Reading List

PURE AND IMPURE PUBLIC GOODS

JJL: Chapter 2.
Myles, G.D. (1995) Public Economics, Sec 9.1-9.5, Cambridge U.P.

  1. *Samuelson, P.A. (1954) "The Pure Theory of Public Expenditure," REStat, 36:387-89.
    --- (1955) "Diagrammatic Exposition of a Theory of Public Expenditure," REStat, 37:350-6.
    --- (1958) "Aspects of Public Expenditure Theories," REStat, 40:332-38.

  2. Samuelson, P.A. (1969) "Pure Theory of Public Expenditure and Taxation," in Public Economics, J. Margolis and A. Guiton (eds), Macmillan, 98-123.

  3. Kaneko, M. (1977) "The Ratio Equilibrium and a Voting Game in a Public Goods Economy," JET, 16:123-36.

  4. *Bergstrom, T.C. and R.C. Cornes (1981) "Gorman and Musgrave Are Dual: An Antipodean Theorem on Public Goods," EL, 7:371-378.

  5. Blumel, W., R. Pethig, and O. von dem Hagen (1986) "The Theory of Public Goods: A Survey of Recent Issues," JITE, 142:241-309.

  6. *Oakland, W.H. (1987) "Theory of Public Goods," in [Handbook, V2].

  7. Batina, R.G. (1990) JPuE, 42:125-33.

  8. O'Reilly, T. (1995) "Observable Preferences for Public Goods," JPuE, 58:309-17.

  9. Conley, J.P. and D. Diamontaras (1996) "Generalized Samuelson Conditions and Welfare Theorems for Nonsmooth Economics," JPuE, 59(1):137-52.

Analytics

  1. Shibata, H. (1971) "A Bargaining Model of the Pure Theory of Public Expenditures," JPE, 79(1):1-29.

  2. Cornes, R. and Sandler, T. (1985) "The Simple Analytics of Pure Public Good Provision," Economica, 52:103-16.

  3. Schlesinger, H. (1989) "On the Analytics of Pure Public Good Provision," PF, 44(1):102-9.

Lindahl Equilibria

  1. *Lindahl, E. (1919) "Just Taxation --- A Positive Solution," in Classics in the Theory of Public Finance, R.A. Musgrave and A.T. Peacock (eds) (1958). Macmillan.

  2. Johansen, L. (1963) "Some Notes on the Lindahl Theory of Determination of Public Expenditures," IER, 4(3):346-58.

  3. Roberts, D.J. (1974) "The Lindahl Solution for Economies with Public Goods," JPuE, 3:23-42.

  4. Danziger, L. (1976) "A Graphical Representation of the Nash and Lindahl Equilibria in an Economy with a Public Good," JPuE, 6:295-307.

  5. Mas-Colell, A. and J. Silvestre (1989) "Cost Share Equilibria: A Lindahl Approach," JET, 47:239-56.

  6. Danziger, L. and A. Schnytzer (1991) "Implementing the Lindahl Voluntary-exchange Mechanism," EuroJPE, 7:55-64.

Home

NASH BEHAVIOR AND FREE-RIDING

C&S: Chapter 6.

  1. *Tullock, G. (1971) "Public Decisions as Public Goods," JPE, 79(4):913-18.
    Bergstrom, T.C. and H. Varian (1987) "Government by Jury."

  2. *Becker, G.S. (1981) "Altruism in the Family," in A Treatise on the Family, Harvard U.P.
    Bergstrom, T.C. (1989) "A Fresh Look at the Rotten Kid Theorem and Other Household Mysteries," JPE, 97(5):1138-59.
    Bruce, N. and M. Waldman (1990) "The Rotten Kid Theorem Meets the Samaritan's Dilemma," QJE, 14(3):155-65.
    Cornes, R.C. and E.C.D. Silva (1999) "Rotten Kids, Purity, and Perfection," JPE, 107(5):1034-40. ["Comment" (2002) by P.-A. Chiappori and I. Werning, JPE, 110(2):475-480.]

  3. Lindbeck, A. and J.W. Weibull (1988) "Altruism and Time Consistency: The Economics of Fait Accompli," JPE, 96(6):1165-82.

  4. *Andreoni, J. (1988) "Privately Provided Public Good in a Large Economy: The Limits of Altruism," JPuE, 35:57-73.

  5. *Alexander-Cook, K., D. Bernhardt, and J. Roberts (1998) "Riding Free on the Signals of Others," JPuE, 67:25-43.

  6. *Engers, M. and J.S. Gans (1998) "Why Referees Are Not Paid (Enough)," AER, 88(5):1341-49.

  7. *Gaube, T. (2001) "Group Size and Free Riding When Private and Public Goods Are Gross Substitutes," EL, 70:127-32.

  8. *Kotchen, M.J. (2009) "Voluntary Provision of Public Goods for Bads: A Theory of Environmental Offsets," EJ, 119:883-899.

The Neutrality/Invariance Hypotheses

  1. *Warr, P.G. (1983) "The Private Provision of a Public Good Is Independent of the Distribution of Income," EL, 13:207-11.
    Bergstrom, T.C., L. Blume, and H. Varian (1986) "On the Private Provision of Public Goods," JPuE, 29:25-49. (See improved proofs in JPuE, 1992, 49:389-92)
    Itaya, J.-I., D. de Meza, and G.D. Myles (1997) "In Praise of Inequality: Public Good Provision and Income Distribution," EL, 57:289-96. [Welfare equalization under identical preferences]

  2. Roberts, R.D. (1985) "A Taxonomy of Public Provision," PC, 47:267-303.

  3. Bernheim, B.D. (1986) "On the Voluntary and Involuntary Provision of Public Goods," AER, 76(4):789-93.

  4. Steinberg, R. (1987) "Voluntary Donation and Public Expenditures in a Federalist System," AER, 77(1):24-36.

  5. *Andreoni, J. (1989) "Giving with Impure Altruism: Applications to Charity and Ricardian Equivalence," JPE, 97(6):1447-58.
    --- (1990) "Impure Altruism and Donations to Public Goods: A Theory of Warm-Glow Giving," EJ, 100:464-77.

  6. --- (1993) "An Experimental Test of the Public-Goods Crowding-out Hypothesis," AER, 83(5):1317-27.

  7. *Gradstein, M., S. Nitzan, and S. Slutsky (1994) "Neutrality and the Private Provision of Public Goods with Incomplete Information," EL, 46:69-75./

  8. Smith, V.H., M.R. Kehoe, and M.E. Cremer (1995) "The Private Provision of Public Goods: Altruism and Voluntary Giving," JPuE, 58:107-26. [Empirical testing]/

  9. Chan, K.S., et al. (1996) "The Voluntary Provision of Public Goods under Varying Income Distribution," CanJE, XXIX(1):54-69.

  10. Bolton, G.E. and E. Katok (1998) "An Experimental Test of the Crowding-out Hypothesis," JEBO, 37:315-31.

Charity and Transfer Public Goods:

Jones, A.M. and J.W. Posnett (1993) "The Economics of Charity," in Current Issues in the Economics of Welfare, N. Barr and D. Whynes (eds), MacMillan.

  1. *Warr, P.G. (1982) "Pareto Optimal Redistribution and Private Charity," JPuE, 19:131-38.

  2. Roberts, R.D. (1984) "A Positive Model of Private Charity and Public Transfers," JPE, 92(1):136-48.

  3. Kingma, B.R. (1989) "An Accurate Measurement of the Crowd-Out Effect, Income Effect, and Price Effect for Charitable Contributions," JPE, 97:1197-1207.

  4. Glazer, A. and K.A. Konrad (1996) "A Signaling Explanation for Charity," AER, 86(4):1019-28. [Conspicuous giving, wealth signaling/demonstration]

Non-Nash Behaviors:

C&S: Section 10.4.

  1. Buchanan, J.M. (1967) "Cooperation and Conflict in Public-Goods Interaction," WEJ, 5:109-21.

  2. Breit, W. (1968) "Public Goods Interaction in Stackelberg Geometry," WEJ, 6:161-64.

  3. *Cornes, R. and T. Sandler (1984) "The Theory of Public Goods: Non-Nash Behavior," JPuE, 23:367-79.
    Scafuri, A.J. (1988) "On Consistency of Conjectures in the Private Provision of Public Goods," JPuE, 37:395-98.

  4. *Sugden, R. (1985) "Consistent Conjectures and Voluntary Contribution to Public Goods," JPuE, 27(1):117-24. [Also: Reply by Cornes and Sandler]

  5. Guttman, J.M. (1987) "A Non-Cournot Model of Voluntary Collective Action," Economica, 54:1-19.

  6. Scafuri, A.J. (1992) "Rational Conjectures Equilibria in the Private Provision of Public Goods," PFQ, 20(2):139-51.

  7. Dasgupta, D. and J. Itaya (1992) "Comparative Statics for Private Provision of Public Goods in a Conjectural Variations Model with Heterogeneous Agents," PF, 47(1):17-31.
    --- and --- (1995) "Dynamics, Consistent Conjectures, and Heterogeneous Agents in the Private Provision of Public Goods," PF, 50(3):371-89.

Free-riding Experiments:

Ledyard, J.O. (1995) "Public Goods: A Survey of Experimental Research," in J.H. Kagel and A.E. Roth (eds), The Handbook of experimental Economics, Princeton U.P.

  1. Kim-Walker (PC 1984)
  2. Isaac-Walker-Thomas (PC 1984)
  3. Isaac-McCue-Plott (JPuE 1985)
  4. Andreoni (JPuE 1988), Croson (EL 1996)
  5. Aquino-Steisel-Kay (JCR 1992)
  6. Asch-Gigliotti-Polito (PC 1993)
  7. Isaac-Walker-Williams (JPuE 1994)
  8. Weimann (JPuE 1994)
  9. Andreoni (AER 1995, QJE 1995)
  10. Laury-Walker-Williams (JEBO 1995)
  11. Palfrey-Prisbrey (JPuE 1996, AER 1997)
  12. Sefton-Steinberg (JPuE 1996)
  13. Burlando-Hey (JPuE 1997) [Cultural difference]
  14. Cadsby-Maynes (JEBO 1998) [Subject pool selection]

Home

PRIVATE PROVISION OF PUBLIC GOODS

Motivation:

  1. Margolis, H. (1982) Selfishness, Altruism, and Rationality, Chs. 3-5, Cambridge U.P.

  2. Sugden, R. (1982) "On the Economics of Philanthropy," EJ, 92:341-50.

  3. --- (1984) "Reciprocity: The Supply of Public Goods through Voluntary Contributions," EJ, 94:772-87.

Non-additive Continuous Public Goods:

  1. *Hirshleifer, J. (1983) "From Weakest Link to Best Shot: The Voluntary Provision of Public Goods," PC, 41:371-86. [And "Correction" in PC, 1985, 56:221-23]

  2. Harrison, G.W. and J. Hirshleifer (1989) "An Experimental Evaluation of Weakest Link/Best Shot Models of Public Goods," JPE, 79(1):201-25.

  3. Cornes, R. (1993) "Dyke Maintenance and Other Stories: Some Neglected Types of Public Goods," QJE, 108:259-71.

  4. *Vicary, S. (1990) "Transfers and the Weakest-Link," JPuE, 43:375-94. [Strategic transfers]

Binary/Threshold Public Goods:

  1. Palfrey, T.R. and H. Rosenthal (1983) "A Strategic Calculus of Voting," PC, 41:7-53. [Binary contribution, non-voting]

  2. *Palfrey, T.R. and H. Rosenthal (1984) "Participation and the Provision of Discrete Public Goods: A Strategic Analysis," JPuE, 24:171-93. [Binary contribution]

  3. *Bagnoli, M. and M.L. Lipman (1989) "Provision of Public Goods: Fully Implementing the Core through Private Contributions," REStud, 56:583-601.
    Bagnoli, M. and M. McKee (1991) "Voluntary Contribution Games: Efficient Private Provision of Public Goods," EI, 29:351-66. [Variable contribution]
    Cadsby, C.B. and E. Maynes (1999) "Voluntary Provision of Threshold Public Goods with Continuous Contributions: Experimental Evidence," JPuE, 71:53-73.

  4. Bagnoli, M. and M.L. Lipman (1992) "Private Provision of Public Goods Can Be Efficient," PC, 74:59-78.

  5. Offerman, T., J. Sonnemans, and A. Schram (1996) "Value Orientation, Expectations and Voluntary Contributions in Public Goods," EJ, 106:817-45.

  6. Marks, M. and R. Croson (1998) "Alternative Rebate Rules in the Provision of a Threshold Public Goods: An Experimental Investigation," JPuE, 67:195-220.

Efficiency:

  1. *Guttman, J.M. (1978) "Understanding Collective Action: Matching Behavior," AER, 68(2):251-55. [2-stage matching game]

  2. Ben Zion, U., M. Gradstein, and U. Spiegel (1988) "Financing of Public Goods and Noncooperative Theory of Bargaining," JPuE, 37:345-57. [Alternate-offer bargaining over PG contributions]

  3. *Gradstein, M. and S. Nitzan (1990) "Binary Participation and Incremental Provision of Public Goods," SCW, 7:171-92. [Incremental PG, binary contribution]

  4. Ihori, T. (1992) "Impure Public Goods and Transfers in a Three-Agent Model," JPuE, 48:385-401. [Impure PG, transfer]

  5. *Baik, K.H. (1993) "Effort Levels in Contests: The Public-Good Prize Case," EL, 41:363-67.
    Drago, R., G.T. Garvey, and G.K. Turnbull (1996) "A Collective Tournament," EL, 50:223-27.

  6. *Varian, H. (1994) "Sequential Contributions to Public Goods," JPuE, 53(2):165-86. [Continuous PG, variable contribution, Stackelberg game]
    Buchholz, W., K.A. Konrad, and K.E. Lommerud (1997) "Stackelberg Leadership and Transfers in Private Provision of Public Goods," JEDsgn, 3(1):29-43. [Follower transferring to leader]

  7. Kaufman, D.A. (1994) "Welfare and the Private Provision of Public Goods When Altruism Increases," PFQ, 22(2):239-57. [Exogenously induced altruistic preferences]

  8. *Buchholz, W. and K.A. Konrad (1995) "Strategic Transfers and Private Provision of Public Goods," JPuE, 57:489-505. [Continuous PG]

  9. *Andreoni, J. and T.C. Bergstrom (1996) "Do Government Subsidies Increase the Private Supply of Public Goods?," PC, 88:295-308. [Individually uniform taxation]

  10. *Falkinger, J. (1996) "Efficient Private Provision of Public Goods by Rewarding Deviations from Average," JPuE, 62:413-22. [Tax/subsidy depends on distribution of contributions]

  11. Ihori, T. (1996) "International Public Goods and Contribution Productivity Differentials," JPuE, 61:139-54.

  12. Toeh, S.H. (1997) "Information Disclosure and Voluntary Contributions to Public Goods," RandJE, 28(3):385-406.

  13. *Harbaugh, W.T. (1998) "What Do Donations Buy? A Model of Philanthropy Based on Prestige and Warm Glow," JPuE, 67:269-84. [Category reporting, impure altruism]

Joint Production:

  1. Vicary, S. (1997) "Joint Production and the Private Provision of Public Goods," JPuE, 63:429-45. [PG provided by both direct donation and private good production]

  2. Vicary, S. (2000) "Donations to a Public Good in a Large Economy," EER, 44:609-18. [Donated PG adversely affected by private consumption]

Time Dynamics, Uncertainty, and Incomplete Information:

  1. McMillan, J. (1979) "Individual Incentives in the Supply of Public Inputs," JPuE, 12:87-98. [Supergame, continuous public input]

  2. *Bliss, C. and B. Nalebuff (1984) "Dragon-Slaying and Ballroom Dancing: The Private Supply of a Public Good," JPuE, 25:1-12. [Threshold PG, single provider, private cost info]
    Hendricks, K., et al. (1988) "The War of Attrition in Continuous Time with Complete Information," IER, 29(4):663-80. [Two players with asymmetric returns]
    Bilodeau, M. and A. Slivinski (1996) "Toilet Cleaning and Department Chairing: Volunteering a Public Service," JPuE, 59(2):299-308.
    Bulow, J. and P. Klemperer (1999) "The Generalized War of Attrition," AER, 89(1):175-89. [N+K firms competing for N prizes]

  3. *Palfrey, T.R. and H. Rosenthal (1988) "Private Incentives in Social Dilemmas," JPuE, 35:309-32. [Threshold PG, binary contribution, iid private payoff info]

  4. *Nitzan, S. and R.E. Romano (1990) "Private Provision of a Discrete Public Good with Uncertain Cost," JPuE, 42:357-70. [Threshold PG, variable contribution, uncertain PG cost]

  5. *Admati, A.R. and M. Perry (1991) "Joint Projects without Commitment," REStud, 58:259-76. [Multi-stage game, alternate contributions]

  6. *Fershtman, C. and S. Nitzan (1991) "Dynamic Voluntary Provision of Public Goods," EER, 35:1057-67. [Cumulative continuous PG, continuous infinite time, open/feedback stable Nash]

  7. *Gradstein, M. (1992) "Time Dynamics and Incomplete Information in the Private Provision of Public Goods," JPE, 100(3):581-97. [Incremental PG, binary contribution, iid private cost info]

  8. Dickinson, D.L. (1998) "The Voluntary Contributions Mechanism with Uncertain Group Payoffs," JEBO, 35:517-33. [Experimental study]

  9. *Gradstein, M. (1998) "Provision of Public Goods in a Large Economy," EL, 61:229-34. [Tax-subsidy scheme, only distribution of individual costs is known]

Home

SECOND-BEST PROVISION

  1. Atkinson, A.B. and N.H. Stern (1974) "Pigou, Taxation, and Public Goods," REStud, 41:119-28. [Single consumer, C-D utility function]
    Wilson, J.D. (1991) "Optimal Public Good Provision in the Ramsey Tax Model," EL, 35:57-61. [Generalization to CES utility function]

  2. Roberts, R.D. (1987) "Financing Public Goods," JPE, 95(2):420-37.

  3. Boadway, R., P. Pestieau, and D. Wildasin (1989) "Tax-transfer Policies and the Voluntary Provision of Public Goods," JPuE, 39:157-76.

  4. Wilson, J.D. (1991) "Optimal Public Good Provision with Limited Lump-Sum Taxation," AER, 81(1):153-66.

  5. *Falkinger, J. (1991) "On Optimal Public Good Provision with Tax Evasion," JPuE, 45:127-33. [Impact of tax evasion on optimal PG]

  6. Ballard, C.L. and Fullerton, D. (1992) "Distortionary Taxes and the Provision of Public Goods," JEP, 6(3):117-31.

  7. Roberts, R.D. (1992) "Government Subsidies to Private Spending on Public Goods," PC, 74(2):133-51. [Efficient subsidy under free-riding and direct taxation]

  8. Ng, Y.-K. (1984) "Quasi-Pareto Social Improvements," AER, 74(5):1033-50.

  9. King, M.A. (1986) "A Pigouvian Rule for the Optimum Provision of Public Goods," JPuE, 30:273-91.

  10. Ng, Y.-K. (1987) "Relative-Income Effects and the Appropriate Level of Public Expenditure," Oxford Econ Papers, 39:293-300.

  11. Wilson, J.D. (1991) "Optimal Public Good Provision with Limited Lump-Sum Taxation," AER, 81(1):153-66. [Many-consumer economy with commodity and poll tax]

  12. Kaplow, L. (1996) "The Optimal Supply of Public Goods and the Distortionary Cost of Taxation," NTJ, 49(4):513-33.

  13. *Kirchsteiger, G. and C. Puppe (1997) "On the Possibility of Efficient Private Provision of Public Goods through Government Subsidies," JPuE, 66:489-504.

  14. Feldstein, M. (1997) NTJ, 50(2):197-213.

Home

EXTERNALITIES AND THE CPR PROBLEM

A. Externalities

JJL: Chapter 1.
Burrows, P., "Nonconvexities and the Theory of External Costs," Ch. 12 in Handbook of Environmental Economics
Myles, G.D. (1995) Public Economics, Chapter 10, Cambridge UP
Mueller, D.C. (1989) Public Choice II, Chapter 2

  1. *Coase, R.H. (1960) "The Problem of Social Cost," JL&E., 3:1-44.
    Turvey, R. (1962) "On Divergences between Social Cost and Private Cost," Economica, 30(3):309-13.
    Frech III, H.E. (1979) "The Extended Coase Theorem and Long Run Equilibrium: The Non-equivalence of Liability Rules and Property Rule," EI, 17:254-68.
    Schweizer, U. (1988) "Externalities and the Coase Theorem: Hypothesis or Result?," JITE, 144:245-66.

    Experiments on Coasean bargaining:

    Harrison-Mckee (1985), JL&E, 28:633-70. [Alternative property right structures]
    Hoffman-Spitzer (1986), JLS, 15:149-71. [Large bargaining groups]
    Shogren (1992), JEBO, 17:153-69. [Uncertain payoff streams]
    Shogren-Kask (1992), EL, 39:155-61. [Imperfect contract enforcement]

  2. Dolbear, Jr., F.T. (1967) "On the Theory of Optimum Externality," AER, 57(1):90-103.

  3. Baumol, W.J. (1972) "On Taxation and the Control of Externalities," AER, 62(2):307-22.

  4. *Kolstad, C.D., T.S. Ulen, and G.V. Johnson (1990) "Ex Post Liability for Harm vs. Ex Ante Safety Regulation: Substitutes or Complements?" AER, 80(4):889-901.

  5. Parks, R.P. (1991) "Pareto Irrelevant Externalities," JET, 54:165-79.

  6. *Greenwood, J. and R.P. McAfee (1991) "Externalities and Asymmetric Information," QJE, 1991(Feb):103-21.

  7. *Griffin, R.C. (1991) "The Welfare Analytics of Transaction Costs, Externalities, and Institutional Choice," AJAE, 73:601-14.

  8. *Cornes, R. (1992) "Externalities and Public Goods," Chapter 10 in Duality and Modern Economics, Cambridge U.P.

  9. Usher, D. (1992) "Externality and Destruction: A Model of Production and Banditry," pages 77-89 in The Welfare Economics of Markets, Voting and Predation, Manchester UP.

  10. Bigelow, J.P. (1993) "Inducing Efficiency: Externalities, Missing Markets, and the Coase Theorem" IER, 34(2):335-46.

  11. *Varian, H. (1994) "A Solution to the Problem of Externalities When Agents Are Well-Informed," AER, 84(5):1278-93. [And Comment by S. Ziss, AER, 87(1):231-35.]

  12. *Lewis, T.R. (1996) "Protecting the Environment When Costs and Benefit Are Privately Known," RandJE, 27:819-47.

  13. *Huber, C. and F. Wirl (1998) "The Polluter Pays versus the Pollutee Pays Principle under Asymmetric Information," JEEM, 35:69-87. [Polluter cost unknown to pollutee, pollutee damage unknown to polluter; P-A design]

  14. *Dixit, A. and M. Olson (2000) "Does Voluntary Participaion Undermine the Coase Theorem?" JPuE, 76:309-35. [2-stage non-coop/coop game]

  15. *Schmitz, P.W. (2000) "On the Joint Use of Liability and Safety Regulation," IRLE, 20:371-82. [Wealth varies among injuriers]

Case Studies:

  1. *Brito, D.L., E. Sheshinski, and M.D. Intriligator (1991) "Externalities and Compulsory Vaccinations" JPuE, 45:69-90.
    Francis, P.J. (1997) "Dynamic Epidemiology and the Market for Vaccinations," JPuE, 63:383-406.
    Geoffard, P.-Y. and T. Philipson (1997) "Disease Eradication: Private versus Public Vaccination," AER, 87(1):222-30. [Positive analysis]

  2. *Epple, D. and R.E. Romano (1998) "Competition Between Private and Public Schools, Vouchers, and Peer-Group Effects," AER, 88(1):33-62. [Tax-financed tuition-free public schools v. tuition-financed private schools, 2-dimensional student sorting]

B. Altruism and Nonprofit Institutions

  1. *Archibald, G.C. and D. Donaldson (1976) "Non-paternalism and the Basic Theorems of Welfare Economics," CanJE, 9(3):492-507.

  2. *Bergstrom, T.C. (1989) "Love and Spaghetti," JEP, 3(2):165-73.

  3. Rose-Ackerman, S. (1996) "Altruism, Nonprofits, and Economic Theory," JEL, 34:701-28.

  4. Wigger, B.U. (1996) "Two-sided Altruism, the Samaritan's Dilemma, and Universal Compulsory Insurance," PF, 51(2):275-90.

  5. *Ley, E. (1997) "Optimal Provision of Public Goods with Altruistic Individuals," EL, 54:23-27.

  6. Eshel, I., L. Samuelson, and A. Shaked (1998) "Altruists, Egoists, and Hooligans in a Local Interaction Model," AER, 88(1):157-79. [Imitation-based local learning, discrete-time spatial circle model]

C. The Common Property Problem

  1. Hardin, G. (1968) "The Tragedy of the Commons," Science, 162:1243-48.
    Benson, B.L. (1994) "Are Public Goods Really Common Pools?" EI, XXXII:249-71.

  2. Weitzman, M.L. (1974) "Free Access vs Private Ownership as Alternative Systems for Managing Common Property," JET, 8:225-34.

  3. De Meza, D. and J.R. Gould (1987) "Free Access versus Private Property in a Resource: Income Distributions Compared," JPE, 95(6):1317-25.

  4. Ostrom, E., et al. (1994) Chapters 1-4 in Rules, Games, and Common-Pool Resources, Univ of Michigan Press.

  5. *Brito, D.L., E. Sheshinski, and M.D. Intriligator (1997) "Privatization and Distribution of Income in the Commons," JPuE, 64:181-205.

  6. Sethi, R. and E. Somanathan (1997) "The Evolution of Social Norms in Common Property Resource Use," AER, 86(4):766-88. [Evolutionary game-theoretic framework, resource-stock dynamics]

  7. Mason, C.F. and S. Polasky (1997) "The Optimal Number of Firms in the Commons: A Dynamic Approach," CanJE, XXX(4b):1143-60.

Home

PREFERENCE REVELATION AND MECHANISM DESIGN

"Incomplete Information and Public Economics" [JJL, Chapter 5]
Green, J.R. and J.-J. Laffont (1979) Incentives in Public Decision-Making, North-Holland.
Laffont, J.-J. (ed) (1979) Aggregation and Revelation of Preferences, North-Holland. [Parts 4-5]
Laffont, J.-J. (1987) "Incentives and the Allocation of Public Goods," in [Handbook V2]
Groves, T. and J.O. Ledyard (1987) "Incentive Compatibility Since 1972," in Information, Incentives, and Economic Mechanisms, T. Groves et al. (eds), Basil Blackwell.
Moore, J. (1992) "Implementation, Contracts, and Renegotiation in Environments with Complete Information," in Advances in Economic Theory: Sixth World Congress, Cambridge U.P.
Mas-Colell, A. et al. (1995) "Incentives and Mechanism Design," Chapter 23 of Microeconomic Theory, Oxford U.P.
Campbell, D.E. (1995) Incentives: Motivation and the Economics of Information, Cambridge U.P.

  1. *Clarke, E.H. (1971) "Multi-part Pricing of Public Goods," PC, 11:17-33. [Also: C&S 6.4]

  2. *Groves, T. and M. Loeb (1975) "Incentives and Public Inputs," JPuE, 4:211-26.
    Groves, T. (1976) "Information, Incentives, and the Internalization of Production Externalities," in Theory and Measurement of Economic Externalities, S. Lin (ed), Academic Press.

  3. *Tideman, T.N. and G. Tullock (1976) "A New and Superior Process for Making Social Choices," JPE, 84:1145-59.
    [Also see Kreps, D.M. (1990) Pivot Mechanism, Sec 18.3 of A Course in Microeconomic Theory]

    Attiyeh, G., Franciosi, R., and R.M. Isaac (2000) "Experiments with the Pivot Process for Providing Public Goods," PC, 102:95-114.

  4. *Groves, T. and J. Ledyard (1977) "Optimal Allocation of Public Goods: A Solution to the 'Free Rider' Problem," Econometrica, 45(4):783-809.
    --- (1977) "Some Limitations of Demand Revealing Processes," PC, 29:107-24, 139-43.

  5. Hurwicz, L. (1979) "Outcome Functions Yielding Walrasian and Lindahl Allocations at Nash Equilibrium Points," REStud, 46(2):217-25.

  6. Groves, T. (1979) "Efficient Collective Choice when Compensation is Possible," REStud, 46(2):227-41. [Synthesis of classical results]

  7. *Moore, J. and R. Repullo (1988) "Subgame Perfect Implementation," Econometrica, 56(5):1191-1220. [Read Sections 1 and 5]

  8. Zhou, L. (1991) "Impossibility of Strategy-Proof Mechanisms in Economies with Pure Public Goods," REStud, 58:107-19.

  9. *Jackson, M. and H. Moulin (1992) "Implementing a Public Project and Distributing Its Cost," JET, 57:125-40. [Indivisible PG, truthful revelation undominated Nash implementation]

  10. Sinn, H.-W. (1993) "Pigou and Clark Join Hands," PC, 75:79-91.

  11. Tian, G. (1996) "Continuous and Feasible Implementation of Rational-Expectations Lindahl Allocations," GEB, 16:135-51.

  12. *Schummer, J. (1998) "Strategy-proofness versus Efficiency for Small Domains of Preferences over Public Goods," ET, ?:??.

  13. Chen, Y. and F-F. Tang (1998) "Learning and Incentive-Compatible Mechanisms for Public Goods Provision: An Experimental Study," JPE, 106(3):633-62.

  14. Ledyard, J.O. and T.R. Palfrey (1999) "A Characterization of Interim Efficiency with Public Goods," Econometrica, 67(2):435-48.

Home

COLLECTIVE CHOICE THEORY

Sen, A. (1999) "The Possibility of Social Choice," AER, 89(3):349-78.
JJL: Chapter 4.
Myles, G.D. (1995) Public Economics, Sec 9.7, Cambridge U.P.
Ingberman, D. and R. Inman (1988) "The Political Economy of Fiscal Policy," in [PGH].

  1. *Bowen, H.R. (1943) "The Interpretation of Voting in the Allocation of Economic Resources," QJE, 58:27-48. [Also: C&S 6.5]
    Bergstrom, T.C. (1979) "When Does Majority Rule Supply Public Goods Efficiently?," ScanJE, 81:216-26.

  2. Caplin, A. and B. Nalebuff (1988) "On 64%-Majority Rule," Econometrica, 56(4):787-814.

  3. Dunleavy, P. and H. Ward (1991) "Economic Explanations of Voting Behavior," in Democracy, Bureaucracy and Public Choice, P. Dunleavy (ed), Harvester Wheatsheaf.

  4. *Ledyard, J.O. and T.R. Palfrey (1994) "Voting and Lottery Drafts as Efficient Public Goods Mechanisms," REStud, 61(2):327-55.

  5. *Epple, D. and R.E. Romano (1996) "Public Provision of Private Goods," JPE, 104(1):57-84. [Govt supply of private goods with private supplemental purchase, majority voting equilibrium]

  6. *McGuire, M.C. and M. Olson, Jr. (1996) "The Economics of Autocracy and Majority Rule," JEL, XXXIV(1):72-96.

  7. *Harbaugh, W.T. (1996) "If People Vote Because They Like to, then Why Do So Many of Them Lie," PC, 89:63-76.

  8. Winter, E. (1997) "Negotiations in Multi-issue Committees," JPuE, 65:323-42.

Home

LOCAL AND EXCLUDABLE PUBLIC GOODS

A. LOCAL PUBLIC GOODS

Atkinson, A.B. and J.E. Stiglitz (1980) Lecture 17 of Lectures on Public Economics.

  1. *Tiebout, C.M. (1956) "A Pure Theory of Local Expenditures," JPE, 64:416-24.

  2. Stiglitz, J.E. (1974) "The Demand for Education in Public and Private School Systems," JPuE, 3:349-85.

  3. *Bewley, T.F. (1981) "A Critique of Tiebout's Theory of Local Public Expenditures," Econometrica, 49(3):713-40.

  4. Stiglitz, J.E. (1982) "The Theory of Local Public Goods Twenty-Five Years after Tiebout: A Perspective," NBER Working Paper No. 954.

  5. *Rubinfeld, D.L. (1987) "The Economics of the Local Public Sector," in [Handbook V2].

  6. *Gradstein, M. (1993) "Rent Seeking and the Provision of Public Goods," EJ, 103:1236-43. [Private provision (with free-riding) v. public provision (under rent-seeking)]

  7. Krelove, R. (1993) "The Persistence and Inefficiency of Property Tax Finance of Local Public Expenditures," JPuE, 51:415-35. [Multiple-jurisdiction economies with competitive entrepreneurial govts]

  8. Hochman, O., D. Pines, and J-F. Thisse (1996) "On the Optimal Structure of Local Governments," AER, 85(5):1224-40.

  9. Kollman, K., J.H. Miller, and S.E. Page (1997) "Political Institutions and Sorting in a Tiebout Model," AER, 87(5):977-92. [Computational model of Tiebout competition]

  10. Glomm, G. and R. Lagunoff (1998) "A Tiebout Theory of Public vs Private Provision of Collective Goods," JPuE, 68:91-112. [Coercive vs voluntary provision of PG under Tiebout assumption]

B. THEORY OF CLUB GOODS

C&S: Part IV (Chapter 11-16).
Starett, D. (1988) Chapter 4 of Foundations of Public Economics, Cambridge U.P.
Club Theory Symposium, Special Issue of JPuE, 65(1), July 1997.
Sandler, T. and J.T. Tschirhart (1980) "The Economic Theory of Clubs: An Evaluative Survey," JEL, XVIII:1481-521.

  1. *Buchanan, J.M. (1965) "An Economic Theory of Clubs," Economica, 32:1-14.

  2. Oakland, W. (1974) "Public Goods, Perfect Competition, and Underproduction," JPE, 82:927-40.

  3. *Berglas, E. (1976) "On the Theory of Clubs," AER, 66:116-21.

  4. Brito, D. and W. Oakland (1980) "On the Monopolistic Provision of Excludable Public Goods," AER, 70(4):691-704.

  5. Burns, M. and C. Walsh (1981) "Market Provision of Price-Excludable Public Goods," JPE, 89:166-91.

  6. Brennan, J. and C. Walsh (1981) "A Monopoly Model of Public Goods Provision: The Uniform Pricing Case," AER, 71(1):196-206.

  7. Scotchmer, S. (1985) "Profit-Maximizing Clubs," JPuE, 27:25-45.

  8. *Helsley, R.W. and W.C. Strange (1991) "Exclusion and the Theory of Clubs," CanJE, 24(4):888-99.

  9. Sandlet, T. and J. Tschirhart (1997) "Club Theory: Thirty Years Later," PC, 93:335-55.

Home

EMPIRICAL STUDIES ON PUBLIC GOOD DEMAND

C&S: Chapter 17.
Mueller, D.C. (1989) Public Choice II, Chapter 10(C)(D).
Blundell, R. (1988) "Econometric Issues in Public Sector Economics" in [PGH].

Public Choice Approach --- Median Voter Models:

  1. *Borcherding, T.E. and R.T. Deacon (1972) "The Demand for the Services of Non-Federal Governments," AER, 62:891-901.

  2. *Bergstrom, T.C. and R.P. Goodman (1973) "Private Demands for Public Goods," AER, 63(3):280-96.

  3. Pommerehne, W.W. and B.S. Frey (1976) "Two Approaches to Estimating Public Expenditures," PC, 4(4):395-407.
    Pommerehne, W.W. (1978) "Institutional Approaches to Public Expenditures: Empirical Evidence from Swiss Municipalities," JPuE, 9:163-201.

  4. Inman, R. (1978) "Testing Political Economy's `As If' Proposition: Is the Median Voter Decisive," PC, 33(4):46-64.

  5. *Romer, T. and H. Rosenthal (1979) "The Elusive Median Voter," JPuE, 12:143-70. [Critical review of empirical literature]

  6. Holcombe, R.G. (1980) "An Empirical Test of the Median Voter Model," EI, 18:260-74.

  7. *Goldstein, G.S. and M.V. Pauly (1981) "Tiebout Bias on the Demand for Local Public Goods," JPuE, 16:131-43.

  8. *Gramlich, E.M. and D.L. Rubinfeld (1982) "Micro Estimates of Public Spending Demand Functions and Tests of the Tiebout and Median-Voter Hypotheses," JPE, 90:536-60.

  9. Oats, W.E. (1988) "On the Measurement of Congestion in the Provision of Local Public Goods," JUrbE, 24:85-94.

  10. Tridimas, G (1993) "A Choice Consistent Model of Demand for Government Expenditures," EuroJPE, 9:125-40.

  11. Baumgardner, J.R. (1993) "Tests of Median Voter and Political Support Maximization Models," PFQ, 21(1):48-83. [Tests on federal/state welfare programs (Medicaid and AFDC)]

Other Approaches:

  1. *Bergstrom, T.C., D.L. Rubinfeld, and P. Shapiro (1982) "Microbased Estimates of Demand Functions for Local School Expenditures," Econometrica, 50(5):1183-1205.

  2. *Bohm, P (1984) "Revealing Demand for an Actual Public Good," JPuE, 24:135-51.

  3. *Baum, D.N. (1986) "A Simultaneous Equations Model of the Demand for and Production of Local Public Services: the Case of Education," PFQ, 14(2):157-78.

  4. *Schwab, R.M. and E.M. Zampelli (1987) "Disentangling the Demand Function from the Production Function for Local Public Services," JPuE, 33:245-60.

Efficiency:

  1. *Barlow, R. (1970) "Efficiency Aspects of Local School Finance," JPE, 78(5):1028-40. [And comments in JPE Symposium on Local School Finance, 1973, 81(1):158-202]

  2. Brueckner, J.K. (1979) "Property Values, Local Public Expenditure, and Economic Efficiency," JPuE, 11:223-4.
    --- (1982) "A Test for Allocative Efficiency in the Local Public Sector," JPuE, 19:311-31.
    Deller, S.C. and D.L. hicoine (1993) "Representative versus Direct Democracy: A Test of Allocative Efficiency in Local Government Expenditures," PFQ, 21(1):100-14. [Influence of institutional arrangements]

  3. Bergstrom, T.C., et al. (1988) "A Test for Efficiency in the Supply of Public Education," JPuE, 35:289-307.

Journal Abbreviations

Home