

59 Stapel, ed., III, 277-292, 310-365.

60 Campbell, 265-287; GM, II, 536, 706, 785; 't Verwaerloosde Formosa (Amsterdam, 1675), published by Coyet or someone closely associated with him; see Campbell, 383-492 for an English translation. For more about Coyet see Gunnar Müllern, Första svensken i Japan: Han som miste Formosa (The first Swede in Japan: The man who lost Formosa; Stockholm, 1963).

61 Campbell, 459-462.

62 GM, II, 456, 539, 613, 783.

63 On the 1655 embassy see Johan Nieuhof, Het Gezantschap der Neerlandtsche Oost-Indische Compagnie aan den Grooten Tartarischen Cham, Den Tegenwoordigen Keizer van China (The embassy of the Dutch East India Company to the Great Tartar Khan, the present emperor of China; Amsterdam, 1665); Fu Lo-shu, A Documentary Chronicle of Sino-Western Relations (1644-1820), 2 vols. (Association for Asian Studies Monographs and Papers, 22, Tucson,

Ariz., 1966), I, 11-12, 16-20, 221-224; GM, III, 122-126, 173-184.

<sup>64</sup> GM, II, 609-612; Olfert Dapper, Gedenkwaardig Bedryf der Nederlandsche Oost-Indische Maetschappye op de Kuste en in het Keizerrijk van Taising of Sina (Notable enterpirse of the Dutch East India Company on the coast and in the empire of Taising [Ta-Ch'ing] or China; Amsterdam, 1670), 38-41; Lin Ch'ien-kuang; Yü Wen-i, 6; Chu Chieh-chin 朱傑勤  
Cheng Ch'eng-kung shou-fu T'ai-wan shih-chi 鄭成功收復台灣事蹟  
(The story of Cheng Ch'eng-kung's recovery of Taiwan; Shanghai, 1956), 17; Inō Yoshinori 伊能嘉矩, Taiwan bunka shi 臺灣文化志  
new printing, 3 vols. (A study of the culture of Taiwan; Tokyo, 1972), I, 67-68.

<sup>65</sup> GM, II, 538.

<sup>66</sup> GM, II, 455-456, 541.

<sup>67</sup> GM, III, 198.

<sup>68</sup> GM, III, 277.

<sup>69</sup> GM, III, 277.

<sup>70</sup> GM, III, 55-56, 194-196; Chiang Jih-sheng, 4:165-166.

<sup>71</sup> GM, II, 536, 706.

<sup>72</sup> GM, II, 758.

<sup>73</sup> GM, III, 278; CDNI, II, 128-133, 149-151. Campbell, 248, refers to a project to encourage the aborigines to use cattle for plowing. This may have some connection with the "Cattle Office" (niu-t'ou-ssu 牛頭司) mentioned in a few gazetteers; see Liu Liang-pi 劉良璧, Ch'ung-hsiu Fu-chien T'ai-wan-fu chih 重修福建臺灣府志 4 vols. (Revised gazetteer of Taiwan prefecture of Fukien; TW, No. 74), 491.

<sup>74</sup> Campbell, 400-409, 470-474; GM, III, 358-365; Albrecht Herport, Reise nach Java, Formosa, Vorder-Indien und Ceylon, 1659-1668 (Bern, 1668: reprinted in S.P. l'Honoré Naber, ed., Reise-Beschreibungen von Deutschen Beamten und Kriegsleuten im Dienst der Niederländischen West- und Ost-Indischen Kompagnien, 1601-1797, 13 vols., The Hague, Nijhoff, 1930-1932, Vol. V), 31-50; DR, 1661, pp. 62-65.

<sup>75</sup> GM, III, 358-365; DR, 1661, pp. 81-86.

<sup>76</sup> For useful summaries of the Cheng conquest of Taiwan see S. Kalff, "De Val van Formosa" (The fall of Formosa), De Gids 61.2:104-138 (1897);



C.R. Boxer, "The Siege of Fort Zeelandia and the Capture of Formosa from the Dutch, 1661-1662", Transactions of the Jann Society of London, 24:15-48 (1927); Shidehara Hiroshi 幣原 士旦, "Kokusenya no Taiwan kōryaku" 國姓爺の臺灣攻略 (Koxinga's conquest of Taiwan), Shigaku zasshi 東洋學雜誌, 42.3:265-299 (1931). For <sup>Western</sup> sources see Campbell, 383-492; GM, III, 373, 379, 385-389, 393-395; DR, 1661, 197-200, 203, 207-208, 428-430, 453, 484-520; Herport, 51-80; CDNI, II, 194-198; Wouter Schouten, Oost-Indische Voyagie (East Indian voyage; Amsterdam, 1676), 161-171.

<sup>77</sup> I hope to describe this episode in more detail in another article. The most important Dutch manuscript sources are Koloniaal Archief, 1148:982-1047 and 1291-1362, Keelung resolutions and day-register, 12 Jan - 29 Apr 1666; 1155:a172-191, Keelung to Batavia, 4 Feb 1667, and miscellaneous documents. See also DR, 1668, pp. 117-118, 211-212. On the Cheng attack see Liu Liang-pi, 486.

<sup>78</sup> Frederic J. Foley, S.J., The Great Formosan Impostor (Rome and St. Louis, Jesuit Historical Institute and St. Louis University, 1968).

<sup>79</sup> Ch'en Wen-ta 陳文達, T'ai-wan-hsien chih 臺灣縣志, 2 vols (Gazetteer of Taiwan hsien; TW, No. 103), 220; George Masselman, The Cradle of Colonialism (New Haven, Yale University Press, 1963), 103-104.

<sup>80</sup> Fang Hao 方豪, Chung-Hsi chiao-t'ung shih 中西交通史, 5 vols. (History of Sino-Western relations; Taipei, 1954), 5: 56-59.

<sup>81</sup> Fang Hao, 5:77-81.