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International migration and economic growth: a source country perspective

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Abstract This study analyzes the impact of international migration on economic growth of a source country in a stochastic setting. The model accounts for endogenous fertility decisions and distinguishes between public and private schooling systems. We find that economic growth crucially depends on the international migration since the migration possibility will affect fertility decisions and school expenditures. Relaxation of restrictions on the emigration of high-skilled workers will damage the economic growth of a source country in the long run, although a ‘brain gain’ may happen in the short run. Furthermore, the growth rate of a source country under a private education regime will be more sensitive to the probability of migration than a country under a public education regime.

Keywords Migration · Brain drain · Economic growth

JEL Classification F22 · J24 · O15

1 Introduction

There has been considerable recent debate on the pros and cons of international migration from developing countries. The traditional view of openness to migration in a developing country demonstrates that such openness would induce the emigration of high-skilled workers and create a “brain drain” problem. Miyagiwa (1991) developed a theoretical model with scale economies in advanced education to analyze human capital formation for both host and source countries and concluded that a “brain drain” will impact upon the availability of intermediate-skilled workers in the source country. Conversely, Stark et al. (1998) and Stark and

1 See Bhagwati and Rodriguez (1975) for a literature survey of earlier works on this issue.
Wang (2002) argued that migration raises the return on human capital that will in turn raise the average level of human capital in the source country.

Following the prior literature, we investigate the impact of migration on economic growth through the role of human capital in this paper. However, there are three features to distinguish this paper from previous works. First, it is well known that fertility and education are interdependent decisions for parents. Becker et al. (1990) developed a model to study how the joint decisions of fertility and education affect economic growth. De la Croix and Doepke (2003) explored the linkage between growth and inequality when differential fertility matters. However, studies in migration tend to assume constant population and do not take fertility decision into account. Rodriguez (1975) and Mountford (1997) presented a dynamic model to study the issues of migration and economic growth; however, population was taken as an exogenous variable and was assumed to grow at a constant rate. In this paper, we allow parents to make fertility and education decisions and to have an opportunity to migrate to a foreign country.Internalizing fertility decisions will induce a trade-off between quality and quantity for parents when the possibility of migration changes. The quality–quantity trade-off of children will then have an effect on economic growth because it affects children’s human capital accumulation. Furthermore, when considering an economy with heterogeneous agents, fertility matters since it will affect the structure of the labor force.

Second, a stochastic model of migration is developed. The uncertainty of migration was considered by Beine et al. (2001) to differentiate an ex ante “brain effect” and an ex post “brain effect.” We adopt the stochastic model developed by Kalemli-Ozcan (2003) to stress the random property of migration and to internalize fertility decisions within the model. For parents, the uncertainty of migration will induce the need of insurance against failed migration of children. Hence, there will be a “precautionary demand” of children for parents.

Third, the previous theoretical literature of migration only focuses on the accumulation of human capital under a private education regime. As pointed out by Glomm (1997), when considering secondary schools, for most developing countries, the public school enrollment rate is higher than the private school enrollment rate. Under a private education regime, parents decide the level of educational investment that they will make for their children and the school expenditure is heterogeneous. Under a public education regime, public schools are financed by tax revenue and adults vote for the tax rate. Hence, public school expenditure is provided by the government and is homogenous. Economic performance will be different under different school regimes because the school expenditure will affect the accumulation of human capital. Therefore, a theoretical approach is required in order to study the impacts of migration on human capital accumulation under these two different education systems. Glomm and Ravikumar (1992) found that private schooling generates a higher growth rate, whilst income inequality is lower under public schooling. De la Croix and Doepke (2004) incorporated education and fertility decisions and compared the implications for economic performance within private and public schooling. In this paper, we study the impact of international migration on economic growth under two different education regimes when a source country is open to migration, arguing that the type of education regime matters.

2 For the model setting of human capital accumulation under a private education regime, see Uzawa (1965) and Lucas (1988).
We first analyze an economy with homogenous agents, then extend the model to an economy with heterogeneous agents when there is a change of migration possibility. The impacts of an increase in the probability of migration on fertility and educational expenditure depend on the wage ratio of the home country to a foreign country, parents’ preference, and the migration probability. Assuming that high- and low-skilled workers have different probabilities of migration, we show that if the wage ratio of the home country to a foreign country is large, or if high-skilled parents strongly prefer their children to emigrate to a foreign country, or if the probability of emigration for high-skilled workers is high enough, high-skilled parents will have fewer children and a greater level of educational expenditure per child under a private education regime. Under a public education regime, high-skilled parents will similarly prefer to have fewer children. Hence, parents will have more time for work because they spend less time to raise children, and their earnings will increase. The educational expenditure per student in public schools will increase due to the higher tax base. Similar results can be also acquired for low-skilled parents.

Allowing more high-skilled workers to emigrate will damage the economic growth of a source country in the long run, although a “brain gain” may happen in the short run. However, relaxing migration restrictions on low-skilled workers will increase or decrease the economic growth, depending on the economic conditions. In a comparison of the implications of migration under private and public schooling, we find that fertility is more sensitive to the possibility of migration when education is not free. Hence, the per capita income growth rate will be more sensitive to the probability of migration under private schooling than under public schooling.

The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In the next section, we describe the setting of the model, introducing a stochastic model of migration and analyzing economic performance under private and public schooling. This is followed by an examination of an economy with heterogeneous agents. The numerical experiments are given in the penultimate section, followed by the conclusions drawn from this study in the final section.

2 The model

We consider an infinite-horizon, discrete-time, overlapping-generations model where agents with identical preferences live for two periods. Each period covers approximately 30 years, corresponding to childhood (young agents) and adulthood (old agents).

We assume that adults can migrate to a foreign country (country B) with probability $p \in (0,1)$ or stay in the home country (country A) with probability $(1-p)$. Let $w_A$ and $w_B$ represent the real wage per unit of human capital in country A and B, respectively. In order to reflect the motivation for migration, we assume that $w_B$ is higher than $w_A$. Adult earnings are equal to their level of human capital, $h_t$, multiplied by the real wage per unit of human capital of the country in which they live ($w_j h_t$, $j = A, B$).

Education in the source country could be under a private regime (denoted by $r$) or a public regime (denoted by $u$). Let $i$ represent the school type. Individuals born in period $t-1$ need to decide their adult consumption, $c_{it}$, and the optimum number of children, $n_{it}$. A proportion of these children, $p_{nit}$, will migrate to country B and earn $w_B h_{it+1}$, where $h_{it+1}$ is the human capital of children educated under a certain type of education system. The remainder, $(1-p)n_{it}$, will stay in country A and earn...
Define $N_{it} = pn_{it}$ to represent the mean number of migrants; thus we define the utility function as:

$$u_{it} \log (c_{it}) + \beta \log (N_{it} w_B h_{it+1} + a(n_{it} - N_{it})w_A h_{it+1}), \ i = r, u. \quad (1)$$

The parameter $\beta > 0$ reflects the degree of altruism amongst parents. Agents care about their adult’s consumption, the expectation of total income earned by their children in a foreign country, and the total income earned by their children staying in the home country. The parameter measures how much income earned by children in a foreign country will provide the same utility as 1 unit of income earned by children in the home country. Equation 1 can be rewritten as

$$u_{it} = \log (c_{it}) + \beta (\log w + \log n_{it} + \log h_{it+1}), \quad (1')$$

where $w = pw_B + a(l - p)w_A$.

Suppose that $e_{it}$ represents school expenditure. The human capital accumulation function depends on both school expenditure, $e_{it}$, and parental human capital, $h_{it}$, and is given by:

$$h_{it+1} = \lambda e_{it}^{\gamma} h_{it}^{1-\gamma}, \ i = r, u, \quad (2)$$

where $\lambda$ is a positive constant and $\gamma \in (0, 1)$. The parameters $\gamma$ and $1 - \gamma$ represent the elasticity of human capital amongst children in terms of their respective school expenditure and parental human capital.

### 2.1 A private education regime

Each adult is endowed with 1 unit of time that they need to allocate between working and raising children. We assume that each child consumes a fraction $(\phi \in (0, 1))$ of his/her parent’s unit of time. Hence, the budget constraint for an adult staying in country A is:

$$c_{rt} + n_{rt} e_{rt} = (1 - \phi n_{rt})w_A h_{rt}. \quad (3)$$

Adults need to make decisions on fertility and education and have a chance to migrate to country B. If they stay in country A, they will maximize Eq. 1’ subject to Eqs. 2 and 3 under private schooling. The optimal choices of $n_{rt}$ and $e_{rt}$ are:

$$n_{rt} = \frac{\beta (1 - \gamma)}{\phi (1 + \beta)}, \quad (4)$$

$$e_{rt} = \frac{\gamma \phi}{1 - \gamma} w_A h_{rt}. \quad (5)$$

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3 Parents would care about domestic and foreign children differently due to several reasons. For example, parents may care less about migrating children since they see them less often. On the other hand, parents may care more about migrating children because of a direct monetary reason such as remittances.
Given the parameter values, \( n_{rt} \) is constant, whereas \( e_{rt} \) is a linear function of parental human capital. Both \( n_{rt} \) and \( e_{rt} \) are independent of \( p \). Hence, without considering the random property of migration, changes in \( p \) will not affect \( n_{rt} \) and \( e_{rt} \).

2.2 A public education regime

Under a public education regime, education is provided free. We assume that adults need to pay income tax and we use \( \tau_t \) to represent the tax rate. The government uses tax revenue to support public schools and runs a balanced budget. Let \( n_{ut} \) and \( e_{ut} \) represent the respective fertility and school expenditure under a public education regime. School expenditure \( (e_{ut}) \) under a public education regime is:

\[
e_{ut} = \tau_t (1 - \phi n_{ut}) w_A H_{ut},
\]

where \( H_{ut} \) is the average human capital under a public education regime. Therefore, the budget constraint for adults becomes:

\[
c_{ut} = (1 - \tau_t)(1 - \phi n_{ut}) w_A h_{ut}.
\]

Agents who stay in country A will maximize Eq. 1 subject to Eqs. 2, 6, and 7 by choosing fertility and tax rate. Since the school expenditure is determined by the public policy, parents do not need to decide the educational investments for their children. The optimal choices of fertility \( (n_{ut}) \) is:

\[
n_{ut} = \frac{\beta}{\phi(1 + \beta)}.
\]

Substituting Eq. 8 into Eq. 6, we can get the public school expenditure as

\[
e_{ut} = \frac{1}{1 + \beta} \tau_t w_A H_{ut}.
\]

Using Eqs. 6’ and 8, the indirect utility function under public schooling is

\[
\log \left( \frac{1 - \tau_t}{1 + \beta} w_A h_{ut} \right) + \beta \left[ \log w + \log \frac{\beta}{\phi(1 + \beta)} + \log \left( \frac{1}{1 + \beta} \tau_t w_A H_{ut} \right)^{\gamma} \right].
\]

Hence, the optimal choice of the tax rate is

\[
\tau_t = \frac{\beta \gamma}{1 + \beta \gamma} = \tau \in (0, 1).
\]

Equations 8 and 9 show that both the tax rate and fertility are constant. We can then derive from Eq. 6 that school expenditure is a fraction of average human capital. Proposition 1 summarizes the impact of \( p \) on fertility and school expenditure under private and public schooling.

**Proposition 1** Without considering the random nature of migration, any variation in the probability of migration will not affect fertility and school expenditure per student under both education regimes. Furthermore, fertility will be higher when education is provided free.
In order to compare fertility under the two different education systems, note that:

\[ n_{ut} = \frac{\beta}{\phi(1 + \beta)} > \frac{\beta(1 - \gamma)}{\phi(1 + \beta)} = n_{rt}. \]

Hence, fertility is higher under a public education regime than under a private education regime because when education is provided free, the cost of having children is lower. Let \( L_t \) represent the total population and \( \pi_t \) represent the population growth rate, proposition 2 reflects the implications of \( p \) on population growth.

**Proposition 2** Without considering the random nature of migration, an increase in the probability of migration will reduce the population growth rate under both education regimes.

**Proof** The population growth rate is:

\[ \pi_{it}(p) = \frac{L_{it+1}}{L_{it}} - 1 = (1 - p)n_{it} - 1, \quad i = r, u. \]

Without incorporating the random nature of migration, fertility is positively constant under both education regimes. Hence:

\[ \pi'_{it}(p) = -n_{it} < 0, \quad i = r, u. \]

QED.

A “brain drain” problem occurs if changes in the probability of migration deplete the accumulation of human capital. On the other hand, changes in the probability of emigration will cause a “brain gain” if they raise the accumulation of human capital. Propositions 1 and 2 demonstrate that an increase in the probability of migration will reduce only the population growth rate and will not affect fertility or school expenditure. This implies that an increase in \( p \) will neither cause a “brain drain” nor a “brain gain.” Hence, we need to adopt a model to incorporate the random nature of migration.

### 2.3 The stochastic model

In order to embody the random feature of adult migration, a stochastic model of migration is constructed based on Kalemli-Ozcan (2003). If we assume that the number of migrants, \( N_{it} \), is a random variable drawn from a binomial distribution, then the expected utility for agents can be written as:

\[ \sum_{N_{it}=0}^{n_{it}} \left\{ \log c_{it} + \beta \log(N_{it}w_Bh_{it+1} + a(n_{it} - N_{it})w_Ah_{it+1}) \right\} \left( \frac{n_{it}}{N_{it}} \right) p^{N_{it}} \times (1 - p)^{n_{it} - N_{it}}. \] (10)

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4 However, several modifications have been made because the intention of Kalemli-Ozcan (2003) was to study the implications of mortality.
Appendix 1 shows that, using Taylor series expansions to approximate the utility function around the mean, the household maximization problem can be written as:

$$\max_{e_{it}, n_{it}} \left\{ \log((1 - \phi n_{it})w_A h_{it} - n_{it}e_{it}) + \beta \left( \log w + \log n_{it} + \log h_{it+1} - \frac{p(1-p)d^2}{2w^2n_{it}} \right) \right\}$$

where $d = w_B - aw_A$.

When the random feature of migration is present, agents maximize Eq. 10, subject to Eqs. 2 and 3, by choosing fertility and educational investment under a private education regime. The first-order conditions of the maximization problem are:

$$\beta y + \phi n_{rt} = \beta \left[ 1 + \frac{p(1-p)d^2}{2w^2n_{rt}} \right], \quad (11)$$

$$e_{rt} = \frac{\beta y(1 - \phi n_{rt})w_A h_{rt}}{(1 + \beta y)n_{rt}}. \quad (12)$$

Using Eqs. 11 and 12 to substitute fertility and educational investment into Eq. (2), we can derive the law of motion of human capital under private schooling.

Under a public education regime, agents maximize Eq. 10, subject to Eqs. 2, 6, and 7, by choosing fertility and tax rate. Optimization with respect to $n_{ut}$ implies that:

$$\frac{\phi}{1 - \phi n_{ut}} = \beta \left[ \frac{1}{n_{ut}} + \frac{p(1-p)d^2}{2w^2n_{ut}^2} \right]. \quad (13)$$

Although we are not able to solve for the analytical solution of $n_{ut}$ from Eq. 13, the tax rate is the same as in Eq. 9 because of the property of the logarithm utility function.

Substituting the tax rate and fertility in Eqs. 9 and 13 into Eq. 2 gives us the law of motion of human capital under public schooling; from the human capital accumulation functions under private and public education regimes, we can derive the constant growth rate of average human capital under both education regimes.

**Proposition 3**

Given the probability of migration, the growth rates of average human capital ($g_i^H, i=r,u$) are constant under both education regimes when agents are homogeneous.

**Proof**

See Appendix 2.

### 2.4 Implications of migration

Equations 11 and 13 show that with the random property of migration, fertility depends on the probability of migration under both education systems. This is because the random nature of migration will cause a “precautionary demand” of
children for parents. Furthermore, combining Eqs. 11 and 12 shows that educational investment under a private education regime also depends on the probability of migration. Under a public education regime, a change in the probability of migration will affect both fertility and the time spent by parents on work. This will in turn change the tax base and affect public school expenditure per student.

**Proposition 4** With the random nature of migration, an increase in the probability of migration will lead to a trade-off between quality and quantity. If \( \frac{w_B}{w_A} > \frac{a(1-p)}{p} \), this will reduce fertility and increase the level of school expenditure per student under both education regimes. The situation will be reversed if \( \frac{w_B}{w_A} < \frac{a(1-p)}{p} \).

**Proof** See Appendix 3.

We define \( p^* \) such that \( \frac{a(1-ps)}{p^*} = \frac{w_B}{w_A} \). First, notice that a decrease in \( a \) or an increase in \( p \) will lower the value of \( \frac{a(1-p)}{p} \). Hence, if the ratio of the domestic wage rate to the foreign wage rate is sufficiently large, or if parents strongly favor their children migrating to a foreign country (\( a \) is sufficiently small), or if the probability of migration is sufficiently high, a rise in \( p \) will lower fertility because it decreases the need for an insurance against failed migration and it reduces the “precautionary demand” of children. Moreover, it also implies that more children will be able to migrate to a foreign country to earn higher wage rates per unit of human capital, and thus, there will be an increase in the return on human capital. Under private schooling, parents will prefer to have fewer children, but they will spend more on each child’s education. Under public schooling, with an increase in \( p \), fertility will decline; having fewer children means that parents can spend more time at work, and this will increase the tax revenue/school expenditure per student. Conversely, if the ratio of the domestic wage rate to the foreign wage rate is sufficiently small, or if \( a \) is sufficiently large, or if \( p \) is sufficiently small, an increase in \( p \) will augment fertility because it increases the expected income earned by children. Thus, school expenditure per student will be lower. The influence of an increase in \( p \) under two education regimes are summarized in Table 1.

As regards population growth, if \( p > p^* \), an increase in \( p \) will not only reduce fertility, but will also mean that more adults will migrate to a foreign country. However, if \( p < p^* \), fertility will increase with an increase in \( p \), and the impact of \( p \) on population growth is uncertain. Thus:

**Proposition 5** With the random property of migration, if \( p > p^* \), an increase in the probability of migration will reduce population growth rate under both education regimes. However, if \( p < p^* \), the impact of changes in \( p \) on population growth is uncertain under both education regimes.

**Proof** The population growth rate is:

\[
\pi_{it}(p) = \frac{L_{it+1}}{L_{it}} - 1 = (1 - p)n_{it} - 1, \quad i = r, u.
\]

Therefore, \( \pi_{it}(p) = -n_{it}(p) + (1-p)n_{it}(p), \quad i=r,u \).

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5 Kalemli-Ozcan referred to this as the “insurance effect” since with the uncertainty of mortality of children, a self-insurance strategy for parents is to overshoot fertility.
From proposition 4, if \( p > p^* \), then \( n'_i(p) < 0 \) and \( \pi'_i(p) < 0 \) for \( i = r, u \). However, if \( p < p^* \), then \( n'_i(p) > 0 \), and the sign of \( \pi'_i(p) \) is uncertain under both education regimes.

QED.

In order to study the “brain drain” or “brain gain” problem, we analyze the impact of \( p \) on human capital accumulation.

**Proposition 6** If \( p > p^* \), with the random feature of migration and homogeneous agents, an increase in the probability of migration will create a “brain gain” under both education regimes. However, if \( p < p^* \), an increase in the probability of migration will cause a “brain drain” under both education regimes.

**Proof** Proposition 4 shows that \( e'_i(p) \geq 0 \) if \( p \geq p^* \), for \( i = r, u \), then:

\[
\frac{\partial H_{it+1}}{\partial p} = \frac{\partial h_{it+1}}{\partial p} = \frac{\partial h_{it+1}}{\partial e'_i(p)} e'_i(p) \geq 0 \text{ if } p \geq p^*.
\]

QED.

Proposition 6 demonstrates that as the probability of migration increases, both “brain gain” and “brain drain” could happen. When the wage ratio is quite large between the home country and a foreign country, or when parents favor children to migrate, or when the probability of migration is high enough, an increase in \( p \) will create a “brain gain” and reduce the population growth. On the other hand, if the wage ratio of the home country to a foreign country is small, or if parents favor children staying in the home country, or if the probability of migration is low, an increase in \( p \) will create a “brain drain” and its impact on the population growth is uncertain.

**3 Heterogeneous agents**

In the previous section, we assumed that everyone in the economy was homogeneous with the same probability of migration. However, it is well known that high-skilled workers are more welcome within a host country than low-skilled workers.\(^6\) Hence, in this section, we extend our model to an economy with heterogeneous agents.

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\(^6\)The probability of migration for both low- and high-skilled workers will be determined by the policies adopted by the governments from both the source and home countries. However, in this paper, we assume that the probability of migration is exogenous, and we do not study the migration issue from a host country’s perspective.
Without loss of generality, we assume that there are two types of workers: workers with low human capital, $h^L_t$ (these are referred to as low-skilled workers) and workers with high human capital, $h^H_t$ (these are referred to as high-skilled workers), $i=r,u$. The respective ratios of low-skilled workers and high-skilled workers to the total adult population in period $t$ are $\theta^L_{it}$ and $\theta^H_{it}$. Hence, $\theta^L_{it} + \theta^H_{it} = 1$.

The respective probabilities of migration to country B for low- and high-skilled workers are $p^L$ and $p^H$. We assume that in order to reflect the fact that $p^L < p^H$, it is easier for high-skilled workers to migrate to a foreign country.\footnote{The model can be easily extended to allow for the endogenous choice of migration by including the cost of migration and the innate ability into the human capital accumulation function. The results would be that young agents with high parental human capital and high innate ability (agents with high human capital accumulation) will emigrate. Hence, similar results can be obtained by assuming that high-skilled workers have higher probability to emigrate than low-skilled workers.}

Let $n^L_{it}$ and $n^H_{it}$ represent respective fertility for low- and high-skilled workers. The respective ratios of low- and high-skilled workers to the total population in period $t+1$ become:

\[
\begin{align*}
\theta^L_{it+1} &= \frac{(1-p^L)^{\theta^L_{it} n^L_{it}}}{(1-p^L)^{\theta^L_{it} n^L_{it}} + (1-p^H)^{\theta^H_{it} n^H_{it}}} \quad \text{and} \\
\theta^H_{it+1} &= \frac{(1-p^H)^{\theta^H_{it} n^H_{it}}}{(1-p^L)^{\theta^L_{it} n^L_{it}} + (1-p^H)^{\theta^H_{it} n^H_{it}}}.
\end{align*}
\]

Therefore, average human capital in period $t+1$ becomes $H_{t+1} = \theta^L_{it+1} h^L_{it+1} + \theta^H_{it+1} h^H_{it+1}$.

To discuss the impacts of the probability of migration, we need to consider three cases: (1) $p^H > p^L > p^*$, (2) $p^H > p^* > p^L$, and (3) $p^* > p^H > p^L$. Using parameter values calibrated in the following section, Figs. 1 and 2 describe the decisions made by low-skilled parents when facing the migration probability of $p^L$. Fig. 1 presents decisions on fertility and educational investments under private schooling, while Fig. 2 shows fertility decision under public schooling.

We use $e^L_{ir}$ and $e^H_{ir}$ to represent respective educational investment for low- and high-skilled workers under a private education regime. Equations 11 and 12 show that the educational investment under private schooling depends on the migration probability and parental human capital. From proposition 4, we know that if $p^H > p^L > p^*$, high-skilled parents will have fewer children than low-skilled workers and spend more on each child’s education ($n^L_{ir} < n^L_{ir}$, $e^L_{ir} > e^H_{ir}$). Hence, according to Eq. 2, the children of high-skilled (low-skilled) parents will be high-skilled (low-skilled) workers in the next period because of high (low) parental human capital and high (low) educational expenditure ($h^L_{ir+1} < h^L_{ir+1}$). Under a public education regime, the amount of educational expenditure per student is $e^L_{it} = \phi^L_{it} \tau (1-\phi n^L_{it}) w^L_{it} + \phi^H_{it} \tau (1-\phi n^H_{it}) w^H_{it} + \phi^H_{it} w^H_{it}$ and is the same for every student. Hence, $h^L_{it+1} < h^H_{it+1}$ due to lower parental human capital for the children of low-skilled parents.\footnote{Notice that there is no intergroup mobility in our model. Similar model setting can be found in De la Croix and Doepke (2004). One possible way to allow for the intergroup mobility is to incorporate the innate ability into the human capital accumulation function and assume that the probability of migration depends on each agent’s human capital accumulation. However, this will complicate the model without changing our main results about the impacts of migration probability on the economic growth.}
However, in the cases 2 and 3, $e_{rt}^L$ can be larger than $e_{rt}^H$ if $h_{rt}^H$ is not sufficiently larger than $h_{rt}^L$. Hence, it is possible that $h_{rt+1}^L$ will be higher than $h_{rt+1}^H$ under private schooling. However, under public schooling, the school expenditure is provided by the government; $h_{ut+1}^L < h_{ut+1}^H$ because parental human capital is the crucial determinant of children’s human capital. Before carrying out the computational procedure, propositions 7 and 8 consider the impacts of migration probability for

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Fig. 1 Impacts of $p^L$ on fertility and educational investment for low-skilled workers under private schooling

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Fig. 2 Impacts of $p^L$ on fertility for low-skilled workers under public schooling

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However, our computational results in the next section show that through the five periods (which is approximately 150 years), $e_{rt}^L$ ($h_{rt}^L$) is always lower than $e_{rt}^H$ ($h_{rt}^H$) in every period.
Proposition 7 Under the condition that $p^H > p^*$, then an increase in the probability of migration for high-skilled workers will create a “brain gain” if an increase in $p^H$ does not cause a large increase in $\theta^H_{t+1}$. Conversely, if an increase in $p^H$ induces a large increase in $\theta^L_{t+1}$, then an increase in high-skilled emigrants will create a “brain drain.”

Proof See Appendix 4.

Under a private education regime, with an increase in $p^H$, high-skilled parents will decide to have fewer children and increase their educational investment for each child; hence, the human capital accumulation for children of high-skilled workers will increase. If an increase in $p^H$ will not cause a large increase in $\theta^L_{t+1}$, an increase in $h^H_{t+1}$ will compensate the loss of $h^H_{t+1}$ due to the emigration of some high-skilled workers, and the economy will end up with a “brain gain.” Under a public education regime, decisions by high-skilled workers to have fewer children when there is an increase in $p^H$ will contribute to an increase in public school expenditure; thus, the human capital accumulation for all children will increase. If an increase in $p^H$ does not induce a large increase in $\theta^L_{t+1}$, an increase in $h^H_{t+1}$ and $h^L_{t+1}$ will compensate the loss of $h^H_{t+1}$ due to emigration of some high-skilled workers, and the economy will end up with a “brain gain.” Conversely, if an increase in $p^H$ induces a large increase in $\theta^L_{t+1}$, the emigration of high-skilled workers will create a “brain drain” since the economy will be occupied by low-skilled workers, and the loss will exceed the gain.

Since when $p^L > p^*$ an increase in $p^L$ will increase the human capital accumulation of children belonging to low-skilled parents under both education regimes, it will cause a “brain gain.” This result is demonstrated in proposition 8.

Proposition 8 Under the condition that $p^L > p^*$, then an increase in the probability of migration for low-skilled workers will create a “brain gain.”

Proof See Appendix 5.

In order to study and to quantify the influence of migration on economic performance both in the short run and in the long run, we simulate our model in the next section.

4 Numerical experiments

Before proceeding with our computational work, we need to calibrate the parameters used in the model. We begin by calibrating the parameter values of the human capital accumulation function. The results of the empirical study by Johnson and Stafford (1973) showed that income elasticity for education expenditure was 0.198, whilst the figure used by Fernandez and Rogerson (1997), based on the
estimates of Card and Krueger (1992), was 0.2. Since the figures provided by these studies are virtually identical, we also set γ as being equal to 0.2.10 The study of Haveman and Wolfe (1995) demonstrated that parents spend around 15% of their time raising children; hence, we also assign a value of 0.15 to φ.

We calibrate the remaining parameter values according to 1985 data, choosing the USA as the foreign country and the Philippines as the source country.11 Respective per capita GDP levels for 1985 for the USA and the Philippines were $17,267 and $2,165.1.12 Normalizing $A$ as 100, a value of 797.5 is assigned to $B$.13

In order to consider the case of heterogeneous agents, we need to calibrate the initial distribution of human capital for the source country — $h_L^1$, $h_H^1$, $\theta_L^1$, and $\theta_H^1$. In 1985, the ratio of the share of income in the Philippines between the top and bottom quintiles was 10.019; hence, we assume an extreme case and calibrate $h_H^1$ to be 10.019 times $h_L^1$.14 Setting $h_L^1$ to 87 and $h_H^1$ to 10.019*$h_L^1=871.653 allows us to roughly match the per capita GDP level of the Philippines.15 The values of $\theta_L^1$ and $\theta_H^1$ are calibrated to match the Gini coefficient of 46.08% in the first period.16 This gives $\theta_L^1=87.73\%$ and $\theta_H^1=12.27\%$.

Given that, for the Philippines, the enrollment rate in 1985 (as a proportion of the total enrollment in secondary schools) was higher for public schools than for private schools, we use an economy under a public education regime as our baseline model.17 Since it will necessarily take many years for educational investment to contribute to economic growth, we calculate the average annual growth rate from 1985 to 1994 for the Philippines. This gives us an average annual growth rate in real GDP of 2.28%. Hence, λ is set at 2.27, so that the growth rate over ten periods under a public education regime will roughly match the average economic growth rate from 1985 to 1994.

Since only tax revenue is used for education in the model, the tax rate is calibrated according to public expenditure on education. Public spending on education accounted for 1.4% of GNP in 1985.18 Therefore, under our model

10 Given the exogenous real wage per unit of human capital (w), the elasticity of human capital for children with respect to school expenditure equals the income elasticity with respect to school expenditure.
11 We choose the Philippines as our source country because, based on 1990 data, Carrington and Detragiache (1999) demonstrated that highly-educated migrants from the Asia-Pacific region were the second largest group of immigrants to the USA, and of this particular group, the Philippines was shown to be the major source country.
12 Source: per capita GDP, PPP (constant 1987 international dollar), World Development Index, World Bank.
13 Given that per capita GDP in the US is 7.975 times the level of per capita GDP in the Philippines, $B$ is calibrated as 7.975 $A$.
14 The data set composed by Deininger and Squire (1996) shows that the share of income of the bottom quintile was 5.2%, whilst the share of income of the top quintile was 52.1%.
15 Using these calibrated numbers along with other calibrated parameter values for fertility gives us a per capita GDP level equal to *2,522.6 at the end of the first period.
17 Public school enrollment was 59% of total enrollment in secondary schools for the Philippines in 1985.
setting for a public education regime, public spending on education is equal to 2.373% of GNP. Setting $\tau = 2.373\%$, the value of $\beta$ is calibrated as 0.122.

We assume that low-skilled workers have only a very small chance to migrate to country B and set $p^L = 0.004$. The fertility rate in the Philippines (births per woman) was 4.4 in 1985. The probability of migration for high-skilled workers is calibrated as 0.06 to match fertility under a public education regime. We consider a situation in which parents strongly favor their children to migrate to a foreign country and assign $a = 0.01$. All the parameter values calibrated above are referred to as baseline model parameter values, and given that our main purpose is to study the influence of the probability of migration, we will also test the sensitivity of $p^L$ and $p^H$.

4.1 Results

Using the parameter values we just calibrated, $p^*$ equals 0.00125. In the following, we consider the impacts of migration in three possible cases.

4.1.1 High probabilities of migration for high- and low-skilled workers

We start our analysis by considering case 1. Note that our baseline model describes case 1 since $p^H = 0.06 > p^L = 0.004 > p^*$. When carrying out our computational process, we analyze the impacts of the probability of migration, first fixing $p^L$ at 0.004 and examining the effects of two different measures of $p^H$ ($p^H = 0.06$ and 0.1) under two different education regimes. Keeping $p^H$ at 0.06, we then study the impacts of $p^L$ ($p^L = 0.004$ and 0.01) under both education regimes. Table 2 presents the short-run (first period) and long-run (fifth period) impacts of migration on fertility, labor structure, the logarithm of per capita income, and Gini coefficients under a private and a public education regime.

To study the impacts of migration under different education regimes, we compare column 2 with column 5. The transitions of the logarithm of per capita income, the Gini coefficient, and $\theta^H$ over five periods are presented in Fig. 3. Our computational results show that under a public education regime, fertility is higher. Per capita income is lower under a public education regime in the short run. However, in the long run, per capita income is higher under a public education regime than under a private education regime due to the higher ratio of high-skilled workers to the labor force and the tax rate calibrated in the previous section; in addition, the Gini coefficient is lower under a public education regime than under a private education regime both in the short run and in the long run since under a public schooling, the school expenditure is the same for every student. Similar results can be also obtained if we compare column 3 (4) with column 6 (7).

Columns 2, 3, 5, and 6 show the situation with an increase in $p^H$ from 0.06 to 0.1 under the two different education regimes. For both education regimes, an

---

19 In the baseline model, everyone attends a public school. Hence, the proportion of public school expenditure to GNP becomes $0.014/0.59 = 2.373\%$.
20 Data source for economic growth rate and population growth rate: World Development Index, World Bank.
increase in $p^H$ will initially lower fertility and raise per capita income as a result of the trade-off between quality and quantity for high-skilled workers. However, with the migration of more high-skilled workers, there will be an increase in fertility as

Table 2 Impacts of migration probability in case 1

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Private education regime</th>
<th>Public education regime</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>$p^H$</td>
<td>0.0600</td>
<td>0.0600</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$p^L$</td>
<td>0.0040</td>
<td>0.0040</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$n^H$</td>
<td>2.2185</td>
<td>2.2185</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$n^L$</td>
<td>4.4600</td>
<td>4.4600</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fertility 1</td>
<td>4.1849</td>
<td>3.6015</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\theta_1^H$ (%)</td>
<td>6.1612</td>
<td>7.2039</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>log ($Y_1$)</td>
<td>7.5303</td>
<td>7.7255</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gini 1 (%)</td>
<td>40.3705</td>
<td>41.3862</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fertility 5</td>
<td>4.4449</td>
<td>3.7743</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\theta_5^H$ (%)</td>
<td>0.3179</td>
<td>0.7315</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>log ($Y_5$)</td>
<td>8.5077</td>
<td>9.2562</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gini 5 (%)</td>
<td>11.1454</td>
<td>15.6300</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Definitions of variables are: $n^H$ — fertility of high-skilled parents; $n^L$ — fertility of low-skilled parents; Fertility 1 and fertility 5 — average fertility in the first and fifth period; $\theta_1^H$ and $\theta_5^H$ — the ratio of (high-skilled workers)/(labor force) in the first and fifth period; log($Y_1$) and log($Y_5$) — the logarithm of per capita income at the end of the first and fifth period; Gini 1 and Gini 5 — Gini coefficient at the end of the first and fifth period.

Fig. 3 Comparison between private and public schooling
\( \theta^H \) decreases, and, in the long run, a higher \( p^H \) will result in higher fertility, but lower per capita income and income inequality. Hence, allowing higher probability of migration for high-skilled workers will cause a “brain gain” the short run, but it will induce a “brain drain” in the long run. Moreover, in the long run, the logarithm of per capita income will fall by 1.722% under a private education regime and by 0.35% under a public education regime; thus, in the long run, an increase in \( p^H \) will have a more detrimental effect on economic growth under a private education regime.

Columns 2, 4, 5, and 7 display the effects when \( p^L \) increases from 0.004 to 0.01 under the two different education regimes. For both education regimes, an increase in \( p^L \) will reduce fertility whilst also increasing both per capita income and inequality. In the fifth period, the logarithm of per capita income will increase by 8.798% under a private education regime and by 5.834% under a public education regime. Since fertility is more sensitive to the probability of migration when education is not free, the growth rate of per capita income is more susceptible to the probability of migration under a private education regime than under a public education regime, which is consistent with the results shown in Table 2. Although an increase in \( p^L \) would stimulate economic growth under both education regimes, it would also cause high income inequality in the long run.

4.1.2 High probability of migration for high-skilled workers and low probability of migration for low-skilled workers

The difference between case 2 and case 1 is that \( p^L \) is lower than the critical value \( p^* \). The impacts of \( p^H \) are demonstrated in proposition 7. However, an increase in \( p^L \) will affect the future average human capital in two ways. First, it increases fertility and lowers the educational expenditure for low-skilled parents. Second, higher \( p^L \) means that more low-skilled workers will migrate to country B in the next period.

### Table 3 Impacts of migration probability in case 2

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>( p^H )</th>
<th>Private education regime</th>
<th>Public education regime</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0.0600</td>
<td>0.1000</td>
<td>0.0600</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0.0001</td>
<td>0.0001</td>
<td>0.0005</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.2185</td>
<td>1.8358</td>
<td>2.2185</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.2624</td>
<td>3.2154</td>
<td>4.2941</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7.8834</td>
<td>6.3499</td>
<td>5.9843</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7.8436</td>
<td>7.9097</td>
<td>7.4946</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>41.9748</td>
<td>39.0599</td>
<td>40.2015</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.3855</td>
<td>3.3963</td>
<td>4.5703</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.1855</td>
<td>0.3732</td>
<td>0.2723</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18.9496</td>
<td>8.9896</td>
<td>10.5036</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

For definitions of variables, see Table 2
The simulation results under both education regimes with low $p^L$ are presented in Table 3. The two values of $p^H$ (0.06 and 0.1) we consider are the same as in Table 2. The statistics in columns 2, 3, 5, and 6 illustrate the influence of $p^H$ under private and public schooling. The results are similar to those we obtain from Table 2. Columns 2, 4, 5, and 7 in Table 3 exhibit the effects when $p^L$ increases from 0.0001 to 0.0005 under the two different education regimes. Note that these two values are all smaller than $p^*$. It shows that under both education regimes, an increase in $p^L$ will raise fertility (hence, lower $\theta_1^H$ and $\theta_5^H$) and decrease per capita income both in the short run and in the long run.

In the long run, when $p^L$ increases from 0.0001 to 0.0005, fertility will increase by 34.996% and the logarithm of per capita income will decrease by 13.571% under a private education regime, while fertility will increase by 33.992% and per capita income will decrease by 9.297% under a public education regime. Therefore, both fertility and per capita income are more sensitive to the probability of migration under a private education regime than under a public education regime.

4.1.3 Low probabilities of migration for high- and low-skilled workers

In this case, both $p^H$ and $p^L$ are lower than $p^*$. The impacts of $p^H$ and $p^L$ are presented in Table 4. Columns 2, 3, 5, and 6 illustrate the situation with an increase in $p^H$ from 0.0007 to 0.001, while columns 2, 4, 5, and 7 show the effects when $p^L$ increases from 0.0001 to 0.0005 under the two different education regimes. Note that increasing the probability of migration will raise fertility and decrease educational expenditure for high- (low-) skilled parents. Hence, high-skilled parents will have higher fertility than low-skilled parents. Increasing $p^H$ ($p^L$) will cause a “brain drain” under private and public schooling both in the short run and in the long run. The fertility and per capita income are also more volatile to the changes of the probability of migration under private schooling than under public schooling. When $p^H$ goes up from 0.0007 to 0.001, fertility increases by 1.128% and per capita income is lowered by 0.433% under private schooling, and fertility

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Private education regime</th>
<th>Public education regime</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>$p^H$</td>
<td>0.0007</td>
<td>0.0007</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$p^L$</td>
<td>0.0001</td>
<td>0.0001</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$n^H$</td>
<td>4.7104</td>
<td>4.7104</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$n^L$</td>
<td>3.4084</td>
<td>3.4084</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fertility 1</td>
<td>16.1898</td>
<td>16.1898</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\theta_1^H$ (%)</td>
<td>16.1898</td>
<td>16.1898</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>log($Y_1$)</td>
<td>7.3156</td>
<td>7.3156</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gini 1 (%)</td>
<td>45.9050</td>
<td>45.9050</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fertility 5</td>
<td>4.3847</td>
<td>4.3847</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\theta_5^H$ (%)</td>
<td>14.2795</td>
<td>14.2795</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>log($Y_5$)</td>
<td>9.7295</td>
<td>9.7295</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gini 5 (%)</td>
<td>34.0891</td>
<td>34.0891</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

For definitions of variables, see Table 2
increases by 1.07% and per capita income decreases by 0.275% under public schooling. When $p^{L}$ goes up from 0.0001 to 0.0005, fertility increases by 19.595% and per capita income is reduced by 10.327% under private schooling, and fertility increases by 19.372% and per capita income decreases by 8.15% under public schooling.

Finally, notice that Tables 2, 3, and 4 all demonstrate that an increase in $p^{H}$ will cause a “brain drain” in the long run. However, the stories behind these results are different. In the case of $p^{H}>p^{*}$ (Tables 2 and 3), although relaxation of restrictions on the emigration of high-skilled workers would increase school expenditure, which will contribute to the economic growth in the short run, it will hurt the economic growth in the long run since the labor market will be dominated by low-skilled workers. However, in the case of $p^{H}<p^{*}$ (Table 4), a “brain drain” will happen in the long run when increasing the probability of migration for high-skilled workers because it increases fertility for high-skilled parents while school expenditure is lowered.

In addition, if $p^{L}>p^{*}$ (Table 2), with more low-skilled workers emigrating to foreign countries, there would be an increase in domestic economic growth because of the increase in school expenditure and the reduction in the proportion of low-skilled workers in the labor market. However, if $p^{L}<p^{*}$ (Tables 3 and 4), an increase in $p^{L}$ will reduce economic growth in the long run because fertility for low-skilled parents will be higher while school expenditure will be lower. These results show that fertility matters when considering the “brain drain” or “brain gain” problem since the economic growth depends on the structure change of the labor force.

5 Conclusions

This paper proposes a stochastic dynamic model to study the implications of migration on economic growth from a source country perspective. In contrast to the existing literature, in this study, adults need to make fertility and education decisions and are possible to migrate to a foreign country. We find that with the uncertainty of migration, there is a “precautionary demand” of children for parents, and it will induce a trade-off between quality and quantity for parents when the migration probability changes. And this trade-off between quality and quantity will in turn affect the economic growth and income distribution in the short run and in the long run.

Our work also has some interesting policy implications for the debate on restrictions to migration. Hence, according to our simulation results, the government of a source country whose goal is to increase economic growth should aim to place some restrictions on the emigration of high-skilled workers. On the other hand, allowing more low-skilled workers to emigrate to a foreign country will increase the economic growth if $p^{L}>p^{*}$ and will reduce the economic growth if $p^{L}<p^{*}$.

Migration also has different effects when an economy is under a private or a public education regime. Our model predicts that economic growth is more sensitive to the probability of migration under a private education regime than under a public education regime. Therefore, a source country under a private education regime should be more careful when formulating any policy on migration. Furthermore, the long-run economic growth under a public education regime would dominate that of a private education regime for a source country with a higher tax rate.
The estimation by Beine et al. (2001) showed that the growth rate is negatively correlated with the migration flow and positively correlated with the share of educated people for source countries. However, they did not distinguish countries under private schooling with countries under public schooling. Furthermore, they have discussed the difficulties either of the data collection or of the econometric techniques that researchers need to deal with when conducting empirical researches in migration. It would be a challenging work in the future to empirically test the implications drawn from a migration model.

Appendix 1

In this appendix, we omit the time index $t$ explicitly to make our derivations easier to read. We should first of all note that the first- and second-order partial derivatives of the utility function with respect to $N$ are:

$$u_N = \frac{\beta(w_B - aw_A)}{NW_B + a(n - N)w_A} = \frac{\beta d}{NW_B + a(n - N)w_A},$$

(14)

$$u_{NN} = \frac{-\beta d^2}{[NW_B + a(n - N)w_A]^2},$$

(15)

where $d = w_B - aw_A$.

The second-degree Taylor series expansions of the utility function around the mean $N=pn$ is:

$$u \approx u(pn) + (N - pn)u_N(pn) + \frac{(N - pn)^2}{2!} u_{NN}(pn).$$

(16)

Substituting Eqs. (14) and (15) into Eq. (16) and using the statistical results that $E(N-pn)=0$ and $E(N-pn)^2=np(1-p)$, we can derive the expectation of the utility function as:

$$E(u) = u(pn) + \frac{\beta np(1-p)}{2!} \left\{ -\frac{d^2}{[(pn)w_B + an(1-p)w_A]^2} \right\}$$

$$= u(pn) - \frac{p(1-p)\beta d^2}{2nw^2},$$

(17)

where $w = pw_B + a(1-p)w_A$.

Appendix 2

A2.1 Proof of proposition 3

We first analyze an economy under a private education regime and then go on to study an economy under a public education regime.
A2.1.1 Under a private education regime

Given all parameter values, Eq. 11 implies that the number of children is constant. Hence, from Eq. 12, $e_{rt}$ is a linear function of $h_{rt}$ and can be expressed as $e_{rt} = \varepsilon h_{rt}$, where $\varepsilon$ is a positive number. Equation 2 tells us that human capital in the next period will be $h_{rt+1} = \lambda(\varepsilon h_{rt})^{\gamma} = \lambda \varepsilon^{\gamma} h_{rt}$. With homogeneous agents, $H_{rt} = h_{rt}$ for all $t$. Therefore, the growth rate of average human capital under a private education regime is:

$$g^H_r = \frac{H_{rt+1}}{H_{rt}} - 1 = \frac{h_{rt+1}}{h_{rt}} - 1 = \varepsilon^{\gamma} - 1.$$  (18)

Equation 18 implies that $g^H_r$ is constant.

A2.1.2 Under a public education regime

Under a public education regime, the human capital accumulation function becomes:

$$h_{ut+1} = \lambda e^{\gamma} h_{ut-1}^{1-\gamma} = \lambda [\tau_t (1 - \phi n_{ut}) w_A H_{ut}]^{\gamma} h_{ut}^{1-\gamma}.$$  (19)

When agents are homogeneous, $H_{ut} = h_{ut}$ for all $t$. This implies that the growth rate under a public education is:

$$g^H_u = \frac{H_{ut+1}}{H_{ut}} - 1 = \frac{h_{ut+1}}{h_{ut}} - 1 = \lambda [\tau_t (1 - \phi n_{ut}) w_A]^{\gamma} - 1.$$  (20)

Because Eqs. 9 and 13 show that given the probability of migration, the tax rate and fertility are constant, Eq. 20 implies that $g^H_u$ is constant.

QED.

Appendix 3

A3.1 Proof of proposition 4

We first consider an economy under a private education regime. Then we study an economy under a public education regime.

A3.1.1 Under a public education regime

The left-hand side of Eq. 11 is a function of $n_{rt}$ and can be expressed by $\xi(n_{rt})$. The right-hand side depends on $n_{rt}$ and $p$ and can be represented by $\mu(n_{rt}, p)$. Hence, we can rewrite Eq. 11 as

$$\xi(n_{rt}) = \mu(n_{rt}, p).$$  (21)

Taking the derivative of both sides of Eq. 21 with respect to $p$, we get

$$\left( \frac{d \xi}{dn_{rt}} - \frac{\partial \mu}{\partial n_{rt}} \right) n'_{rt}(p) = \frac{\partial \mu}{\partial p}.$$  (22)
Note firstly that
\[
\frac{d\xi}{dn_{rt}} = \frac{\phi(1 + \beta \gamma)}{(1 - \phi n_{rt})^2} > 0, \quad (23)
\]
secondly that
\[
\frac{\partial \mu}{\partial n_{rt}} = -\frac{\beta p(1 - p)d^2}{2w^2n_{rt}^2} < 0, \quad (24)
\]
and thirdly that
\[
\frac{\partial \mu}{\partial n_{rt}} = -\frac{\beta p(1 - p)d^2}{2w^2n_{rt}^2} < 0, \quad (25)
\]
Substituting the definitions of \(w\) and \(d\) into the numerator of Eq. 25, we can get
\[
\frac{\partial \mu}{\partial p} = \frac{\beta d^2 \left[-pw_B + a(1 - p)w_A\right]}{w^3}.
\]
Define \(p^*\) such that \(a(1 - p^*) = \frac{w_B}{w_A}\). Hence, if \(\frac{\partial \mu}{\partial p} < 0\) if \(p > p^*\). Then one must have \(n_{rt}'(p) < 0\) if \(p > p^*\) for Eq. 22 to hold. The situation will be reversed if \(p < p^*\).

From Eq. 12, the derivative of \(er_t\) with respect to \(n_{rt}\) is:
\[
\frac{de_{rt}}{dn_{rt}} = -\frac{\beta \gamma w_A h_{rt}}{(1 + \beta \gamma)n_{rt}^2} < 0. \quad (26)
\]
Using the implicit differentiation of \(e_{rt}\), we can get that \(e_{rt}'(p) = \frac{de_{rt}}{dn_{rt}}n_{rt}'(p) > 0\) if \(p > p^*\) and vice versa.

1.1.2 Under a public education regime

The left-hand side of Eq. 13 is a function of \(n_{ut}\) and can be expressed by \(\xi(n_{ut})\). The right-hand side depends on \(n_{ut}\) and \(p\) and can be represented by \(\mu(n_{ut}, p)\). Hence, we can rewrite Eq. 13 as:
\[
\xi(n_{ut}) = \mu(n_{ut}, p). \quad (27)
\]
Taking the derivative of both sides of Eq. 27 with respect to \(p\), we get
\[
\left(\frac{d\xi}{dn_{ut}} - \frac{\partial \mu}{\partial n_{ut}}\right)n_{rt}'(p) = \frac{\partial \mu}{\partial p}. \quad (28)
\]
Note firstly that
\[
\frac{d\xi}{dn_{ut}} = \frac{\phi^2}{(1 - \phi n_{ut})^2} > 0, \tag{29}
\]
secondly that
\[
\frac{\partial \mu}{\partial n_{ut}} = -\beta \left[ \frac{1}{n_{ut}^2} + p(1 - p)d^2 \right] < 0, \tag{30}
\]
and thirdly that
\[
\frac{\partial \mu}{\partial p} = \beta d^2 \left[ -pw_A + a(1 - p)w_A \right]. \tag{31}
\]

Hence, if \( p > p^* \), \( \frac{\partial \mu}{\partial p} < 0 \). Then from Eq. 28, we know that \( n_{ut}'(p) < 0 \). The situation will be reversed \( \frac{\partial \mu}{\partial p} > 0 \) and \( n_{ut}'(p) > 0 \) if \( p < p^* \).

From Eq. 6, the derivative of \( e_{ut} \) with respect to \( n_{ut} \) is
\[
de_{ut} = -\tau \phi w_A H_{ut} = -\frac{\beta \gamma \phi}{1 + \beta \gamma} w_A H_{ut} < 0. \tag{32}
\]

Using the implicit differentiation of \( e_{ut} \), we can get that \( e_{ut}'(p) = \frac{de_{ut}}{dn_{ut}} n_{ut}'(p) > 0 \) if \( p > p^* \) and vice versa.

QED.

Appendix 4

A4.1 Proof of proposition 7

We should first of all note that:
\[
\frac{\partial \theta_{it+1}^L}{\partial \theta_{it+1}^H} = -\frac{\partial \theta_{it+1}^H}{\partial \theta_{it+1}^H} = \frac{(1 - p^L)\theta_{it+1}^L \theta_{it+1}^H - (1 - p^H)\theta_{it+1}^H \theta_{it+1}^H (p^H)}{[(1 - p^L)\theta_{it+1}^L + (1 - p^H)\theta_{it+1}^H]^{2}} > 0, \quad i = r, u. \tag{33}
\]

Under a private education regime, the partial differentiation of \( H_{rt+1} \) with respect to \( p^H \) can be written as:
\[
\frac{\partial H_{rt+1}}{\partial p^H} = \frac{\partial H_{rt+1}}{\partial p^H} (h_{rt+1}^L - h_{rt+1}^H) + \frac{\partial H_{rt+1}}{\partial e_{rt}^L} e_{rt}^L (p^H) + \frac{\partial H_{rt+1}}{\partial e_{rt}^H} e_{rt}^H (p^H). \tag{34}
\]

Since \( e_{rt}^L(p^H) = 0 \), Eq. 34 can be expressed as:
\[
\frac{\partial H_{rt+1}}{\partial p^H} = \frac{\partial H_{rt+1}}{\partial p^H} (h_{rt+1}^L - h_{rt+1}^H) + \frac{\partial H_{rt+1}}{\partial e_{rt}^H} e_{rt}^H (p^H). \tag{35}
\]
Because \( \frac{\partial q_{rt+1}^L}{\partial p^H} > 0 \) and \( \theta_{rt+1}^H \frac{\partial H_{rt+1}^L}{\partial e_{rt}^H} e_{rt}^H (p^H) > 0 \) if \( p^H > p^* \), a sufficient condition for \( \frac{\partial H_{rt+1}^L}{\partial e_{rt}^H} > 0 \) under a private education regime is that \( \frac{\partial q_{rt+1}^L}{\partial p^H} \) is not too large (that is, an increase in \( p^H \) will not cause a large increase in \( \theta_{rt+1}^H \)).

Under a public education regime with heterogeneous agents, public school expenditure is:

\[
e_{ut} = \theta_{ut}^L (1 - \phi n_{ut}^L) w_A h_{ut}^L + \theta_{ut}^H (1 - \phi n_{ut}^H) w_A h_{ut}^H.
\]  

(36)

From Eq. 36, we can derive that \( e_{ut}'(p^H) = \frac{\partial e_{ut}^H}{\partial p} n_{ut}'(p^H) > 0 \).

The partial differentiation of \( H_{ut+1}^L \) with respect to \( p^H \) can be written as:

\[
\frac{\partial H_{ut+1}^L}{\partial p^H} = \frac{\partial q_{ut+1}^L}{\partial p^H} (h_{ut+1}^L - h_{ut+1}^H) + \left[ \frac{\partial h_{ut+1}^L}{\partial e_{ut}^L} + \frac{\partial h_{ut+1}^H}{\partial e_{ut}^H} \right] e_{ut}^H (p^H). \quad (37)
\]

Because \( \frac{\partial q_{ut+1}^L}{\partial p^H} > 0 \), \( \frac{\partial h_{ut+1}^L}{\partial e_{ut}^L} > 0 \), \( \frac{\partial h_{ut+1}^H}{\partial e_{ut}^H} > 0 \), and \( e_{ut}^H (p^H) \) if \( p^H > p^* \), a sufficient condition for \( \frac{\partial H_{ut+1}^L}{\partial p^H} > 0 \) under a public education regime is that \( \frac{\partial q_{ut+1}^L}{\partial p^H} \) is not too large (that is, an increase in \( p^H \) will not cause a large increase in \( \theta_{ut+1}^L \)).

QED.

**Appendix 5**

A5.1 Proof of proposition 8

We should first of all note that:

\[
\frac{\partial q_{it}^L}{\partial p^H} = - \frac{\partial q_{it}^H}{\partial p^H} = \frac{1 - (1 - p^H) \phi L n_{it}^H (1 - p^H) \phi L n_{it}^L}{(1 - p^L) \phi L n_{it}^L + (1 - p^H) \phi H n_{it}^H} < 0, i = r, u.
\]  

(38)

Under a private education regime, the partial differentiation of \( H_{rt+1}^L \) with respect to \( p^L \) can be written as:

\[
\frac{\partial H_{rt+1}^L}{\partial p^L} = \frac{\partial q_{rt+1}^L}{\partial p^L} (h_{rt+1}^L - h_{rt+1}^H) + \theta_{rt+1}^L \frac{\partial e_{rt}^L}{\partial e_{rt}^L} e_{rt}^L (p^L) + \theta_{rt+1}^H \frac{\partial H_{rt+1}^L}{\partial e_{rt}^H} e_{rt}^H (p^L).
\]  

(39)

Since \( e_{rt}^H (p^L) = 0 \), Eq. 39 can be expressed as:

\[
\frac{\partial H_{rt+1}^L}{\partial p^L} = \frac{\partial q_{rt+1}^L}{\partial p^L} (h_{rt+1}^L - h_{rt+1}^H) + \theta_{rt+1}^L \frac{\partial e_{rt}^L}{\partial e_{rt}^L} e_{rt}^L (p^L).
\]  

(40)

Because \( \frac{\partial q_{rt+1}^L}{\partial p^L} < 0 \) and \( \theta_{rt+1}^L \frac{\partial e_{rt}^L}{\partial e_{rt}^L} e_{rt}^L (p^L) > 0 \) if \( p^L > p^* \), from Eq. 40, we have \( \frac{\partial H_{rt+1}^L}{\partial p^L} > 0 \).
Under a public education regime, from Eq. 36, we can derive that

$$e'_{it}(p^L) = \frac{\partial e_{it}}{\partial n_{it}} n'(p^L) > 0.$$  

The partial differentiation of $H_{it+1}$ with respect to $p^L$ can be written as:

$$\frac{\partial H_{it+1}}{\partial p^L} = \frac{\partial e_{it+1}^L}{\partial p^L} \left( h_{it+1}^L - h_{it+1}^H \right) + \left( \theta_{it+1}^L \frac{\partial h_{it+1}^H}{\partial e_{it}} + \theta_{it+1}^H \frac{\partial h_{it+1}^H}{\partial e_{it}} \right) e'_{it}(p^L). \quad (41)$$

Because $\frac{\partial h_{it+1}^L}{\partial e_{it}} > 0$, $\frac{\partial h_{it+1}^H}{\partial e_{it}} > 0$, and $e'_{it}(p^L)>0$ if $p^L>p^*$, we can get that $\frac{\partial H_{it+1}}{\partial p^L} > 0$ from Eq. 41. QED.

References

World Bank, World Development Index, various issues