Experimental Economics (實驗經濟學)

NTU (Spring 2013)

Time: Friday, 9:00-12:10pm, at 社科2   

Office Hour: Friday 12:10-1pm (after class) or by Email appointment

Course Syllabus

Textbooks:

• Textbook 1:   Colin F. Camerer (2003), Behavioral Game Theory, Princeton University Press. (BGT)

• Presentation: Daniel Ariely (2012), The Honest Truth About Dishonesty: How We Lie to Everyone---Especially Ourselves, Harper.

References:

    1. Kagel and Roth (1995, 2012), Handbook of Experimental Economics, Vol.1, and selected Vol.2 chapters, Princeton UP.
    2. Cassar and Friedman (2004), Economics Lab: An Intensive Course in Experimental Economics, Routledge (EL)
    3. Holt (2007), Markets, Games and Strategic Behavior, [雙葉代理] (undergraduate textbook)
    4. Riley (2012), Essential Microeconomics, Cambridge University Press. (EM)

Class Topics:

 1. [ 2 /22] Experimental Economics and Behavioral Game Theory (BGT, Ch.1, Wang notes) [Intro1]
               Experiment 1: The Pit Market
               Experiment 2: Ultimatum Game

 2. [ 3 / 1 ] Basic Principles of Experimental Design (BGT, A1.2) [Intro2]
               Experiment 3: p-Beauty Contest

               關於 presentation 的一些想法 (aka "How to Prepare a 20-minute Presentation" by Wei-jen Hsu)
                    Youtube: Life After Death by PowerPoint (with Chinese caption); 2010 updated version 
                    Youtube: Principles of economics, translated  (Transcription)  
                    10 most common presentation mistakes
                    Graphic Representation of Data: 1812 (originally by Minard)

 3. [ 3 / 8 ] Risk and Time Preferences [old slides] [Intro3]
               Experiment 4: Decision under Uncertainty (A), (B), (C)

               Student Presentation: 林政澤
                            Andreoni and Sprenger (2012a), Estimating Time Preferences from Convex Budgets, American Economic Review, 102(7), 3333-3356.
                   Andreoni and Sprenger (2012b), Risk Preferences Are Not Time Preferences, American Economic Review, 102(7), 3357-3376.

               Further Reading:  
                      Shadow Prices (EM 1.2) and Envelope Theorem (EM 1.3) [Theory1]
                   Theory of Risky Choice (EM 7.1) and Aversion to Risk (EM 7.2) [Theory2]

 4. [ 3 /15] Mixed Strategy Equilibrium and Quantal Response Equilibrium [old slides] (BGT, Ch.3, Ostling et al., 2011) [Strategic1]
               Experiment 5: LUPI game

               Book Chapter 1 Presentation: TBA
               Student Presentation: Ralf Counen
                   (Review) Goeree, Holt and Palfrey (2012), “Quantal Response Equilibrium,” New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics.

               Further Reading:
               Strategic Equilibrium (EM 9.1) [Theory3]

 5. [ 3 /22] Level-k Thinking and Dominant Solvable Games [old slides] (BGT, Ch.5 and Crawford et al., JEL 2013) [Strategic2]
               Experiment 6: Hide and Seek Game

               Book Chapter 2 Presentation: 陳嘉瑋、陳正庭
               Student Presentation: 林彥竹、吳奎慶
                   Ho and Su (2013), A Dynamic Level-k Model in Sequential Games, Management Science, forthcoming.

               Further Reading:
               Games with History (EM 9.2) [Theory4]

 6. [ 3 /29] Learning [old slides](BGT, Ch.6; new Handbook chapter) [Strategic3]

               Book Chapter 2B Presentation: 劉郁辰、吳宗翰、陳端駿
               Student Presentation: 葉明仁、李穆先、陳乃宣
                   Chen, Liu, Chen and Lee (2011), Bounded Memory, Inertia, Sampling and Weighting Model for Market Entry Games, Games, 2(1), 187-199. (Learning) 

 7. [ 4 /12] Coordination and Equilibrium Selection [old slides] (BGT, Ch.7) [Strategic4]
               Experiment 7: Presidential Nomination Game
               Experiment 8: Minimum Effort Game
               Experiment 9: Price/Quantity Market

               Book Chapter 3 Presentation: 張凱杰、王璽維
               Student Presentation: 劉郁辰、吳宗翰、陳端駿
                    Cason, Savikhin and Sheremeta (2012), Behavioral Spillovers in Coordination Games, European Economic Review, 56, 233-245.

 8. [ 4 /19] Coordination and Equilibrium Selection (continued)

               Book Chapter 4 Presentation: 林建勳、鄭庭安
               Student Presentation: 彭陸洋、賴俞安、鍾幸辰
                    Kagel, Lien and Milgrom (2013), Ascending Prices and Package Bidding: Further Experimental Analysis, mimeo.

               Further Reading:
               Games of Incomplete Information (EM 10.1) [Theory5]

 9. [ 4 /26] Auctions [old slides] (EL, Ch.9; new Handbook chapter) [Strategic5]

               Book Chapter 5 Presentation: 林政澤、Ralf Conen、陳柏文
               Student Presentation: 陳嘉瑋、陳正庭
                    Drouvelisa, Müller and Possajennikov (2012), Signaling Without a Common Prior: Results on Experimental Equilibrium Selection, Games and Economic Behavior, 74(1), 102–119.

               Further Reading:
               Refinements of Bayesian Nash Equilibrium (EM 10.2) [Theory6]

10.[ 5 / 3 ] Auctions (continued)

               Book Chapter 6 Presentation: 彭陸洋、賴俞安、鍾幸辰
               Student Presentation: 林建勳、鄭庭安
                    Vespa and Wilson (2012), Communication with Multiple Senders: An Experiment, under revision for Econometrica.

11.[ 5 /10] Signaling, Reputation and Cheap Talk (BGT, Ch.8) [Strategic6]
               Experiment 10: Pull or Push

               Book Chapter 7 Presentation: 葉明仁、李穆先、陳乃宣
               Student Presentation: 王璽維
                    (Review) Johnson and Mislin (2011), Trust Games: A Meta-Analysis, Journal of Economic Psychology, 32(5), 865-889.
                    (Review) Engel (2011), Dictator Games: a Meta Study, Experimental Economics, 14(4), 583-610.
                    (Review) Oosterbeek, Sloof and Van de Kuilen (2004), Cultural Differences in Ultimatum Game Experiments: Evidence from a Meta-Analysis, Experimental Economics, 7(2), 171–188.

12.[ 5 /17] Neuroeconomics: fMRI and Eyetracking (Wang Handbook chapter) [old slides] [Topic1]

               Book Chapter 8 Presentation: 蘇孟謙、吳怡軒、謝富文
                    Dean (2012), What Can Neuroeconomics Tell Us About Economics (and Vice Versa)? mimeo.
                    (Review) Chen and Goeree, NOBEL 2012 Economics: Stable Allocations and Market Design, Nature, 492, 54-55 (06 December 2012).

13.[ 5 /24] Social Preferences (BGT, Ch.2; new Handbook chapter) [Topic2]

               Book Chapter 9 Presentation: 唐恩信
               Student Presentation: 唐恩信
                    Pathak and Sönmez (2013), School Admissions Reform in Chicago and England: Comparing Mechanisms by their Vulnerability to Manipulation, American Economic Review, 103(1): 80-106.
                    Budish and Cantillon (2012), “The Multi-unit Assignment Problem: Theory and Evidence from Course Allocation at Harvard,” American Economic Review, 102(5): 2237-71.

14.[ 5 /31] Bargaining (BGT, Ch.4) and Field Experiments [old slides] (Harrison and List, 2004) [Topic3]

               Book Chapter 10 Presentation: 林彥竹、吳奎慶
               Student Presentation: 張凱杰、陳柏文
                    Balafoutas, Beck, Kerschbamer and Sutter (2013), What Drives Taxi Drivers? A Field Experiment on Fraud in a Market for Credence Goods, Review of Economic Studies, forthcoming.

15.[ 6 / 7 ] Prediction Markets and Asset Bubbles (EL, Ch.8; MGS, Ch.34) [Topic4]
               Experiment 11: Asset Market Experiment

               Student Presentation: 蘇孟謙、吳怡軒、謝富文
                    Hanson, Oprea and Porter (2006), Information aggregation and manipulation in an experimental market, Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, 60(4), 449-459.
                    Tung, Chou, Lin and Lin (2011), Comparing the Forecasting Accuracy of Prediction Markets and Polls for Taiwan's Presidential and Mayoral Elections, Journal of Prediction Markets, 5(3), 1-26.

               Further Reading:
               Robinson Crusoe Economy (EM 5.1) and Equilibrium and Efficiency (EM 5.2) [Theory7]
               Equilibrium Future Prices (EM 5.6) and Arrow-Debreu Equilibrium (EM 8.1) [Theory8]
               Security Market Equilibrium (EM 8.2) [Theory9]