THE DIGNITY OF NATIONS

Equality, Competition, and Honor in East Asian Nationalism

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Between Heimat and Nation: Japanese Colonial Education and the Origins of "Taiwanese Consciousness"

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Introduction

China's President Jiang Zemin once invited Lee Teng-hui to visit Beijing as "Chairman of the Kuomintang." In his other capacity as President of Taiwan, Mr Lee declined the invitation. He would only go, he insisted, "on condition of complete equality." By insisting on equality as a precondition for face-to-face meetings, Mr Lee was referring not to the equal claims of the two Presidents to lead the Chinese nation. President Lee had long conceded that ground. He was referring instead to the formal equality of sovereign states manifest in the persons of their Presidents. By insisting on "complete equality" President Lee sought unconditional recognition of Taiwan's equality with the People's Republic of China as a sovereign state. Anything less would have been an affront to the dignity of the people of Taiwan. "We must," as he put it, "have full dignity." He would travel to Beijing as President Lee or not at all.[1]

Claims for "complete equality" and "full dignity" became the irreducible desiderata of Taiwan's claim for recognition as a political community in the 1990s. President Lee himself oversaw the transition from the Nationalists' long-standing claim to governing all of China to the more radical claim of Taiwan's equal sovereignty with China. This was not merely a matter of shifting identity politics. To be sure, significant changes in the self-identification of the Taiwanese electorate were closely charted in opinion polls through the 1990s, most of them highlighting a diminishing trend in popular

identification with China. More significantly, Taiwan emerged over this period as a discrete political subject in its own right. President Lee's insistence on "complete equality" and "full dignity" in Taiwan's relations with China draw attention to the crystalization of such identity claims around a hard assertion of equal and autonomous subjectivity. People living in Taiwan had become the people *of* Taiwan (*Taiwanren*).

How did the people of Taiwan come to see themselves as "the people of Taiwan?" And how did they come to form a sentimental attachment to their *heimat*, or homeland, as the foundation for a territorial claim to equal sovereignty? Drawing on analysis of school textbooks used in colonial Taiwan and extensive interviews with Taiwanese people born under Japanese rule, I argue in this chapter that the education system introduced during the Japanese colonial period (1895–1945) was instrumental in creating an awareness of Taiwanese community, and in welding this awareness to a sense of a homeland bounded by the mountains, bays, and rivers of the Island of Taiwan. Further, I mount a case that the education policies pursued by the Nationalist administration in the 1950s and 1960s exacerbated indigenous patriotism by dishonoring an earlier generation as "slaves" of the Japanese.

Many honorable people resented being branded "slaves." They nurtured an alternative vision of life in Taiwan under Japanese occupation that subverted what their children were being taught in Nationalist schools. Their vision was a constituent element of what has since come to be known as "Taiwanese consciousness."

Taiwanese consciousness (*Taiwan yishi*) refers to a keen awareness among residents of Taiwan today that they are "Taiwanese" in ways distinct from being "Chinese," especially in terms of political identity.[2] In its sharpest forms — as ethnically and/or culturally distinct from Chinese (*zhongguoren*) — it amounts to a sense of national identity. Yet many possessing "Taiwanese consciousness" do not actively assert that Taiwan is a "nation" separate from the Chinese nation. Along the spectrum of national consciousness in Taiwan at this moment, people acknowledging outright Chinese national identity and those asserting outright Taiwanese national identity occupy two opposite extremes, while those in the middle make up the major part of the population.[3] Taiwanese consciousness nevertheless has an inclination to evolve into "national identity." It is a loose and inclusive term. Its ambiguity hints at the complexity of the issue of national identity in Taiwan. In its original form, in the colonial period, Taiwanese consciousness was born in opposition to the notion of Japanese identity, not Chinese.

A Compressed Process of Modernization and Colonization

We can usefully employ "the notion of generations" to divide Taiwanese who were socially active in the colonial period into three generations. This approach is based on personal observations and further inspired by the work of H. Stuart Hughes. In *Consciousness and Society*, Hughes describes his subject as "the generation of the 1890s." He quotes Marc Bloch to the effect that the notion of one generation in history "is very elastic," and yet "corresponds to realities which we feel to be very concrete." Obviously all generations overlap, and all are somewhat arbitrarily defined. At the same time, however, distinct generations tend to shape their own definitions through common experiences.[4] I too find the notion of generation very helpful in grasping the impact of drastic changes upon Taiwanese in the colonial period.

The first generation were Taiwanese who had reached adolescence in 1895 when the Chinese government ceded Taiwan to Japan. The educated elite among this generation had a classical Chinese schooling and many held strong attachments towards Chinese culture, if not loyalty to the Qing. The middle generation mainly refers to those who were born around 1895. They came to the world early enough to have some idea of the Chinese ancestral land; many of those educated in this generation still mastered to some degree the written Chinese language (*hanwen* or *kanbun*), in addition to the Japanese language learned in school. Most opinion leaders and activists in the 1920s and 1930s came from this generation. The wartime generation of the educated Taiwanese elite were typically aged between 15 and 25 when the war ended in 1945. They obtained a thoroughly Japanese education in Taiwan. These three generations had very different collective experiences under Japanese rule. To relate a long and complex story in a concise way, I divide colonial Taiwan into three periods as follows: the pacification period of 1895–1915, the placid time of 1916–1936, and the wartime era of 1937–1945.

Military suppression, the laying of foundations for colonial rule, and a variety of "modernization" projects, characterize the first period. Japan acquired Taiwan through a peace treaty at the conclusion of the first China–Japan war, but occupied it only after arduous military campaigns. More than four months passed before Japanese troops were able to push down from Taipei to the Tainan area and consolidate an island-wide takeover. The anti-Japanese fighting forces consisted of Qing troops, local militias, and ordinary people. Qing troops were under the leadership of Qing officials who fought on despite an imperial order to withdraw. A fine study has shown that quite a few local leaders of the resistance were from the "lower-gentry class." Most members of the upper gentry and wealthy merchants fled to the mainland.[5]

At this historical juncture, the western half of Taiwan had but recently emerged from the circumstance of being an immigrant society of Han Chinese existing on the fringe of China's territory.[6] When looking closely at the armed struggle undertaken by residents on Taiwan, one can discern different mentalities at work. Many fought to protect a homeland narrowly defined as their local community, and lacked a wider vision of Taiwan as a whole. People from a village would frequently attack Japanese forces while others welcomed them.[7] Some raised flags welcoming "the Meiji King."[8] The actions of these villagers were a far cry from those of modern nationalists. Among the lower gentry, however, we find a clearer sense of political and cultural loyalty to the Qing. Generally speaking, it would not be incorrect to say that, at the time of Japan's takeover, Han people in Taiwan lacked either a national identity (in the modern sense) or a strong sense of the island as an entity.

Unconnected armed struggles against Japanese rule lasted until 1902, resulting in thousands of deaths. From 1902 onward, the anti-Japanese movements went underground. In 1915, an uprising plotted by Yu Qingfang and two other leaders was uncovered on the outskirts of Tainan. The Tainan provisional court utilized the so-called "Ordinances concerning Punishment of Bandits" and sentenced 866 of the 1957 defendants to death. Although the Governor-General of Taiwan later commuted all of the sentences by a special pardon, 95 were executed nevertheless. This event is known as the Xilaian or Jiaoba'nian Incident, and marks the end of armed anti-Japanese activities on the part of Han Taiwanese.[9]

While the Japanese army and police force were kept busy suppressing anti-Japanese endeavors, the colonial government set out to create an institutional framework that would facilitate Japanese rule on the island. It is widely recognized that the period 1898–1906 under the rule of Governor General Kodama Gentarô (1852–1906) and his administrator-in-chief Gotô Shimpei (1857–1929) were crucial for Japan's "successful" rule on the island. The reforms and policies adopted by the Kodama–Gotô administration were so radical as to be regarded by George H. Kerr as a "licensed revolution," in the sense that they entailed radical top-down reforms affecting village life.[10] Included among the Kodama–Gotô revolutionary projects, for example, were a thorough general land survey and the abolition of the dual land-tenure system that had been practised for more than 200 years.

By the 1920s, Japan could boast that it had turned a backward island into a model colony. Taiwan was indeed advanced by comparison with neighboring countries. Among the colonial government's contributions to Taiwan were a modern school system, a modern legal system, modern

banking, railroads, electricity, etc. One must not be distracted, however, by these modern accomplishments, from recognizing the inequitable nature of colonial rule.[11] Taiwanese were systematically discriminated against and suffered from unfair treatment in many respects. Most bitterly felt were the inequities in wages and education. In the workplace, for the same work, a Japanese was entitled to extra "hardship allowances" ranging from 50 to 60 percent of the salary. In education, although school-aged Taiwanese were encouraged to enroll in elementary school, they had fewer chances of entering high school and far fewer of entering university than their Japanese counterparts.[12] In addition, the police enjoyed more power than their counterparts in Japan proper, subjecting Taiwanese to the abuses of colonial authority in a number of ways.[13]

The 1920s witnessed vigorous political, social, and cultural movements led by prominent gentry from the first generation, and intellectuals with a modern education. A considerable number of activists had entered university in Japan proper. Their efforts included a push to establish a Taiwan parliament by way of petitions to the Diet — a movement that lasted 14 years (1921–1934) but came to naught.

Accompanying the petition campaigns, the Taiwan Association for Culture (*Taiwan wenhua xiehui*) came into existence in 1921, under the leadership of Jiang Weishui (1891–1931). Until its split in 1927, the Association organized various influential activities, including summer school programs and lectures on a broad range of subjects. Political and social thought in this period became polarized with the passage of time. The left became more and more militant, while the right grew ever more reticent and conciliatory towards Japan. Given the number of publications, organizations, and activities that flourished, one may say the 1920s were a golden era for Taiwanese dissidents.[14] In the early 1930s, Taiwanese activists began to feel the pressure from Japanese rightists and the military.

In late 1936, the colonial government in Taiwan launched a series of campaigns collectively known as the *kôminka* movement (literally meaning Make [the colonial peoples] His Majesty's subjects). On 7 July 1937 the Lugouqiao Incident occurred, marking the beginning of the Second Sino-Japanese War. The war had a direct impact on Taiwan, in that the colonial authorities carried out the *kôminka* movement with increased vigor. The ultimate goal of this movement was to Japanize the Taiwanese completely. To use the expression of that time, the aim was to make the colonial people become "real Japanese" (*shin no Nihonjin*). To this end, the movement included four major programs: (1) a national language campaign whose goal was to make all Taiwanese speak Japanese, (2) a name-changing program that

offered legal procedures for "qualified" Taiwanese to adopt Japanese-style names, (3) a drive encouraging Taiwanese youth to volunteer for the military, and (4) promotion of the Shinto religion and reforms of social customs. A movement of the same nature was carried out simultaneously in Korea.[15]

In essence, the movement proclaimed as its goal to make Japan and its colonial peoples "one nation." In the 1920s and early 1930s, the colonial authorities claimed that "assimilation" (*dôka*) was the cardinal guideline for its rule over Taiwanese. Yet the "assimilative policies" meant at best equality between Taiwanese and Japanese in a legal sense. The eighth Governor General, Den Kenjirô (1855–1930), was committed to the idea of "assimilation." Under his administration (1919–1923), Taiwanese children were allowed to enroll in elementary schools previously reserved for Japanese, and the organization of local governments was reorganized on the model of Japan proper.[16] From the time Japan set up schools on the island up to the period of "assimilation," Taiwanese children were taught that they were Japanese. This meant that they were subjects of the emperor (*tennô*), rather than that they were Japanese in an ethnic sense. Only in the final 8 years of Japanese rule were Taiwanese (and Koreans) urged to try to become indistinguishable from ethnic Japanese.

The *kôminka* movement succeeded to varying degrees in its projects.[17] As one might assume, the responses of Taiwanese towards the "becoming-Japanese" campaigns showed some differences along generational lines. The movement had a tremendous influence on Taiwanese youth. It is not unusual for those whose formative years were spent during the war to proclaim that they *were* Japanese.[18] The recruitment drive seemed to have succeeded in mobilizing young Taiwanese, men and women alike, to join the war effort for the sake of the emperor.

In the short period of fifty years, Taiwan experienced a compressed process of modernization. This process involved — in addition to economic development, scientific technology and Western-style political institutions — the establishment of a mass education system that was designed, ideally, to educate all school-aged children for the purpose of creating culturally homogenous, loyal, and well-trained subjects or citizens.[19] Japanese colonial education proved very effective in this regard. The mass education system, in contrast to the elite system that had prevailed before the colonial period, shaped a Taiwanese collective mentality, that came close to a form of national identity.

Modern Education and Its Impact on Taiwan in the Colonial Period

The coming of age of modern education in Taiwan

After the Meiji Restoration of 1867, Japan's ruling elite endeavored to bring "*bunmei kaika*" (civilization and enlightenment) to their country. *Bunmei kaika* had a meaning close to today's concept of modernization; new style education, therefore, was an important part of their efforts. They fashioned educational institutions after Western models, first English, then American, later mainly German. In the early Meiji era, many school textbooks were directly translated from Western works, including readers on ethical subjects (*shûshin*). By the time Japan took over Taiwan, its educational system had matured, and was under the supervision of the state. The textbooks for elementary schools nationwide began to be compiled and published by the Ministry of Education in 1903. These are discussed in greater detail below. Here we need only note that enthusiasm for education was a phenomenon that characterized Meiji Japan.

It therefore comes as no surprise that the famous educator Izawa Shûji (1851–1917) appeared, on 17 June 1896, at a ceremony held inside the city wall of Taipei by the first Governor-General of Taiwan, Kabayama Sukenori, to formally mark the commencement of Japanese rule. Izawa Shûji took charge of education and his views shaped the future development of colonial education in Taiwan. Those views can be summarized as follows: (1) popularize elementary education throughout the colony; (2) use Japanese as the educational language; and (3) make the assimilation of Taiwanese with Japanese the goal of education.[20] For the purpose of satisfying immediate needs, Izawa turned a temple at today's Shilin into a school to teach the Japanese language to Taiwanese, marking the beginning of Japanese colonial education.

In the early years of its rule, the colonial government set up several schools devoted to teaching Taiwanese students the "national language" (Japanese). On 16 August 1898, the government proclaimed regulations concerning "common schools for Taiwanese" (*kôgakkô*), elementary schools exclusively for Taiwanese. By 1 October of that year, 55 schools had been set up island-wide, with more to appear year by year. The policy of the colonial government was to make elementary education universally available to school-age children. That was not an easy task. First, the government faced competition from Chinese schools, categorized by Japanese as *shobô* (*shufang* in Mandarin).[21] Taiwanese who could afford to educate their children (mainly male) preferred the familiar *shobô* to modern schools, where the teachers were

Japanese and the curriculum alien. It took many years, and considerable political pressure, before elementary schools gained the upper hand over *shobô*. In 1904, the number of Taiwanese children enrolled in elementary schools began to exceed those enrolled in *shobô*.[22] By 1908 the enrollment rate was 15.71 percent, increasing to 37.02 percent in 1933, and 71.3 percent in 1943.[23] In short, owing to an endeavor over several decades, modern elementary education became firmly and widely established in Taiwan.

Here I should say a few words about segregation in the elementary educational system and colonial policies of discrimination regarding primary, middle, and high school education. From the outset, elementary schools were divided into "*kôgakkô*" (common schools) and "*shôgakkô*" (primary schools) varieties.[24] The former was for Taiwanese, and the latter for Japanese. Initially, strict segregation was practiced. In 1922, Governor-General Den Kenjiro introduced a so-called "educational integration system" (*kyôgakusei*) that made it legal for selected Taiwanese children to enroll in *shôgakkô*. Nevertheless, in the years to come, *kôgakkô* remained mainly for Taiwanese, while *shôgakkô* were reserved for Japanese and a few privileged Taiwanese children. One of the major differences between the two systems was that textbooks used in the *kôgakkô* were compiled by the colonial government, whereas the *shôgakkô* used textbooks compiled by the Ministry of Education for students in Japan proper.[25]

The colonial authorities encouraged Taiwanese children to attend elementary schools. But many hurdles existed if they aspired to pursue education in a high school, because Taiwanese were systematically discouraged from seeking higher learning. This situation led many well-to-do Taiwanese families to send their children to Japan for education at high school and university levels — a practice which applied to Japanese families in Taiwan only in relation to university education.[26] A large number of Taiwanese from elite families studied law or medicine in Japan, a phenomenon for which one easily finds parallels in Western colonies.[27]

The content of education

The elementary school system under Japanese rule supplied the foundation for the mass education strategy of the colonial regime. It was well organized and financially supported. Moreover, according both to contemporary sources and the recollections of former students, the majority of teachers employed by the colonial administration were rigorous and enthusiastic. The effect of such a system is hard to ignore, given the power of modern education to shape a homogeneous culture among school children. In this section, I will discuss the content of Japanese colonial education in Taiwan.

What did Taiwanese children learn in elementary school? The subjects of the elementary school curriculum in the relatively stable 1920s included the national language (*kokugo*; hereafter, Japanese language), ethics, arithmetic, Japanese history,[28] geography, science (*rika*), painting, music, physical education, classical Chinese (*kanbun*), and some vocational training courses. Science was taught from the fourth grade onward,[29] while history and geography were taught in fifth and sixth grades. Among all subjects, Japanese language was the most important, and took up from 10 to 14 class hours per week.[30] Ethics took up two hours per week, from the first through sixth grades. Its importance must be appreciated in light of an ideal of moral cultivation directed by the state. Japanese language, ethics, history, and geography were the four subjects deemed essential for cultivating "*kokumin seishin*" (the spirit of the citizen).[31] Hence it is important to consider briefly the content of these four subjects.

By the end of its rule in Taiwan, the colonial government had published five editions of the Japanese language textbooks, each comprising 12 volumes. Among them, the third edition was in use for the longest period (from 1923 to 1937) and hence the edition to which Taiwanese children were most widely exposed in the colonial era. For this reason it has been selected for close textual analysis here.

An analysis of the third edition shows a text abounding in scientific/practical (*jitsugaku*) knowledge and local themes, in this case Taiwan-related matters. Patriotism, and matters concerning Japan, took third place in terms of quantity.[32] This finding may come as a surprise because we might assume that textbooks used in Japan's colonies would place a great deal of emphasis on loyalty towards Japan. The final two editions did have a stronger patriotic flavor, but they were published during wartime and were used for a relatively short period of time. Nonetheless, an education that conveys its messages with sophistication may be more effective than one that engages in outright indoctrination. Japanese education in Taiwan did succeed to a certain degree in nurturing in Taiwanese a feeling of identity with the Japanese empire. Before we turn to patriotic (*aikoku*, love for the *kuni*) education, let us first examine the significance of an education that stressed practical knowledge, and set aside for later the question of local themes.

In general, colonial education in Taiwan was influenced greatly by practices in Japan proper. The idea of *jitsugaku* (practical learning) had a long history in Tokugawa Japan. Owing to Fukuzawa Yukichi's (1834–1901) advocacy, scientific/practical learning constituted a crucial part of education in the Meiji era.[33] The *kokugo* textbooks used in Taiwan taught about plants, insects, hygiene, epidemics, the postal system, telegram, mining, agriculture,

irrigation, forestry, industry, electricity, weather forecast, printing, banking, etc.[34] If one were not aware of the idea of practical learning in education, one might be surprised to find a National Language lesson entitled "Question and answer concerning commerce," in which specialized terms such as pay in cash, pay in credit, wholesale, retail, and advertisement are explained.[35] It seems likely that an education that stressed practical learning likely contributed to the formation of a mentality conducive to modernization in general and economic development in particular.

Ethics textbooks used in Taiwan were also published five times, with each set consisting of six volumes, one for each grade. Moral codes taught in ethics classes fell roughly into the following categories: *kuni* (country or state), family, society, and the private realm. A brief review of ethics readers used in Japan proper sheds light on our understanding of a transformation that took place in the teaching of ethics during the period in question. The official ethics textbooks were first compiled in 1903 and had gone through four revisions by the end of World War Two. The first edition placed much emphasis on "social morality," but teaching concerning the imperial *kuni* intensified as time went by.[36] Readers used in Taiwan exhibited the same tendency.[37] Like Japanese language readers, ethics readers before the war period were more or less "custom-made" by the colonial government for Taiwanese children. They had illustrations with a distinctly Taiwanese flavor, but almost all exemplary figures were Japanese, including royal family members and historical figures. Among the 33 historical figures, only two non-Japanese appeared in the textbooks; one was a Qing official from mainland China, the other the protagonist of a fictional story based in Taiwan.[38] Thus, hardly a single native Taiwanese was presented as a moral example. In short, moral teaching in Taiwanese schools largely transmitted the colonizer's ideas and values — granted that some of these values, such as filial piety and diligence, were shared by traditional Chinese/Han society.[39]

Faithful to its name, "Japanese History" consisted entirely of Japanese history. It centered on the emperors (*tennô*) and followed the divine and unbroken line of imperial succession from the fabled times of the Sun Goddess. This framework, as one historian has termed it, encompasses "the history of the imperial realm" (*kôkoku shikan*).[40] It starts with Amaterasu Ômikami (the Sun Goddess) and ends with the present *tennô*.[41] History textbooks compiled in 1923 were in two volumes, one used for the fifth grade, the other for the sixth. In these readers one finds very little about Taiwan, which first appears only in the third lesson of the second volume.[42] Only in the sixth grade, in other words, did Taiwanese children come across Taiwan in their history textbooks. Even then, Taiwan appears mainly in the context of Japan's

overseas adventures and its later rule over the island. The most important and longest period of history for Han Taiwanese was omitted — the 212 years of Taiwan's rule by the Qing dynasty, during which a society dominated by Han Chinese was formed and developed. Stripped of this history, Taiwan was neatly incorporated into the framework of Japanese history. It lacked its own narrative.

Geography readers also comprised two volumes. The first lesson was entitled "the Greater Empire of Japan," which was followed by lessons about the home region of the students. Here the content was more detailed than those for lessons for other regions. The readers published in 1931 divide the Japanese empire into eleven regions: Kantô, Ôu (now generally called Tôhoku, the Northeast), Chûbu, Kinki, Chûgoku, Shikoku, Kyûshû, Hokkaido, Karafuto (Sakhalin), Taiwan, and Chôsen (Korea). In the case of Taiwan, students would learn the geography of the island before that of any other region. Moreover, Taiwan took up three lessons while other regions were allotted only one each. In this edition two lessons — on Kantôshû (Japan's leased territories in Manchuria) and Japan's mandates in Nan'yô (Micronesia) — appear after the lesson on Chôsen. These are followed by a lesson entitled "A General Description of the Greater Empire," which concludes the coverage of the Japanese empire. Unmistakably, Taiwan was presented as an integral part of Japan. The first lesson on the geography of Taiwan began with the statement that "Taiwan is located in the southwestern point of *wagakuni* (our country)," and described Mount Morrison as "the highest mountain of *wagakuni*."[43] Through the subject of geography, it is likely that a sense of Japan as an "imagined community" was engendered in the consciousness of Taiwanese children.

To sum up, Taiwanese children spent most of their class time learning Japanese, which was to become the common spoken language among Taiwanese of different ethnic/linguistic origins and *the only written language* they would ever master. They were taught to model their conduct after that of great Japanese figures. They systematically studied Japanese history and the geography of Taiwan, as well as of the empire as a whole. Thus, temporally and spatially, Japan was what Taiwanese school children could well have apprehended as their *kuni* — with a coherent past and a clear boundary. Nevertheless, as we shall see, there was an acute problem concerning the presentation of Taiwan in textbooks. Hence while engendering among Taiwanese a feeling of identity with Japan, as *kuni*, the colonial education also unwittingly begot something more.

The emergence of a homogeneous vision of Taiwan and a culture of one's own

As mentioned earlier, Japanese language readers are rich in "local color," and this aspect deserves our special attention. Against what background could such attention to local themes be possible in colonial education? What impact might the teaching of things "distinctly Taiwanese" have on children in Taiwan?

On the basis of my own analysis, 67 out of a total of 300 lessons in the third edition of Japanese language readers have Taiwanese themes. Most of these fall into seven categories: (1) animals and vegetation in Taiwan; (2) scenery in the countryside; (3) life in the countryside; (4) industries and natural resources; (5) geography and points of interest; (6) contrast of past and present; and (7) historical figures related to Taiwan. All lessons of this kind are devoted to Taiwan as a "homeland" (*kyôdo* in Japanese or *heimat* in German). Reading these lessons sixty years after they were taught, I find them enormously engaging, and able even now to evoke nostalgic feelings. What emerges from the vivid descriptions and fine illustrations accompanying the lessons is Taiwan as a society complete in itself and with a distinctive culture of its own. In reality, it was never this way. Han Taiwanese of Fujianese and Hakka origins often lived separately, and spoke different languages. They also differed in their way of life in certain respects. Hakka women, for instance, did not practice foot-binding. Yet, in these textbooks ethnic distinctions became invisible. The children depicted in them appear to live in the same society and share a homogeneous culture.

The emphasis on teaching about the homeland in Japanese elementary school education, in Japan and in Taiwan, was modeled on approaches used in Germany. In 1891, elementary schools in Japan were required to teach local geography and history (*kyôdo chiri* and *kyôdo shitan*). Yet with the adoption of uniform textbooks in 1903, teaching materials related to local themes decreased. The educator Hoshina Kôichi (1872–1955)[44] pointed out that it was natural that a textbook compiled for use throughout Japan, an archipelago stretching from a frigid northern zone to the subtropics, could not contain much *kyôdo* material illuminating each region. Lessons about snow would be particularly engaging for children in the north, but, he believed, might not interest children in semi-tropical Kyûshû.[45] In order to compensate for such a deficiency, schools were encouraged to compile supplementary materials on *kyôdo* for their students. In the late 1920s and early 1930s, a movement known as the "Movement for Education about the Homeland" (*kyôdo kyôiku undô*) flourished. Its advocates believed that those who love their homeland, that is, their locality, love their *kuni*.[46]

In contrast to the more uniformly styled textbooks distributed in Japan, those compiled for Taiwan by the colonial government bore a distinctly Taiwanese flavor. In fact, more information was to be found about Taiwan in these textbooks than about any region in Japan proper. The difference is partly explained by the different administrative guidelines developed for Japan proper and Taiwan. Guidelines for the third edition of Japanese language textbooks in Japan proper required teaching materials to be: (1) related to children's daily life; (2) conducive to appreciation of rural life (*den'en shumi*); (3) related to sciences and industry; (4) related to economy and citizens' morality; and (5) instrumental for understanding the country and the world.[47] Guidelines for textbooks used in Taiwan followed those for Japan proper, with significant modification. Teaching materials were required to "touch upon the daily life of children on this island" and "be conducive to cultivating interest particular to this island."[48] The result was the production of textbooks full of lessons with Taiwanese features. Taiwan thus had the kind of textbooks that would have delighted educator Hoshina Kôichi, who lamented that uniform textbooks erased local color.[49]

Still, did the assumption that love for one's homeland leads to love for one's *kuni* work in the context of colonial Taiwan? Analysis of the textbooks reveals an important omission in the lessons related to the homeland in the case of Taiwan, notably history. In the 67 lessons with distinctive Taiwanese themes, Taiwan's history was virtually absent.[50] The chief exception is a lesson about Zheng Chengkong (Koxinga) emphasizing Zheng's loyalty to the Ming dynasty, and the fact that he was born to a Japanese mother and worshipped in a Shintô shrine at Tainan. As mentioned above, education about the homeland (*kyôdo kyôiku*) in Japan proper was comprised of two essential elements: history and geography, which were incorporated into supplementary readings for homeland studies taught in all elementary schools. It was recognized that history was instrumental to the cultivation of national identity and love for the *kuni*. However, for colonial children to know the history of their homeland was another matter.

Writings by Japanese educators in Taiwan reveal a common anxiety expressed about whether or not to teach students Taiwanese history. One high school teacher asserted that a sensible approach would be to distinguish the pre-colonial and colonial periods in Taiwan history, so that the "dark (pre-colonial) period" might highlight the "bright (Japanese) period" by contrast.[51] On the other hand, the educator Kitahata Gen'ei rejected outright the view that Taiwan history had any place in "National history" (*kokushi*). He bluntly asserted that "... in no case can it be said that the land called Taiwan is a subject (*shutai*). Our country (*wagakuni*) must forever be the subject. The land called

Taiwan is not the subject; it cannot be otherwise than that it forever exists as an object (*kyakutai*)."[52]

The result was that the textbooks presented Taiwan as a region bereft of history. In school, Taiwanese learned a great deal about their homeland, but nothing about how their society had developed to the present point. While the texts taught much about Japanese history, mythology, and major historical figures, Taiwan's history remained blank. In the final analysis, the homeland called Taiwan appeared in educational materials as a geographical place in the context of Japan's long history. Perhaps, by such methods, colonial children's love for their homeland could be directed or elevated to a love of a higher order — i.e., love for a *kuni* that was unmistakably Japan.

Although a Taiwan without a past could hardly become the object of Taiwanese children's love or loyalty, as a *kuni* or a nation, it did at least become a place with particular geographical features and a distinctive culture of its own. School taught them not only what they already knew intimately about Taiwan, but also what they could not have known otherwise. The former included the water buffalo, rice fields, the banyan tree, the white egret, the village temple, and the afternoon shower. The latter included geography, industries, products, imports, village structure, modern facilities, and more. Among these, most important, perhaps, was a "bird's eye" view of Taiwan. What could be more effective in forging a homogeneous vision of Taiwan than a vigorous school curriculum of this sort? Moreover, elementary education enabled Taiwanese children to speak one language (Japanese) and share similar experiences from a tender age. All of the above was conducive to the formation of a sense of community clearly defined and bounded by the margins of the island, even if the island was clearly located within the Japanese empire. Outside the framework of empire, such a sense of distinctive community could readily evolve into something else again.

Kuni, nation, and Taiwanese consciousness in the 1930s–40s

In Japanese the word *aikoku* (Mandarin *aiguo*) means love of country or "patriotism." This word is widespread in the historical materials of colonial Taiwan. Yet what is the object of one's love? Country, state, nation, nation-state, or empire? Today, because Japan is no longer an empire holding colonies, it is easy to determine what *kuni* (the Japanese equivalent to state/nation) means to Japanese, but it was rather difficult to know what *kuni* meant to the colonial peoples within the empire of Japan. To comprehend the patriotism of Taiwanese under Japanese rule, two factors have to be taken into consideration.

First, we have to bear in mind the particular features of the concept of the *kuni* in prewar Japan. To colonial peoples, Imperial Japan was inextricably associated with the idea or ideology of the Emperor (*tennô*), a term that connoted both the ruler and a divine spiritual figure. Japan was the divine *kuni* (*kôkoku* or *mikuni*) of the *tennô*, and it was the duty of His Majesty's subjects to be loyal and devoted to him. In textbooks, the Japanese *kuni* or *kokka* was never taught without being associated with His Majesty the Emperor (*tennô heika*). One might say that the *kuni* existed only for the sake of the Emperor. Accordingly, when Taiwanese youth said they would die for the sake of *mikuni*, what occurred to them was probably Japan in the image of His Majesty the Emperor, not Japan the state nor Japan the empire. Taiwanese children were taught to be Japanese, meaning above all being subjects of His Majesty. And in being an imperial subject, one need not discard one's "local color." However, the notion of being Japanese changed towards the end of Japanese rule.

This change took place during the war. The *kôminka* movement offered an inclusive definition of the nation of Japan, and "methods" by which colonial subjects could become "real Japanese." Before the movement started, colonial peoples were taught to be Japanese and love the *kuni*, but they were not asked to be one nation with ethnic Japanese. By contrast, the *kôminka* movement sought to eliminate cultural and linguistic differences within the empire.

Through memoirs and interviews, we find that, to many young Taiwanese of the wartime generation, the Japan *kuni* was indeed the primary object of their patriotism. In terms of both intensity and character, what Taiwanese youth felt about Japan came close to a feeling of national identity in the present-day sense. Nevertheless, many Taiwanese were aware of their diverse origins as Chinese, as Minnanese, Hakka or other.

Japanese education produced a generation of Taiwanese who shared common experiences in school, used the same language, and held a vision of Taiwan as a distinct community with a culture of its own within the empire of Japan. They were encouraged to love their homeland and by extension love the *kuni*. Yet the homeland Taiwan students came to know lacked a history; it was a spatial place without its own temporal depth. Attempts were made to fill the vacuum by inserting the history of Japan, lest Taiwanese children's love for *kyôdo* not lead to love for the *kuni*. Thus, a Taiwanese strongly influenced by his or her colonial education would be a person who loved Japan and Taiwan simultaneously, albeit in different ways.

Looked at closely, the *kôminka* movement in a sense was a "nation-building" endeavor, aiming to turn the entire empire of Japan into an extended nation of Japan. It is possible that, given time, it might have

succeeded — we have no way of knowing. What interests me, however, is what happened when the process was abruptly cut short in mid-August 1945. With the defeat of Japan, the intense love many young Taiwanese held for *kuni* suddenly lost the object — Japan.

Post-war Taiwan and the Rise of Taiwanese Consciousness

Substituting Sinification for Japanification after retrocession

After Japan surrendered on 15 August 1945, Taiwanese in general welcomed their return to China with enthusiasm. They quickly set about adjusting to their new rulers; various programs for studying Mandarin arose more or less spontaneously after retrocession.[53] But they were soon to be disappointed with life under the new government, specifically the Taiwan Provincial Administrative Executive Office, headed by Chen Yi. The basic pattern of external imposition was little affected by the transfer of power from Tokyo to Nanjing. Here, space does not allow me to give an account of the practices and events leading to the February 28 Incident in 1947. Rather, I shall concentrate on two aspects of the post-war situation to illustrate how the new government sought to transform Taiwanese: *official* denunciation of Japanese education for "enslaving" (*nuhua*) the Taiwanese; and the new government's radical efforts to "de-Japanize" and "Sinicize" (*zuguohua*) the Taiwanese.[54]

The "Mandarin-only" policy, for example, was quickly in place. In fact, few Taiwanese spoke or understood the new "national language" of Mandarin. At the time of retrocession, Japanese was the common language of the educated elite of Taiwan, and Fujianese or Hakka were the mother tongues of almost all Han Taiwanese. The policy to re-educate Taiwanese in the official national language was adopted by the Taiwan Investigation Committee even before Japan's surrender.[55] The Committee drafted an "Outline of the Plan for the Takeover of Taiwan," which was made public in March 1945.

In the cultural sphere, the Outline recommended that "after the takeover the cultural policy should be focused on promoting national consciousness, eradicating the slave mentality, making education universal, and elevating cultural levels."[56] A more detailed proposal on education and culture specified that a plan for promoting the national language should be implemented, that the national language should be a required course in elementary and middle schools, and that civil servants should be the first required to use the national language.[57]

After Taiwan was formally transferred to China, the new provincial government launched the National Language Movement (*guoyu yundong*), with the demand that the use of Japanese be phased out by late 1946. In that year, schooling began to be conducted in Mandarin. In October 1946, exactly one year after the retrocession, the Japanese language was banned from newspapers and magazines. Within a very short period, fluency in Mandarin had become a prime requirement for obtaining a government position. Under this "Mandarin-only" policy, an entire generation of educated Taiwanese found themselves virtually "illiterate."

The February 28 Incident in 1947 further convinced and justified the mainlanders in their denunciation of the Taiwanese people's "poisoning" by Japanese education. On 31 March 1947, Chen Yi addressed his staff, saying: "What caused the Incident is the instigating propaganda and poisonous ideas produced by 51 years of Japanese rule."[58] The editorial of *Taiwan xinsheng bao* on 1 April 1947 comments: "This Incident was neither for political reforms nor mass uprisings; it was entirely a transient revival of Japanese education and was instigated by the remaining poisonous factors of Japanese thought."[59] After the Incident, the use of Japanese was banned, as was Japan-related matter such as books in Japanese and recordings of Japanese songs. Speaking Japanese was prohibited among civil servants; they were required to speak Mandarin as a matter of principle. Speaking in Mandarin was enforced in elementary and high schools.[60]

Deprived of a language hard-learned in school, educated Taiwanese were institutionally marginalized in the new society. All cultural capital, real or potential, associated with the Japanese language was devalued and became worthless. To the majority of these Taiwanese, it was equivalent to being reduced to the uneducated class. The impact was universal. Those who had achieved literary fame in the late colonial era could no longer have their works published unless they wrote in Chinese, a virtually impossible task.[61]

The new administration's language policy was extreme. From the vantage point of Chinese national integration, it was natural to require that Taiwanese learn the national language. But to demand a linguistic transformation from Japanese to Chinese within a period of one year was too drastic by any standard. It caused a great deal of resentment. Japan banned the use of the Chinese written language in 1937 only after forty-two years of rule. The Nationalists banned Japanese and imposed a new language within the space of one or two years. In the Nationalist case, the problem was not simply the radical imposition of a new language policy, but also that the effective silencing of many Taiwanese who had been educated over fifty years of colonial rule. They were to feel mute in the decades that followed.

A history muted by the state and the disappearance of the "homeland"

Condemned as being "enslaved" or "poisoned" by Japanese rule and education, Taiwanese had no choice but to remain silent about their past. Meanwhile, Taiwanese children were educated in Chinese and taught Chinese history. In December 1949, the Nationalist government retreated from China to Taiwan. Coming with the central government was a population of about two- or three-hundred thousand military men and refugees from the mainland. This 1949 diaspora drastically changed the ethnic make-up of Taiwan, and had a tremendous impact on its future development.

The massacres of Taiwanese elite and ordinary people after the February 28 Incident had brought about deep resentment and animosity towards the KMT government and mainlanders. Now, with newcomers flooding into Taiwan, the social boundary between "*benshengren*" and "*waishengren*," or locals and outsiders, became further marked. These two terms were coined after the retrocession when people from mainland China first made their presence felt in Taiwan. "*Benshengren*" literally means "people of this province," i.e. Taiwan, referring chiefly to Han Taiwanese on the island. In contrast, those who came from China after 1945 were called "*waishengren*," which literally means "people from provinces outside" Taiwan. In other words, Chinese from the mainland were lumped together without regard for their differences in class, language, and geographical origin. In order not to burden the reader with too many romanized terms, I will hereafter use "Taiwanese" and "mainlanders" to refer to "*benshengren*" and "*waishengren*" respectively.

Taiwan after December 1949 was legally a province of China, but the entire Nationalist state was subsequently stationed on the island. This government regarded Taiwan as *the* base for campaigns to "strive against Communism and restore the country." The regime, mistrusting the Taiwanese, implemented authoritarian and repressive rule on the island, with 28 February 1947 punctuating this policy. The society was placed under close surveillance. School education was tightly controlled by the state apparatus. The KMT ideology, a nationalism along fascist lines, was pervasive in textbooks and social indoctrination. From the mid-1950s to the late 1970s, a period later known as the "White Terror," one could be thrown into jail without due process if suspected of harboring "dangerous thoughts" or if alleged to have connections with Communist organizations by any of the security units widely planted in the society. Victims of the White Terror included Taiwanese and mainlanders; most of the latter were liberals, leftists, or those associated with them. But although Taiwanese were not the exclusive target of KMT's repression after 1950, the February 28 Incident and the White

Terror created a climate of fear among Taiwanese, further hardening the social boundary between Taiwanese and mainlanders.

The Nationalist government and its supporters understood that language and history were crucial in "Sincizing" the Taiwanese. Fujianese and Hakka, classified as dialects (*fangyan*), were banned in school; schools adopted humiliating punishments for students overheard speaking in their mother tongues.[62] Dialects were banished from official occasions and the public domain in general. Where Taiwanese children in the colonial period had learned the national history of Japan, their counterparts were now studying the "orthodox" version of Chinese history — Chinese history, that is, according to the KMT — which included strong anti-Communist and nationalistic messages. Under these circumstances, Taiwan's past under Japanese rule had no place. Indeed, it represented the antithesis of orthodoxy.

Virtually no mainlanders who came with the KMT government to Taiwan harbored other than strongly anti-Japanese sentiments. Yet Taiwan had stood on the opposing side during the eight years of China's struggle against Japan. Between 1937 and 1945, more than 200,000 Taiwanese were recruited into the Japanese military; a good many of them fought for the Japanese *kuni* with undoubted sincerity.[63] How could such a past fit into anti-Japanese nationalism? Not surprisingly, Taiwanese veterans had no public outlets in which to relate their wartime experiences. On anecdotal evidence, it seems that few veterans even related their experiences to their children. The events of the first years after the retrocession were no less taboo. Yet, muted voices sometimes speak volumes and have a far-reaching impact. My point here is that in the society of Taiwan there was a perceptual undercurrent of its past held by those who had experienced Japanese rule, who had witnessed the February 28 Incident and its repressive aftermath, and this unspoken past *silently* contested with the official/orthodox history propagated by the KMT.

In the early 1950s, the main textbooks used in elementary schools came in two sets, entitled "Reader for National Language and Common Knowledge" (*guoyu changshi keben*) for the first four grades, and "Reader for National Language" (*guoyu keben*) for the fifth and sixth grades. An examination of these readers shows nationalistic material to be highly pervasive. In their first reader, students learned simple statements such as: "National flag, national flag, I love you; I revere you." They were taught to love using national products.[64] Still, in general the first four readers do not seem overly nationalistic. From the third grades onward, however, messages of nationalism in the particular KMT mode begin to increase drastically. Before long students are studying, at some length, the Father of the Republic

(Dr Sun Yat-sen) and President Chiang (Chiang Kai-shek), with a total of five lessons on Sun, three lessons on President Chiang, and a lesson on his letters to his son, Jiang Jingguo (Chiang Ching-Kuo).[65]

The anti-Japanese war constitutes another major theme.[66] Two lessons entitled "Good News," couched in play form, are devoted to the surrender of Japan in August 1945. In Act I, the setting is a city in Sichuan Province. A couple and their teenaged son and daughter are thrilled to hear the news, via a phone call, that Japan has been hit by atomic bombs and has declared its unconditional surrender. Act II opens with a girl and her younger brother in the living room of another family home an hour later. They are visited by the two teenagers from Act I and told the good news. Because their city has no newspaper, the four decide to make a poster to notify city residents of this news. They write the headline: "Good News! A phone call from Chongqing: Japan surrenders unconditionally!"[67]

Interestingly, textbooks used in the early 1950s do not carry strong anti-Communist messages. This is probably because they were modeled after those compiled during the KMT-CCP civil war, when the KMT still controlled the central government on the mainland. Textbooks that appeared later, on the other hand, carried a resolute anti-Communist outlook. Communists were depicted as the most wicked beings on earth; one lesson was entitled "The Communist bandits — a multitude of evils" (*wan'e de gongfei*).[68] Students were taught that "counter-attacking the mainland" (*fangong dalu*) was the sacred and imminent mandate of the people on Taiwan. A father tells his son at dinner, "Now, our mainland compatriots have neither food to eat nor clothes to wear. We, under the leadership of President Chiang, must counter-attack on the mainland and drive out the Communist bandits as soon as possible, enabling mainland compatriots to eat well and dress warmly [like us]."[69] In addition, the cult of Chiang Kai-shek is prominent in the textbooks published in the 1960s.[70]

Needless to say, Taiwan finds no place in this history, except as the base for realizing the mission of "restoration of the mainland." Viewed from the perspective of the Taiwanese, the content of school education under the KMT was filled with mainlanders' culture — a culture forged out of the heterogeneous origins of mainlanders. That a "homogeneous" culture of mainlanders came into being in Taiwan after 1950 is an interesting issue that awaits exploration

In contrast to textbooks used during the Japanese colonial period, one finds almost no "homeland" material (Taiwan-related lessons) in the new readers. To give an example: whereas Taiwanese children appear in colonial textbooks with the prefix "*A*," such as "A Ren" or "A Chun,"[71] in post-

war readers all child protagonists are called "*xiao* so-and-so," such as "xiao Hua" or "xiao Ming."[72] The former is a Taiwanese prefix, while the latter is considered a typical way of addressing children of mainlanders. If Taiwanese children during the colonial era had been able to see their own image (in text as well in illustrations) in school readers, their counterparts in KMT Taiwan found only images of mainlanders' children. It is fair to say that mainlander culture was officially privileged and Taiwanese were educated to feel culturally inferior to their mainlander classmates.

No history, no homeland — that sums up the content of post-war textbooks with regard to Taiwan. How effective could such an education be? The Taiwanese literary critic Ye Shitao (1925–) offers a personal story in his memoirs. In 1954, he was released from a military prison. After working at odd jobs, he finally landed a teaching position at an elementary school in a backward location. The following year he met a 19-year-old woman teacher, and developed a romantic relationship with her. In his depiction, the young teacher more than 10 years his junior lived in a world completely different from his. In spite of spending her childhood under Japanese rule, she had no "Japanese experiences." She could neither speak Japanese, nor carry out a conversation in her mother tongue, Taiwanese (a common reference to Fujianese as spoken in Taiwan). Her language was actually Mandarin Chinese. It was not merely a language issue; she knew virtually nothing about Taiwan before the retrocession. She had a liking for literature, however when Ye mentioned writers unfamiliar to her, she quickly concluded that he knew nothing about literature. The writers she praised were newcomers from the mainland of whom Ye had a low opinion.[73] As we know, Ye Shitao had published works in prestigious magazines during the war, and was widely read in literature and philosophy. The confident ignorance of his woman teacher companion indicates the way and degree in which a Taiwanese could internalize mainstream values through education, and how Taiwan's past was beyond retrieval in the new society.

The resurgence of Taiwan's past in the 1980s

The history of Taiwan, especially that of the colonial period, was kept in the closet from the 1950s. Students learned and memorized Chinese history in a systematic way at school. There were few chances for them to learn about the history of Taiwan beyond Taiwan's historical relations with China and events supporting the cause of "restoring the mainland" such as the "recovery" of Taiwan from the Dutch by Zheng Chengkong (Koxinga). Even in higher education, there were few avenues through which one could learn about the

history of Taiwan. Some subjects such as the February 28 Incident were taboo. Although research on general Taiwanese history was never prohibited, it was on the one hand discouraged and on the other retarded by self-censorship among scholars.[74]

If the thought control of the KMT was omnipresent and effective, how could Taiwanese consciousness have any chance to sprout? Here, we must return to the generation issue. The majority of Taiwanese who spent their adolescence under Japanese rule remained excluded from the KMT's process of Sinification. Their attitudes towards what was going on, even if maintained in silence, had the potential to exert a significant influence on their children. It was not uncommon for a Taiwanese child to be deeply puzzled by his/her parents' indiscreet remarks contradicting what he/she learned in school. In other words, the effect of school education could be diluted by anti-KMT sentiments at the level of family or local community. This kind of illicit protest was small in scale and isolated, but it was there to challenge the orthodoxy and in some cases was markedly tenacious. Even though Ye Shitao found it impossible to discuss his past and the past of Taiwan with the woman he loved, he very likely influenced at least some of the young Taiwanese he encountered, even in his most muted years.

This muted history of Taiwan re-emerged on a large scale in the late 1980s, mainly due to the democratization of the island. It seems that people in Taiwan developed an intense interest in knowing about Taiwanese history, especially the era immediately before and after the retrocession, including episodes of Taiwanese wartime experiences, the February 28 Incident, and the White Terrors. To 1986, government suppression of independent voices effectively silenced these histories. The lifting of martial law restrictions incited intensive historical interest: over 90 percent of published original sources and research concerning the February 28 Incident appeared over the ten years beginning in 1987.[75] Many of those who lived through or witnessed these events are still alive. Thus oral history has become popular with both amateur and professional historians. In the decade that followed, the lifting of martial law, we come to see two histories competing against each other. One is the orthodox history along the lines of Chinese nationalism, insisting that Taiwan be an integrated part of China; the other is a history (or histories) of Taiwan that pays much attention to its distinctive characteristics.

This competition between the two histories had its climax in a debate over junior-high school textbooks entitled "Knowing Taiwan" (*renshi Taiwan*) in 1997. As discussed above, Taiwanese history had virtually no place in textbooks; consequently one could graduate from a university or even a graduate school without acquiring the most rudimentary knowledge of this

subject. The composition of "Knowing Taiwan" was unprecedented in that here was a set of textbooks devoted to the "self-knowledge" of Taiwan ("Knowing Taiwan" comprises three readers entitled "History," "Geography," and "Society" respectively). This change unleashed a series of heated debates between the pro-China and the pro-Taiwan camps. The debates reveal a great anxiety on the part of Chinese nationalists, and yet concern on the part of Taiwanese nationalists that the textbooks were too moderate. The publication of the "Knowing Taiwan" textbooks not only reflected the rising tide of Taiwanese consciousness, but was also an outcome of it.

In the future we can expect continuing demands on Taiwan history. Nevertheless, it should be borne in mind that ever since Japan ruled the island, the Taiwanese have never had a chance to learn about their past in a systematic way. Taiwanese educated in colonial times are likely to have an intimate knowledge of Taiwan as a pastoral homeland, but they learned almost nothing about its history. Many of them, not only young people, are now picking up whatever is available. Thus we can anticipate that works by amateurs will continue to feed an active market.

To scholars interested in how history is invented or how national identity is manufactured in the process of nation-building, today's Taiwan serves as a exemplary case-study. A critical question is how the swelling tide of Taiwanese consciousness or nationalism comes to terms with the Chinese nationalism in interpreting Taiwan's past. Is a collision inevitable?

Conclusion

The Nationalists began to denounce Japanese colonial education as "enslaving" Taiwanese before they set foot on the island. The discourse on "enslavement" involves issues ranging from nationalism to justification for the redistribution of social resources. In the period immediately after the retrocession, some mainlanders sneered at Taiwanese, saying all that the Taiwanese learned after fifty years of Japanese education was how to line up in a queue. In effect, Japanese colonial education had many merits, and making people line up in a queue was no small achievement. The education, moreover, had deeply moved its recipients.

Among the 101 elderly Taiwanese who responded to my survey on colonial education, the majority showed great satisfaction with the elementary education, and none answered "very dissatisfied."[76] When asked how they liked school life, a similar pattern emerges. The overwhelming majority

responded positively while only two disliked it.[77] This impression is strongly confirmed by their qualitative assessments; some criticized discrimination in higher education and the *kôminka* movement.[78]

Patriotism was certainly an important part of the curriculum under Japanese educators in Taiwan. It might be assumed that because Taiwan was a colony there was a higher "dose" of patriotic education than in Japan proper; but this seems not to have been the case. E. Patricia Tsurumi points out in her book that the content of Japanese language and ethics textbooks in wartime Taiwan "seems to have fallen short of Japanese elementary school textbooks in ultranationalistic content."[79] On the basis of my own research, I confirm this assessment.

Japanese education offered the first opportunity for Taiwanese to think of the island as *one*, and of its society as homogenous, culturally different from other places within the Japanese empire. They saw their collective image in the well-executed illustrations in textbooks. Outside school, they were able to communicate in a common language among themselves and felt a common bond against ethnic Japanese, especially when discrimination was experienced. They loved the Japan *kuni*, but at the same time knew they were not Japanese, except for those who were on the road (under *kôminka* programs) to "becoming Japanese." But the war ended before anyone could discover whether this transformation could be completely effected.

A half-century of separation between Taiwan and China made Taiwanese and mainlanders strangers to each other. During this period, Taiwanese were educated to be patriotic Japanese, and mainlanders to be patriotic Chinese. Even though the *kôminka* movement did not succeed in turning Taiwanese youth into "real Japanese," it seems to have made many Taiwanese "less Chinese." Meanwhile, Chinese nationalism had been widely absorbed throughout China, and anti-Japanese sentiments ran deep in the 1940s. As a result, Taiwan's return to China faced immense problems. The collision between China and Japan over the decades 1931–45 was one between two nationalisms, but in the end, in Taiwan, there emerged a third nationalism — Taiwanese consciousness.

Scholars explain the rise of Taiwanese consciousness from various perspectives. Few, however, have looked at the colonial period. This chapter shows that the colonial period is a logical place to search for the origins of Taiwanese nationalism: in the development of a consciousness of Taiwan being a lovely, cohesive, and independent locality, one powerfully reinforced by Japanese educational praxis and new social experiences under Japanese rule. In short, Taiwanese consciousness has its origins in Japanese colonial rule of Taiwan and the island's separation from the mainland.

By all indications, in August 1945 Taiwanese genuinely welcomed their return to China. They expected this sudden development to turn into a reality in which they were no one's subordinates and equals of their Chinese compatriots. Instead, their dignity was deeply wounded and their protest ruthlessly crushed. It was in this situation that they began to sense keenly their difference not only from Japanese but also from mainland Chinese. Their love for homeland Taiwan found no nation as an outlet, thus evolving into national consciousness on its own.

A half-century of colonial experience under Japanese rule created great gaps between the Taiwanese and the mainlanders. A further half-century of separation from Communist China has rendered the history of Taiwan (both pre- and post-1945, up to the present) unfathomable to Chinese on the mainland. Conversely, the majority of Taiwanese know very little about China. If people on the two sides of the Straits are to be peacefully one nation "again,"[80] a real understanding of each other's history will be crucial. And that is a formidable, perhaps impossible, task. If, on the other hand, they are to go their separate ways, mutual understanding will be no less important.

54. Wei Jingsheng, interviews with CND 1998 (see preceding notes).

Chapter 7

1. Jonathan Mirsky, "Taiwan's President Lee Teng-hui told the truth last week, " *Hong Kong Voice of Democracy*, 10 November 1997, www.democracy.org.hk/pastweek/97_nov/mirsky971110.htm.
2. My sample is limited to Taiwanese of Han origin, chiefly descendents of Fujianese and Hakka immigrants. The aboriginal peoples of Taiwan fall outside the focus of this study on the implications of Taiwanese identity for the autonomy of the state.
3. According to 1996 surveys, people identifying themselves as Taiwanese, Taiwanese and Chinese, or primarily Chinese, made up 33.1, 45.1 and 16.6% of Taiwan's population respectively. The corresponding ratios in 1991 were 16.5, 47 and 32.5%. Figures cited in Hsiau A-chin, "Crafting a nation: Contemporary Taiwanese cultural nationalism" (PhD dissertation, University of California, San Diego, 1998), p. 186, note 63.
4. H. Stuart Hughes, *Consciousness and Society: The Reorientation of European Social Thoughts 1890–1930* (New York: Vintage Books, 1962), p. 18.
5. See Weng Jiayin, *Taiwan hanren wuzhuang kang Ri shi yanjiu, 1895–1902* (Taipei: National Taiwan University, 1986), pp. 88–90.
6. The emergence of Han people in Taiwan from the status of an immigrant society to an "indigenized" or a "Sinicized" one is dated by some scholars to the 1860s.
7. See Liao Jiazhan, *Laozheng xinsheng* (Taipei: Yuanliu chuban yiuxian kongsi, 1995), p. 39.
8. "*Mingzhi jun zuo zhu*," see Weng Jiayin, "Fucheng jiaohui bao suojian Riben ling Tai qianhou lishi xiang," in *Taiwan fengwu* 41 (September 1991), pp. 93–4.
9. The final uprising of the aborigines, in October 1930, was known as the Wushe Incident.
10. See George H. Kerr, "A licensed revolution," *Formosa: Licensed Revolution and the Home Rule Movement 1895–1945* (Honolulu: The University of Hawaii Press, 1974), Chapter 5, pp. 69–94.
11. See Yanaihara Tadao, *Teikokushugi ka no Taiwan* (Tokyo: Iwanami shoten, 1929).
12. Discrimination at secondary level worked via a disproportional quota system. For instance, Taihoku Normal School (Taihoku shihan gakkô) customarily accepted 30 Japanese for every 10 Taiwanese to make up a class of 40.
13. See Wang Taisheng, "Riben zhimin tongzhi xia Taiwan de falü gaige," in Wang Taisheng, *Taiwan falü de jianli* (Taipei: Guoli Taiwan daxue faxue congshu bianji weiyuan hui, 1997), pp. 170–2.

14. Lian Wenqing, *Taiwan zhengzhi yundong shi,* in Weng Jiayin and Zhang Yanxian, eds. (Taipei: Daoxiang chubanshe, 1988); Lin Bowei, *Taiwan wenhua xiehui cangsang* (Taipei: Taiyuan chubanshe, 1993); Lu Xiuyi, *Riju shidai Taiwan gongchandang shi, 1928–1932* (Taipei: Qianwei chubanshe, 1990).
15. For a study of the *kôminka* movement, see Wan-yao Chou, "The *kôminka* movement in Taiwan and Korea: Comparisons and interpretations," in Peter Duus, Ramon H. Myers, and Mark R. Peattie, eds., *The Japanese Wartime Empire, 1931–1945* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1966), pp. 40–68.
16. Wu Wenxing et al., eds., *Taiwan zongdu Tian Jianzhilang riji* (Taipei: Preparatory Office, the Institute of Taiwan History, Academia Sinica, 2000).
17. For an evaluation of the success with each program, see Wan-yao Chou, "The *kôminka* movement in Taiwan and Korea: Comparisons and interpretations."
18. A Taiwanese veteran says: "I was Japanese for twenty-five years ... [f]rom when I was born until the war ended." Usui Kazumitsu, *Shôkon* (Osaka: Kôbô U, 1987), p. 22.
19. Cf. Ernest Gellner, *Nations and Nationalism* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1983), p. 140.
20. Zhou Wanyao (Chou Wan-yao), "Aimei de Taiwanren: Riben zhimin tongzhi yu jindai minzu guojia zhi rentong," in *Hewei Taiwan?* (Taipei: Xungshi meishu yuekanshe, 1996), p. 8.
21. In 1898 there were 1,707 *shobô* in Taiwan, enrolling 29,941 students (65 female). This is probably under 5% of school-aged children. Taiwan kyôikukai, ed., *Taiwan kyôiku enkakushi* (Taipei, 1939), p. 984.
22. In 1904, the number of Taiwanese children enrolled in elementary schools was 23,178, while *shobô* had 21,661 students.
23. Taiwan sheng xingzheng zhangguan kongshu, ed., *Taiwan sheng wushiyi nian lai tongji tiyao* (Taipei: The editor, 1946), p. 1241.
24. E. Patricia Tsurumi uses "common schools" and "primary schools" to translate *kôgakkô* and *shôgakkô* respectively. See her *Japanese Colonial Education in Taiwan, 1895–1945* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1977), pp. 18, 33.
25. Only towards the very end of Japanese rule did *kôgakkô* start using the same textbooks as those used in schools in Japan proper.
26. The Imperial University of Taihoku (Taipei) was established in 1928, chiefly to cater for Japanese. It was more difficult for Taiwanese to enter than prestigious universities in Japan proper.
27. Similar situations can be found in the Spanish Americas. See Benedict Anderson, *Imagined Communities* (London and New York: Verso, 1991), p. 51, note 19.
28. The title of this subject was changed to "National History" (*kokushi*) in 1933.
29. Before 1922 the subject of science was taught in the fifth and sixth grades.
30. The subject of Japanese language took up 12, 14, 14, 14, 10 and 10 hours per week, respectively, from the first grade to the sixth grade, out of 24, 26, 28,

29 (31), 32 (33) and 32 (33) total hours. Figures in parentheses are class times for female students. See Taiwan kyôikukai, ed., op. cit., pp. 379–80.

31. "*Kokumin*" during the war era implied "subjects of imperial Japan." On "*shôkokumin*" (young *kokumin* in textbooks), see Xu Peixian, "Suzao zhimindi shaoguomin: Riju shiqi Taiwan kongxuexiao jiaokeshu zhi fenxi," MA thesis, National University of Taiwan, 1994.
32. For details see Chou Wan-yao (Zhou Wanyao), "Shixue jiaoyu yu xiangtu jiaocai: Disanqi kongxuexiao 'guoyu' jiaokeshu de fenxi," *Taiwan shi yanjiu* 4:2, pp. 7–53.
33. For Fukuzawa Yukichi's idea of *jitsugaku*, see Fukuzawa Yukichi, "Gakkumon no susume," in *Fukuzawa Yukichi zenshû* (Tokyo: Iwanami shoten, 1979), pp. 21–144. For the significance of Fukuzawa's idea of *jitsugaku*, see Maruyama Masao, "Fukuzawa ni okeiru 'jitsugaku' no denkai: Fukuzawa Yukichi no tetsugaku kenkyû josetsu," in *Maruyama Masao shû* (Tokyo: Iwanami shoten, 1995), Vol. 3, pp. 107–31.
34. For a list of 68 lessons under the category "practical learning," see Zhou Wanyao (Chou Wan-yao), "Shixue jiaoyu yu xiangtu jiaocai: Disanqi kongxuexiao 'guoyu' jiaokeshu de fenxi," pp. 24–5.
35. Taiwan Sôtokufu, ed., *Kôgakkô yô kokugo tokuhon (dai'ichi shû)* (Taipei: The editor, 1924/1931), Volume 7, Lesson 21, pp. 73–7.
36. See Chen Roshui (Chen Jo-shui), "Riben jindai wenhua yu jiaoyu zhong de shehui lunli wenti," in *Taiwan jiaoyushi yanjiuhui tongxun,* No. 3 (March 1999), pp. 13–6.
37. E. Patricia Tsurumi compares Japanese language and ethics textbooks used in Taiwan and Japan (op. cit., pp. 133–45). She concludes that textbooks compiled for Taiwanese children were not watered-down versions of those used for Japanese children, and that the former were in effect less nationalistic than the latter.
38. They are Cao Jin and Wu Feng in the Qing period. Cao Jin was a Qing official praised for good public service. Wu Feng was an interpreter working among aboriginal people, but the story of Wu sacrificing his own life in order to rid them of their custom of head-hunting has been widely judged a fiction.
39. For an analysis of ethics textbooks used in colonial Taiwan, see Zhou Wanyao (Chou Wan-yao), "Shiluo de daode shijie: Riben zhimin tongzhi shiqi Taiwan gongxuexiao xiushen jiaoyu zhi yanjiu," *Taiwan shi yanjiu* 8:2 (December 2001), pp. 1–63.
40. Isoda Kazuo, "Kôminka kyôiku to shokuminchi kokushi kyôkasho," in *Kindai Nihon to shokuminchi*, 4 (Tokyo: Iwanami shoten, 1993), p. 124.
41. In History readers compiled in 1938, a final chapter entitled "The Resolution of the Imperial Subjects" (*kokumin no kakugo*) was added. The presentation of Japanese history chiefly in terms of the unbroken imperial line was a crucial way to support *tennô*-centered nationalism in modern Japan. In reality, only in a limited period of time did emperors wield real power in Japanese history.

42. Taiwan sôtokufu, ed., *Kôgakkô yo Nihon rekishi* (Taipei: Taiwan sôtokufu, 1923), Vol. 2, p. 13.
43. Taiwan sôtokufu, ed., *Kôgakkô chirisho* (Taipei: Taiwan sôtokufu, 1931), Vol. 1, lesson 2, pp. 6–7.
44. Hoshina Kôichi is known as "kokugo kyôikusha" (educator for national language education).
45. See Hoshina Kôichi, *Saikin kokugo kyôjujô no shomondai* (Tokyo: Kyôiku shinchô kenkyûkai, 1915), p. 292.
46. Shinjô Teruo, "Hontô kyôiku to kyôdo kyôiku," in *Taiwan kyôiku* 381 (April 1934), p. 37; Suzuki Hiroo, ed., *Genten Kaisetsu: Nihon kyôiku shi* (Tokyo: Nihon tosho bunka kyôkai, 1985), pp. 288–91.
47. Karasawa Tomitarô, *Kyôkasho no rekishi: kyôkasho to Nihonjin no keisei* (Tokyo: Sôbunsha, 1956), p. 370.
48. Hisasumi Ei'ichi and Fujimoto Genjiro, *Kôgakkô kakuka kyôjuhô* (Taihoku: Shinkôdô shoten, 1924), p. 80.
49. Hoshina Kôichi, op. cit., p. 292.
50. See Zhou Wanyao (Chou Wan-yao), "Shixue jiaoyu yu xiangtu jiaocai: Disanqi kongxuexiao 'guoyu' jiaokeshu de fenxi," p. 37.
51. Suzuki Kizo, "Taiwan ni okeru kyôdo kyôiku no kachi," *Taiwan kyôiku* 417 (April 1937), pp. 2–10.
52. Kitahata Gen'ei, "Shotô kokushi kyôiku no honshitsu to sono shimei ni oite: Toku ni kôgakkô no kokushi kyôiku ni oite (4)," *Taiwan kyôiku* 386 (September 1934), p. 30.
53. For the Taiwanese "zeal for national language" (*guoyu re*), see Xu Xueji, "Taiwan kuangfu chuqi de yuwen wenti," *Shilian zazhi* 19 (December 1991), pp. 91–2.
54. On the issue of "enslavement," see Li Xiaofeng, "Ererba shijian qian de wenhua chongtu," *Shilian zazhi* 19 (December 1991), p. 111. The term *"zuguohua"* was actually used by officials in charge of the takeover of Taiwan in 1945.
55. The Taiwan Diaocha weiyuanhui was set up by the KMT government in April 1944, when Japan's defeat was anticipated. The committee was headed by Chen Yi, later governor of Taiwan.
56. Chen Mingzhong and Chen Xingtang, eds., *Taiwan guangfu he guangfuhou wunian shengqing* (Nanjing: Nanjing chubanshe, 1989), p. 49.
57. Ibid., p. 54.
58. *Taiwan Xinsheng bao* (1 April 1947).
59. Ibid.
60. Xu Xueji, "Taiwan kuangfu chuqi de yuwen wenti," pp. 97–8.
61. There were exceptions such as literary critic Ye Shitao (1925–). See Ye Shitao, *Yige laoxiu zuojia de wuling niandai* (Taipei: Qianwei chubanshe, 1991), pp. 27–8, 33, 92.
62. In the 1950s, speaking the mother tongue attracted fines or punishments,

e.g. being forced to hang a square board from their necks reading "I spoke dialect."

63. For Taiwanese involvement in the Japanese war effort from 1937 to 1945, see Zhou Wanyao (Chou Wan-yao), "Riben zai Tai junshi dongyuan yu Taiwan ren de haiwai canzhan jingyan, 1937–1945," *Taiwan shi yanjiiu* 2:1 (June 1995), pp. 85–126.
64. *Chuji xiaoxue guoyu changshi keben* (Taipei: Guoli bianyi guan, 1951), Vol. 1, p. 7; Vol. 2, p. 30.
65. *Chuji xiaoxue guoyu changshi keben* (Taipei: Guoli bianyi guan, 1951), Vol. 5, p. 15, 50; Vol. 7, pp. 21–2; Vol., 8, p. 17; *Gaoji xiaoxue guoyu keben* (Taipei: Guoli bianyi guan, 1951-52), Vol. 1, pp. 3–6, pp. 25–6; Vol., 2, pp. 1–4; Vol., 3, pp. 1–5.
66. *Chuji xiaoxue guoyu changshi keben* (Taipei: guoli biany guan, 1951), Vol. 5, p. 19; Vol. 7, pp. 14–5, 55, 59; Vol. 8, pp. 28–33, 50–1; *Gaoji xiaoxue keben* (Taipei: Guoli bianyi guan, 1953), Vol. 4, p. 1.
67. *Chuji xiaoxue guoyu changshi keben*, Vol., 8, pp. 29–33.
68. *Guomin xuexiao guoyu keben: Chuji* (Taipei: Guoli bianyi guan, 1964), Vol. 5, p. 23.
69. Ibid., Vol. 3, lesson 21.
70. For example, *Guomin xuexiao guoyu keben: Chuji* (Taipei: Guoli bianyi guan, 1962–6) had lessons entitled "The Diligent President Chiang" (Vol. 4, Lesson 1), "Long Live President Chiang" (Vol. 5, Lesson 12), "The Patriotic President Chiang" (Vol. 5, Lesson 28), "The Loyal and Brave President Chiang" (Vol. 6, Lesson 28), and "The Great President Chiang" (Vol. 7, Lesson 21). In the readers for the fifth and sixth grades, one lesson was entitled "The Constantly Self-strengthening President Chiang" (*Guomin xuexiao guoyu keben: Gaoji*, Vol. 1, Lesson 11).
71. Only during wartime did most characters in textbooks appear with Japanese-style names.
72. "Xiao Hua" is the main protagonist in readers used in the early 1950s. Only when I came across two names Aihua and Xinghua in the later parts of the readers did I realize that "hua" stands for China (Zhonghua). Aihua literally means "loving China" and Xinghua "awakening China."
73. Ye Shitao, op. cit., pp. 148–53.
74. Professor Cao Yonghe (Ts'ao Yung-he) shared with me the observation that scholars avoided dealing with the transition of power from Zheng Chenggong to his son for fear of what it might imply about Chiang Kai-shek's relations with his son.
75. Ka Gilin (He Yilin), "Taiwan jin no seiji shakai to ni-ni-hachi jiken: Datsu shokuminchika to kokumin tôgô no kattô" (PhD dissertation, Tokyo University, 1998), p. 16.
76. Question 16: How did you feel about the education [provided at] a common school or a primary school? The responses were as follows: 1. Very satisfied

(15), 2. Satisfied (70), 3. No opinions (14), 4. Dissatisfied (2), 5. Very dissatisfied (0). The numbers in parentheses represent the number of respondents checking the choice.

77. Question 17: How did you feel about school life? The answers were as follows: 1. Liked very much (20), 2. Liked (59), 3. No special feelings (20), 4. Disliked (2), 5.Strongly disliked (0).
78. Question 55: Your overall evaluation of Japanese education is: (to be answered in writing). See "questionnaire on education in elementary schools under Japanese colonial rule."
79. Tsurumi, *Japanese Colonial Education*, p. 143.
80. We must note that aboriginal peoples in Taiwan (roughly today's *gaoshanzu*) were hardly under the Qing administration by 1895, although most "Plains aborigines" (*pingpuzu*) were. The concept of "nation" was alien to them before the 1940s.

Chapter 8

1. Speech dated 22 April 1999. Chen Shui-bian eventually won the Presidential Election in March 2000, and promised in his inaugural speech that he would not declare Taiwanese independence if the People's Republic of China did not invade Taiwan.
2. Thomas B. Gold, "Taiwan: Still defying the odds," in Larry Diamond et al., eds., *Consolidating the Third Wave Democracies: Regional Challenges* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1997), pp. 178–80; Tian Hong-mao, "Taiwan's transformation," in Larry Diamond et al., eds., *Consolidating the Third Wave Democracies*, p. 155.
3. For a detailed account of the historical background mentioned above, see John F. Copper, *Taiwan: Nation-State or Province?* (Boulder: Westview Press, third edition, 1999), pp. 21–52, Alan M. Wachman, *Taiwan: National Identity and Democratization* (Armonk: M. E. Sharpe, 1994), pp. 91–127, and Christopher Hughes, *Taiwan and Chinese Nationalism* (London: Routledge, 1997), pp. 21–94. See also Lai Tse-han, Ramon H. Myers, and Wei Wou, *A Tragic Beginning: The Taiwan Uprising of February 28, 1947* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1991) for the analysis of the February 28 event and Chu Yun-han, *Crafting Democracy in Taiwan* (Taipei: Institute for National Policy Research, 1992) for the process of democratization in Taiwan.
4. Anthony D. Smith, *National Identity* (Reno: University of Nevada Press, 1991), p. 14.
5. Smith, *National Identity*, p. 39.
6. Benedict Anderson, *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism* (London: Verso, second edition, 1991), pp. 6–7.
7. For discussions of the origin and formation of nations, see also E. J. Hobsbawm,