

# THE JAPANESE WARTIME EMPIRE, 1931–1945

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## The *Kōminka* Movement in Taiwan and Korea: Comparisons and Interpretations

*Wan-yao Chou*

For most of the period from 1937 to 1945, when Japan was at war, first with China and then with the Allies, the Japanese empire expanded with enormous speed. The expansion was neither modest in scope nor restrained in method. By the summer of 1942, Japan's perimeter encompassed, in addition to Japanese-occupied regions of China, the Kuriles, Attu, Kiska, Kiribati, the Solomon Islands, Western New Guinea, the Sunda Islands, and Burma, and thus enclosed an immense area—so large, in fact, as to stretch the empire well beyond its capabilities.<sup>1</sup> Military campaigns and geographical expansion, needless to say, require human resources, and wartime Japan felt this need increasingly acutely as the war progressed.

Before 1937, when the second Sino-Japanese War began the phase of rapid expansion of the Japanese empire, Japan had already acquired several colonies. The two major ones were Taiwan, annexed in 1895, and Korea, which was formally incorporated into the empire in 1910. Given the large population of these two colonies, a combined total of some 27 million human beings,<sup>2</sup> it was natural that Japan would involve them in its war effort.

How did Japan mobilize its colonial populations in wartime? What methods did the colonizer adopt to assure and enhance the loyalty of its colonial peoples? To answer these questions, this chapter presents a

I wish to thank Stanford University, the Chiang Ching-kuo Foundation (USA), and Professors Ramon H. Myers and Mark R. Peattie of the Hoover Institution for supporting my study of the *kōminka* movement.

<sup>1</sup> Alvin D. Coox, "The Pacific War," in *The Cambridge History of Japan*, vol. 6, *The Twentieth Century*, ed. Peter Duus (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988), pp. 345–61.

<sup>2</sup> In 1937, excluding Japanese residents, Taiwan had a population of 5,261,404, and Korea had a population of 21,682,855. See T'ai-wan-sheng wen-hsien wei-yüan-hui, *T'ai-wan-sheng t'ung-chih-kao* (Taipei, 1960) (hereafter *TWSTCK*), *chüan* 2, "Jen-ming chih: Jen-k'ou p'ien," table XIV:1; Chōsen Sōtokufu, *Chōsen sōtokufu shisei nempō (1939)* (Seoul, 1941), p. 18.

comparative study of the *kōminka* movement in Taiwan and Korea.<sup>3</sup> Setting aside the processes by which the Japanese colonial authorities launched the *kōminka* movement, my emphases will be on the Taiwanese and Korean responses toward the movements' programs, in the hope that this inquiry can shed some preliminary light on this hitherto obscure but important aspect of the wartime Japanese empire in general, and the wartime histories of Taiwan and Korea in particular.

#### THE DESIGNATION AND BEGINNING OF THE *KŌMINKA* MOVEMENT

The *kōminka* movement can be viewed from two perspectives, as an intensification of an ongoing process of assimilation and as an integral part of the wartime mobilization of the Japanese empire as a whole. The term *kōminka* in Japanese literally means "to transform [the colonial peoples] into imperial subjects." In other words, the *kōminka* movement was a movement aimed at shaping the colonized in the image and likeness of the colonizer. In this sense, it can be regarded as an "assimilation" movement, but in an extreme form. Japanese colonizers in Taiwan and Korea were guided by a vaguely defined policy of assimilation from the very outset of their rule in the two colonies. Yet, this policy was realized essentially in an administrative sense, and was never intended to extend constitutional rights to the colonized.<sup>4</sup> During the wartime period, the ultranationalist fervor in the Japanese homeland was reflected in the colonies by the excessive, even fanatical character of the *kōminka* movement.<sup>5</sup> The primary and ultimate aim of *kōminka* was to make the colonial peoples "true Japanese," not only in deed but in

<sup>3</sup> The Taiwan part is mainly based on my Ph.D. dissertation, "The *Kōminka* Movement: Taiwan under Wartime Japan, 1937–1945" (Yale University, 1991). My understanding of the Korean *kōminka* movement comes from a reading of Japanese and English primary and secondary sources.

<sup>4</sup> Japanese colonialism was self-contradictory, if not self-defeating, in the sense that the realization of its proclaimed goal of assimilation would have annihilated the very relationship between the colonizer and the colonized that defined colonialism. The historian Mark R. Peattie has offered important interpretations of the unique and inherently contradictory nature of Japanese colonialism in his various works. For example, see Mark R. Peattie, "Introduction" and "Japanese Attitudes toward Colonialism, 1895–1945," in *The Japanese Colonial Empire, 1894–1945*, ed. Ramon H. Myers and Mark R. Peattie (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1984), pp. 13–15, 96–99, 123–24; "The Japanese Colonial Empire, 1895–1945," in *The Cambridge History of Japan*, ed. Peter Duus, vol. 6: *The Twentieth Century*, pp. 237–44; *Nan'yō: The Rise and Fall of the Japanese in Micronesia, 1885–1945* (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1988), pp. 103–5.

<sup>5</sup> The late Gregory Henderson coined the term "colonial totalitarianism" to describe Japan's rule in Korea, and identified a "totalitarian climax" in Korea during the wartime period. See Gregory Henderson, *Korea: The Politics of the Vortex* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1968), p. 104.

“spirit.” For anyone familiar with the Japanese wartime diction, in which the term *seishin* (spirit), as in “the spirit of the military nation” (*gunkoku seishin*) and the “imperial nation’s spirit” (*kōkoku seishin*), was endlessly repeated, it is not surprising that “spirit” would be the touchstone of the wartime Japanization movement in the colonies. But why was there such a need to remake the colonial peoples in Japan’s image at this juncture of Japan’s imperial history? The reason lies in the fact that the ever-expanding conflict proved to be one that Japan proper could not fight alone; wartime pressures demanded the mobilization of all colonial resources and manpower. Yet, without the colonial subjects’ wholehearted loyalty toward the mother country such mobilization would be incomplete. The *kōminka* movement was, therefore, essential to Japan’s war effort. As a result, Japanization and war mobilization were interwoven and mutually supporting.

Technically speaking, the Japanization movements in Taiwan and Korea had different names. In Taiwan, this movement was invariably referred to as *kōminka undō* (imperialization movement), whereas the colonial government in Korea called its efforts to Japanize Koreans *kōkoku shinmin ka*, literally meaning “to transform [Koreans] into the imperial nation’s subjects.”<sup>6</sup> However, the term *kōminka* was also used informally in Korea,<sup>7</sup> as *kōkoku shinmin* can be abbreviated as *kōmin*. Present-day scholars also have a tendency to refer simply to the *kōminka* movement, whether in Taiwan or Korea, a usage that I shall follow throughout this chapter.<sup>8</sup> There was, however, a difference in nuance in the way the word was used in Taiwan and Korea because of the circumstances in which the Japanization campaigns were launched in each colony. Since the difference has a definite historical significance, it deserves some elaboration.

The formal designation of the Japanization movement in Korea as “*kōkoku shinmin ka*” was not arbitrary. On October 2, 1937, the so-called “Oath as Subjects of the Imperial Nation” (*kōkoku shinmin no*

<sup>6</sup> For example, see *Chōsen jijō* (1940) (Seoul: Chōsen Sōtokufu, 1939), pp. 96, 97. The principal slogan of the movement was “*naisei ittai*” (“Japan and Korea Are One Entity,” or “Japanese-Korean Unity”). See Ki-baik Lee, *A New History of Korea*, trans. Edward W. Wagner with Edward J. Shultz (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1984), pp. 352–53. See also Carter Eckert, *Offspring of Empire: The Koch’ang Kims and the Colonial Origins of Korean Capitalism, 1876–1945* (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1991), p. 236.

<sup>7</sup> For example, see Mitarai Tatsuo, *Minami sōtoku no Chōsen tōchi* (Seoul: Keijō Nip-pōsha, 1942), pp. 7–11; *Keijō Nippō*, October 2, 1942 (morning edition), p. 3.

<sup>8</sup> See Kang Chae-on, *Nihon ni yoru Chōsen shihai no yonjūnen* (Osaka: Osaka shoseki, 1983), pp. 139, 141; Miyata Setsuko, *Chōsen minshū to “kōminka” seisaku* (Tokyo: Mirai sha, 1985); Sani Michio, “Kōminka kyōiku to ‘hantō’ no kodomotachi,” in *Chōsen no kindaiishi to Nihon*, ed. Hatada Takashi (Tokyo: Yamata shobō, 1987), pp. 158–72.

*seishi*) was introduced by the Korean Government-General during the period when Minami Jirō was governor-general (1936–42).<sup>9</sup> This proclamation clearly marked the beginning of the *kōminka* movement in Korea, since the recitation of the oath by Koreans was made compulsory at all public gatherings. There were two sets of oaths, one for the adult population and a linguistically simpler version for children and teenagers, each having three articles. The oath for adults reads:

1. We are the subjects of the imperial nation; we will repay His Majesty as well as the country with loyalty and sincerity.
2. We the subjects of the imperial nation shall trust, love, and help one another so that we can strengthen our unity.
3. We the subjects of the imperial nation shall endure hardship, train ourselves, and cultivate strength so that we can exalt the imperial way.<sup>10</sup>

The significance of the Korean recitation of the oath can be better appreciated when it is understood that in Taiwan no parallel ceremony existed. This contrast reminds us that, whereas Taiwan was merely a newly designated province of the Ch'ing dynasty when it was annexed by Japan, Korea, before its demotion to the status of a colony, had been an independent nation. Perhaps due to this difference in the historical circumstances under which Taiwan and Korea became Japan's colonies, securing the loyalty of the population in each colony posed a different problem for the colonizer.<sup>11</sup> The fact that Koreans were obliged to take an oath and Taiwanese were not was thus symbolic of the degree of difficulty faced by Japan in obtaining the loyalty of the peoples of these two colonial territories.

In the case of Korea, the concept of "the nation" was clearly emphasized in the oath. It goes without saying that "the nation" here meant Japan. This seems to suggest that the colonial government in Korea had to compete, in its endeavour to transform Koreans into Japanese, with the historical fact that Korea had once been an independent nation. The required recitation of the oath on each and every public occasion represented, on the one hand, a spiritual undermining of Korean nationalism—be it in the dynastic or in the modern sense—and, on the other, a daily ritual of indoctrination of Koreans in Japanese state ideology. In contrast, the colonial authorities in Taiwan do not seem to have found it

<sup>9</sup> Chōsen Sōtokufu, *Shisei sanjūnin shi* (Seoul, 1940), p. 790.

<sup>10</sup> *Chōsen jijō* (1940), p. 102; for the oath for children and teenagers, see p. 101.

<sup>11</sup> For an overall comparison of Japanese colonial rule in Korea and Taiwan, see Edward I-te Chen, "Japan: Oppressor or Modernizer?" in *Korea under Japanese Colonial Rule: Studies of the Policy and Techniques of Japanese Colonialism*, ed. Andrew T. Nahm (Kalamazoo, Mich.: Center for Korean Studies, Western Michigan University, 1973), pp. 251–58.

necessary to impose a ceremony of the same nature upon the Taiwanese. Taiwan, because it was a frontier province on the periphery of China, was incorporated into the Japanese empire through a process that involved little dismantling of the authority of imperial symbols or even of the authority of the provincial government.<sup>12</sup> Moreover, the colonial government in Taiwan gave the Taiwanese a two-year grace period to choose either to stay or to leave.<sup>13</sup> Psychologically, this policy must have created a sense of resignation in those Taiwanese who could have left but chose to stay, and those who had left but decided to return. Notwithstanding the weaker nationalist resistance of the Taiwanese, colonial authorities in Taiwan had to deal with a different but analogous problem, that of Han Chinese cultural identity, which I will discuss below.

Because there was no event in Taiwan as drastic and unprecedented as the introduction of the oath in Korea, the beginning of the *kōminka* movement in Taiwan was not as clearly marked, though it appears that the term appeared sometime in late 1936.<sup>14</sup> The inauguration of the movement was one of the three principal policies adopted by the seventeenth governor-general of Taiwan, Kobayashi Seizō (1936–40), who took office in the fall of 1936, the two others being those of industrializing Taiwan and the realization of a “southward advance.”<sup>15</sup> On April 1, 1937, the use of Chinese in newspapers was abolished as a result of pressure from the colonial government,<sup>16</sup> marking the first implementation of measures to carry out Kobayashi’s *kōminka* policy. To Japan’s colonial populations, the Marco Polo Bridge Incident on July 7, 1937,<sup>17</sup>

<sup>12</sup> Shortly before the Japanese troops marched ashore on the island of Taiwan in the summer of 1895, the provincial government was dissolved after its officials left for the Chinese mainland, thus creating a political and institutional vacuum wherein the minimal imperial presence ceased to exist.

<sup>13</sup> A fair number of Taiwanese, mostly gentry members and merchants, did move back to mainland China, but many finally, perhaps painfully, decided to return to Taiwan where their families had taken root too deeply to relocate elsewhere. See Wu Wen-hsing, *Jih-chü shih-ch’i T’ai-wan she-hui ling-tao chieh-ts’eng chih yen-chiu* (Taipei: Cheng-chung shu-chü, 1992), pp. 24–31.

<sup>14</sup> Shirai Asakichi, “Taiwan *kōminka* no shō mondai,” *Taiwan jijō*, January 1940, p. 32.

<sup>15</sup> See Taiwan Sōtokufu Jōhōbu, *Jikyokuka Taiwan no genzai to sono shōrai* (Taipei, 1940), p. 7.

<sup>16</sup> All but one newspaper complied with this “Japanese only” policy and discontinued their Chinese columns on April 1, 1937. The only Taiwanese-managed and -owned newspaper, *Taiwan shinminpō*, was allowed to gradually decrease its Chinese columns until their total disappearance by the end of June of that year. See I-lan-hsien wen-hsien wei-yüan-hui, *I-lan-hsien chih* (repr. I-lan, 1969), “ta-shih-chi,” p. 52.

<sup>17</sup> In Taiwan and Korea the Marco Polo Bridge Incident was often referred to as the “Recent Incident” (*konji jihen*) or simply “the Incident” (*jihen*). It was commonplace for people in the *kōminka* era to say that “since the ‘Recent Incident’ . . .” or “since ‘the

marked the coming of a new era. The two *kōminka* movements were initiated shortly before and after it. Thus in both Taiwan and Korea, the eight years from 1937 to 1945 were unmistakably the *kōminka* era.

As a transformative policy, the *kōminka* movement naturally touched almost every aspect of life in the colonies. Theoretically, whatever was deemed Japanese was to be imposed upon the colonial peoples, while whatever was considered Korean or Taiwanese (or Chinese) was to be expunged in both colonies. In general, the movement had four major definable programs, namely “religious reform,” the “national language” movement (*kokugo undō*), the name-changing campaign (*kaiseimei* in Taiwan; *sōshi kaimei* in Korea), and the recruitment of military volunteers (*shiganhei seido*). Although it may appear that both governments-general in the two colonies adopted similar programs for their respective Japanization movements, they actually addressed different issues, and consequently their approaches to the *kōminka* movement were not identical. Let us turn to each of the four.

#### SHINTOISM VERSUS INDIGENOUS RELIGIONS

“Religious reform” was high on the agenda of the *kōminka* movement. Both in Taiwan and in Korea, and perhaps to a lesser degree in Micronesia,<sup>18</sup> the colonial governments promoted the Japanese state religion, Shintoism, at the expense of indigenous religions. During the *kōminka* era, the number of Japanese shrines (*jinja*) in Taiwan increased significantly. Thirty-eight out of the total sixty-eight *jinja* in Taiwan were built between 1937 and 1943.<sup>19</sup> The authorities encouraged the general public to pay visits to *jinja*, especially to the Taiwan Grand Shrine located in present-day Yüan-shan, Taipei. The colonial government was able to boast a record figure of approximately 150,000 visitors to the shrine in two days on October 28 and 29, 1942, on the occasion of its most important festival of the year.<sup>20</sup> Apart from their public observance of Shinto ceremonies, Taiwanese were also advised to maintain a domestic altar (*kamidana*) in each household, and were expected to wor-

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Incident' . . .” For the usage “Recent Incident,” see *Kōnan shimbun* (hereafter *KNSB*), July 3, 1941 (evening ed.), p. 2; *Goen*, 34, no. 7 (July 1941): 45; Tsuda Katashi, *Naisen ittai ron no kihon rinen* (Seoul: Ryokki remmei, 1940), p. 85. For “the Incident,” see Shirai Asakichi and Ema Tsunekichi, *Kōminka undō* (Taipei, 1939), pp. 156–57; *Chōsen jijō* (1939) (Seoul: Chōsen Sōtokufu, 1938), p. 374.

<sup>18</sup> For Japan’s attempt to assimilate Micronesians into Japanese religion, see Peattie, *Nan’yō*, pp. 106–8, 225–29.

<sup>19</sup> Ts’ai Chin-t’ang, “Tai-wan ni okeru shūkyō seisaku no kenkyū, 1895–1945” (Ph.D. dissertation, Tsukuba University, 1990), p. 149.

<sup>20</sup> “Hontō jiji nishshi,” *Taiwan keisatsu jihō* (hereafter, *TWKSJH*), no. 325 (December 1942) (pages are unnumbered).



ship every morning the *taima* (paper amulets) distributed from the Ise Shrine, the holiest of Shinto sites in the Japanese homeland.<sup>21</sup> According to official figures, in 1941 about seven out of ten households in Taiwan received Ise Shrine paper amulets, though one doubts that such religious charms were actually venerated by Taiwanese.<sup>22</sup>

In the name of *kōminka* Japanese colonial administrators not only promoted Shinto but also attempted to stamp out the traditional indigenous religion, a hybrid of Buddhism, Taoism, and folk beliefs. One Japanese local official under the governorship of Kobayashi Seizō even went as far as to demolish native temples. The extremity of such a “religious reform” provoked strong protests from the Taiwanese as well as harsh criticism from the Diet in Japan proper. The temple demolition operation was halted when Hasegawa Kiyoshi (1940–44) replaced Kobayashi Seizō as the governor-general of Taiwan in late 1940.<sup>23</sup> Nevertheless, the number of native temples had by then decreased by one-third.<sup>24</sup>

In Korea, on the other hand, the colonial government concentrated its efforts on the subjugation of Christianity, Korea’s most active and influential religion.<sup>25</sup> During the *kōminka* movement, the colonial authorities adopted harsh measures against Korean Christian communities. Unlike the situation in Taiwan, the number of *jinja* in Korea did not increase significantly, notwithstanding the near doubling of minor shrines (*jinshi*). Korea had 60 shrines in 1939 and 73 when the war ended, while the number of minor shrines increased from 470 to 828 during the period 1939–42.<sup>26</sup>

<sup>21</sup> The Ise Shrine was the principal center of worship for Amaterasu, the goddess and first ancestress of Japan’s imperial house. The Ise Shrine was made the highest shrine in the early Meiji period and thereafter distributed talismans nationwide and later to the colonies. See Helen Hardacre, *Shintō and the State, 1868–1988* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1989), pp. 84, 86–87.

<sup>22</sup> See Yokomori Kumi, “Taiwan ni okeru jinja: kōminka seisaku to no kanren ni oite,” *Taiwan kingendaishi kenkyū*, no. 4 (October 1982), p. 200. Wu Cho-liu (1900–1976), the famous Taiwanese (Hakka) writer, revealed in his memoir that he never worshipped the Ise paper amulets kept in his house. See Wu Cho-liu, *T’ai-wan lien-ch’iao*, trans. Chung Chao-cheng (Taipei: Nan-fang ts’ung-shu ch’u-pan she, 1987), p. 109.

<sup>23</sup> Yokomori, “Taiwan ni okeru jinja,” pp. 202–6.

<sup>24</sup> See Ch’en Ling-jung, *Jih-chū shih-ch’i shen-tao t’ung-chih hsia ti T’ai-wan tsung-chiao cheng-ts’e* (Taipei: Tzu-li wan-pao wen-hua ch’u-pan she, 1992), p. 254.

<sup>25</sup> The Korean indigenous religion, Ch’ondogyo (the Religion of the Heavenly Way), played a leading role in the March First Independence Movement of 1919. However, its anti-Japanese influence declined after 1920 because of internal strife and repression by the colonial authorities. See John Kie-chiang Oh, “Ch’ondogyo and Independence Movements,” in *Korea’s Response to Japan: The Colonial Period, 1910–1945*, ed. C. I. Eugene Kim and Doretha E. Mortimore (Kalamazoo, Mich.: Center for Korean Studies, Western Michigan University, 1977), pp. 123–26.

<sup>26</sup> “Sankō tōkeihyō,” *Chōsen jijō* (1940) (Seoul, 1939), p. 10; “Sankō tōkeihyō,” *Chōsen jijō* (1944) (Seoul, 1943), p. 9. Chen Ling-jung, *T’ai-wan tsung-chiao cheng-ts’e*, p. 53.

In Korea, the Shinto shrine issue emerged as early as 1935 and stemmed from the new policy that obliged Koreans to worship at Shinto shrines. Unlike most Taiwanese Christians who seemingly acquiesced in this matter,<sup>27</sup> those in Korea often refused to visit the shrines. In September 1937, for example, the students of seven schools refused to do so. The authorities did not take the confrontation lightly; they subsequently closed down these schools.<sup>28</sup> For Korean Christians, the question of whether or not to visit a Shinto shrine was a serious one,<sup>29</sup> for the performance of rituals there directly conflicted with the Christian tenet that God is the one true deity; worship at the site of another religion amounted to idolatry. As the *kōminka* movement intensified, the colonial government's pressure on Korean Christians to observe Shinto rites increased. In May 1938 the Presbyterian Church decided to close its schools throughout Korea to show its defiance of the observance of Shinto ceremonies.<sup>30</sup> However, in September of that year the Korean Presbyterian General Assembly was forced to pass a resolution supporting the government view that to participate in ceremonies at Shinto shrines was a patriotic rather than a religious act.<sup>31</sup> Meanwhile, a vigorous anti-shrine worship movement came into being. Many Christian organizations were disbanded as a result of their refusal to comply with the authorities on the Shinto shrine issue. From June 1940 onward, more than two hundred churches were closed down; seventy ministers and two thousand or so Christians were arrested; more than fifty ministers died in jail.<sup>32</sup>

The statement of disbandment issued in early 1944 by the religious association for Korean Adventist churches provides us with a glimpse of how difficult the situation had become for Korean Christians at the height of the *kōminka* movement. Part of the statement reads:

<sup>27</sup> Taiwanese Christians, mostly Presbyterians, complied with official pressures concerning Shinto ceremonies, although occasionally some of them did refuse to pay visits to the Shinto shrine. See Huang Wu-tung, *Huang Wu-tung hui-i lu* (Irvine, Calif.: Taiwan Publishing Co., 1986), p. 117; T'ai-wan chi-tu chang-lao chiao-hui tsung-hui li-shih wei-yüan-hui, *T'ai-wan chi-tu chang-lao chiao-hui pai-nien-shih* (Taipei: Centenary Publication Committee, Presbyterian Church of Formosa, 1965), pp. 257, 390.

<sup>28</sup> Mun Kuk-chu, *Chōsen shakai undōshi jiten* (Tokyo: Shakai hyōron kai, 1981), p. 62.

<sup>29</sup> Kondō Kenichi, ed., *Taiheiyō senka no Chōsen oyobi Taiwan* (Chigasaki: Chōsen shiryō kenkyū kai, 1961), p. 12.

<sup>30</sup> See Spencer J. Palmer, "Korean Christians and the Shinto Shrine Issue," in Kim and Mortimore, *Korea's Response to Japan*, pp. 144–45.

<sup>31</sup> Chong-Sik Lee, *Japan and Korea: The Political Dimension* (Stanford, Calif.: Hoover Institution, 1985), p. 11.

<sup>32</sup> Kang, *Chōsen shihai no yonjūnen*, p. 149; Palmer, "Korean Christians," p. 150. In post-colonial Korea, the Shinto shrine issue created a wide gap between those who had complied and those who had not.

This church was established by American missionaries and has existed for more than forty years. . . . As a result, we unknowingly were influenced by the thought of our enemies, America and England alike, and we worshipped their Western customs and habits so that our oriental indigenous good customs were gradually destroyed. . . . Furthermore, we should dissociate ourselves from the position of being members of religious organizations and return to that of natural human beings (*shizenjin*). Thus, as the children of His Imperial Majesty, we should serve our country, and as the subjects of the imperial nation (*kōkoku shinmin toshite*), we, of course, pledge that we will repay our country's benevolence with all our will and might, acting in accordance with the demands of the present situation in the Greater East Asian War. . . .<sup>33</sup>

These agonizingly constructed phrases attest to the immensity of official pressure on the Korean Christian community and demonstrate that, for Korean Christians, compliance with the government's pressure was often a matter of lip service.<sup>34</sup>

It is proof of the barren ground for Shinto in Taiwan and Korea that, despite the most intense efforts of the colonial authorities to promote it, in each territory Shinto disappeared with hardly a trace once Japan's colonial rule came to an end.<sup>35</sup> Upon Japan's defeat, one of the matters that the colonial authorities in Taiwan and Korea regarded as most urgent was to protect the sacred objects in the Shinto shrines from being desecrated by the local population.<sup>36</sup> This showed prescience, especially in Korea, since the first thing that the people there did to vent their hatred toward the Japanese was to set fire to Shinto shrines.<sup>37</sup> In Taiwan there was less violence against Shinto shrines, but there, too, Shintoism was completely eradicated in a very short time.

#### THE "NATIONAL LANGUAGE" MOVEMENT

The *kōminka* movement strongly promoted use of the "national"—Japanese—language. When officials of the colonial government first ar-

<sup>33</sup> *Keijō nippō*, January 7, 1944 (morning ed.), p. 3.

<sup>34</sup> Chong-Sik Lee, *The Politics of Korean Nationalism* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1963), pp. 269–70.

<sup>35</sup> This also holds true in the case of Micronesia. See Peattie, *Nan'yō*, p. 108. The outright failure of Shintoism to take root in Japan's colonies in spite of all missionary efforts may have much to do with Shintoism's lack of transcendental qualities, essential to if not requisite for any vital religion, as Mark Peattie insightfully suggests.

<sup>36</sup> Morita Yoshio, *Chōsen shūsen no kiroku: Bei So ryōgun no shinchū to Nihonjin no hikiage* (Tokyo: Gannandō shoten, 1986), pp. 107–13.

<sup>37</sup> Wi Ji Kang, "Religion and Politics Under Japanese Rule," in Kim and Mortimore, *Korea's Response to Japan*, p. 118; Richard E. Kim, *Lost Names: Scenes from a Korean Boyhood* (New York: Praeger, 1970), p. 164.

rived at Taiwan in mid-July 1895, they referred to their own language as *Nihongo* (Japanese), but within a year it was officially known as *kokugo* (the national language), and so it remained until the end of the colonial era.<sup>38</sup> In Korea, the designation of the Japanese language changed over time, as follows:

1891	<i>Nichigo</i> (Japanese), in the name of the Institute for Japanese Language
1895	<i>gaikokugo</i> (foreign language), as in the text of the law on primary schools
1909	<i>Nihongo</i> (Japanese), as in the text of regulations for common schools ( <i>futsū gakkō</i> )
1910–45	<i>kokugo</i> (national language) <sup>39</sup>

The designation of Japanese as the national language foreshadowed its critical role in the *kōminka* movement. Although at the outset of Japanese rule education in both colonies did not exclude the indigenous languages in the elementary-school curricula, it eventually did so during the *kōminka* movement. In Taiwan, classical Chinese, read in Taiwanese dialects, was taught in elementary schools, but class time spent on this subject was diminished gradually during the prewar period. Finally, in April 1937, classical Chinese completely disappeared from the curriculum.<sup>40</sup> In Korea, the same misfortune befell the Korean language, or *Chōsen-go*. From 1911 to 1938, Korean was a required subject in elementary schools; during this period, however, class time spent on Korean was much shorter than that spent on Japanese, which was also a required subject.<sup>41</sup> In 1938, Korean was further degraded to the status of an optional subject. Worse still, in 1941 it was completely removed from the curriculum, although still listed as optional.<sup>42</sup>

<sup>38</sup> See the written suggestions submitted to Kabayama Sukenori, the first governor-general of Taiwan (1895–96), by Izawa Shūji, who then headed the Education Bureau of the colonial government, in *Taiwan kyōiku kai, Taiwan kyōiku enkakushi* (repr. Tokyo: Seishi sha, 1982), pp. 6–10. In the spring of 1896, the Government-General of Taiwan changed the name for the Japanese language training institutes from *nihongo denshūsho* to *kokugo denshūsho*. See *Taiwan kyōiku enkakushi*, pp. 17–18.

<sup>39</sup> Yi Suk-cha, "Nihon tōchika Chōsen ni okeru Nihongo kyōiku: Chōsen kyōiku rei to no kanren ni oite," *Chōsen gakuho*, no. 75 (April 1975), p. 101.

<sup>40</sup> *TWSTCH, chūan* 5, "Chiao-yū chih: chiao-yū she-shih p'ien," p. 53.

<sup>41</sup> Yi Suk-cha adroitly compares the percentage of class time spent on the Japanese language to the percentage of class time spent on the Korean language in her article "Nihongo kyōiku," pp. 105–12. For example, in 1894, 12.3 percent of class time was spent on Japanese and 22.2 percent on Korean. In 1922, the Japanese proportion had increased to 37.6 percent, while that of Korean had declined to 11.7 percent; and in 1938, the proportions were 33.1 percent and 8.3 percent respectively. In 1941, 29.3 percent of class time was taken by Japanese, and Korean was no longer taught.

<sup>42</sup> Yi Suk-cha, "Nihongo kyōiku," pp. 102, 112. According to Richard E. Kim, Korean

Needless to say, the colonizers felt that speaking the “national language” was a prerequisite for being a true Japanese.<sup>43</sup> As an educator and promoter of the Japanese language in Taiwan put it, “the national language is the womb that nurtures patriotism.”<sup>44</sup> This view was widely shared by his fellow colonizers, and spreading the use of Japanese among the general public became an important task for them. In order to provide Japanese-language schooling for those who did not attend or could not afford formal schooling, Taiwan’s colonial authorities started setting up outreach programs called “national language study programs” (*kokugo kōshōjo*) island-wide in 1929. A similar program offering a shorter study period also came into existence and was called the “basic national language study program” (*kan’i kokugo kōshōjo*).<sup>45</sup> By April 1937, there were 2,812 “national language study programs” with a total enrollment of 185,590 students, and 1,555 “basic national language study programs” with a total enrollment of 77,781 students.<sup>46</sup>

These widespread outreach programs were closely tied to the official campaign to increase the number of colonial subjects who understood the “national language” (*kokugo kaisha*, or “national language speakers”). In 1937, when the *kōminka* movement commenced, “national language speakers” made up 37.38 percent of the entire population in Taiwan, and were expected to increase to 50 percent by 1943.<sup>47</sup> In the event, the percentages grew faster than anticipated and, no doubt to the great delight of the colonial government, in 1940 the number of “national language speakers” had already reached 51 percent, and in 1943, no less than 80 percent.<sup>48</sup> Nonetheless, one should be aware of how these numbers were derived. According to official criteria, Taiwanese counted as “national language speakers” basically fell into the following four categories: children presently studying at an elementary school or its equivalent; graduates of an elementary school or its equiv-

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language and history were taught to Korean children only in the first and second grades, and from the third grade up all schoolchildren were required to speak Japanese at school and expected to speak Japanese at home as well. But from 1940 onward, even first- and second-graders were no longer taught Korean language and history. See Kim, *Lost Names*, pp. 71–72, 77–78.

<sup>43</sup> Chōsen Sōtokufu Jōhōka, *Atarashiki Chōsen* (Seoul, 1944; repr. Tokyo: Fūtō sha, 1982), p. 62.

<sup>44</sup> Yamazaki Mutsuo, *Kokugo mondai no kaiketsu* (privately published: Taipei, 1939), p. 53.

<sup>45</sup> Sung Teng-ts’ai, *Kokugo kōshūjo kyōiku no jissai* (privately published: Taipei: 1936), p. 37.

<sup>46</sup> *Taiwan kyōiku enkakushi*, p. 1054.

<sup>47</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>48</sup> *Taiwan jijō* (1942), p. 132; *KNSB*, October 12, 1943 (evening ed.), p. 1.

alent; students presently studying at a Japanese language outreach program; and graduates of a language outreach program.<sup>49</sup>

Given the rigor with which Japanese educators performed their duties, there is little doubt that an average elementary-school graduate could converse in Japanese with satisfactory fluency. But how fluent in Japanese were those who only attended classes in an outreach program? As a matter of fact, the outreach programs required much shorter schooling time—sixty to one hundred school days a year for two to three hours each day—and one could complete the program in a one- to four-year period.<sup>50</sup> Furthermore, the official statistics are potentially misleading in that one was counted as a “national language speaker” even if one dropped out of the program immediately after the survey was done. My review of primary sources has led me to believe that the real numbers of Taiwanese capable of speaking Japanese were significantly less than the official percentages of “national language speakers.”<sup>51</sup>

After the commencement of the “national language” movement, the population was discouraged from speaking Southern Fukienese (a language spoken by about 80 percent of the population) as well as other indigenous languages.<sup>52</sup> During the *kōminka* era, although the government never systematically banned local languages, some institutions did proscribe Southern Fukienese, perhaps only on a temporary basis. Occasionally, Taiwanese might find that they were forbidden to speak in their mother tongue aboard a bus or when visiting a city hall.<sup>53</sup>

Among programs promoting the national language in Taiwan, one stood out: the program to recognize so-called “National Language Families” (*kokugo katei*). This program began in Taihoku (Taipei) prefecture in 1937, and was later duplicated by other prefectures island-wide.<sup>54</sup> In general, a family wishing to be granted the “National Language Family” designation had to apply for it and prove that all family members spoke only Japanese at home.<sup>55</sup> After an application was ac-

<sup>49</sup> Sung, *Kokugo kōshūjō kyōiku no jissai*, p. 37.

<sup>50</sup> *Ibid.*; *Taiwan kyōiku enkakushi*, p. 1051.

<sup>51</sup> A youth wrote to an official saying that one year of study in an outreach program had not helped his mother; she still could not speak a word of Japanese. See *Taiwan nichichi shimpō* (hereafter *TWNNSP*), April 10, 1940 (evening ed.), p. 2.

<sup>52</sup> Taiwan's population comprised mainly Fukienese, Hakka, and aborigines. In general, Fukienese spoke Southern Fukienese (commonly known as Taiwanese), Hakka spoke Hakka, and the aborigines spoke about a dozen languages among themselves.

<sup>53</sup> For example, *TWNNSP*, January 31, 1941, p. 4; October 20, 1940, p. 5.

<sup>54</sup> *Ibid.*, February 14, 1940, p. 5; April 20, 1941 (evening ed.), p. 2; *Takao shimpō*, June 17, 1940, p. 7; *Tō Taiwan shimpō* (hereafter *TTWSP*), March 23, 1941, p. 3; March 27, 1941, p. 2.

<sup>55</sup> Taichū prefecture held to a lower standard by which only active family members

cepted, the family would receive, among other things, a tablet bearing the inscription “*kokugo no ie*,” or “*kokugo katei*,” in a special ceremony, to be hung by the front door of its residence as a symbol of honor.<sup>56</sup>

Because of the lack of sources, we do not know the total number of families that were so designated before the war ended. But one source reveals that from 1937 to 1943, 3,448 households in Taihoku, or about 1.3 percent of the city’s total, received the title.<sup>57</sup> Given the fact that Taihoku was the capital and cultural center of the colony, it would be logical to assume that the average island-wide figure would have been lower than 1.3 percent.

The “National Language Family” program targeted well-educated Taiwanese and was intended to make them examples for the rest of the society. It was presumably an honor, but there were also material rewards that came with the designation, such as better chances for children of such families to enter supposedly good schools, or priority for employment in government or public organizations.<sup>58</sup> Because rewards were involved, it is difficult to determine how sincerely the Taiwanese elite endorsed this program in the context of the *kōminka* movement. It is, however, clear that quite a number of Taiwanese from “National Language Families” did not follow the “Japanese only” rule at home or in public as strictly as the title demanded.<sup>59</sup>

Compared to the program in Taiwan, the “national language” movement in Korea had a good deal of ground to make up. In contrast to the 37.8 percent of the Taiwanese population claimed as “national language speakers” in 1937, in Korea, even as late as 1938, the percentage was only 12.38.<sup>60</sup> In the years that followed the number of “national language speakers” grew steadily but not spectacularly as shown in table 2.1.

The percentages of “national language speakers” in Taiwan and in Korea differed greatly. The Korean figures were arrived at by adding up two groups of people: one was “those who understand a little [Japanese]” (*sōkaishi eru mono*) and the other was “those who could carry on an ordinary conversation [in Japanese]” (*futsū kaiwa ni sashinaki mono*).<sup>61</sup>

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were required to speak Japanese. See Nagata Jōdai, *Minfu sakkō no gutaisaku* (privately published: Taipei, 1938), pp. 84–85.

<sup>56</sup> Some prefectures gave money for the conferees to have their tablets custom-made. See Taiwan Sōtokufu, *Taiwan no shakai kyōiku* (Taipei, 1941), pp. 199, 209.

<sup>57</sup> KNSB, November 2, 1943 (evening ed.), p. 2.

<sup>58</sup> *TTWSP*, March 27, 1941, p. 2.

<sup>59</sup> Wu Wen-hsing, “Jih-chū shih-ch’i T’ai-wan tsung-tu-fu t’ui-kuang jih-yū yün-tung ch’u-t’an” (part 2), *T’ai-wan feng-wu*, 37, no. 4 (December 1987): 74; *TWNNSP*, February 4, 1941 (evening ed.), p. 2.

<sup>60</sup> “Sankō tōkeihyō,” *Chōsen jijō* (1940), p. 10.

<sup>61</sup> *Ibid.*

TABLE 2.1  
Proportion of Korean Population Educated to Speak Japanese, 1938–1943

Year	Population	"National Language Speakers"	Percentage
1938	21,950,716	2,717,807	12.38
1939	22,098,310	3,069,032	13.89
1940	22,954,563	3,573,338	15.57
1941	23,913,063	3,972,094	16.61
1942	25,525,409	5,089,214	19.94
1943	25,827,308	5,722,448	22.15

Source: Kondo Ken'ichi, ed., *Taiheyō senka shumatsuki Chōsen no chisei* (Tokyo: Chōsen shiryō hensan kai, 1961), p. 200.

According to official criteria, those who spoke Japanese as fluently as fourth graders in elementary school were considered to belong to the former group, while the latter category included those who spoke Japanese as fluently as elementary-school graduates.<sup>62</sup> Given the vagueness of these criteria, it is difficult to decide whether Korea's standard of who qualified as a "national language speaker" was equivalent to Taiwan's.

There were a number of reasons for the much lower percentage of "national language speakers" in the Korean population. First, Korea formally became a Japanese colony fifteen years later than Taiwan did, if we do not count the five-year period from 1906 to 1910 when it was under Japan's tutelage. This shorter period of colonization could explain to some extent Korea's lag in "national language" acquisition. Second, Korea was more than four times larger than Taiwan in terms of population and 6.5 times larger in land area. Given Korea's sizable territory and large number of people, the Korean colonial government's task of propagating the Japanese language was definitely more difficult than its counterpart's in Taiwan. Third, the illiteracy rate in Korea was very high to start with. According to a census taken in 1930, 77.7 percent of Koreans read neither Korean nor Japanese, and only about 15 percent of school-age Koreans were enrolled in elementary schools.<sup>63</sup> In contrast, the percentage of Taiwanese children who were enrolled in elementary schools in 1930 was twice as high—30.6 percent—and the government in Taiwan was able to increase the percentage to an impressive 71.1

<sup>62</sup> Kondō Kenichi, ed., *Taiheyō senka shūmatsuki Chōsen no chisei* (Tokyo: Chōsen shiryō hensan kai, 1961), pp. 194–95.

<sup>63</sup> Ko Chun-sōk, *Kōnichi genron tōsōshi* (Tokyo: Shinsen sha, 1976), pp. 278–79.



percent in 1944.<sup>64</sup> Finally, the government in Korea started language outreach programs only in 1938, nine years later than in Taiwan. Although these programs boasted a yearly average enrollment of three hundred thousand students from 1938 to 1941,<sup>65</sup> this figure could only add a meagre 1 percent or so to the percentage of “national language speakers.” Like the colonial government in Taiwan, Korea’s colonial authorities also conferred the designation “National Language Family” on Koreans who could prove that they spoke only Japanese in public and at home.<sup>66</sup> All the same, it is difficult to determine the number of such families.

Notwithstanding the striking similarities between the “national language” movements in Taiwan and Korea, the respective colonial governments did show crucial differences in their attitudes toward indigenous languages. In Taiwan, as mentioned earlier, Taiwanese might occasionally find that they were forbidden to speak the language of their birth when aboard a bus or when visiting a government office. Despite sporadic prohibitions, speaking indigenous languages did not seem to constitute a threat to colonial rule. In contrast, because the colonial authorities in Korea drew connections between Korean nationalism and the Korean language, Koreans might open themselves to serious punishment if they tried to preserve their mother tongue.<sup>67</sup> The harsh measures the colonial government of Korea adopted against those who continued to promote the Korean language are exemplified in the infamous October 1942 Korean Language Society incident, which resulted in the arrest and imprisonment of 33 leading figures of the society, some of whom were subjected to torture.<sup>68</sup>

After the number of “national language speakers” in Taiwan reached 51 percent of the population in 1940, some optimistic colonizers hoped that Taiwan would eventually become *kokugo Taiwan*,<sup>69</sup> or “national language Taiwan,” meaning that everyone in Taiwan would speak Japanese, an unrealized goal by the time the war ended in 1945. Still, if the

<sup>64</sup> E. Patricia Tsurumi, *Japanese Colonial Education in Taiwan, 1895–1945* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1977), Appendix B, pp. 244–45.

<sup>65</sup> Chōsen Sōtokufu, *Chōsen sōtokufu shisei nenpō: Shōwa jūroku nendō* (Seoul, 1943), p. 158.

<sup>66</sup> See Chun Kwang-yong, “Kapitan Lee,” trans. Marshall R. Pihl, in *Listening to Korea: A Korean Anthology*, ed. Marshall R. Pihl (New York: Praeger, 1973), p. 95.

<sup>67</sup> Mark R. Peattie, “The Japanese Colonial Empire in the China and Pacific Wars,” paper presented at the conference on “Fifty Years After—The Pacific War Reexamined,” held at Lake Yamanaka, Tokyo, November 13–17, 1991, p. 7, note 14. Cited with the permission of Professor Peattie.

<sup>68</sup> For a personal account, see Lee Hi-seung, “Recollections of the Korean Language Society Incident,” in Pihl, *Listening to Korea*, pp. 19–42.

<sup>69</sup> *Taiwan nippō*, March 6, 1943, p. 2.

Korean colonial government had ever similarly hoped to build a *kokugo Chōsen*, it would have had a much longer way to go. In either case one suspects that it would have taken a good deal of statistical juggling by Japanese colonial authorities to manufacture a *kokugo Taiwan* or *Chōsen*. In sum, we may say that the “national language” movement in Taiwan was significantly more successful than that in Korea. Again, under the surface of apparently similar Japanization programs, one can discern differences in the ways each colonial government carried out its program.

#### THE NAME-CHANGING CAMPAIGN

On February 11, 1940, the Governments-General in Taiwan and Korea simultaneously proclaimed a set of newly revised regulations concerning household registration that made it legally possible for colonial subjects to replace their original names with Japanese ones. Thus began the name-changing (*kaiseimei*) campaign, which accorded with the transformative principles of the *kōminka* movement. Theoretically, a Taiwanese or a Korean who became a true Japanese should be essentially the same as an ethnic Japanese, in form and substance (in Japanese, *jisshitsu keishiki tomoni naichijin to gōmo kotonaru tokoro no nai*, or, to put it more concisely, *keishinittai*).<sup>70</sup> One of the “forms” that had hitherto distinguished Japanese from the colonial people was the use of names.

Although both colonial governments wanted to make their subjects adopt Japanese names, their reasoning and approaches differed. In Taiwan, the official reason for the name-changing program was twofold. On the one hand, the colonial government declared that assimilating Taiwanese into Japanese culture had always been the ultimate goal of Japanese rule. (I should note here that Japanese colonizers took great pride in the self-perception that while Japan supposedly aimed to assimilate the colonized, western colonization was supposedly characterized by mere economic exploitation.) On the other hand, the government claimed that the Taiwanese had demonstrated the “spirit” of imperial subjects during Japan’s war in China and that, in testimony to this loyalty, many of them wished to bear names similar to those of ethnic Japanese.<sup>71</sup> The first of these assertions implied that the name-changing policy was an inevitable outcome of Japanese colonial rule, while the second suggested that such a policy was a reasonable response to Taiwanese wishes. In fact, there was more propaganda than truth in both claims.

<sup>70</sup> *TWNNSP*, February 11, 1940, p. 3; Mitarai, *Minami sōtoku*, p. 24.

<sup>71</sup> *TWNNSP*, February 11, 1940, p. 3.

In Taiwan, according to the new regulations, the name-changing program was a matter for the household rather than the individual; only the head of a household could apply for a name change on behalf of the members of the entire family. One should note that not every Taiwanese family that wished to have the names of its members officially changed to Japanese ones was eligible for this program. There were qualifications to meet. A prospective family must be first recognized as a family in which all its active members spoke Japanese at home. The second qualification was rather abstract; that is, the members of a prospective family must endeavor to cultivate a disposition appropriate for imperial subjects and be full of "public spirit."<sup>72</sup> Given the fact that applicants for name changing had to meet these two qualifications, the *kaiseimei* program in Taiwan was not mandatory.

Interestingly, the choice of new names was restricted. A prohibition against the use of improper names was made public when the *kaiseimei* program commenced. As proclaimed by the authorities, improper names fell into the following four categories: (1) names of Japan's emperors, (2) names of famous historical personalities, (3) surnames indicating the geographical origins of Chinese names previously held by the applicants, (4) other improper names such as names of contemporary important figures and eccentric names.<sup>73</sup>

Among these four prohibitions, the third is most relevant to the subject of this essay and needs some elaboration. In Chinese culture, to change one's surname—let alone to a foreign one—is one of the most humiliating things a person can do. If it became inevitable, therefore, people preferred to choose the least demeaning possible name. Because Chinese geographical names usually consist of two characters, as most Japanese surnames also do, they may pass for Japanese surnames. Thus, by adopting a geographical name as his new Japanese surname, a name changer would have been able to establish an obvious and recognizable link between his old and new names. For instance, Ying-ch'uan, in present-day Honan, is supposedly the place from which the ancestors of people named "Ch'en" came. As a result, it was a time-honored tradition for a Ch'en to be referred to, on some occasions, as a "Ying-ch'uan Ch'en." The same characters that make up "Ying-ch'uan" are pronounced "Eigawa" in Japanese, which happens to be a normal Japanese surname. Thus, it would make an ideal name change for a Taiwanese surnamed "Ch'en" to adopt "Eigawa" as his new Japanese surname,

<sup>72</sup> Mamiya Sadakichi, *Taiwan kaiseimei sōdan (kaiseimei ni tomonau: meigi kakukae shoshiki)* (privately published: Tainan, 1941), pp. 7–9.

<sup>73</sup> *TWNNSP*, February 11, 1940, p. 3; Taketa Hisao, *Ronsetsu bunrei kaiseimei tokuhon zenshū* (Taipei: Taiwan kaiseimei suishin kair, 1943), pp. 60–61.

thereby keeping his given name intact in the written form, although now pronounced in Japanese. Apparently the colonial authorities foresaw that, should such a practice be allowed, there would have been a strong tendency for Taiwanese to use place names indicating their geographical or ancestral origins as their new surnames. The prohibition against geographical names demonstrated some cultural discernment on the part of the authorities, for the effect was to prevent Taiwanese from expressing their Han Chinese identity through their name choices.

The Taiwanese response to the name-changing program was tardy at the outset. In April 1940 only twelve households were granted name changes in the first round (name-changing permits were granted monthly in the first year), and by the end of the year the total was 1,357.<sup>74</sup> The following year, however, witnessed a rapid increase. In January 1941, 2,014 Taiwanese households officially adopted new names, and by the end of the year name changers made up about 1 percent of the total population.<sup>75</sup> By the end of 1943, a total of 17,526 households comprising 126,211 individuals had adopted new names; that is, slightly more than 2 percent of the total population.<sup>76</sup> On January 24, 1944, the Government-General relaxed the requirements, and this led to a surge in name changes.<sup>77</sup> From then on the figures grow sparse, and it is difficult to estimate the final number of Taiwanese who officially adopted Japanese names. But from one source, at least, we may infer that perhaps about 7 percent of the population had adopted Japanese names when the war came to an end in August 1945.<sup>78</sup>

Reviewing the rare lists of name changers, one finds that there were hardly any violations of the four guidelines regarding improper names. Nonetheless, it is easy to detect some conspicuous patterns in new name choices. The new surnames were quite often related to the original family names in one way or another. Just to give a few examples, a person surnamed Huang would prefer a new Japanese surname like Tomota, for Tomota is no more than the single character *huang* dissected

<sup>74</sup> Mamiya, *Kaiseimei sōdan*, p. 160. For the list of name changers, see pp. 161–252.

<sup>75</sup> *TWNNSP*, February 11, 1941 (evening ed.), p. 2; Suzuki Takashi, "Senjika no shokuminchi," in *Iwanami kōza Nihon rekishi* 21, no. 8 (1977): 243.

<sup>76</sup> *KNSB*, January 24, 1944 (evening ed.), p. 2.

<sup>77</sup> For instance, Japanese proficiency requirement was lifted for children and the elderly. Also, families whose member(s) served in the military, government, or public organizations were automatically eligible for name changes. See *KNSB*, January 24, 1944 (evening ed.), p. 2.

<sup>78</sup> A local gazetteer compiled by Taipei County records that among its population of 519,498, 37,742, or over 7 percent, had their Chinese names restored after the war. My inference is based on the assumption that Taipei's percentage was representative. See *T'ai-pei hsien-chih* (repr. Taipei: Ch'eng-wen ch'u-pan she, 1972), *chüan* 4, p. 1663.

into two characters, *kung* and *t'ien*.<sup>79</sup> Another preferred pattern was to choose a Japanese surname whose characters made up the old surname or part of it, such as Lin-Kobayashi/Nagabayashi, Lü-Miyagawa, and Chang-Hasegawa.<sup>80</sup> The connections are visually detectable. Other patterns show a more subtle link between old names and new ones.<sup>81</sup>

As pointed out previously, the name-changing program in Taiwan was not compulsory, but evidence shows that some public figures were subject to pressure to endorse it by adopting Japanese names.<sup>82</sup> The postwar official historical view that Taiwanese were “forced” to have their Chinese names changed to Japanese ones is an overstatement, though not entirely incorrect.<sup>83</sup>

In Korea, the name-changing program was by nature mandatory. The Korean program was called *sōshi kaimei*, which betrays its basic difference from the *kaiseimei* program in Taiwan. *Kaiseimei* literally means to “change one’s surname and given name.” *Sōshi kaimei*, on the other hand, means to “create family names and change one’s given name.” Here lies the ostensible reason why the colonial government in Korea imposed the name-changing program upon Koreans. As is widely known, Koreans have relatively few surnames—a total of 250 in 1930 for a population of more than twenty million.<sup>84</sup> In order to justify their demand that Koreans change their names, the Japanese colonizers were at pains to argue that the 250 Korean surnames were *sei* (clan names) rather than *shi* (family names). This, the authorities reasoned, was because Koreans had not yet developed a “modern family system”:<sup>85</sup> and hence, family names had to be created. In terms of etymology, the distinction between *sei* and *shi* is not completely incorrect. Yet to say that because Koreans did not have family names in the strict sense, they must therefore adopt Japanese ones, was conspicuously manipulative in this particular historical situation.

To illustrate their arguments, the Japanese colonizers presented to Koreans an analysis of Japanese naming customs in terms of the *sei-shi*

<sup>79</sup> In the first round of *kaiseimei*, a Taiwanese named Huang Ch'i-shih adopted a new Japanese name, Tomota Shigeyoshi. See *TWNNSP*, April 14, 1940, p. 2.

<sup>80</sup> *Ibid.*, January 25, 1941, p. 3; Mamiya, *Kaiseimei sōdan*, p. 170; Chung I-jen, *Hsin-suan liu-shih-nien* (Taipei: Tzu-yu shih-tai ch'u-pan she, 1988), pp. 236–37.

<sup>81</sup> Common name-change patterns include what I would call the “anagram pattern,” the “component pattern,” the “enclosure pattern” and the “synonym pattern.” See Chou, “The *Kōminka* Movement,” pp. 135–37.

<sup>82</sup> For example, see Yeh Jung-chung, *Lin Hsien-t'ang hsien-sheng chi-nien-chi* (Taichung: Lin Hsien-t'ang hsien-sheng chi-nien-chi pien-chi wei-yüan-hui, 1960), p. 69.

<sup>83</sup> *TWSTCK*, *chūan* 1b, vol. 2, p. 38.

<sup>84</sup> See Chōsen Sōtokufu, *Chōsen no sei* (Seoul, 1934), p. 1. Kim, Yi, Pak and Ch'oe, in that order, were the most common surnames.

<sup>85</sup> Mitarai, *Minami sōtoku*, p. 22.

distinction. In Japan, Minamoto, Taira, Fuji, and Tachibana are *sei* or clan names, while Konoe, Kokura, Minami, etc., are *shi* or family names. Konoe Fumimaro, then prime minister, who came from an illustrious family, was brought in as an elucidative example. Fujiwara was Konoe Fumimaro's *sei*, emblematic of his clan, while Konoe was his *shi*, representing his family. In other words, adopting new, though Japanese-style, family names did not mean that Koreans were to discard their clan names. On the contrary, name changing was meant to help "modernize" the Korean family system.<sup>86</sup>

The name-changing program began in Korea on February 11, 1940, and allowed the population six months to change their Korean *sei* to Japanese *shi*. According to the new laws, those who failed to register new surnames when the registration period ended would find that their former *sei* automatically become their new *shi*. In his autobiographical work *Lost Names*, Richard E. Kim vividly recounts how ruthlessly the local authorities carried out the name-changing program in his home town. As a fourth-grader, on the morning of February 11 he braved a bitter snow storm on his way to school, only to have his teacher tell him to go home and not report back until he had acquired a Japanese name. Left with little choice, Kim's father, a highly respected anti-Japanese intellectual, went to the police station to register a new name; so did many other parents. Kim's father and some of his friends dressed in traditional Korean attire and wore black armbands. After they registered their new names, they all went to the village cemetery to mourn over the loss of their old names with their ancestors. "By twelve o'clock," writes Kim, "all the children in our class have new names."<sup>87</sup> We should note that similar measures of compulsion did not occur in Taiwan.

Governor General Minami Jirō once said, "It goes without saying that the revision of these [household registration] laws is not one that of its nature forces the general public on the peninsula [i.e., Koreans] to adopt Japanese *shi*."<sup>88</sup> The laws indeed did not specify that the new names should be Japanese ones. Thus, theoretically, a Korean could just adopt his clan name as his new family name. Nonetheless, in reality, a Japanese new name was almost unavoidable. Richard Kim's description of how the Koreans reacted to the name-changing program also tells us that no matter how hard the colonial government tried to make Koreans believe that the program only "created" new family names and did not do away with their clan names, for Koreans it was unmistak-

<sup>86</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 23.

<sup>87</sup> Kim, *Lost Names*, pp. 99–106.

<sup>88</sup> Zenshō Eisuke, *Chōsen no seishi to dōzoku buraku* (Tokyo: Tōkyō shoin, 1943), p. 32.

ably a program that aimed at making them give up their Korean names and adopt Japanese ones. Despite official rhetoric, they simply “lost their names.”

The Korean name-changing program was very much of a coercive nature. According to official estimates, by August 11, 1940, more than 3.17 million households had new family names; this number was 75 percent or so of the total households. Late registrants were said to be continuing to pour in.<sup>89</sup> Those Koreans who refused to change their names, or failed to do so on time, were discriminated against in various ways. For instance, their children were denied entrance to school and advancement in higher education, and they themselves were deprived of job opportunities or demoted to less important positions.<sup>90</sup> Korean school faculty and staff members who did not adopt Japanese names are said to have been dismissed from their positions.<sup>91</sup> However, how consistent was this punitive policy remains to be examined.

In contrast to the policy in Taiwan, however, the Korean Government-General did not prohibit Koreans from adopting new surnames that indicated their geographical or ancestral origins. On the contrary, many Koreans adopted new names in the Japanese fashion that bore easily discernible connections with their ancestral places. For instance, Koreans surnamed “Pak” had a predilection for adopting “Takamura” as their new surname for the good reason that the two Chinese characters that make up “Takamura” can be an abbreviation of the three that stand for Kō Hō Ch’ōn, the place from which their supposed ancestor, Hyōkkōse, originated. Similarly, Koreans surnamed Yun favored Sakahira, Suzuhira, Suzuhara, or Hiranuma as their new Japanese surnames, because the ancestors of the Yuns supposedly came from Lake Yong Tōk at the foot of P’a Pyōng Mountain (Sakahira in Japanese) in P’a Chu, formerly known as Yōng pyōng Mountain and Yōng wōn (Suzuhira and Suzuhara, respectively). The characters making “Hiranuma” mean “flat marshes,” reminiscent of P’a Pyōng (“flat hills”), making the surname a good one for Yuns. Apart from making obvious connections with ancestral places, the Koreans, like their Taiwanese counterparts, showed a marked preference for new names that bore visually recognizable associations with their former names. Such a preference is exemplified in name-changing patterns such as Pak-Kiboku, Ch’oe-Yamayoshi, and Hwang-Tomota: in these cases, the character of a Korean surname is di-

<sup>89</sup> *Chōsen jijō* (1941), p. 214. By the end of 1941, the percentage went up to 8.15. See *Atarashiki Chōsen*, p. 78.

<sup>90</sup> See *Chōsen Minshushugi jinmin kyōwakoku shakai kagakuin rekishi kenkyūsho kindaiishi kenkyūshitsu*, *Nippon teikokushugi tōchika no Chōsen*, trans. Kim Yu-hyon (Tokyo: Chōsen seinen sha, 1978), p. 218.

<sup>91</sup> Ko, *Kōnichi genron tōsōshi*, p. 281.

vided into two characters, which are then given their Japanese pronunciation. Phonetic similarity was also popular, as reflected in the patterns of Ch'oe-Sai, Yu-Umori, Kwak-Kaku, Han-Kanda, etc.<sup>92</sup>

In many cases, the precise meaning of a new name was perhaps only clear to the name changer; indeed, a name-changer might use his new name to make a hidden protest. For instance, Richard Kim's father adopted the name Iwamoto, a choice that the authorities regarded as suitable because the Kims were living by a rocky mountain, and *iwamoto* means "foundation of rock." However, the real reason Kim, a Presbyterian, chose this surname was that it echoed the words of Jesus: "On this rock I will build my church."<sup>93</sup> A solemn expression of resistance! Some Koreans, however, unequivocally expressed their protest in their new names. For instance, a Korean named Chŏn Pyŏng-ha adopted a new name pronounced "*tennō heika*," exactly in the way Japanese address their supposedly divinely descended and hence inviolable emperor. Laughable though the name seems, it was a choice that could not have been more blasphemous in the eyes of the Japanese colonizers. There were also cases where Koreans sacrificed their lives to keep their names.<sup>94</sup>

Despite the fact that the name-changing programs in Taiwan and in Korea both served the same goal of transforming the colonial peoples into "true Japanese," the respective colonial governments adopted very different methods in carrying out this program. In general, the name-changing program in Taiwan was more incentive-based and less coercive than that in Korea. The difference between the Taiwanese and the Korean name-changing programs tends to substantiate the commonly held view that Japanese rule in Korea was harsher, whereas in Taiwan it was more benign. Moreover, the Taiwanese and Korean responses to the name-changing program also attest to the essential differences in their respective relationships with the colonial ruler: the Taiwanese relationship with the colonizers was more conciliatory, while the Korean one was more confrontational.

#### THE MILITARY VOLUNTEER PROGRAM

Before the war Taiwanese and Koreans were not liable to military service. Nonetheless, with a population of about 24 million, Korea had long been regarded as a major reserve of human resources. Ever since 1932, one year after the Manchurian Incident took place, the Chōsen

<sup>92</sup> Shini Hiroshi, "Sōshi mondō," pt. 2, *Keijō nippō*, August 20, 1941 (evening ed.), p. 3.

<sup>93</sup> Kim, *Lost Names*, pp. 105–6.

<sup>94</sup> Suzuki, "Senjika no shokuminchi," p. 241.



Army (Japanese troops stationed in Korea) had been seriously considering the possibility of involving Koreans in the military. In June 1937, one month before the Marco Polo Bridge Incident, the Army Ministry asked the Chōsen Army to offer its suggestions concerning the recruitment of Koreans for military service. In response, the Chōsen Army submitted on July 2 a document entitled “Opinions Concerning the Korean Volunteer System,” which suggested that an experimental volunteer system be set up for young Koreans.<sup>95</sup>

On February 22, 1938, the “Laws concerning Army Special Volunteers” were promulgated, which established what was commonly known as the Volunteer System (*shiganhei seido*). According to these regulations, young Koreans of age seventeen or older could apply to be army volunteers, provided that they met certain requirements. To be qualified for the volunteer program, one needed to be 160 cm in height, receive an A classification in an army physical examination, have an elementary school education or its equivalent, have no criminal or prison record, and also satisfy other requirements.<sup>96</sup> An aspirant had to submit application forms, a physical examination, and other required documents to the police station in the area in which his household was registered. After careful screening at several administrative levels, those who were chosen for further consideration were asked to take both oral and written tests. The written test topics consisted of the “national language,” “national history,” and arithmetic; the oral test focused on aspirants’ “thought, attitudes, and language” with special attention to their proficiency in Japanese.<sup>97</sup> Koreans who were put on the final list entered “the Army volunteers training camp” for six months of military training, and then joined the Army.<sup>98</sup>

Applications for the volunteer program were reported to have poured in in overwhelming numbers, enabling the Government General of Korea to boast of the great enthusiasm among young Koreans for this program. Table 2.2 compares the total numbers of applicants to those of successful applicants for each year between 1938 and 1943. The first group of volunteers was sent to the front in northern China as early as the summer of 1939.

In August 1943, the Government-General took a further step, and implemented the “Navy Special Volunteer System.” It was reported that within a month or so after recruitment began, about ninety thousand Koreans applied for the new program.<sup>99</sup> Both the army and the

<sup>95</sup> Miyata, “*Kōminka*” *seisaku*, pp. 51–52.

<sup>96</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 58.

<sup>97</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 59–60.

<sup>98</sup> *Chōsen Sōtokufu shisei nempō (1941)*, p. 158.

<sup>99</sup> Kondō, *Chōsen oyobi Taiwan*, pp. 34–35.

TABLE 2.2  
Number of Korean Military Volunteer Applicants and Those Chosen

Year	Applicants	Successful Applicants
1938	2,946	406
1939	12,348	613
1940	84,443	3,060
1941	44,743	3,208
1942	254,273	4,077
1943	303,294	6,300

Source: Kondō Ken'ichi, ed., *Taihei'yō senka no Chōsen oyobi Taiwan* (Chigasaki: Chōsen shiryō kenkyū kai, 1961), p. 33.

navy volunteer programs were abolished in 1944 when general conscription was introduced. Back in 1937 when the volunteer program was only under consideration, general conscription had been considered something only achievable in future decades.<sup>100</sup> But the practical and urgent need to mobilize Korean human resources for the war effort meant that the conscription system had to be implemented much earlier than anticipated.

In Taiwan, a similar army volunteer program was introduced in 1942. Actually, as early as the fall of 1937, the colonial authorities had already begun recruiting Taiwanese as supply carriers for the military.<sup>101</sup> As Japan's invasion of China intensified and expanded, Taiwanese were also recruited as interpreters of Fukienese, Cantonese, and Mandarin.<sup>102</sup> During the war, the number of Taiwanese supply troops and interpreters was kept secret from the general public, and therefore it is hard to know the total number of recruits.

What I have called the "blood plea" (*kessho*) mania during the volunteer recruitment campaign is worthy of mention. Early in the recruitment of military porters, it was reported that some young men had sent in their application forms each with an attachment written in their own blood pleading for the honor of serving in the military.<sup>103</sup> The first documented "blood plea," dated December 14, 1937, reads: "Long live the Emperor. I am a man of Japan. I possess the spirit of Great Japan. No matter how difficult the task might be, if it is for the sake of His Imperial Majesty as well as for that of our nation, I will not regard it to be

<sup>100</sup> Miyata, "*Kōminka*" *seisaku*, pp. 52–53.

<sup>101</sup> See Cheng Ch'un-ho, "Wasurerareta Nipponhei," in *Tsuisō* (Newsletter of the Taiwan Southern Star Reunion Association; Taipei, 1988), p. 50.

<sup>102</sup> Shirai Asakichi and Ema Tsunekichi, *Kōminka undō* (Taipei: Tō Taiwan shimbō sha, 1939), p. 167.

<sup>103</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 157, 166, 335.

difficult. Please take me as a supply carrier.”<sup>104</sup> Accompanying this “blood plea” was a rising-sun flag drawn in blood. (Since the national flag simply features a red sun on a white square field, it was comparatively easy to draw on a white handkerchief with blood from a finger.) Written on both sides of the red sun were the slogans: “Long live His Imperial Majesty!” and “Long live the Imperial Military!”<sup>105</sup> The rising sun drawn in blood and accompanied by short slogans became the typical pattern of later “blood pleas.”

This act of writing a “blood plea” was to be repeated on a much larger scale in 1941 when Taiwanese were informed that the “Army Volunteer System” would be implemented in the following year. From this time onward it became the fashion for Taiwanese youth to demonstrate their patriotism—a fashion that lasted perhaps until the very end of colonial rule. Evidence is insufficient for us to determine whether the first Taiwanese youth who submitted a “blood plea” did so on his own initiative, or whether the act was suggested by the authorities. I believe the latter alternative is more likely in view of the fact that the same phenomenon was also prevalent in Korea.<sup>106</sup> The former president of South Korea, Park Chung Hee, was said to have written a “blood plea” in his youth. Also, we must not lose sight to the fact that the “blood plea” practice was widespread in Japan proper during wartime. War mobilization in the two colonies was in many aspects an extension of that in the mother country.

The Taiwanese response to the army volunteer program appears to have been more impressive than the Korean response in terms of the ratio of applicants to the population. In 1942, 425,921 Taiwanese, or 14 percent of the male population, turned in applications for one thousand or so volunteer slots.<sup>107</sup> The second round of the army volunteer program had even more applications—601,147 applicants for the same number of slots.<sup>108</sup> Certainly, there were “fake applicants” who applied with the full knowledge that they could not possibly be accepted as volunteers because of old age or poor health. A certain degree of cynicism seems to have lurked in this seemingly genuine patriotic movement.

<sup>104</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 334–35. In Japanese, the “blood plea” reads: “*Tennō heika banzai. Watashi wa Nippon no otoko desu. Yamato damashi ga arimasu, donna kurushi koto demo, Tennō heika no tame, kuni no tame nara, kurushi to wa omoimasen. Gunpu ni shite kudasai.*”

<sup>105</sup> Takeuchi Kiyoshi, *Jihen to Taiwanjin* (Tokyo: Nichiman shinkō bunka kyōkai, 1940), picture pages, unnumbered.

<sup>106</sup> Miyata, “*Kōminka*” *seisaku*, p. 79.

<sup>107</sup> KNSB, June 10, 1942, p. 2. The male population at that time in Taiwan was about 3 million. See *Taiwan tōsei yōran* (Taipei, 1945), p. 23.

<sup>108</sup> KNSB, February 13, 1943 (evening ed.), p. 2.

In 1943, navy volunteer systems were simultaneously implemented in Taiwan and in Korea. In Taiwan's first round of applications, 316,097 men applied for roughly three thousand training slots.<sup>109</sup> As general conscription was expected soon to be put into effect in Taiwan, the "Navy Volunteer System" was abolished in late 1944, as was the "Army Volunteer System" in 1945. Up to this point, about 16,500 Taiwanese youth had gone to war—5,500 or so as army volunteers, and 11,000 or so as navy volunteers.<sup>110</sup> General conscription was implemented in April 1945. When the war finally ended in August 1945, the number of Taiwanese who had been recruited into the military totalled 207,183, including soldiers and civilian employees. Of these, 30,304 died in service.<sup>111</sup>

One may ask why so many young Taiwanese and Koreans responded to the call for military service. A commonly held view asserts that young people were forced to apply; such a view is to some extent valid. Nevertheless, to categorically deny the existence of genuine volunteers will prevent us from probing the psychological effects of the *kōminka* movement on Taiwanese and Korean youth. Aside from coercion, there are several factors that might have contributed to young men's apparent enthusiasm. First, the colonial authorities blatantly promoted these programs in highly moral tones. In news media, military service was depicted as the highest honor bestowed upon colonial subjects. Along with compulsory education and taxpaying, it was one of the citizens' "three great obligations" (*sandai gimu*), and the one that colonial subjects had not yet been called on to fulfill.<sup>112</sup> The colonizer even drew an analogy between taxpaying and military service, calling the latter the "blood tax."<sup>113</sup> The implementation of the "Army Volunteer System" in Taiwan was hailed as "the islanders' highest honor" (*tōmin no saikō eiyo*), or "the supreme glory" (*mujō no kōei*).<sup>114</sup> The same high-sounding language was echoed in Korea.<sup>115</sup>

Second, local authorities used various channels to mobilize young men for these programs. One source reveals that in a district meeting in Keijō (Seoul), it was decided that for the purpose of promoting the

<sup>109</sup> Ibid., July 23, 1943 (evening ed.), p. 2; September 22, 1943, p. 2; Taiwan Sōtokufu, *Shōwa nijūnen Taiwan tōchi gaiyō* (Taipei, 1945), p. 73.

<sup>110</sup> Ibid., p. 72.

<sup>111</sup> See Yang Pi-ch'uan, ed., *T'ai-wan li-shih nien-piao* (Taipei: Tzu-li wan-pao ch'u-pan bu, 1983), p. 187.

<sup>112</sup> *Goen*, 34, no. 7 (July 1942), p. 43; *TWKSJH*, no. 317 (April 1942), p. 12.

<sup>113</sup> Miyata, "*Kōminka*" *seisaku*, p. 107.

<sup>114</sup> *KNSB*, July 8, 1941, p. 4; July 9, 1941 (evening ed.), p. 2; July 3, 1941, p. 2; July 9, 1941 (evening ed.), p. 2.

<sup>115</sup> Miyata, "*Kōminka*" *seisaku*, p. 107.

volunteer program, town representatives were to visit the family of every elementary-school graduate in the area under their charge. Principals of elementary schools were to appeal to the Youth Corps—organizations set up in 1920s with the function of a continuing education program and the purpose of cultivating in elementary-school graduates the qualities of loyal and good subjects<sup>116</sup>—attached to their schools. High-school principals were to persuade their graduates to apply for the volunteer program.<sup>117</sup> In the case of Taiwan, although I have not come across direct sources detailing how the authorities mobilized young Taiwanese for the volunteer program, circumstantial evidence shows that the Youth Corps were the main organizations through which the authorities mobilized young Taiwanese. During the *kōminka* era the Youth Corps for men and women alike seem to have been readily at the disposal of the authorities for the *kōminka* programs.

In addition, peer pressure seems to have played an important role in young people's "volunteer fever," for example in the writing of "blood pleas." But writing a "blood plea" seems also to have assumed a life of its own, signifying a heroic and romantic act of patriotism among young people, including young girls. Women were not recruited into the fighting forces, but they could be directly involved in the war effort by becoming nurses. Many young women responded to official recruitment campaigns for wartime nursing assistants in more or less the same fashion as their male counterparts did to the volunteer program. A young girl in Taiwan likened wartime nursing assistants to "female military volunteers."<sup>118</sup> It was also not uncommon for young girls to send in "blood pleas" expressing their deep desire to go to the front as nurses.<sup>119</sup> The impact of these officially praised "heroic young people" upon their peers is, of course, difficult to measure in precise terms, but the influence appears to be rather significant.

Finally, to some young men pride was at stake in the colonial subjects' response to the volunteer program. The military was an arena where one could truly compete with ethnic Japanese and prove the high qualities of one's race, or even its superiority to that of the Japanese. This explains why some proud Koreans were determined to be "more Japanese than a Japanese" (*Nipponjin ijō Nipponjin*).<sup>120</sup> Nor is it surprising that Taiwanese veterans took great pride in remembering that their perfor-

<sup>116</sup> Taiwan Sōtokufu, *Taiwan jijō* (1936), pp. 203–4.

<sup>117</sup> *Keijō nippō*, November 6, 1941, p. 4.

<sup>118</sup> *KNSB*, March 20, 1942 (evening ed.), p. 2.

<sup>119</sup> *TWKSJH*, no. 310 (September 1941), "Hontō jiji nisshi"; *TTWSP*, February 7, 1942, p. 2.

<sup>120</sup> Miyata, "*Kōminka*" *seisaku*, p. 79.

mance had equaled, if not exceeded, that of Japanese servicemen.<sup>121</sup> Thus, ironically and paradoxically, even if the colonial governments could make a young person act as a Japanese, that youth's earnest wishes to behave like a "true Japanese" might still come from a deep sense of pride in his or her ethnic origins as well as the will to compete with the ruling race.

## CONCLUSION

From the comparisons presented in the previous sections, one might easily get the impression that the measures adopted by the colonial government in Taiwan in carrying out the *kōminka* movement were more benign than those in Korea. In terms of response, the way Taiwanese responded to each *kōminka* program varied. In general, religious reforms met the coldest reception; the name-changing program was also unpopular among Taiwanese, at least in the beginning. With regard to the "national language" movement, the rapid growth of the population of "national language speakers" during the *kōminka* era seems to suggest a certain degree of success. Finally, the volunteer program, targeted at young people, seems to have aroused enthusiasm among them.

Korean response to each of the *kōminka* programs largely followed the same pattern, but the Koreans often showed more resistance and less compliance than the Taiwanese in each case. Scholars in the field of Japanese colonial history have long noticed that the colonial experiences of Taiwan and Korea differed in that the interactions between the ruler and the ruled in Korea were much more violent and stormy than those in Taiwan. The study of the *kōminka* movement helps substantiate this impression.

The study of the *kōminka* movement also leads us to ponder its impact upon historical developments in postcolonial Taiwan and Korea. There is no doubt that the *kōminka* movement was imposed by the Japanese colonizers upon their colonial subjects and that most colonial subjects passively complied with it. Nonetheless, Japan's attempts to instill loyalties among its colonial subjects were not without their successes, and this wartime Japanization movement had a particularly strong influence on the Taiwanese and the Koreans who spent their formative years in the *kōminka* era. As is often true of many political campaigns in modern times, youth is perhaps more receptive to political indoctrination than other age groups. Miyata Setsuko points out in the

<sup>121</sup> For example, see Ch'en Yung-tai, "Fukuin shite yonjūni shūnen . . . no kaikō," *Tsuisō*, p. 21; Ch'en Fen-hsiang, "Kako no tsuisō," *Ibid.*, p. 40.

preface to her book on the Korean *kōminka* policy that some of her Korean friends of the *kōminka* generation, when drunk, sing nothing but Japanese military songs, and on suitable occasions they can still recite the “Imperial Rescript on Education,” “Admonitions on the Battlefield,” the names of Japanese emperors, and similar fragments of remembered propaganda.<sup>122</sup> It is no surprise that a Taiwanese veteran would still consider that he was once a Japanese and would be more than ready to sing Japanese military songs for an interviewer.<sup>123</sup> One should note that Miyata’s friends are Korean expatriates who continued to live in Japan after the war ended, and it is understandable that the influence of the *kōminka* movement upon them should remain intact. Conversely, Koreans in Korea proper, having finally regained independence, seem to have long eradicated a great part, if not all, of the imprint the *kōminka* movement left on their lives.

The impact of the *kōminka* movement upon Taiwanese, however, took a different turn. I suspect that the *kōminka* movement, though it failed to convert Taiwanese into true Japanese, did cause some confusion of national identity among Taiwanese, particularly the younger generation. In other words, the *kōminka* movement may not have succeeded in turning Taiwanese into Japanese, but it may have succeeded in making them less Chinese, more easily alienated from a Chinese government that not only failed to live up to their expectations but also disheartened them by various acts of misconduct and bloody repression.<sup>124</sup>

In summary, the *kōminka* movements in Taiwan and in Korea seem to have shared very similar features, but if the movements are examined closely, the similarities are only surface-deep. Not only did the two colonial governments adopt very different approaches to their respective *kōminka* movements, but also the responses of Taiwanese and Koreans differed significantly. In the postcolonial era, the impact of these movements also precipitated very divergent historical developments in Taiwan and Korea; their respective histories can only be properly understood if the influence of the *kōminka* movement is appreciated—an area that, of course, awaits more research.

<sup>122</sup> Miyata, “*Kōminka*” *seisaku*, p. 2.

<sup>123</sup> See Usui Kazumitsu, *Shōson* (Osaka: Kōbō U, 1987), pp. 4–5. Furthermore, in an interview I conducted with Chang Tzu-ching, a Taiwanese World War II veteran, Chang offered to sing Japanese military songs for me.

<sup>124</sup> Certainly, the best-known and most serious conflict between Taiwanese and the Nationalist government in the postwar period was the February 28 Incident of 1947. For a recent study, see Lai Tse-han, Ramon H. Myers, and Wei Wou, *A Tragic Beginning: The Taiwan Uprising of February 28, 1947* (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1991).