A Theory of International Currency: Competition and Discipline

Yiting Li
Department of Economics, National Taiwan University, Taipei, Taiwan
yitingli@ntu.edu.tw.

Akihiko Matsui
Faculty of Economics, University of Tokyo, Tokyo 113-0033, Japan
amatsui@e.u-tokyo.ac.jp

November 2008

Abstract

We explicitly consider strategic interaction between governments to study currency competition and its effects on the circulation of currencies and welfare in a two-country two-currency search theoretic model. Each government finances public goods by means of seigniorage. Compared with a regime with two local currencies, a regime with one international currency allows the issuer of the international currency to reduce the inflation tax while collecting more seigniorage, and forces the other issuer to raise the rate to compensate for a diminished tax base. However, the country with a local currency is sometimes constrained by an inflation discipline: the more open a country is, the stronger is the discipline. Strategic selection of equilibrium gives rise to a further inflation discipline: the larger country tries to have its currency circulate abroad, while the smaller country tries to prevent the circulation of foreign currency.

JEL Classification: E40; E50; E60

Keywords: International currency; Currency competition; Inflation discipline; Seigniorage; Policy game

*We thank Kazuya Kamiya, Takashi Shimizu, Victor Rios-Rull, V.V. Chari, Shouyong Shi, Alberto Trejos, Randy Wright and two anonymous referees for valuable comments.
1 Introduction

Monies, either minted or printed, have long been used to provide economies with means of payment and to generate revenues for governments to finance public spending. These two functions of money issuance are interrelated with each other. If a government is a sole issuer of currency, it is easier for it to collect seigniorage at the expense of providing a “stable” means of payment than otherwise. In the fifteenth century, for example, the Yuan dynasty enjoyed the monopoly power of issuing paper money in China, paying little attention to the control of inflation, until its economic and military power declined. On the other hand, if multiple states issue monies, competition for wider circulation imposes an inflation discipline. In the seventeenth century, the Spanish Monarchy pursued a policy of “price discrimination” among its own Castillian currencies: it faced competition from other states minting large-denomination coins, forcing it not to seek additional short-term revenue, while petty coinage was a local monopoly, allowing the Monarchy to collect a good amount of seigniorage (Motonura, 1994).

Even now, many developing countries still heavily rely on seigniorage revenue. They would raise the inflation rates to collect seigniorage had there been no currency competition. In the presence of international currencies such as US dollar, however, too high an inflation rate may lead to the domestic circulation of the international currency, which deteriorates the tax base of seigniorage. This concern induces an inflation discipline on these countries. ¹ The purpose of this paper is to construct a model of multiple currencies as media of exchange that systematically accounts for these observations.

More specifically, this paper studies currency competition between governments and its effects on the circulation of currencies and welfare levels in a two-country, two-currency search theoretic model due to Matsuyama et al. (1993). ² Each country consists of infinitely-lived pri-

¹ According to the estimates by Gordon and Li (2005), seigniorage averaged about 10.3 percent of revenues collected in the developing countries, and 1 percent in the developed countries between 1996 and 2001. At the same time, inflation rate is averaged about 8.1 percent in the developing countries, and 2.4 percent in the developed countries. Aizenman and Jinjarak (2006) find that trade openness and financial integration have a negative impact on the tax base of the so-called “easy to collect” taxes such as seigniorage and tariff in the developing countries between the early 1980s and the late 1990s.

² There are preceding works using search-theoretic models to study the issues of international currency. Zhou (1997) considers preference shocks to induce currency exchange in a framework similar to Matsuyama et al. (1993). Wright and Trejos (2001) consider a search model with divisible goods to study the determination of exchange rate.
vate agents and a government. A representative agent obtains utility from private good and the public good of his own country. Each government prints fiat money, taxes on money holdings, and uses seigniorage to purchase private goods and provide public goods. Agents interact with home and foreign agents with different frequencies, reflecting the relative country size and the degree of international economic integration. Agents choose which money to hold to conduct trade. In so doing, they take into account the relative frequency of trade, which may differ across currencies, and the risk of confiscation (a proxy for inflation) that each currency is subject to. We first study the effects of inflation taxes on the circulation of currencies. If the degree of economic integration is sufficiently low, there exists an equilibrium where the two national currencies circulate only locally. We call this situation autarky. The higher the degree of economic integration becomes, the more likely is one of the currencies to circulate internationally. In particular, the larger country is more likely to have its currency circulate internationally than the smaller country. We find that the higher the inflation rate on a given currency is, the less likely is it to circulate locally and internationally. More specifically, the greater the foreign inflation tax is relative to home inflation tax, the more attractive home currency becomes relative to foreign currency and, therefore, the higher incentive agents have to use home currency. A sufficiently high inflation tax eliminates its chance of domestic circulation as well as worldwide circulation. The negative impact of a country’s inflationary policy on the circulation of its currency imposes an inflation discipline. This is one of the issues that cannot be analyzed in a framework with no endogenous emergence of an international currency.

Trejos (2003) conducts numerical simulations on a policy game with seigniorage maximization as the objective of governments, in the model of Wright and Trejos (2001). Curtis and Waller (2003) show how currency restrictions and government transactions policy affect the values of fiat currencies in a two-country model. Ravikumar and Wallace (2002) show that a uniform currency can eliminate inferior equilibria associated with distinct currencies, while Kiyotaki and Moore (2003) provide a model in which a unified currency can lead to too little specialization.

Previous studies on how trade frictions and government policy influence the circulation and value of a medium of exchange include Li (1995), Aiyagari and Wallace (1997) and Li and Wright (1998). In Li (1995) the government taxing fiat money holding increases the risk (cost) of holding money, which we adopt here as the proxy for inflation.

This paper is also related to the studies on currency competition and tax competition. For example, Martin and Schreft (2006) consider competition among privately issued monies in a search-theoretic model, whereas both currencies in the current paper are fiat currencies. Canzoneri and Diba (1992) use a money-in-the-utility-function model to show that (exogenously-determined) currency substitution provides an inflation discipline, while the acceptance of currencies is endogenously determined in this paper. Wilson (1986) shows that the interregional tax
We then consider strategic interaction between governments, which is the main contribution of the present paper that goes beyond, among others, Matsuyama et al. (1993) and Wright and Trejos (2001). We first study a situation in which all the agents and the governments believe a particular equilibrium to prevail, and the two governments choose tax rates simultaneously, measuring the payoff of each government by the utility of its own representative agent. Two opposing forces affect the optimal inflation rate chosen by the country that issues the international currency: the enlarged tax base, and the tax burden that falls partially on foreigners. If the former effect dominates the latter, we observe a lower inflation rate on a currency circulating abroad than under autarky. The country with the local currency, on the contrary, has an incentive to raise the inflation rate to collect seigniorage, because the tax base shrinks due to the use of foreign currency. However, the possibility of abandoning the use of home currency provides a force to curb the inflation tendency. The force is stronger as the degree of “openness” facing the country is higher, since this increases the gains of using foreign currency.\(^5\)

A country that successfully has its currency circulate abroad will enjoy higher welfare than under autarky: both the amount of public good and private consumption are higher, since it can collect seigniorage from foreigners, and the trade opportunities expand. Whether the other country benefits from the circulation of foreign currency depends on the positive effect of an increase in trade opportunity and the negative effect of losing the tax base. If the degree of “openness” facing the country is sufficiently small, using foreign currency is not beneficial because the seigniorage is partially taken away, while there is little benefit from trade.

We also consider the situation where both governments choose inflation tax rates, understanding the possibility that their choices affect which equilibrium to prevail. One of the key findings is as follows. If the governments act strategically in selecting equilibrium, the larger country would try to lower the inflation rate to make its currency circulate internationally. The other country, knowing this, may lower the inflation rate to maintain its national currency as

\(^5\)Romer (1993) finds negative correlation between openness and inflation and argues that the absence of pre-commitment in monetary policy leading to excessive inflation is the underlying mechanism. Here we provide another mechanism: the negative impact of a country’s inflationary policy on the realm of circulation of its currency imposes an inflation discipline, and the higher the degree of openness is, the stronger is the discipline.
the sole medium of exchange to prevent the tax base from diminishing. As a result, it would
raise less seigniorage than when there was no such strategic interaction. We also ask, will a
government raise the inflation rate after it has successfully made its national currency circulate
abroad? This time-inconsistency problem is not likely to arise if the “degree of openness” is
sufficiently high, since in this case, the government can make the currency attractive enough to
foreigners without lowering the inflation rate too much in the first place.

The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the basic model. Section 3
discusses the existence and properties of various types of equilibria under inflation tax policy.
Section 4 studies currency competition between governments and its effects on welfare. In section
5 we discuss strategic selection of equilibrium. Section 6 concludes with suggestions for possible
modifications and extensions.

2 The Basic Model

Time is discrete and the horizon is infinite. There is a [0, 1] continuum of infinitely-lived agents
with unit mass. The agents are divided into two regions, Home and Foreign. Let \( n \in (0, 1) \) be the
size of Home population. There are \( k \) (\( k \geq 3 \)) types of indivisible goods. Within each economy,
there are equal proportions of \( k \) types of agents, who specialize in consumption, production and
storage. A type \( i \) agent derives utility only from consuming type \( i \) good and can produce only
good \( i + 1 \) (mod \( k \)). Agent \( i \) can only store his production good costlessly up to one unit; he can
neither produce nor store other types of goods. Hence, there is no double coincidence of wants.
Let \( u > 0 \) be the instantaneous utility from consuming an agent’s consumption good and \( \delta \) his
discount rate.

There are two distinguishable fiat currencies, Home currency and Foreign currency. Each
currency is indivisible. An agent can store only one unit of good or one unit of currency at a
time. Let \( m_h \) (\( m_f \)) denote the fraction of Home agents holding the Home (Foreign) currency.
The inventory distribution of Home agents can be summarized by \( X = (1 - m_h - m_f, m_h, m_f) \).
Likewise, let \( m^*_h \) (\( m^*_f \)) denote the fraction of Foreign agents holding the Home (Foreign) currency.
The inventory distribution of Foreign agents can be summarized by \( X^* = (1 - m^*_h - m^*_f, m^*_h, m^*_f) \).
Let \( m \) and \( m^* \in (0, 1) \) denote the supply of the Home currency per Home agent and that of
Foreign currency per Foreign agent, respectively. Then,

\[ nm = nm_h + (1 - n)m_h^*, \quad (1 - n)m^* = nm_f + (1 - n)m_f^*. \]

Agents are matched randomly in pairs, but not in a uniform fashion. Agents who live in different countries meet less frequently than a pair of agents who live in the same country. Let \( \beta \in (0, 1) \). A Home agent meets another Home agent with probability \( n \), and meets a Foreign agent with probability \( \beta(1 - n) \). A Foreign agent meets a Home and another Foreign agent with probability \( n \) and \( (1 - n) \), respectively. Note that the above description implies the probability of meeting a trade partner also depends on the size of country. We can interpret \( \beta \) as the degree of economic integration or a measure of the trading frictions in international trade. An increase in \( \beta \) reduces international trade frictions, because higher \( \beta \) makes it easier to meet with foreign citizens. Similarly, a higher \( n \) not only makes it easier for the Home agents to meet with their fellow citizens but also makes it easier for a Foreign agent to trade with Home agents.

Trade entails a one-for-one swap of inventories, and takes place if and only if both agents agree to trade. The trade partner’s type and inventory are observable, trade histories are not. Agents are unable to commit to future actions, and proposed transfers cannot be enforced. Thus, people trade when there is a single coincidence of wants, and all trades involve the use of a tangible medium of exchange.

The role of governments in the provision of public goods

In each country there is a government whose role is to print fiat money, tax money holdings and provide public goods from the private goods that it purchases. An agent who holds Home (resp. Foreign) currency is subject to a probability \( \tau_h \) (resp. \( \tau_f \)) that his money would be confiscated by the government of Home (resp. Foreign) country. We interpret \( \tau_h \) (resp. \( \tau_f \)) as an inflation tax.\(^6\)

---

\(^6\)One may wonder why we use the present formulation for tax scheme instead of Li’s (1995) formulation. Indeed, it is more naturally interpreted as a consumption tax rather than an inflation tax. In an ex ante sense, however, it may well be interpreted as an inflation tax. The reason is twofold. First, since each agent has no incentive to defer the timing of consumption, the difference between an inflation tax and a consumption tax does not induce any difference in terms of decision making of the agent. Second, since each agent is risk neutral, these two taxes do not cause different effects in terms of expected payoff if properly translated. The main merit of the setup of the current version is its tractability. Indeed, in an earlier version of the paper we modeled the inflation tax as in Li (1995), but it turned out to be non-tractable to obtain closed form solutions in various attempts.
When a Home currency holder and a commodity holder are matched and about to trade, a Home government agent steps in with probability \( h \), confiscating money from the money holder and purchasing the commodity from the commodity holder. The same arrangement is made for Foreign government. In this series of moves, the money holder loses what he had without obtaining his consumption good and goes back to the status of holding commodity, the commodity holder becomes money holder just like when he trades with the private agent, and the government obtains the commodity.

Home (resp. Foreign) government transforms the private goods it purchases into public goods from which every private agent in Home (resp. Foreign) country enjoys the utility of \( n\phi(G) \) (resp. \((1 - n)\phi(G^*)\)) where \( G \) (resp. \( G^* \)) is the total quantity of private goods purchased by Home (resp. Foreign) government in a unit of time. We assume \( \phi'(G) \to \infty \) as \( G \to 0 \), \( \phi'(G) > 0 \) and \( \phi''(G) < 0 \). Public goods are nonstorable (e.g., administrative service).\(^7\)

**Strategies and equilibria**

An agent chooses trade strategies to maximize his expected discounted utility, taking as given others’ strategies and the distribution of inventories. We restrict our attention to pure strategies which only depend on his nationality and the objects he and his trading partner have in inventory. Thus, the Home agent’s trade strategy can be described as

\[
s_{ab} = \begin{cases} 
1 & \text{if he trades object } a \text{ for } b \\
0 & \text{otherwise},
\end{cases}
\]

where \( a, b = g, h, \) or \( f \), and \( a \neq b \). Similarly, the Foreign agent’s trade strategy is given by \( s_{ab}^* = 0 \) or 1. We consider only time-independent strategies. Given that the physical environment is stationary and the planning horizon is infinite, we can therefore confine our attention to steady-state equilibrium.

Let \( V_g, V_h \) and \( V_f \) denote the expected discounted utility to a Home agent holding his production good, the Home currency, and Foreign currency, respectively. Let \( P_{ab} \) (\( P_{ab}^* \)) denote the transition probability with which a Home (Foreign) agent switches his inventory from object

\(^7\)One may like to assume that Home government and Foreign government have different efficiency in providing public goods; e.g., the quantity of public goods \( G \) is a fraction \( \gamma \) of total consumption goods purchased by the government, and both countries may have different \( \gamma \)'s. One can also assume that Home and Foreign agents have different preferences for public goods.
a to object b. Then, the Bellman’s equations are

\[ V_g = \frac{[(1 - P_{gb} - P_{gf})V_g + P_{gb}V_h + P_{gf}V_f]/(1 + \delta)}{1}, \]  
(1)

\[ V_h = \frac{[\tau_h P_{hfg}V_g + (1 - \tau_h)P_{hfg}(u + V_g) + (1 - P_{hfg} - P_{hff})V_h + P_{hff}V_f]/(1 + \delta)}{1}, \]  
(2)

\[ V_f = \frac{[\tau_f P_{fgf}V_g + (1 - \tau_f)P_{fgf}(u + V_g) + P_{fhh}V_h + (1 - P_{fgf} - P_{fhf})V_f]/(1 + \delta)}{1}. \]  
(3)

Note that the first terms in the RHS of equality in (2) and (3) imply that, if an agent’s currency is confiscated by the issuing government (with probability \( \tau_h \) and \( \tau_f \) that his money is confiscated by Home and Foreign government, respectively), his value becomes that of holding production good. The value functions and strategies must satisfy the following incentive compatibility constraints:

\[ s_{gb} = 1 \text{ iff } V_g < V_b \ (b = h \text{ or } f), \]

\[ s_{ag} = 1 \text{ iff } V_a < u + V_g \ (a = h \text{ or } f), \]

\[ s_{ab} = 1 \text{ iff } V_a < V_b \ (a, b = h \text{ or } f). \]

For example, \( V_g > V_f \) is the sufficient and necessary condition for a Home agent not to trade his production good for Foreign currency.

We restrict our attention to the equilibrium where agents always accept their local currency. There are thus four types of equilibria – no international currency, Foreign currency is the only international currency, Home currency is the only international currency, and both currencies circulate in both countries. We characterize the existence conditions in terms of \( \beta \) and \( n \), the extent of international and local trade frictions, as well as the tax rates \( \tau_h \) and \( \tau_f \).

First of all, in any of these equilibria, we have \( P_{fh} = P_{hf} = P_{fh}^* = P_{hf}^* = 0 \). Given the tie-breaking rule, no two agents in the same country exchange Home currency and Foreign currency; indeed, for currency exchange to occur between two, say, Home agents, we need \( s_{hf} = s_{fh} = 1 \), which implies \( V_f > V_h \) and \( V_h > V_f \); a contradiction. Therefore, the only possibility for currency exchange is between agents from different countries. Due to the nature of equilibrium, this may happen only when both currencies circulate worldwide. In this case, we need to have, say, \( V_h > V_f \) and \( V_f^* > V_h^* \) (the opposite case has a similar consequence). If \( \tau_h = \tau_f \) holds, then the two currencies are perfect substitutes, and therefore, \( V_h = V_f \) and \( V_f^* = V_h^* \), which is a contradiction. But, if, say, \( \tau_h \) becomes smaller than \( \tau_f \), then Home currency is more attractive.
for both Home and Foreign agents than Foreign currency. Thus, both Home and Foreign agents have the same incentives concerning the acceptance of a currency, and therefore, there is no room for currency exchange.

Before conducting equilibrium analysis, we calculate the value functions from (1), (2) and (3):

\[ V_g = \left[ (\delta + P_{fg})(1 - \tau_h)P_{gh}P_{hg} + (\delta + P_{hg})(1 - \tau_f)P_{gf}P_{fg} \right] u/P, \]  
\[ V_h = \left[ (1 - \tau_h)(\delta + P_{gh})(\delta + P_{fg}) + \delta P_{gf} \right] + (1 - \tau_f)P_{gf}P_{fg} \] 
\[ P_{hg}P_{hg} \] 
\[ u = P; \]  
\[ (4) \]

\[ V_h = \left[ (1 - \tau_h)(\delta + P_{gh})(\delta + P_{fg}) + \delta P_{gf} \right] + (1 - \tau_f)P_{gf}P_{fg} \] 
\[ P_{hg}P_{hg} \] 
\[ u = P; \]  
\[ (5) \]

\[ V_f = \left[ (1 - \tau_f)(\delta + P_{gf})(\delta + P_{hg}) + \delta P_{gh} \right] + (1 - \tau_h)P_{gh}P_{hg} \] 
\[ P_{fg}P_{fg} \] 
\[ u = P; \]  
\[ (6) \]

where

\[ P = \delta [(\delta + P_{gh} + P_{hg})(\delta + P_{fg}) + P_{gf}(\delta + P_{hg})]. \]

Using the above value functions, we are able to state some general results.

**Proposition 2.1. In a steady-state equilibrium,**

1. \( u + V_g > V_g, V_h, V_f. \)
2. \( \max\{V_h, V_f\} > V_g. \)
3. \( V_h > (\prec)V_g \text{ iff } (1 - \tau_h)P_{hg}(\delta + P_{fg} + P_{gf}) > (\prec)(1 - \tau_f)P_{gf}P_{fg}. \)
4. \( V_f > (\prec)V_g \text{ iff } (1 - \tau_f)P_{fg}(\delta + P_{hg} + P_{gh}) > (\prec)(1 - \tau_h)P_{gh}P_{hg}. \)

*The same relations hold for a Foreign agent, with relevant variables starred.*

### 3 Equilibria

#### 3.1 Equilibrium A: Two local currencies

In this equilibrium a Home agent trades his production good for the Home currency, the Home currency for his consumption good, but does not accept Foreign currency \((u + V_g > V_h > V_g \geq V_f)\). A Foreign agent trades his production good for the Foreign currency, the Foreign currency for his consumption good, but does not accept the Home currency \((u + V_g^* > V_f^* > V_g^* \geq V_h^*)\). There is no international currency and no international trade in this equilibrium. The
inventory distributions are given by \( X = (1 - m, m, 0) \) and \( X^* = (1 - m^*, 0, m^*) \). The transition probabilities in this equilibrium for a Home agent are:

\[
\begin{align*}
P_{gh} &= nm/k, & P_{hg} &= n(1 - m)/k \\
P_{fg} &= \beta(1 - n)(1 - m^*)/k, & P_{gf} &= P_{hf} = P_{fh} = 0.
\end{align*}
\] (7)

Note that \( P_{gh} \) incorporates the opportunity to sell goods to acquire money from private agents and Home government with probabilities \( nm(1 - \tau_h)/k \) and \( nm\tau_h/k \), respectively. If a Home agent ever holds Foreign currency, then given others’ strategies the chance that he can acquire consumption goods is from trading with Foreign sellers, of which probability is \( (1 - \tau_f)P_{fg} = \beta(1 - n)(1 - \tau_f)(1 - m^*)/k \). Similarly, the transition probabilities for a Foreign agent are:

\[
\begin{align*}
P_{gf}^* &= (1 - n)m^*/k, & P_{fg}^* &= (1 - n)(1 - m^*)/k \\
P_{hg}^* &= \beta n(1 - m)/k, & P_{gh}^* &= P_{fh}^* = P_{hf}^* = 0.
\end{align*}
\] (8)

To find the existence conditions for Equilibrium A, we verify the incentive constraints \( u + V_g > V_h > V_g > V_f \) and \( u + V_g^* > V_f^* > V_f > V_h^* \). From Proposition 2.1, \( V_g \geq V_f \) and \( V_g^* \geq V_h^* \) imply other inequalities. We have \( V_g \geq V_f \) (Home agents do not accept Foreign currency) iff \( \beta \leq \beta_A \), where

\[
\beta_A \equiv \frac{m(1 - m)n^2}{(1 - n)(1 - m^*)(k\delta + n)} \frac{1 - \tau_h}{1 - \tau_f}.
\]

Likewise, Foreign agents do not accept Home currency, or \( V_g^* \geq V_h^* \), iff \( \beta \leq \beta_A^* \), where

\[
\beta_A^* \equiv \frac{m^*(1 - m^*)(1 - n)^2}{n(1 - m)(k\delta + 1 - n)} \frac{1 - \tau_f}{1 - \tau_h}.
\]

In the sequel, we focus on the case where agents are sufficiently patient relative to matching frequency, i.e., we study the limiting situation where \( \delta \) goes to zero. Taking the limit, we obtain

\[
\lim_{\delta \to 0} \beta_A = \frac{m(1 - m)n}{(1 - n)(1 - m^*)} \frac{1 - \tau_h}{1 - \tau_f}
\] (9)

and

\[
\lim_{\delta \to 0} \beta_A^* = \frac{m^*(1 - m^*)(1 - n)}{n(1 - m)} \frac{1 - \tau_f}{1 - \tau_h}.
\] (10)

Given parameter values of \( m, m^*, k, \tau_h, \) and \( \tau_f, \beta \leq \beta_A, \beta \leq \beta_A^* \) give the existence conditions of equilibrium A on \((n, \beta)\) space, shown in Figure 1. The region of existence of Equilibrium A on \((n, \beta)\)-space depends on the ratio \((1 - \tau_h)/(1 - \tau_f)\). The less \((1 - \tau_h)/(1 - \tau_f)\) is, the less is

---

The parameters are \( m = m^* = .3, k = 10, u = 1 \).
$\beta_A$ and the greater is $\beta_A'$. In other words, as $\tau_h$ increases and/or $\tau_f$ decreases, the locus $\beta = \beta_A$ shifts downward, while the locus $\beta = \beta_A'$ shifts upward (see Figure 1). If we interpret $(\tau_h, \tau_f)$ as a proxy for the rate of inflation, then this change is intuitive. The less $(1 - \tau_h)/(1 - \tau_f)$ is, the less attractive Home currency becomes relative to Foreign currency, and therefore, the less (resp. more) incentive agents have to use Home currency (resp. Foreign currency). The downward shift of $\beta_A$ implies that under an inflationary policy, staying autarchy is not the best response unless the population size of the country is big enough to offset the negative impacts due to the risk of confiscating currency. Thus, for a given pair of $(n, \beta)$, if a country adopts too high an inflation tax rate, it may destroy the equilibrium with two currency areas.

### 3.2 Equilibria F and H: one local currency and one international currency

We discuss the existence conditions for Equilibrium F, where Home currency is accepted only in Home country, while Foreign currency circulates in both Home and Foreign country as an international medium of exchange. Equilibrium H is the mirror image of Equilibrium F and can be characterized in a similar manner.

Equilibrium F requires $u + V_g > V_h > V_g$, $u + V_g > V_f > V_g$ and $u + V_g^* > V_f^* > V_g^* \geq V_h^*$. When agents follow these strategies, $m_h = m$ and so $X = (1 - m - m_f, m, m_f)$ and $X^* = (1 - m^*_f, 0, m^*_f)$. The steady state requires that the ratios of commodity holders to the Foreign currency holders in the two countries be equalized, i.e.,

$$\frac{m_f^*}{1 - m_f^*} = \frac{m_f}{1 - m - m_f}.$$

From the steady state condition, $m_f = (1 - m)m_f^*$. Therefore we can rewrite the inventory distributions in terms of $m_f^*$ as $X = ((1 - m)(1 - m_f^*), m, (1 - m)m_f^*)$ and $X^* = (1 - m_f^*, 0, m_f^*)$.

The total supply of Foreign currency must equal the total amount circulates in both countries

$$(1 - n)m^* = n(1 - m)m_f^* + (1 - n)m_f^* = (1 - nm)m_f^*.$$  \hspace{1cm} (11)

The transition probabilities for a Home agent are

$$P_{gh} = nm/k, \quad P_{gf} = Bm_f^*/k$$

$$P_{hg} = n(1 - m)(1 - m_f^*)/k, \quad P_{fg} = B(1 - m_f^*)/k$$

$$P_{hf} = P_{fh} = 0.$$  \hspace{1cm} (12)
where $B = n(1 - m) + \beta(1 - n)$, and for a Foreign agent

$$P_{gf}^* = B^*m_f^*/k, \quad P_{hg}^* = \beta n(1 - m)(1 - m_f^*)/k$$
$$P_{fg}^* = B^*(1 - m_f^*)/k, \quad P_{gh}^* = P_{fh}^* = P_{hf}^* = 0,$$

(13)

where $B^* = \beta n(1 - m) + (1 - n)$, and $m_f^*$ satisfies (11).

From Proposition 2.1, it suffices to check that Home agents accept Home currency ($V_g < V_h$), and that Foreign agents do not accept Home currency ($V_g^* \geq V_h^*$).

First, substituting (12) into the third and forth claims of Proposition 2.1, and taking the limit of $\delta$ going to zero, we have $V_h > V_g$ iff

$$\beta \leq \beta_F \equiv \frac{n(1 - m)}{1 - n} \left[ \frac{1 - \tau_h}{1 - \tau_f m_f^*} - 1 \right],$$

(14)

and $V_g^* \geq V_h^*$ iff

$$\beta \leq \beta_F^* \equiv \frac{1 - n}{n(1 - m)} \left[ \frac{1 - \tau_h}{1 - \tau_f m_f^*} - 1 \right]^{-1}.$$  

(15)

Equilibrium F exists if and only if the two incentive constraints hold, given (11), (12) and (13).

We depict the equilibrium region defined by (14) and (15) on the space of $(n, \beta)$ in Figure 2.

Given other parameters, an increase in $\tau_h$ leads to a decrease in $\beta_F$, while an increase in $\tau_f$ leads to an increase in $\beta_F$. Likewise, an increase in $\tau_h$ leads to an increase in $\beta_F^*$, while an increase in $\tau_f$ leads to a decrease in $\beta_F^*$. Hence, the higher the Home inflation tax is (or similarly, the lower Foreign inflation tax is), the less likely Home and Foreign agents are to use Home currency.

### 3.3 Equilibrium U: two international currencies

In this equilibrium, both currencies circulate side by side, i.e., they are both universally accepted: $u + V_g > V_h > V_g$, $u + V_g > V_f > V_g$, $u + V_g^* > V_f^* > V_g^*$, and $u + V_g^* > V_h^* > V_g^*$. When agents follow these strategies, $X = X^*$, and $m_h = m_h^* = nm$, and $m_f = m_f^* = (1 - n)m_f^*$. The
transition probabilities are
\[ P_{gh} = nm[n + \beta(1-n)]/k, \]
\[ P_{gf} = [n + \beta(1-n)](1-n)m^*/k, \]
\[ P_{hg} = P_{fg} = [n + \beta(1-n)][1 - nm - (1-n)m^*]/k, \]
\[ P_{gh}^* = nm[\beta n + (1-n)]/k, \]
\[ P_{gf}^* = [\beta n + (1-n)](1-n)m^*/k, \]
\[ P_{hg}^* = P_{fg}^* = [\beta n + (1-n)][1 - nm - (1-n)m^*]/k, \]
\[ P_{hf} = P_{fh} = P_{hf}^* = 0. \]

Given any \( \tau_h > 0 \) and \( \tau_f > 0 \), and taking the limit of \( \delta \) going to zero, \( V_h > V_g \) (\( \Leftrightarrow V_h^* > V_g^* \)) holds iff
\[ \frac{1 - \tau_h}{1 - \tau_f} > \frac{(1-n)m^*}{1-nm}, \quad (17) \]
and \( V_f > V_g \) (\( \Leftrightarrow V_f^* > V_g^* \)) holds iff
\[ \frac{1 - \tau_f}{1 - \tau_h} > \frac{nm}{1 - (1-n)m^*}. \quad (18) \]
Combining (17) and (18), we ensure that the existence of equilibrium \( U \) iff
\[ \frac{(1-n)m^*}{1-nm} < \frac{1 - \tau_h}{1 - \tau_f} < \frac{1 - (1-n)m^*}{nm}. \]
If the tax rate of, say, Home currency is sufficiently high in comparison with that of Foreign currency, then agents start rejecting Home currency, and the more Foreign currency balance we have, the lower this threshold is since each agent can have Foreign currency relatively quickly after he rejects Home currency.

This result is in contrast to Matsuyama et al. (1993) in which the equilibrium with both currencies universally accepted exists for all parameter values. The reason for this difference is that currencies are no longer perfect substitutes even in this equilibrium if the tax rates are different. Indeed, if \( \tau_h = \tau_f \) holds, then the two currencies become perfect substitutes, and such an equilibrium exists under all parameter values.

4 Policies and Welfare

The following two sections discuss currency competition between governments and its effects on welfare and the determination of currency regimes.
The welfare of Home country (resp. Foreign country), denoted by \( W \) (resp. \( W^* \)), consists of the long-run expected (average) value of each agent in Home (resp. Foreign) country from private transactions and the payoff stream of the representative Home (resp. Foreign) agent obtained from public goods. To be concrete, we use the following specifications:

\[
W \equiv \delta [(1 - m_h - m_f) V_g + m_h V_h + m_f V_f] + n\phi(G) \\
= [m_h (1 - \tau_h) P_{hg} + m_f (1 - \tau_f) P_{fg}] u + n\phi((m_h P_{hg} + m_h^* P_{hg}^*) \tau_h), \quad (19)
\]

\[
W^* \equiv \delta [(1 - m_h^* - m_f^*) V_g^* + m_h^* V_h^* + m_f^* V_f^*] + (1 - n)\phi(G^*) \\
= [m_h^* (1 - \tau_h) P_{hg}^* + m_f^* (1 - \tau_f) P_{fg}^*] u + (1 - n)\phi((m_f P_{fg} + m_f^* P_{fg}^*) \tau_f), \quad (20)
\]

where \( G = (m_h P_{hg} + m_h^* P_{hg}^*) \tau_h \) and \( G^* = (m_f P_{fg} + m_f^* P_{fg}^*) \tau_f \) are the total amounts of public goods, measured by private goods, in each period provided by Home and Foreign governments, respectively. Using these values as the payoffs of the respective governments, we analyze a situation where the two countries use the tax rates and, in some case, money balances as policy instruments. We first study each type of equilibrium separately, and then consider a regime change from one type of equilibrium to another, e.g., equilibrium A to F.

In the subsequent analysis, we sometimes use

\[
\phi(G) = \alpha \ln G \\
\]

(21)
to obtain a closed form solution. Note that by letting \( \alpha \) sufficiently large, we can approximate the situation with seigniorage maximizing governments, and therefore, we do not study such a situation separately.

### 4.1 Equilibrium A

Consider an interior solution to the policy game where all the agents as well as governments believe Equilibrium A to prevail. Substituting transition probabilities (7) into (19), and differentiating it with respect to \( m \), we obtain

\[
\frac{\partial W}{\partial m} = \frac{1}{k} \left[ (1 - \tau_h) n u + n\phi'(\cdot) \tau_h \right] (1 - 2m) = 0.
\]

(22)

Therefore, the optimal money balance is \( m^A = 1/2 \). Similarly, we have \( m^{*A} = 1/2 \) for Foreign money balance where the superscript “A” stands for Equilibrium A. Differentiating (19) with
respect to \( \tau_h \), we obtain
\[
\frac{\partial W}{\partial \tau_h} = \frac{m^A(1 - m^A)n}{k} [-u + n\phi'(\cdot)] = 0,
\]
or
\[
n\phi'(m^A(1 - m^A)n\tau_h^A/k) = u.
\] (23)

Similarly, we have
\[
(1 - n)\phi'(m^*A(1 - m^*A)(1 - n)\tau_f^A/k) = u.
\] (24)

If we use the specification (21), then (23) is rewritten as:
\[
\tau_h^A = \frac{k\alpha}{m(1 - m)u}.
\]

In a similar manner, the optimal tax rate for Foreign government is given by:
\[
\tau_f^A = \frac{k\alpha}{m^*(1 - m^*)u}.
\]

Substituting \( m^A = m^*A = 1/2 \) into the above solutions, we finally obtain
\[
\tau_h^A = \frac{4k\alpha}{u}, \quad \tau_f^A = \frac{4k\alpha}{u}.
\] (25) (26)

Note that this solution exists if and only if \( 4k\alpha < u \), which we assume hereafter.

### 4.2 Equilibrium F

We conduct an analysis similar to the previous subsection, albeit more complicated than that. We assume that the governments believe Equilibrium F to prevail. Also, to simplify the illustration in this subsection, we assume that \( n < 1/2 \) holds.

First of all, if we differentiate \( W^* \) with respect to \( m_f^* \) after substituting (13) into (20), we obtain
\[
\frac{\partial W^*}{\partial m_f^*} = [u(1 - \tau_f)B^*/k + (1 - n)\phi'((1 - m)B + B^*)\tau_f/k] (1 - 2m_f^*) = 0,
\]
which implies \( m_f^* = 1/2 \). Therefore, the optimal money balance for Foreign country is given by \( m_f^* = 1/2 \). On the other hand, the optimal balance of Home currency is not independent
of other variables and parameters. In the sequel, we let $m_f^* = 1/2$ and $m = \bar{m}$ as given and examine the policy game where $\tau_h$ and $\tau_f$ are chosen simultaneously.\footnote{We may consider a two stage game where $m_f^*$ and $m$ are chosen first and $\tau_h$ and $\tau_f$ are chosen second. One can think of $\bar{m}$ as a solution to such a problem, though we do not explicitly solve for $\bar{m}$. Although it would be nice to obtain a closed form solution for $\bar{m}$, it is sufficient even without it for the present purpose, which is to make a qualitative comparison between various tax rates.}

Foreign country’s problem is straightforward, which is to choose $\tau_f$ to maximize $W^*$. Differentiating $W^*$ with respect to $\tau_f$, we obtain

$$\frac{\partial W^*}{\partial \tau_f} = \frac{m_f^*(1-m_f^*)}{k} \left[ -B^* u + ((1-\bar{m})B + B^*)(1-n)\phi'(\cdot) \right] = 0,$$

or

$$(1-n)\phi'(((1-\bar{m})B + B^*)m_f^*(1-m_f^*)\tau_f^F/k) = \frac{B^*}{(1-\bar{m})B + B^*}u.$$  \tag{27}

Using (21), we have

$$\tau_f^F = \frac{1}{\theta^*(1-\bar{m}) + 1} \frac{4k\alpha}{u} = \frac{1}{\theta^*(1-\bar{m}) + 1} \frac{A^f}{A^h} < \tau_f^A,$$  \tag{28}

where

$$\theta^* = \frac{\beta n}{1-n}$$

is the degree of “openness” of Foreign country.

This implies that Foreign country has a lower inflation tax when its currency becomes an international currency than under autarchy. Note that we have two opposing forces. If we look into the arguments of $\phi'$ of both (24) and (27) at $m^A = m_f^F = 1/2$, we notice that

$$(1-n) < \beta(1-\bar{m})B + B^*.$$  

This inequality implies that the tax base for Foreign currency is larger in Equilibrium F than in Equilibrium A, which enables the government to adopt a lower optimal inflation tax. On the other hand, the right hand side of (24) is greater than that of (27). This corresponds to the extent to which Foreign government can raise revenue from Home agents, which gives it an incentive to raise the inflation tax.\footnote{The right hand side of (27) represents the relative utility sacrifice from private consumption of foreign agents due to the inflation tax. This ratio is less than 1 in equilibrium F because the tax burden falls partially on Home agents, and this creates incentive to adopt a higher tax rate.} Under the current specification, however, the effect of an increased tax base dominates that of collecting seigniorage from Home agents.
Home country is faced with the constraint that its currency has to be accepted by Home agents, i.e., $\beta \leq \beta_F$. Thus, its problem is given by

$$\max_{\tau_h \geq 0} W \quad \text{s.t.} \quad \beta \leq \beta_F, \quad \text{given } m = \bar{m},$$

(29)

where $\beta_F$ and $W$ come from (14) and (19) together with (12). Solving this problem in the standard fashion, we obtain

$$\tau^F_h = \begin{cases} \frac{2}{\bar{m}(1-\bar{m})} \frac{k\alpha}{u} & \text{if } \theta \leq \bar{\theta}, \\ \frac{1 - 1 - \tau^F_f}{2} \left[ 1 + \frac{\theta}{1-\bar{m}} \right] & \text{if } \bar{\theta} < \theta < \Theta, \end{cases}$$

(30)

where

$$\theta \equiv \frac{\beta(1-n)}{n}$$

is the degree of “openness” of Home country, and

$$\bar{\theta} = \frac{2}{1-\tau^F_f} \left[ (1-\bar{m}) - \frac{2k\alpha}{m\bar{u}} \right] - (1-\bar{m}),$$

$$\Theta = \frac{1 + \tau^F_f}{1 - \tau^F_f} (1-\bar{m}).$$

If the degree of “openness” is not too high, or $\theta < \bar{\theta}$, Home country can freely choose its tax rate, or to be precise, $\beta = \beta_F$ is not binding. In this case, since $\bar{m}(1-\bar{m}) \leq 1/4$ holds, we have

$$\tau^F_h \geq \frac{8k\alpha}{u} = 2\tau^A_f.$$ 

In other words, the country with local currency has an incentive to raise its tax rate to collect seigniorage due to the internationalization of Foreign currency. If the degree of integration proceeds further, or $\theta \in (\bar{\theta}, \Theta)$, then $\beta = \beta_F$ becomes binding: an inflation discipline is needed in order to keep Home currency in circulation. Beyond $\Theta$, equilibrium $F$ no longer exists since even if Home government sets $\tau_h = 0$, Home agents have no incentive to accept Home currency.\textsuperscript{11}

\textsuperscript{11}Note that while $\bar{\theta} < \Theta$ and $\Theta > 0$ always hold, $\bar{\theta}$ can be negative. If this is the case, (30) is reduced to $\tau^F_h = 1 - (1-\tau^F_f)[1 + \theta/(1-\bar{m})]/2$ for $\theta < \Theta$. 

16
4.3 Equilibrium U

The analysis of this equilibrium is easier than that of equilibrium F. Indeed, it is verified that at the optimum, we have

\[ U^H = \frac{k\alpha}{m[n + \beta(1 - n)][1 - nm - (1 - n)m^*]u}, \]

\[ U^F = \frac{k\alpha}{m^*[\beta n + (1 - n)][1 - nm - (1 - n)m^*]u}, \]

provided that (31) (resp. (32)) satisfies (17) (resp. (18)); for if not, Home (resp. Foreign) currency would not be accepted by anyone. Therefore, if (17) is violated, it is Home government that lowers the inflation rate to meet the constraint, i.e.,

\[ \tau^U_H = 1 - (1 - \tau^F_J)\frac{1 - n) m^*}{1 - nm}, \]

where \( \tau^F_J \) is given by (32). Similarly, if (18) is violated, then we have

\[ \tau^U_J = 1 - (1 - \tau^U_H)\frac{nm}{1 - (1 - n)m^*}, \]

where \( \tau^U_H \) is given by (31).

In order to compare them with the corresponding rates in equilibria A and F, we let \( m = m^* = 1/2 \).\(^{12}\) Then it is verified that \( \tau^U_H > \tau^A_H \) and \( \tau^U_J > \tau^A_J \) hold.\(^{13}\) Both countries have incentives to increase the tax rates to collect seigniorage from the other country. One can also verify that \( \partial \tau^U_H / \partial \theta < 0 \) and \( \partial \tau^U_J / \partial \theta^* < 0 \), i.e., as the degree of “openness” increases, the optimal

\(^{12}\)It is verified that \( \partial W / \partial m > 0 \) at \( m = m^* = 1/2 \). We assume that in equilibrium U, \( m \) and \( m^* \) are not policy variables, but historically determined ones. This enables us to compare equilibrium U with equilibrium A with respect to inflation rate rather than the amount of money, which has an unrealistic crowding out effect in the present model.

\(^{13}\)Equations (31) and (32) are equivalent to

\[ \tau^U_H = \frac{1}{n + \beta(1 - n)} \frac{4k\alpha}{u} > \frac{4k\alpha}{u} = \tau^A_H, \]

\[ \tau^U_J = \frac{1}{\beta n + (1 - n)} \frac{4k\alpha}{u} > \frac{4k\alpha}{u} = \tau^A_J. \]

Also, we verify that (33) and (34) are greater than \( 4k\alpha/u \) where we make use of \( 4k\alpha/u < 1 \):

\[ \tau^U_H - \tau^A_H = \frac{1}{2 - n} + \frac{1}{\beta n + (1 - n)} \frac{1 - n \ 4k\alpha}{2 - n} \frac{u}{u} - \frac{4k\alpha}{u} \]

\[ \geq \frac{4k\alpha}{2u} [\beta n(3 - n) + n(1 - n)] > 0. \]
tax rate under equilibrium $U$ decreases. If $n < 1/2$, then we have $\tau_f^U < \tau_h^U$, i.e., the government of the larger country imposes a lower inflation rate than that of the smaller country.

### 4.4 Welfare comparisons

This subsection compares equilibria A, F, and U in terms of welfare. Let us compare equilibria A and F first. To begin with, (20) implies that $W^*$ is larger in equilibrium F than in equilibrium A. This is fairly intuitive since both the trade opportunity and the tax base are larger in the former than in the latter.

On the other hand, the direction of change in $W$ is unclear since we have the positive effect of an increase in trade opportunity and the negative effect of losing the tax base. These effects change as the “openness” of Home country changes.

Suppose that $\theta$, or $\beta$, is close to zero. We evaluate $W$ and $W^*$ at $m^A = m^*F = 1/2$ and $m^F = m, \theta = 0$ and substitute the optimal $\tau$’s into the expressions to obtain

$$
W^A|_{\beta=0} = \left[ \frac{nu}{4k} - n\alpha \right] + n\alpha \ln \frac{n\alpha}{u},
$$

$$
W^F|_{\beta=0} = \left[ \frac{1-m}{4k}nu - \{1 + (1-m)^2\}n\alpha \right] + n\alpha \ln \frac{n\alpha}{u},
$$

$$
W^U|_{\beta=0} = \left[ \frac{nu}{4k} - 2n\alpha \right] + n\alpha \ln \frac{n}{u},
$$

$$
W^*A|_{\beta=0} = \left[ \frac{(1-n)u}{4k} - (1-n)\alpha \right] + (1-n)\alpha \ln \frac{(1-n)\alpha}{u},
$$

$$
W^*F|_{\beta=0} = \left[ \frac{(1-n)u}{4k} - (1-n)\alpha \right] + (1-n)\alpha \ln \left[ \frac{(1-n)\alpha}{u} \right],
$$

$$
W^*U|_{\beta=0} = \left[ \frac{(1-n)u}{4k} - 2(1-n)\alpha \right] + (1-n)\alpha \ln \frac{n}{u}.
$$

One can show that

$$
W^F - W^A|_{\beta=0} = -nm^2u/4k - \alpha n(1-m)^2 < 0.
$$

Thus, if the “openness” is sufficiently low, then equilibrium A is preferred to equilibrium F by Home country. The reason is that the seigniorage is partially taken away by Foreign government, while there is little benefit from trade.
If the “openness” of Home country increases, this may not be the case. To see this, we evaluate $W^A$ and $W^F$ at $\beta = \beta_A \equiv n/2(1 - n)$. Its sign is ambiguous; we have numerical examples of both cases, $W^F - W^A > 0$ and $W^F - W^A < 0$, as shown in Table 1.

Next, we study equilibrium $U$ in comparison with other equilibria. We have

\[ W^U - W^A|_{\beta=0} = -\alpha n (1 + \ln n), \]
\[ W^U - W^F|_{\beta=0} = \alpha n \bar{m} (-2 + \bar{m}) + n \bar{m}^2 u - \alpha n \ln n, \]
\[ W^*U - W^*A|_{\beta=0} = -\alpha(1 - n)[1 + \ln(1 - n)], \]
\[ W^*U - W^*F|_{\beta=0} = -\alpha(1 - n)[1 + \ln(1 - n\bar{m}(2 - \bar{m}))]. \]

If $\beta$ is close to zero, there is no gain from trade and so the signs of $W^U - W^A$ and $W^*U - W^*A$ depend upon the relative country size: $W^U - W^A|_{\beta=0} > 0$ iff $n < 1/e$, and $W^*U - W^*A|_{\beta=0} > 0$ iff $n > 1 - 1/e$. In other words, the smaller the country size is, the more likely it is to gain by the global circulation of both currencies. The reason is simple: if the country size is small, it can obtain huge seigniorage from abroad provided that it succeeds in circulating its own currency, the difficulty of which is, of course, a different question.

If the country sizes are not too uneven, or to be precise, if $1/e < n < 1 - 1/e$ holds, then both countries lose due to a switch from equilibrium $A$ to equilibrium $U$. The situation exhibits the one similar to the prisoner’s dilemma, i.e., $W^U - W^A|_{\beta=0} < 0$ and $W^*U - W^*A|_{\beta=0} < 0$.

The sign of $W^U - W^F|_{\beta=0}$ is ambiguous but one can show that it is positive as long as $u$ is sufficiently large. Since we know $W^*F - W^*A|_{\beta=0} > 0$ and $W^*U - W^*F|_{\beta=0} > 0$ iff $n < (1 - 1/e)/(2\bar{m} - \bar{m}^2)$, in the neighborhood of $\beta = 0$, we have

\[ W^U > W^A > W^F, \]
\[ W^*F > W^*A > W^*U, \]

if $n < 1/e$,

\[ W^A > W^U > W^F, \]
\[ W^*F > W^*A > W^*U, \]

if $1/e < n < 1 - 1/e$,
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>$\alpha = 1, k = 10, u = 1000, \theta = .5$</th>
<th>$\alpha = 1, k = 6, u = 100, \theta = .5$</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>$\bar{m} = 0.2$</td>
<td>$\bar{m} = 0.4$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$n$</td>
<td>0.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\tau^A_f(\tau^A_h)$</td>
<td>0.04</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\tau^F_h$</td>
<td>0.125</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\tau^F_f$</td>
<td>0.0398</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\tau^U_h$</td>
<td>0.2667</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\tau^U_f$</td>
<td>0.0442</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$W^A$</td>
<td>1.4790</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$W^F$</td>
<td>2.2755</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$W^U$</td>
<td>2.7206</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$W^{*A}$</td>
<td>15.288</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$W^{*F}$</td>
<td>15.405</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$W^{*U}$</td>
<td>14.832</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 1: equilibria A, F, U if $\beta = \beta_A$
if $1 - 1/e < n < (1 - 1/e)/(2\hat{m} - \hat{m}^2)$ and

$$W^A > W^U > W^F,$$

$$W^*U > W^*F > W^*A,$$

if $n > (1 - 1/e)/(2\hat{m} - \hat{m}^2)$.

If $\beta$ is relatively large, we do not have such a clear relationship since we now have another effect, gains from trade.\(^{14}\) In order to compare welfare across equilibria, we assume that $\beta = \beta_A$, which is the greatest $\beta$ for which equilibrium A exists. In this case, we have some numerical examples shown in Table 1.

### 4.5 International policy coordination

This subsection studies international policy coordination by letting governments jointly choose a policy that maximizes the joint welfare $W + W^*$.

**Equilibrium A**

In this equilibrium, policy instruments do not affect the other country, and therefore, the solution $(\hat{\tau}_h^A, \hat{\tau}_f^A)$ is the same as the one in the non-cooperative game, i.e., $(\frac{4k\alpha}{u}, \frac{4k\alpha}{u})$.

**Equilibrium F**

The optimal balances of currencies depend on other parameters. To simplify the analysis, we let $m = \hat{m}$ and $m_f^* = \hat{m}_f^*$ as given. The problem becomes:

$$\max_{\tau_h \geq 0, \tau_f \geq 0} W + W^* \quad \text{s.t.} \quad \beta \leq \beta_F, \quad \text{given} \ m = \hat{m}, m_f^* = \hat{m}_f^*. \quad (35)$$

We differentiate $W + W^*$ with respect to $\tau_f$ and find

$$\hat{\tau}_f^F = \frac{(1-n)ak}{w\hat{m}_f^*(1-\hat{m}_f^*)(1-\hat{m})B + B^*},$$

which is smaller than the non-cooperative solution, $\hat{\tau}_f^F = \frac{(1-n)ak}{w\hat{m}_f^*(1-\hat{m}_f^*)B^*}$ provided that $m_f^* = \hat{m}_f^*$.

Maximizing the joint welfare, Foreign government takes into account its effects on the other country, which, in this case, lowers the tax rate to reduce the tax burden on Home agents.

\(^{14}\)To be precise, this is not the standard gains from trade due to comparative advantages; rather, it is gains from an increase in trade opportunities.
On the other hand, since $W^*$ does not depend on $\tau_h$, the solution $\hat{\tau}_h$ to (35) is the same as in the non-cooperative game; i.e.,

$$\hat{\tau}_h^F = \hat{\tau}_h^F = \begin{cases} 
\frac{2}{m(1-m)} \frac{k\alpha}{u} & \text{if } \theta \leq \tilde{\theta}, \\
1 - \frac{1 - \hat{\tau}_f^F}{2} \left[ 1 + \frac{\theta}{1-m} \right] & \text{if } \tilde{\theta} < \theta < \Theta,
\end{cases}$$

where

$$\theta \equiv \frac{\beta(1-n)}{n}.$$ 

**Equilibrium U**

We consider the following problem:

$$\text{max}_{\tau_h \geq 0, \tau_f \geq 0} W + W^*$$

subject to the constraints for existence. We have the following internal solution:

$$\hat{\tau}_h^U = \frac{k\alpha}{m(1+\beta)[1-nm - (1-n)m^*]u}, \quad \text{(36)}$$

$$\hat{\tau}_f^U = \frac{k\alpha}{m^*(1+\beta)[1-nm - (1-n)m^*]u}, \quad \text{(37)}$$

and $m = m^* = 1/2$. Notice that $\hat{\tau}_h^U$ and $\hat{\tau}_f^U$ are smaller than the non-cooperative solutions. Substituting $m = m^* = 1/2$ into (36) and (37) we have

$$\hat{\tau}_h^U = \hat{\tau}_f^U = \frac{4k\alpha}{(1+\beta)u}.$$ 

Letting $m = m^* = 1/2$ for equilibria A and U and $m = \bar{m}$ and $m^*_f = 1/2$ for equilibrium F, we summarize the above results as follows:

$$\hat{\tau}_h^F = \hat{\tau}_h^F > \hat{\tau}_h^A = \hat{\tau}_h$$

$$\hat{\tau}_f^F < \hat{\tau}_f^F < \hat{\tau}_f^A = \hat{\tau}_f^A$$

$$\hat{\tau}_h^U = \hat{\tau}_f^U < \hat{\tau}_f^A = \hat{\tau}_h^U < \hat{\tau}_f^U,$$

In the non-cooperative game the issuing country of an international currency tends to adopt an excessive inflation tax, causing inefficiencies associated with lack of policy coordination. These inefficiencies increase as both countries become more integrated.

The non-cooperative tax rates are shown to be higher than the cooperative outcome (optimum). The difference between this result and the result of undercutting in many other tax
competition studies is mainly due to the difference between the standard competitive model and the search-theoretic model. In the search-theoretic model considered here, agents have to hold a certain currency in a particular equilibrium in order to trade. Therefore, a seigniorage collecting government has an incentive to increase its tax rate a little above the tax rate of the other government even if the rate is at the socially optimal level. The reason is that, unlike the competitive model, the government can still have its currency accepted by doing so. The mechanism of gaining by undercutting thus does not work here.

5 Strategic selection of equilibrium

In the previous sections, we confine our attention to the situations in which the governments believe a certain equilibrium to prevail and try to meet the constraint it faces to sustain the equilibrium. This section goes one step further, albeit not technically rigorous, and considers a situation in which the governments choose the tax rates, understanding the possibility that their choices affect the type of equilibrium to prevail. Unlike other sections, this section is illustrative rather than analytical.

We focus on the equilibrium selection between equilibria A and F. For this purpose, assume \( n < \frac{1}{2} \), and that \( \beta \leq \beta_A \) holds under \( \tau_h = \tau_f = \frac{4k\alpha}{u} \). Assume further that \( m = m^* = \frac{1}{2} \) if equilibrium A prevails, and that \( m_f^* = \frac{1}{2} \) and \( m = \bar{m} \) if equilibrium F prevails. We finally assume that equilibrium A initially prevails.\(^{15}\)

We assume that once Home agents start accepting Foreign currency, this process continues until equilibrium F prevails with the money balances as assumed, and the governments care only about the final (stationary) outcome.

Let us fix \( \tau_h = \frac{4k\alpha}{u} \) for the moment and consider the incentive of Foreign government. In order to have equilibrium F, Foreign government lowers \( \tau_f \) to make Foreign currency attractive to Home agents. This happens if \( \beta > \beta_A \) occurs under \( (\tau_h, \tau_f) = (\frac{4k\alpha}{u}, \tau_f) \). From (9), the threshold value of \( \tau_f \), denoted by \( \bar{\tau}_f \), is given by

\[
\bar{\tau}_f = 1 - \frac{1 - \frac{4k\alpha}{u}}{2\theta}.
\]

\(^{15}\)Note that the initial condition is crucial in the present analysis since the process from, say, equilibrium A to equilibrium F is irreversible.
There are two questions that are of particular interest. The first is whether or not Foreign
government raises the tax rate from $\bar{\tau}_f$ after equilibrium $F$ prevails, i.e., whether the time
inconsistency problem arises or not. We can examine it by comparing $\bar{\tau}_f$ with $\tau^F_f$ as given
in the previous section. That is, in order to switch to equilibrium $F$, the Foreign government
lowers the inflation rate below the threshold $\bar{\tau}_f$ to make Foreign currency attractive to Home
agents. If the threshold $\bar{\tau}_f$ is higher than $\tau^F_f$, then by adopting the optimal inflation rate $\tau^F_f$,
the Foreign government can move the economy to equilibrium $F$ without changing the inflation
rate afterwards. Under this situation, the time-inconsistency problem does not arise.

Subtracting (28) from (38), we obtain

$$\bar{\tau}_f - \tau^F_f = 1 - \frac{1}{2\theta} + \left[ \frac{1}{2\theta} - \frac{1}{\theta^*(1 - \bar{m}) + 1} \right] \frac{4k\alpha}{u}.$$ 

By definition, $\theta = \theta^* = 0$ at $\beta = 0$, and $\theta = 1/2$ at $\beta = \beta_A$ under $\tau_h = \tau_f$. Therefore, we
have $\bar{\tau}_f < \tau^F_f$ if $\theta$ is close to zero since $4k\alpha/u < 1$, and $\bar{\tau}_f > \tau^F_f$ if $\theta$ is close to a half. As the
degree of “openness” facing Home country is higher, there is larger gains from accepting Foreign
currency, and this offsets partially the negative effect due to a higher $\tau_f$ and thus, allows for a
higher threshold $\bar{\tau}_f$. In other words, the time inconsistency problem is less likely to arise if the
degree of “openness” is high. This also implies that, given other parameters, the larger Foreign
country is, the more likely it is the case that by choosing the optimal inflation rate it can ensure
the existence of its preferred equilibrium without facing the time inconsistency problem.

The second question is whether or not Home government has an incentive to prevent equi-
librium $F$ from prevailing by lowering its tax rate as well. To begin with, Home government has
to set the rate as low as

$$\bar{\tau}_h = 1 - 2\theta(1 - \tau_f)$$

for this purpose. As one may see, it depends upon Foreign government’s decision.

In order to analyze this situation, we need to specify a scenario or a game. We consider two
suggestive, but not necessarily most plausible, scenarios.\textsuperscript{16} The first scenario is as follows:

\textbf{Step 1.} Home government chooses $\tau_h$. After observing it, Foreign government chooses $\tau_f$.

\textsuperscript{16}We have chosen these scenarios not because they are most realistic, but because they are more tractable than
some other (more realistic) scenarios. For example, one may wonder why sequential moves are introduced in Step
1. If we modify it to a simultaneous move game, then in the first scenario, we typically have multiple equilibria,
and in the second, we sometimes have no pure strategy equilibrium.
Step 2-a. If $\beta \leq \beta_A$ holds under $(\tau_h, \tau_f)$ determined in Step 1, then equilibrium A prevails under $(\tau^A_h, \tau^A_f) = (4k\alpha/u, 4k\alpha/u)$ and $m = m^* = 1/2$.

Step 2-b. If $\beta > \beta_A$ holds under $(\tau_h, \tau_f)$ determined in Step 1, then equilibrium F prevails under $(\tau^F_h, \tau^F_f)$, $m^*_f = 1/2$, and $m = \bar{m}$.

In the first scenario, the question is reduced to whether $W^F > W^A$ or not since Foreign government always prefers equilibrium F to A, i.e., $W^{*F} > W^{*A}$, and therefore, the comparison that we made in the previous subsections directly applies. If $W^F > W^A$ holds, then Home government may intentionally raise the tax rate beyond $\tau^A_h$ in order to allow Foreign government to choose a sufficiently low tax rate to switch to equilibrium F. From (9) we know that, given $\tau_h$ the threshold value of $\tau_f$ is $\tilde{\tau}_f = 1 - (1 - \tau_h)/2\theta$. Note that $\tilde{\tau}_f > 0$ iff $n < 2\beta/(2\beta + 1 - \tau_h)$.

That is, given $\tau_h$, the larger Foreign country is, the more likely equilibrium F is to prevail.

The second scenario is the one in which Step 2-a is replaced by the following:

Step 2-a’. If $\beta \leq \beta_A$ holds under $(\tau_h, \tau_f)$ determined in Step 1, then equilibrium A prevails under $(\tau_h, \tau_f)$ and $m = m^* = 1/2$.

In the second scenario, Home government may have to pay an extra cost to maintain equilibrium A. Since Foreign government has an incentive to lower its tax rate as low as zero if doing so leads to equilibrium F, Home government has to set $\tilde{\tau}_h$ at $1 - 2\theta$ if it wishes to prevent the regime change. The higher the degree of “openness” is, the larger is the gains from accepting Foreign currency, and therefore, the higher is the cost for Home government to maintain equilibrium A. Some numerical examples are shown in Table 2. In this table, cases (1)-(4) induce the same equilibrium, F, in both scenarios. Home government prefers equilibrium F to A. In cases (1) and (2), however, Foreign government cannot attain equilibrium F if Home government chooses $\tau^A_h$. Therefore, Home government sets its rate sufficiently high so that Foreign government can induce equilibrium F by choosing a sufficiently low rate.

---

17To be precise, we need to consider the possibility that equilibrium U would prevail. We assume that, when Foreign government lowers the tax rate, it’s more likely that equilibrium F, rather than equilibrium U, would prevail. The justification of this assumption is that under a sufficiently low $\tau_f$, given that Home agents accept Foreign currency, and that other Foreign agents do not accept Home currency, no Foreign agent would have an incentive to deviate to accept Home currency.
These scenarios sometimes induce different results. See cases (5)-(8). They exhibit $W^F < W^A$. Therefore, in the first scenario, Home government chooses a sufficiently low inflation rate to prevent the change. In the second scenario, however, Home government has to commit to a low tax rate to prevent equilibrium F, incurring an extra cost to keep the tax rate that would be non-optimal had there been no concern for equilibrium selection. Consequently, Home government may no longer wish to maintain equilibrium A. In case (5), it chooses $\tilde{\tau}_h$ since $W^A > W^F$ holds. However, in cases (6)-(8), since $\tilde{W}^A < W^F$ holds, Home government does not choose $\tilde{\tau}_h$ but some rate higher than that to allow Foreign government to implement equilibrium F.
6 Conclusion

The issues on currency competition have been discussed in many previous studies, yet there has been few works modeling it in an environment with endogenous determination of the realms of circulation of currencies and strategic interaction between money issuers. By explicitly considering strategic interaction between governments, we have obtained some insights concerning currency competition. For example, the negative impact of a country’s inflationary policy on the realm of circulation of its currency imposes an inflation discipline: the more open a country is, the stronger is the discipline. This result offers another account for the empirical evidence that the degree of “openness” is negatively correlated with the rate of inflation (Romer, 1993).

We also find that, the issuing country of an international currency has an incentive to choose a lower inflation rate than in autarky, a result that is in sharp contrast with previous studies that show governments would opt for an inflation bias if the tax burden falls partially on foreigners (see, e.g., Canzoneri 1989). The other country, since the tax base is reduced due to the use of foreign currency, chooses a higher inflation rate. However, there is a limit of the inflation rate beyond which it cannot sustain the circulation of its national currency.

Another implication is on the costs and benefits of having two international currencies. Our model suggests that when the degree of integration is sufficiently small, if the two countries are of similar size, they both lose by shifting from autarky to the equilibrium with universally circulating currencies. This result is in contrast to those in the previous studies with two-country two-currency search-theoretic models, which argue that a unified currency regime is always preferred. The difference lies in the fact that the current model takes into account a negative effect caused by competition on seigniorage collection. Policy coordination through, say, monetary union, can internalize this negative effect.

Despite the recent development of search theoretic models that relax restrictions on individuals’ money holdings and indivisibility of money, we choose to work with a simple model as it is sufficient for the present purpose. Using a large household model of divisible money, Head and Shi (2003) study the effects of inflation on the exchange rate, but they do not consider various currency regimes and interaction between governments. Later, Liu and Shi (2006) discuss

---

the strategic interaction and coordination between governments in setting the long-run inflation rate. The simple structure of the current paper allows us to depict the coexistence of an international currency and a local currency – a prevalent phenomenon that is hard to capture in models with divisibility of money and goods, and to discuss various policies. For example, we study the effects of the strategic interaction between governments on the circulation of currencies, and how the possibility of abandoning the use of a currency may impose an inflation discipline on its issuer.

One can study many other issues in the present framework with some modifications and extensions. First, we may be able to address issues on trade as well as monetary issues in a unified framework. In the present model, the incentive to trade with foreigners is simply created by expanded trade opportunities. If we consider international trade based on the comparative advantage, some results may still be carried over. For example, if the gains from trade are not too large, then a trade liberalization policy may decrease welfare of the country that starts using foreign currency.

Next, the equilibrium with two local currencies entails no international trade, which is not the case in reality. Zhou (1997) introduces preference shocks to Matsuyama et al. (1993) to induce currency exchange between agents so that they engage in international trade, while both currencies remain local. Another possibility is to introduce a currency exchange market. One way is to endogenize the matching process so that people can go to the market whenever they wish to exchange their money. One can also consider profit-maximizing financial intermediaries or central banks to exchange currencies with other agents.

Finally, introducing more than two currencies in the present model may help us to address issues on currency zoning. Some countries such as Turkey that has been using dollar face a new alternative of Euro, and it is not clear which currency they end up using. It is interesting to know whether or not the circulation of two international currencies increases welfare, and the implications on the policies of the governments whose currencies circulate only locally and of the governments issuing international currencies.

---

\footnote{The autarkic equilibrium in this model may disappear if both goods and money are divisible, and if the marginal cost of production at zero output level is zero. We thank Shouyong Shi for pointing out this possibility.}
References


