「回顧移轉支付問題：凱因斯、凡爾賽合約、與德國一戰賠償」，人文及社會科學集刊。

“A review of the transfer problem: Keynes, the Versailles treaty, and the German reparations,” Journal of Social Sciences and Philosophy.

With Kuo-chun Yeh

Abstract:

一戰於1918年結束。最晚自1919年開始至1932年，凱因斯持續批評戰後協約國對於戰敗德國的索賠金額。凱因斯在辯論時使用的最重要分析觀念，就是移轉支付。本文回顧凱因斯提出的移轉支付問題，以及晚近對於凱因斯觀點的修正。由於移轉支付問題是凱因斯歐洲債務重整計畫的一部分，本文也一併討論他所提出的協約國債務處理方案，及其所涉及的利益衝突。

World War I ended in 1918. Latest from 1919 and until 1932, Keynes kept criticizing the Allies’ reparation policy towards defeated Germany. In the debate he aroused, the most powerful idea that Keynes resorted to was the concept of transfer problem. This article reviews Keynes’s transfer problem and the recent amendment to Keynes’s point of view. Since the transfer problem is part of the Keynes’s plan for European debt restructuring, this article also discusses Keynes’s proposals for dealing with Inter-allied War Debts and his conflict of interest during the debate.

 

 

“Were capital flows the culprit in the Weimar economic crisis?” Explorations in Economic History, 74, 101278.

With Kuo-chun Yeh

Abstract:

This paper examines the role of capital flows in the interwar German economy. We use a calibrated model of sudden stops as our analytical framework and derive four key findings. First, capital flows aggravated the boom–bust cycle of the Weimar economy. Second, these flows were strongly associated —during different periods —with reparations, conditions in the US capital market, and German domestic events. Third, capital flows before 1930 allowed Germany to pay reparations on credit and thus postponed the hour of reckoning when that debt had to be serviced using trade surpluses. Fourth, the German economic downturn in 1931 was due more to capital flows than to productivity shocks or reparations.

 

 

“Room for Maneuver and Alternatives: A Reinterpretation of the German Crisis of 1931,” Journal of Economics and Management, 15 (2), pp. pp. 135-170.

With Kuo-chun Yeh and Mengyuan Cai

Abstract:

This paper revisits the German crisis of 1931, emphasizing that the cause of the crisis was borrowing in a currency that a sovereign cannot control and the resulting high level of foreign currency-denominated debt. We suggest that the deflationist policy of Heinrich Brüning was not due to gold-standard mentality, but because in a sovereign default he was forced to adopt fiscal austerity and not the other, even though such a policy was deemed to be self-defeating amid the crisis. Moreover, the much stated trade-off between the maintenance of the gold standard and the Reichsbank’s role as lender of last resort or that the banking crisis could have been voided if the Reichsbank was not committed to the maintenance of the gold standard is nothing but an illusion.