3 Civil society and democracy-making in Taiwan

Reexamining the link

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Introduction

Two decades ago, democratizing countries all over the world witnessed groundswells of popular organizing against non-democratic incumbents. The general resurgence seen in grassroots activism was remarkable, as the participants seemed to speak the same language in justifying their struggles, despite the vast cultural differences between them. In the 1980s, the term "civil society" became a universal lingua franca that was freely used in the Polish Solidarity movement (Ost 1990: 21), and the Korean opposition movement (Koo 1993), among Chinese dissident intellectuals and by the Taiwanese opposition (Hsiao 1989: 127–33; He 1995). Whether civil society was expressed in Chinese (shimin shehui), Korean (minjung), or Taiwanese (minchian shehui), it denoted an autonomous and oppositional sphere of independent and voluntary associations that resisted state control and prefigured the state of affairs that was to come following the demise of authoritarianism.

Just as Minerva’s owl spread its wings only at dusk, most contemporary scholars of democratic transition failed to take the “civil society fever” seriously. In the 1980s, the so-called transition-by-transaction paradigm conceptualized democratic transition as a game between rival elites whose interactions explained the political trajectory away from authoritarianism (O’Donnell and Schmitter 1986; Share 1987; Di Palma 1990). Collective social actors were assigned a secondary role in this scenario. The rise of social protests was usually seen as a consequence of elite disagreements as well as a transient phenomenon that would come to an end once elites reached a new settlement. It was even feared that an overactive civil society might jeopardize the fragile democratic consensus.

There then came a reevaluation of civil society. Political theorists discussed the liberating potential of the civil society ideal (Taylor 1990; Walzer 1992; Cohen and Arato 1994; Hsiao et al. 1995: 110–16). In empirical studies, collective action was now seen as an integral component of breaking loose from authoritarian control. Working-class mobilization played a critical role in the path toward democracy (Tarrow 1995; Collier and Mahoney 1997;
political institutions into consideration. Take the paradigmatic collapse of the Weimar Republic as an example: polarized patterns of civic associations are certainly not conducive to a sustainable democracy. Notwithstanding this, the insights gained from the earlier studies should not be slighted. Gerschenkron (1989: 92–3) and Moore (1978: 381–91) have demonstrated that the political ascendancy of Nazism was facilitated by the reactionary forces that controlled the military and judicial apparatus of state. It follows that blaming everything on an "overactive" civil society is not a fair call. Consequently, analyzing the behavior of civil society would not be complete without understanding its political context.

What is needed is a comprehensive historical analysis of the link between civil society and democracy-making in one particular new democracy. Taiwan is a suitable case on the ground that it has completed all phases of democratization since the 1980s. The first regime change took place in 2000 as the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) won the presidential election for the first time, and the second regime change happened in 2008 when the Kuomintang (KMT) made a successful comeback. This chapter will examine civil-society forces and their influences on the making of Taiwan's new democracy in the three decades since the 1970s.

We devote our exclusive attention to social movements as the most critical sector in Taiwan's civil society. As a pattern of contentious claim-making (McAdam et al. 1996), social movement is highly sensitive to the political surroundings in which it operates. While other sectors of civil society might be tolerated during a period of high authoritarianism as long as they stay clear of the dangerous realm of politics, due to the oppositional nature of social movement, it is vulnerable to repressive control. As a result, by tracing the evolution of social movements, we can gain a clearer picture of the progressive development of civil society.


The emergence of the public sphere in the authoritarian crisis (1970–1979)

Before Taiwan entered the tumultuous decade of the 1970s, the KMT regime had consolidated its control on the island. In 1947, the Taiwanese call for political reform and autonomy (the 28 February incident) was ruthlessly crushed. Following the military massacre and the white-terror reign, the émigré regime was free of all potential opposition. The KMT was subsequently able to embark on the systematic social engineering of Taiwanese society, first for anti-communist war mobilization, and later for export-led industrialization.
During this period, Taiwan had virtually no bona fide civil society organizations. Furthermore, since the KMT adopted a Leninist control strategy, its penetrating power had been considerably stronger than that of other run-of-the-mill authoritarian regimes. By planting the party-state into every sphere of daily life and preemptively fostering pro-regime organizations, the KMT succeeded in stifling organizing attempts from below (Dickson 1993; Kang 1998; Ho 2007). Even apparently harmless popular religious activities, arguably the most important vehicle for communal self-organizing before the advent of modernity, were placed under watchful surveillance, with ritual festivals being ordered to be curtailed (Jordan 1994: 150–1; Gates 1996: 231–6).

Prior to the 1970s, Taiwan’s civic organizations existed in a highly atrophied pattern. Local charity-oriented associations and foundations were allowed to exist only with the blessing of KMT officials. The international linkage to the United States helped some transplanted social organizations to obtain permission. Middle-class social clubs, such as Junior Chambers of Commerce International, Rotary Clubs, and Lion Clubs, were primarily led by politically connected mainlanders and Taiwanese elites. In addition, some church-related international philanthropic organizations were allowed to operate, such as World Vision, the Christian Children’s Fund (CCF), the Young Men’s Christian Association (YMCA), and the Young Women’s Christian Association (YWCA). All these organizations were “depoliticized” or “nonpolitical” in nature. Their right to exist was conditionally granted so that they were certainly not in a position to promote an independent agenda for social change or to influence the course of state policy (Hsiao, 2005).

In 1971, Taiwan’s representative was expelled from the United Nations. Richard Nixon’s 1972 visit to China and the subsequent normalization of relations between the People’s Republic of China and other major countries further eroded the legitimacy of the KMT government in the international community (Wakabayashi 1994: 174–5). A series of diplomatic setbacks prompted a “soul-searching” process among Taiwanese intellectuals. At that time, a so-called “postwar generation” came of age. This generation was more willing to look at Taiwan’s current situation realistically, without nostalgia for the Japanese period or exiled Chinese nationalism (Hsiang 2008). As a result, a new indigenous consciousness began to emerge in the cultural arena, as manifested in the rise of the Cloud Gate Dance Group (1975), the campus folk song movement (1976), indigenous literature (1977), and indigenization of the social sciences (1979).

These four successful cultural indigenization movements together formed the first “voice” of civil society after a prolonged period of forced silence. The KMT’s initial response to these cultural initiatives can be characterized as guarded suspicion. The state avoided taking the route of direct repression for many reasons. First, by limiting themselves to the purely cultural sphere, they did not immediately raise political demands. Second, the internationally besieged KMT regime needed social support from Taiwanese society. As a consequence, Chiang Ching-Kuo, who took over the reins in the mid-1970s, proceeded to indigenize the political leadership gradually as a gesture designed to appeal to the alienated Taiwanese majority.

Aside from cultural indigenization, intellectuals began to call for political reforms during the 1970s. As the legal space for voluntary association was highly restricted at that time, magazine publishers turned out to be an easier yet effective channel, though censorship was still ubiquitous. Two magazines, University (tahsiih) (1971–73) and Formosa (meiliao) (1979), bore witness to the rise and fall of these efforts.

University was founded in 1968, but did not become a political magazine until 1971, when its editorial group began to include a broader array of younger activists from academia and business. University advocated a number of reforms, such as the reelection of aging parliamentarians, abolishing the compulsory fertilizer-for-crops program, and freedom of speech. Ideologically, University supported the KMT’s anti-communism while championing a form of moderate liberalism. In the initial period, its core activists worked sub rosa with Chiang Ching-kuo, who was then building up his power base, and was welcomed as a more palatable alternative to other old guards. Nonetheless, once Chiang secured his position, the honeymoon was over. University’s conservative members were recruited into the government, while its radicals were harassed and persecuted by the KMT. The antagonism culminated in the National Taiwan University Philosophy Department incident (1974). In that event, some liberal faculty staff and students were expelled—a very symbolic move aimed at disciplining dissident intellectuals (Huang 1976).

Five years after the collapse of University, the opposition scored a major victory in the 1977 election. Encouraged, the opposition adopted a bolder strategy by staging street demonstrations and organizing Formosa in 1979, which was intended as the embryonic form of a political party. Like University, opposition intellectuals were concerned with political liberties as well as the social plight of the lower class. The first issue of Formosa featured articles on the victims of nuclear energy and exploited cabdrivers. However, unlike its predecessor’s more conciliatory approach, Formosa demanded immediate democratization from the KMT. On 10 December 1979, a human rights demonstration in Kaohsiung led to a bloody clash with the police force in an event commonly known as the Formosa incident. The subsequent round-up and prosecution of Formosa activists was a grave, if temporary, setback for the opposition movement.

To conclude, cultural indigenization movements, University, and Formosa were the precious sprouts of the public sphere in the 1970s. Given the harsh reality of political control, Taiwan’s civil society could only manage to survive in the rarified sphere of cultural and intellectual activities. The tragedy of the Formosa incident not only concluded a decade of intellectual agitation, but also clearly demonstrated the highly proscribed scope of civil society activities.
The rise of social movements under soft authoritarianism (1980–1986)

Winkler (1984) uses the term “soft authoritarianism” to characterize the period immediately after the 1979 Formosa incident. In the early 1980s, the KMT resorted to undisguised repression less frequently, while the anti-KMT forces were also able to secure their status as the opposition. It was during this period that Taiwan’s social movements emerged, largely crystallized in the form of middle-class advocacy and grassroots protests.

A group of reform-minded middle-class professionals (lawyers, professors, medical doctors, and journalists) spearheaded the development of civil society with their public engagement (Hsiao and Koo 1997). Their participation was instrumental in facilitating a number of social movement organizations that played pioneering roles. They were the Consumers’ Foundation (1980), Awakening magazine (1982) (which supported the women’s movement), Mountain Youth magazine (1983) (which advocated for the aboriginal movement), the Taiwan Association for Human Rights (1984), the Taiwan Labor Legal Support Association (1984), and New Environment magazine (1986). It should be noted that establishing a legally registered membership organization was still very difficult at that time. Most of those early efforts took the organizational form of magazine publishers or foundations (Awakening and New Environment were later reorganized into foundations), while others deliberately chose to operate outside state regulations.

The social profile of the middle-class leadership largely determined the style of the movement. They regarded themselves as altruistic educators whose role was to enlighten the public and governmental officials. Many of these activists went to the United States for advanced education, so they were eager to bring back the new ideas that they acquired overseas. For example, the 1979 Three Mile Island accident converted many university professors into anti-nuclear crusaders. In a sense, these activists worked to shepherd Taiwanese society along the road of modernization. They expected cooperative responses from the more liberal segments of the KMT, rather than challenging them directly.

Middle-class reform advocates were circumspect in their tactics. While many of them sympathized with the political opposition, they were careful to present a non-partisan facade to avoid antagonizing the KMT. In addition, when facing the mounting grassroots discontents, they played the role of advisers and avoided becoming involved in disorderly protests. Victims of consumer problems and industrial pollution were provided with legal advice; however, when they decided to take it to the streets, their middle-class allies simply backed off.

In environmental movements, the simultaneous rise of middle-class advocacy and grassroots protests was most noticeable. The former focused on the “soft issues” of nature conservation (Hsiao 1998: 36–7) or high-level energy policy (Ho 2003a: 688–92). Their early efforts were somewhat successful in that some state-sponsored projects were abandoned due to environmental considerations and the government even decided to halt temporarily the construction of a controversial nuclear power plant. While middle-class environmentalists sought to create a favorable climate of public opinion, grassroots pollution victims could air their grievances only through unruly protests. By organizing vigilante groups, blocking factories, and vandalism, they insisted on immediate compensation and relief from polluters (Ho and Su 2008: 2405–7). By the mid-1980s, anti-pollution protests had converged into a strong stream of locally based environmentalism.

The initial development of the Taiwanese women’s movement also reflected these characteristics. A contemporary report on the early Awakening activists showed that they tended to be young, highly educated, working professionally, and living in the Taipei metropolitan area (Wang 1988: 103–4). Immediately after Awakening was first published, there was a debate over abortion as the Eugenics Law was under review (1982–1984). When Taiwan’s feminists campaigned for a liberal version, it was noteworthy that they refrained from using the “rights argument” that might sound too provocative to the conservatives. Instead, they pleaded for the so-called “unfortunate girls” who needed legalized abortion to end their miseries. As a result, women’s rights and bodily autonomy were little talked about at that time (Kuan 2008: 145).

Again, the KMT government’s response to the nascent social movements was largely suspicious and resistant. When the cost of repression was low, the state managed to stifle the open expression of discontents by compelling college students, taking workers’ leaders to court, and harassing anti-pollution demonstrators. In some cases, KMT officials preempted the emergence of social movement organizations by establishing pro-regime groups with a similar purpose. Taiwan’s consumer movement and environmental movement encountered this “soft form of control” in 1980 and 1982, respectively.

In sum, amid clamorous grassroots protests and middle-class advocacy, Taiwan’s civil society gave rise to bona fide social movements in the early 1980s. Equally evident was the evolution of political opposition, as it succeeded in establishing the first tolerated opposition party, the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP), on 28 September 1986. The resilience of the opposition was in part explained by the strong support it received from middle-class professionals and small-and-medium businesspersons who were alienated by the KMT’s pro-big business orientation (Solinger 2006). The fact that the DPP’s founding ceremony at Taipei’s Grand Hotel was made possible through the arrangements made by its Rotary Club supporters (Roy 2003: 172) bore testimony to the maturation of civil society in Taiwan.


When political opposition activists decided to organize the DPP, it was an act of defiance that was expected to be met with a merciless crackdown. Instead, Chiang Ching-kuo signaled his tolerance and further proceeded to end the
38-year martial rule in July 1987. With the onset of political liberalization, the
government legalized rallies and demonstrations (1988) and gave greater
latitude to civic organizing (1989). Encouraged by this favorable political
wind, Taiwan's social movements attracted more broad-based participa-
tion, adopted radical strategies, and built political alliances with the DPP.
Frustrated by the mounting wave of popular uprising, the KMT had reverted
from its initial tolerance to repression by the end of the decade. Civil society
and the KMT regime were closing in on a collision course, and the former
won the final confrontation as KMT hardliners were forced to take a political
bow by the Taiwanese chairman, Lee Teng-hui.

The long overdue end to martial law was a significant stimulus to Taiwan's
civil society, as many latent discontent suddenly emerged into the public
arena. Social movements began to embrace wider sectors, even among those
who were thought to be too “conservative” or “traditional” to join the
bandwagon of social protests, such as farmers, the Hakka ethnic group,
schoolteachers, and the urban lower middle class. Long regarded as the
stable pillars of rural society, Taiwan's peasants erupted in a violent anti-
government protest on 20 May 1988, which was triggered by the threat of
agricultural imports that would endanger their livelihoods. As Taiwan's
farmers' movement took to the stage, its leaders also articulated a number of
demands aimed at addressing their economic and social plight, such as the
lack of social insurance, overpriced fertilizers, and undemocratic governance
in farmers' associations and irrigation associations. The Hakka used to be a
socially "invisible" ethnic minority in Taiwan in that they were constantly
assimilated into dominant groups and mainstream society. In December
1988, a historic demonstration was staged to demand recognition of their
specific culture and mother tongue (Hsiao and Huang 2001: 330).

In the past, schoolteachers were assigned with the mission of “spiritual
national defense.” As a result, schoolteachers were placed under strict control
from their training stage onwards. A month after the lifting of martial law,
dissident teachers organized the Taiwanese Teachers’ Human Rights Associ-
ation to demand freedom in teaching and legalization of their labor union.
Two teachers’ strikes subsequently took place. Finally, the speculative boom
of the late 1980s angered the urban salaried class who resented climbing
house prices. With their hopes of homeownership dashed, they called them-
scles “snails without shells” and initiated a series of protests in 1989 (Hsiao
and Liu 2001). In addition to these newcomers, the pre-1987 style of more
or less moderate reformism persisted. In 1988, the Humanistic Education
Foundation was set up with the help of middle-class parents and scholars to
promote a more liberal education system.

The newly liberalized atmosphere also encouraged more people to mobilize
around sensitive issues involving political taboos. Ex-political prisoners and
overseas Taiwanese banned from returning home struggled to have their
voices heard, and their efforts were often assisted by the newly formed DPP.
The first public commemorative activities for the 28 February incident took
place in 1987, forty years after the tragedy, and later even evolved into a fully
fledged peace movement demanding that the KMT rectify its historical
wrongdoings.

The second characteristic of social movements in this period was their
radicalization. Gone was the era of parallel mobilization by middle-class
advocates and grassroots activists; now, they joined hands to pressure the
reluctant KMT government. During its first year, the New Environment wit-
tnessed an internal dispute, and some of its radical members left to organize
the Taiwan Environmental Protection Union at the end of 1987. The latter
vowed to work with localized grassroots anti-pollution protest groups which
were emerging everywhere. Similarly, Taiwanese workers staged two waves of
spontaneous strikes for annual bonuses in 1988 and 1989. Workers were
couraged to wrest back control of their labor unions, which had been under
the sway of the KMT party/state (Ho 2003b).

There was a widespread zeitgeist among movement activists to move
toward bold gestures and claims. The aboriginal movement began to
challenge the ownership of their ancestral lands, and a contingent of activists
barricaded a statue that glorified a biased and historically disputed figure
(the so-called Wu Fong myth). Earlier, university students' activism was
largely confined to campuses, where they were involved in skirmishes with
conservative administrators. After 1987, students built up inter-campus
organizations. They were not only active in the rising workers' and farmers'
movements, but also took part in the debate on the revision of the University
Law in 1988. The first protest against the unfair burden of tuition fees
was staged in 1989. As they mobilized for these activities, students became
better organized and more self-conscious. In March 1990, students initiated
a week-long protest demanding the immediate abolition of the National
Assembly and other steps to hasten the advent of democratization by occupying
Chiang Kai-shek Memorial Hall. The 1990 student protest, modeled
after the Tiananmen movement that had taken place one year previously,
captured national attention, and in the end helped Lee Teng-hui to gain
the upper hand over his hardliner rivals within the KMT (Wright 2001:
95–128).

Finally, radicalized social movements tilted toward an alliance with the
DPP. In a number of cases, social movement activists had outgrown their
psychological fear of being “partisan.” DPP politicians were most heavily
involved in workers' movement and environmental movement. Its local
office-holders offered favorable legal interpretations to support protesters,
while some of its activists assumed protest leadership positions directly. In
March 1990, student protestors and liberal intellectuals kept at arm's length
with the DPP, but two months later, in a protest against the nomination of the
military strongman Hau Po-tsun for premier, they closely coordinated their
efforts with the DPP (Teng 1992: 318–25).

The gradual opening up of political seats for election also encouraged
social movements to try this new avenue. In the 1989, 1990, and 1992 elections,
many movement activists joined electoral races. More often than not, they campaigned as DPP candidates, which further helped the opposition and social movements to cooperate in a united front against the KMT.

The widening scope of social movements as well as their radicalization and politicization could be characterized as “popular surge” (O’Donnell and Schmitter, 1986: 53-4). Facing an ever-increasing wave of social protests, the KMT government was initially tolerant, and even sought to incorporate their demands through administrative initiatives. The Environmental Protection Administration, the Council of Labor Affairs, and a Mountain-area Administration Section under the Ministry of the Interior were set up to meet the challenges of environmental, workers’, and aborigines’ movements within one month of the lifting of martial law. The government was busy in reforming its legal framework so as to channel social contentsions peacefully. Even when dealing with radical protests, the KMT government demonstrated its self-restraint. The aboriginal protestors who demolished the Wu Fong statue were later acquitted in court. A violent blockade against a state-owned enterprise in Kaohsiung was tacitly tolerated, allowing it to continue for more than three years.

However, from 1989, the KMT government shifted to a repressive stance against social movements. One year into his presidential tenure, Lee Teng-hui allied himself with KMT hardliners and their shared diagnosis was that the insurgent civil society needed to be curbed. The conservative invocation culminated in May 1990, as Lee appointed the archconservative Hau Po-tsuo to become Premier. As soon as Hau took office, he vowed to reassert “public authority” against the lawlessness that had emerged. Social protests were framed as a disturbance of social order, and their leaders were characterized as “social movement bullies.” Workers’ movement, environmental movement, and farmers’ movement were most victimized by such state repression, as many activists were indicted and sent to jail. New legal drafts restricting the scope of demonstration rights and removing workers’ protections were considered and sent to the Legislature. With its defiant move to raise the Taiwan independence issue, the DPP was even threatened with dissolution by decree.

While many social movements experienced a temporary setback in those mean years, the reinvigorated state repression ultimately failed. There were two main reasons for this. First, despite the high-handed treatment of social movements, opinion surveys showed that public support for social movements had not declined as expected. Instead, a 1992 survey showed a higher level of support than in the previous year, which persuasively demonstrated the futility of state repression (Hsiao 1997: 7). Second, one side effect of the KMT’s about-face was to help cement the political alliance between social movements and the DPP. When the DPP scored a major victory in the 1992 legislative election, it was immediately seen as a vindication of social movement activists. The KMT’s electoral setback hastened the political demise of the hardliners, as symbolized in Hau Po-tsuo’s reluctant resignation in early 1993. As Lee Teng-hui shifted again toward a reformist course, social movements were no longer singled out for repression.

In hindsight, the sudden and widespread rise of social movements put positive pressure on the government as Taiwan moved away from authoritarianism. It is important to note that one of the last attempts made by the KMT hardliners was to suppress social movements, and their subsequent failure cleared a major obstacle toward the eventual democratization of Taiwan. In this sense, civil society played an undeniably important role in defeating the conservative backlash, even if in an indirect and unforeseeable way.

**Toward a movement society in the democratizing period (1993–1999)**

The period between the convocation of the Second Legislative Yuan (1993) and the DPP’s rise to power (2000) saw the gradual institutionalization of competitive party politics in Taiwan. With the stepwise opening up of top-level political seats to election, mayoral and provincial governor seats in 1994 and presidential elections being held in 1996, the DPP became an established contestant in the political race and its linkage with social movements began to weaken. Weaned off their political support, social movements embarked on a more independent course. They were capable of devising innovative strategy, making substantial policy impacts, and reaching out to broader society with the help of the more liberal political climate. It was during this period that social movements became a recognized, accepted, and routine phenomenon in Taiwan’s new democracy. In this sense, the configuration of this period fitted the description of the so-called “movement society” (Meyer and Tarrow 1998).

Immediately after the KMT reorganized its cabinet in early 1993 came the clear signs that the period of reinforced control over civil society was over. Grassroots blockades against polluting factories were not clamped down on as quickly as they used to be, and the legal maneuvers designed to limit workers’ rights were soon abandoned. Official statistics demonstrated a greater degree of government lenience in dealing with social protests (see Table 3.1). Clearly, the government prosecuted and sentenced fewer protestors, and turned down applications for legal demonstrations less frequently.

Taking advantage of the favorable political atmosphere, Taiwan’s social movements were able to adopt a wider range of tactics. For example, legal lobbying was not a meaningful option prior to the genuine reelection of the Legislative Yuan in 1992. Feminists sought to have their voices heard during the abortion debate in the late-1980s and initiated a draft law on gender equality in force as early as 1989. But it was not until the mid-1990s that their legal offensives found their way onto the legislative agenda. Revising civil regulations on marriage (1996) and legislation on sexual offenses (1997) and domestic violence (1998) were their major achievements in this period. Other social movement organizations also found the Legislative Yuan a vital source...
Table 3.1 A comparison of policing in 1988–1992 and 1993–1999 (annual average)

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<tr>
<td>Number of indicted persons per million participants</td>
<td>24.1</td>
<td>12.6</td>
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<tr>
<td>Number of persons sentenced to more than one year in prison</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
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<td>Percentage of application cases rejected</td>
<td>0.32%</td>
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Note: All of these figures are based on the Demonstration Law. The reported figures are calculated by the authors.

As social movements were gaining political influence, a contingent of activists turned their attention to their local communities in an effort to deepen the demands for social reform. This "community turn" in Taiwan’s social movements first took place in the early 1990s, as some activists began to rediscover their hometown history to promote a new local identity. In so doing, they came to face an inevitable challenge from the clientelistic elites that had dominated Taiwanese local politics (Yang 2007). Later, an increasing number of specific anti-pollution movements evolved into more general locality-based community movement organizations that could better sustain the enthusiasm for local activism. Before the mid-1990s, the aboriginal movement was largely limited to the young elites and urban migrants, with a lack of persistent efforts to mobilize hometown residents. By riding the community-turn wave, aboriginal activists also sought to remake their native society. In 1998, education reform advocates redirected their attention away from state policy and initiated a "community college" movement. Rather than being an auxiliary institution to mainstream education, Taiwan’s community colleges were devised to foster a greater scope of civil-society participation by bringing critical knowledge to more people at various localities.

In addition, there was also a noticeable "professional turn." A decade ago, a small group of Taiwan’s enlightened liberal professionals had played the role of people’s advocates to jump-start social movements; in the mid-1990s, a new generation of professionals carried the momentum of activism into their working sphere. Journalists demanded that their professional autonomy be respected by their bosses. Conscientious medical doctors worked for better protection of patients' rights. Lawyers, judges, and public attorneys joined hands in a movement for judicial reform to protect the judiciary from political interference. The Association for Taiwan Journalists (1995), the Judicial Reform Foundation (1997), the Taiwan Health Care Reform Foundation (1999), and the Taiwan Media Watch (1999) were the main organizational bases used to launch these new reform initiatives.

By the mid-1990s, it was clear that the DPP had matured into a would-be ruling party that was ready to assume national leadership. There was a perceptible "centrist turn" as DPP politicians grew more cautious and reserved in dealing with their social movement allies. The intimate camaraderie that prevailed prior to 1992 was gone, and in some cases activists began to criticize the DPP for "taking political advantage of social movements." In 1996, some environmentalists organized the Taiwan Green Party to dramatize their independence from the DPP. Nevertheless, before the 2000 regime change, the DPP was still widely perceived as much more pro-movement than its main political rivals.

At the same time, when the DPP tried to embrace swinging median voters by shedding its radical past, Lee Teng-hui’s reformist leadership made significant overtures to social movements. In 1994–1996, an official Advisory Committee on Education Reform was formed. An education reform based on humanistic and liberal values was subsequently adopted as the official policy,
at least nominally. The Judicial Yuan also convened a national conference in response to the rising demands for judicial independence in 1994. Around the same period, the national government started to promote an “integrated community building” initiative. Under this policy, state agencies channeled financial resources to nascent community organizations all over Taiwan.

It cannot be overemphasized that the KMT government’s responses were highly selective and based upon carefully crafted calculation. The social movements with more system-threatening potential, such as the labor movement and the environmental movement, continued to be politically excluded throughout the 1990s. Nevertheless, the partial incorporation of social movement demands into the official agenda helped to rebuild the government’s legitimacy as the spokesperson of Taiwan’s civil society, especially after the bruising and confrontational period of 1989–1992. It was an interesting phenomenon that once the state adopted an inclusive attitude, some social movement organizations found it necessary to add the prefix “non-official” or “civil” (míncháin) to their titles to avoid confusion. Obviously, when the political environment turned out to be favorable for social movements, their collective identity became even more salient even though their distance from government officials had been considerably narrowed.

Incorporation and its discontents under the DPP government (2000–2008)

The DPP’s Chen Shui-bian won the 2000 presidential election on a reform agenda (Hsiao 2002: 238). During Chen’s campaign, many social movement activists were recruited to formulate his policy proposals, thus adding movement demands to his platform. However, the DPP’s eight-year rule proved a bittersweet experience for these once-hopeful activists. While social movements were further incorporated into the policy-making process, it became increasingly difficult to engineer meaningful and significant changes due to the political weakness of the DPP government and its subsequent “conservative turn.”

A number of movement activists were able to occupy administrative positions. Among the five Environment Protection Administration ministers the DPP appointed, for example, two were anti-nuclear activists who were considered too radical for the KMT. Two of the three DPP ministers of education were considered to be allies of the education reform movement. In addition, younger activists also obtained the opportunity of working as aides or assistants in state agencies. These appointments facilitated communication between social movements and government officials.

The procedural incorporation of social movements, which had been tentatively developed in the previous era, was further deepened and institutionalized. The Environmental Impact Assessment Committee and the Committee on Women’s Rights Promotion, for instance, were respectively set up in 1995 and 1997; some movement activists were then recruited as members of these committees. The DPP government liberalized its composition rule so that activists could be given more latitude in policy-making (Tu and Peng 2008: 128). The DPP recognized the Taiwan Confederation of Trade Unions as a bona fide national federation of labor in 2000, consequently allowing independent unionists to attend the meetings of the Council of Labor Affairs. Moreover, the DPP set up new official institutions which helped to routinize activists’ participation, including the Council for Hakka Affairs, the National Human Rights Commissions, and the Committee for a Nuclear-free Homeland.

In terms of law-making, social movements succeeded in implementing their agendas in this period. The Protection for Workers Incurring Occupational Accidents Act (2001), the Gender Equality in Employment Act (2002), the Employment Insurance Act (2002), and the Protective Act for Mass Redundancy of Employees (2003) were the fruits of labor movement lobbying since the 1990s. Environmentalists were also relieved to see the Basic Environment Act (2002) finally being passed after more than a decade’s effort.

However, although social movements gained procedural power and made legislative progress, they continued to find it difficult to translate their growing influence into substantial gains. There were several reasons for this.

First, the DPP was handicapped by being a minority government facing a hostile legislature still controlled by the KMT. From 2006, a series of political scandals centering on Chen Shui-bian’s family effectively paralyzed the government. Thus, even when DPP incumbents made efforts to promote changes sought by social movements, their ability to do so was highly constrained. For example, the attempt to terminate the controversial nuclear power plant project (2000–2001) met dogged resistance from opposition parties, and was finally abandoned.

Second, weak government invited counter-mobilizations on the part of those who would be negatively affected by the ascendancy of social movements. In 2002, two large-scale mobilizations by schoolteachers who wanted to protect their privileged exemption from income tax and farmers’ association leaders who resisted financial regulation of their corrupt cooperatives derailed the government’s reform proposals. In 2003, educational conservatives rose to challenge the humanist policy that had been adopted since the late 1990s. Undoubtedly, the rise of counter-mobilizations complicated the political landscape, forcing social movements to fight an increasingly uphill battle.

Last but not least, during its tenure, the DPP constantly changed its position, often swinging back and forth between reformism and political compromise and expediency. In 2001, Chen Shui-bian vowed to “salvage the economy” by loosening environmental regulations and welfare policies. He later maintained that welfare redistribution should take a back seat to economic development (Ho 2005: 411–13). By the time Chen faced reelection in 2004, the DPP government no longer stressed its reformist credentials during
the campaign. The DPP government originally put forth a Green Silicon Island Plan with an emphasis on environmental sustainability and social justice. However, this reformist agenda was largely shelved as the DPP took a conservative turn. It only reemerged during Su Tseng-chang’s premiership (2006-2007) as he laid out the Big Warmth Plan to increase welfare and social spending. Nevertheless, this belated return to reformism was too brief. As Chen’s government was deeply mired in scandals and challenges from both within and without, nationalist mobilization became the only way to secure Chen Shui-bian’s precarious position. In so doing, social reforms were again put to one side and social movement organizations were mostly alienated and frustrated.

This was a frustrating experience for social movement activists who had gained insider status and yet remained “powerless” to influence the government’s course. Nevertheless, it would be wrong to characterize the DPP’s incorporation of civil society, limited as it was, as pure-and-simple co-optation, as if movement activists had given up on their agendas. In many instances, the strategic use of their political positions still helped to make a difference. In 2001, two national policy advisors to the president who came from the welfare movement and the labor movement threatened to resign in opposition to a planned individualistic version of the national pension system. In 2006, two members of the Committee on Women’s Rights Promotion also protested against the move to require a “cooling-off period” before abortion. Both incidents were resolved in favor of the social movements. These examples showed that though movement activists were not necessarily able to make progressive changes, they were still influential enough to prevent obvious policy regression.

By and large, the KMT did not modify its right-wing stand on environmental protection, labor rights, and human rights during its eight-year period of opposition. With the DPP’s reorientation, the ideological differences between the two parties were arguably narrower. Before 2004, the KMT made some symbolic gestures in response to social protests against increases in tuition fees and unemployment to embarrass the DPP government. After its second electoral debacle in 2004, the KMT reverted to its traditional aloofness toward social movements. While Pan-Blue rank-and-file supporters joined the 2006 anti-Chen protest en masse, the KMT continued to avoid any contact with social movement activists before the second regime change.

Conclusion: prospects after the second regime change (2008–)

Following its consecutive victories in the legislative and presidential elections in 2008, the KMT under Ma Ying-jeou formed a strong government. Immediately after Ma’s government was installed, it sought to implement a series of conservative policies, such as legalizing casinos, trimming the national pension system by exempting farmers, tightening control over public television, and increasing the number of on-campus military officers. These measures galvanized environmentalists, welfare activists, media reform activists, and education reform advocates into opposition. The fact that the KMT government gave a green light to the business practice of furlough to meet the challenge of global recession sparked a new round of labor protests. Furthermore, the public was shocked by the aggressive and bruising police action taken against protesters in November 2008 to ensure the red carpet was rolled out for China’s envoy. The student movement, which had been in abeyance for more than a decade, made a dramatic comeback to protest against human rights violations by Ma’s government. Obviously, Taiwan’s civil society remained resilient and combative after the eight-year estranged cohabitation with the DPP. Threats embodied in the form of negation of previous movement gains turned out to be a stimulating force (Goldstone and Tilly 2001: 181). Social movements were ready to challenge conservative roll-backs by the returning KMT government.

Two factors were critical to the prospects for Taiwan’s social movements. First, because movement activists had lost their insider status within the government, they needed to rebuild their grassroots support bases to induce more participation. In the last few years, some movements seemed to have lost their momentum. The anti-nuclear movement, which failed to make a comeback following the disastrous attempt to bring a halt to the construction of the nuclear power plant in 2001, was an obvious example. The institutional incorporation of the Taiwan Confederation of Trade Unions also unexpectedly had a dampening effect on labor movement, as unionized workers enjoyed better protection, while the majority of non-unionized workers, such as part-timers, migrant workers, and subcontracted workers, were increasingly left out. Movement activists have to reassert the art of association to expand their appeal among civil society.

How the DPP reconnected with social movements was no less critical. While the current DPP leadership was preoccupied with dealing with the aftermath of the 2008 defeat and the Chen Shui-bian scandal, its strategy on social movements gradually emerged. In August and October 2008 and May 2009, the DPP led mass protests against the KMT government for its feeble gestures toward China. In early 2009, the DPP reinstalled its Social Movement Department, which had been abolished in 1996. Clearly, with a limited number of political seats in local executives and the Legislative Yuan, the DPP again focused on civil society to boost its strength. However, whether the DPP can regain the trust of movement activists remains to be seen.

In sum, the KMT’s new conservatism and the resurgence of social movements aided by the DPP’s new orientation seem to portend a contentious scenario in the years to come. How the evolution of state–civil society relations might affect post-transitional Taiwan is a challenging question, both practically and intellectually.

Finally, according to Joseph Wong (2003), Taiwan has been making strides toward “deepening its democracy,” as an increasing number of progressive
political issues are absorbed into the mainstream agenda. There are many reasons for this positive development, such as the relative equilibration in the economy, the absence of unbridgeable social cleavages, and the frequently recurring election cycle that compels politicians to search for new issues. While largely agreeing with Wong’s finding, we argue that Taiwan’s vibrant civil society should be given more credit.

This chapter traces the development of Taiwan’s social movements from the 1970s to the second regime change in 2008 to reexamine the link between civil society and democracy-making. Overall, it has shown that social movements have had a consistently positive impact on democracy. Before the political transition, intellectuals and middle-class advocates utilized the limited channel of the public sphere to articulate the call for democratic reforms. During the transition, social movements rose to articulate the interests of and identities among the disenfranchised social sectors. The wave of popular uprisings in the late 1980s was critical in pushing forward the democratizing momentum beyond the restrictive parameters set by KMT hardliners. In the post-transitional era, as social movements were incorporated into the democratic regime, they obtained legitimate status as policy consultants. Despite some temporary setbacks, there is a progressive pattern of evolution in how social movements have been instrumental in making and transforming democracy in Taiwan over several years. In short, we concur with Charles Tilly (2003: 248) in that social movements are ‘‘partly causes, partly effects and almost invariably concomitants of democratic freedoms to speak, assemble, associate and complain.’’

In general, Taiwan’s story confirms the optimistic theory of the role of civil society in the context of new Asian democracies (Hsiao 2008). When viewed against the historical backdrop of state–society relations, social movements tend to be the self-conscious vanguard among all civil-society sectors. The values that underpin their collective vision are usually equality, autonomy, sustainability, and mutual respect, which are in sync with modern democracy. Skeptics of civil society are certainly right when they warn that the vehicle of civic engagement can equally carry anti-democratic passengers. The rise of counter-movements in 2002 and 2003 may fall into this category, but they are isolated and sporadic cases. To maintain a healthy and sustainable democracy in Taiwan, the persistent advocacy, organizing, monitoring, and advice of social movements remain a necessary tonic.

Bibliography


4 The bottom-up nature of Korean democratization

Civil society, anti-Americanism and popular protest

Bruce Cumings

It is a bipartisan commonplace in Washington for policy-makers and pundits to acclaim the Republic of Korea a grand success in democratization, with the assumption that two strong forces made it possible: the rise of the middle class and American support for democracy. When a new president, Lee Myong-bak, a leader eager to support the alliance and promote good relations with the United States, visited Washington in April 2008, it was as if nothing untoward had ever intruded on this relationship. Pundits blamed two previous presidents, Kim Dae Jung and Roh Moo Hyun, for “10 lost years” of turmoil and anti-Americanism, as if George W. Bush’s policies would have met with universal acclaim in Korea had it not been for two misguided presidents and a handful of anti-American demonstrators.1 It is also assumed time and again that relations with Korea began with the courageous American defense of South Korea in the Korean War, when in fact a three-year American Military Government had preceded it, an occupation almost forgotten to history. When it is recalled (a rarity), again, the assumption is that Americans nurtured a democracy with few bumps in the road: as former chairman of the Council on Foreign Relations, Leslie Gelb, put it in contrasting the turmoil in Iraq to previous occupations, postwar Japan, Germany, and South Korea were “all free from internal warfare and with a good economic base” (Gelb 2008).

It is hard to imagine judgments that could be further from the truth. I will argue that turmoil and an anti-Americanism borne of poor policy choices in Washington have marked our relations with Koreans from the start, that the middle class—tiny at the beginning in 1945 but ubiquitous today—has mostly been a conservative upholder of the status quo, that popular protests by peasants at the start, and students and workers in the 1980s and 1990s, drove democratization, and that street protest, labor organization, and widespread dissent in print media built one of the stronger civil societies in the world today.

A forgotten occupation

Leslie Gelb was right that our occupation of South Korea from 1945 to 1948 provides a good comparison with Iraq, but not in his sense. Without