At 9 P.M. on March 18, 2014, hundreds of students stormed Taiwan’s national legislature to oppose the ruling party’s railroading of the Cross-Strait Service Trade Agreement (CSSTA), a free trade pact with China. What was originally planned as a sit-in protest unexpectedly evolved into a political crisis, as the so-called Sunflower Movement occupied the plenary conference chamber for twenty-four days, disrupting the regular working of the Legislative Yuan. On March 30, an unusually large protest rally of purportedly 500,000 people took place to emphasize four principal demands: (1) to withdraw the CSSTA from the legislature, (2) to enact the bill on Cross-Strait Agreement Supervision (CSAS), (3) to
legislate the CSAS bill before the legal review of CSSTA, and (4) to convene a citizens’ constitutional conference (gongmin xianzheng huiyi).

Throughout the stalemate, President Ma Ying-jeou of the Kuomintang (KMT) remained adamant in his support of the CSSTA, though he appeared somewhat more accommodating to the idea of codifying the CSAS law and convening a national affairs conference. On April 6, Wang Jin-pyng, the KMT Legislative Yuan speaker whose relationship with Ma Ying-jeou had turned bitter since the previous year, intervened by promising not to put the CSSTA on the agenda until the CSAS law passed. Wang’s declaration soon won endorsement by other KMT heavyweights, who clearly thought Ma’s hard-liner approach was not conducive to settling the political crisis. Exploiting this visible split within the KMT, the Sunflower leaders declared they had “finished the mission of the current stage and secured significant achievement.”2 Four days later, the students and their allies evacuated the Legislative Yuan, thus concluding the highly dramatized standoff that had drawn national as well as international attention.

The student-initiated protest amounted to the biggest challenge to Ma Ying-jeou’s rapprochement with the People’s Republic of China (PRC), which had successfully deescalated the military tension and strengthened economic exchange without being able to assuage popular suspicion of China’s political and territorial ambitions over Taiwan (Chu 2011, 149–152). It also dealt an embarrassing blow to the opposition, the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP), which was struggling to readjust its traditional pro-independence stance to the reality of a more assertive and powerful PRC (Schubert and Braig 2011, 87), especially after two consecutive defeats in presidential elections. Prior to the protest, the DPP opted for an article-by-article review of CSISTA rather than an outright rejection; however, once the congress was occupied, the DPP decided to back the students’ demand to scrap the current CSSTA version.

The Sunflower Movement is intellectually intriguing in many ways. Generally speaking, Taiwan’s society was not a fertile ground for radical protests. According to a comparative study on East Asian countries, the Taiwanese showed only slightly more willingness to participate in social movement activities (signing a petition, joining boycotts, and attending demonstrations) than the renowned law-abiding Singaporeans, and much less than the Japanese and South Koreans (Sonoda 2012, 7). The Sunflower activists, therefore, over-
came the low public tolerance for disruptive protest to orchestrate a powerful challenge to the government. The sustained congress occupation created a political stalemate, but contrary to some expectations it did not generate negative economic impacts. Outside the protest zone around the Legislative Yuan, most citizens’ daily routines went on as usual. Taiwan’s stock market took a dive in the first three days of the occupation; nevertheless, the stock index soon returned to normal, even ending up 2.4 percent higher on the day that students ended their protest, compared to March 18. It is also remarkable that the students’ radical act of seizing the national legislature enjoyed broad popular support. A TVBS poll on March 20–21 showed 70 percent of respondents agreed with the demand to review the CSSTA on an article-by-article basis and 48 percent supported the occupation of congress (with 40 percent opposed).³

Perhaps the biggest puzzle consists in how the Sunflower activists were able to mount such a radical protest, thereby generating a protracted confrontation with the authorities. Why did they avoid a calamitous defeat when the government leaders stood their ground firmly? Globally, there have only been a few cases of student activism that paralyzed the normal functioning of a governmental branch and yet managed to make a glorious retreat. Building on Charles Tilly’s (1978) polity model and the subsequent debate on political opportunity and strategy, I will develop a theoretical approach to explain what made the Sunflower Movement possible.

I argue that neither the political opportunity structure approach—with its emphasis on enduring institutions—nor a purely strategic approach emphasizing tactical moves and bargaining is adequate to understand this case and other examples of contentious politics. Rather, I develop a modified polity model that emphasizes intra-elite divisions and the role of alliances with institutional actors as important determinants of protest success.

A Modified Polity Model:
Political Opportunity, Threat, and Strategy
Central to the Tillyan model is conceptualization of the relation between protesters and the government as a process of political interaction. The government makes up the core of the “polity,” which also includes “members” that possess “routine and low-cost access” to official resources, such as the ruling parties. The social movement plays the role of a “challenger,” which seeks to advance a claim
whose realization will conflict with the interests of those who control the government (Tilly 1978, 52–53). The polity model highlights the power disparity between polity members and a social movement, which explains why the latter often emerges as a contender that relies heavily on extra-institutional means. A social movement is able to mobilize an effective challenge when its constituencies are organized internally for their shared interests. A social movement is also affected by a series of external factors that facilitate or repress its protest activity. Tilly (1978, 100, 133) identifies this political dimension as “opportunity/threat.” The couplet formulation is intended to highlight that the responses of political incumbents can increase the opportunity or decrease the threat of movement success through a mix of repression and concessions. Tilly’s original conceptualization implies a continuum of opportunity and threat in any given setting characterized by contentious politics.

Later researchers developed Tilly’s seminal idea into the concept of “political opportunity structure” (POS) (McAdam 1982; Meyer 1990; Tarrow 1989). POS essentially means “the features of regimes and institutions that facilitate or inhibit a political actor’s collective action” (Tilly and Tarrow 2007, 49), or those state-related variables that encourage or discourage social movements. To make POS more operational, scholars have identified its components, which include stability of the regime, existence of influential allies, availability of policy channels, the state’s repressive capacity, and so on (McAdam 1996; Tarrow 1996). This theory predicts that a social movement emerges in response to the opening up of POS and goes into inevitable decline when POS contracts. In stable democracies, social movements regularly undergo a rising and falling cyclical pattern because a favorable POS always emerges as a transitory phenomenon, bookended by longer periods of tranquility during which opportunities for protest-making are minimal.

Yet, with the gradual consolidation of POS as a basic vocabulary for social movement research come its detractors. First, critics contend that opportunity does not exist without subjective evaluation. A favorable POS generates movement activism insofar as collective actors are capable of perceiving and seizing it (Goodwin and Jasper 1999; Kurzman 1996). The term POS is criticized as an oxymoron because opportunity is inherently subjective whereas structure is objective (Jasper 2012).

Second, it is argued that in some cases social movements actually happen in spite of adverse POS. Researchers argue that the neg-
ative turn in a political situation often functions as a wake-up call to complacent or dormant activists (Koopmans and Statham 1999; Moodie 2002; Rucht 1996). If there is radical indeterminacy between POS and activism, the analytical value of the concept is greatly compromised. Indeed, a number of researchers have advocated abandoning the POS concept for a less deterministic understanding of the political situation that confronts movement activists (Amenta and Halfmann 2012; Goldstone 2004; Kriesi 2004).

Finally, since the POS theory represents the most sophisticated attempt to understand the dynamics of social movements on a structuralist basis, disenchantment with it naturally encourages a revival of agency-based conceptualization. The strategy model is back in fashion, which sees social movements as a recurring process of interaction with the movement opponents (Fligstein and McAdam 2012; Jasper 2004).

In analyzing large antiregime protests, which are characterized by an intensive yet relatively short episode of contention, in this article I maintain that it is possible to reconstruct an analytical framework out of the recent debate between POS and strategy models. First, the original polity model emphasizes the disadvantaged position of social movements vis-à-vis government incumbents who control the means of repression—an insight the strategy model advocates appear to have neglected. Particularly in the context of antiregime protests, where high-profile challenges are directed at the incumbents’ legitimacy and not merely their specific policies, governments tend to be less tolerant and more ready to use repression.

Another merit of the polity model consists in its stress on the interactive relation between protesters and incumbents, which is irretrievably lost in the structuralist formulation of POS. Many classical POS studies aim at understanding how long-term social changes affect political institutions so as to offer a window of opportunity for movement activism. The benefit of a shorter observation period for the interaction between antiregime protesters and political leaders is that we can more or less put institutions in the background, as they do not usually experience rapid change. Moreover, such contention entails high-stakes consequences since paralyzing a governmental branch easily justifies harsher responses from the incumbents, which can even come with casualties. Hence, strategic calculation plays a more prominent role in structuring the dynamics and outcomes of movement activism.

Finally, the POS theorists fail to tap a vital conceptual resource in the seminal polity model. Originally Tilly developed opportunity
and threat in a single dimension (opportunity being the absence of threat). Later on, Tilly and his students separated them into two distinct concepts. The revision was made to take into consideration that it is possible that a hostile gesture by government officials actually provokes rather than damps protest activities. A relevant case here is how the inflammatory April 26 editorial in the *People’s Daily* fueled the Beijing students’ activism that led up to the Tiananmen incident in 1989 (Calhoun 1994, 47–49). An unsophisticated use of the POS perspective might have identified such a situation as a closure of opportunity, whereas threat would be a more appropriate characterization there. In other words, threat, defined as “the cost it [a social group] expects to suffer if it does not take action” (Goldstone and Tilly 2001, 183), stimulated more protest activities.

Therefore a modified polity model is capable of explaining the development of antiregime protests by synthesizing the opposing camps in the POS debate. To build that theoretical perspective on an interactive basis, the discussion on opportunity and threat needs to be reformulated to accommodate the strategic dimension of protest. Hereafter in this article I will abandon the already overburdened term POS and instead use *political opportunity* or *opportunity*, strictly defined as “those behaviors by government incumbents or polity members that lower the cost of protest mobilization.”

In the list of political opportunities outlined by leading scholars (McAdam 1996, 27; Tarrow 1996, 54–56; 2011, 165–167; Tilly and Tarrow 2007, 57), some items refer to the institutional features of a political regime, such as openness of the political system, state capacity, propensity for repression, and political access, which usually do not undergo rapid change in a short period of time and hence can be seen as a stable background. Yet, there are two kinds of political opportunities that are of particular relevance here. First, elite disunity invites protests because movement activists can exploit the inconsistency among officials to justify their contentious behavior. Repression becomes less likely because of the dissenting voices within the government. In the literature of democratization, the split between reformers and hard-liners is often seen as a starting signal for political transition that encourages the opposition movement (O’Donnell and Schmitter 1986, 19; Przeworski 1986, 56). Both China’s Tiananmen movement in 1989 and Taiwan’s Wild Lily movement in 1990 originated from the widening conflict between reformers and conservatives within the regime (Wright 2001).
Somewhat related to this first source of opportunity is the emergence of influential allies with institutional access that favors the extra-institutional contenders. No matter how well a social movement is organized, it lacks institutional avenues to the formalized decisionmaking arenas that an established political party enjoys. Therefore endorsement by an opposition party usually enhances its political impact (Maguire 1995).

While elite disunity and influential allies reduce the cost of anti-regime protests, they should not be seen as structural preconditions for protest as the POS tradition implies. It is possible that politicians’ struggle for power, such as their split, factionalism, and coalition-building, inadvertently creates consequences that empower certain social movements. Moreover, we have to pay attention to situations where movement leaders employ strategies that explicitly aim at creating a split among elites or enlisting their sponsorship. In other words, social movements do not merely respond to the emergence of favorable circumstances, but also attempt to create political opportunity.

Finally, the earlier view of threat implies it is a “negative opportunity,” such as repression; nevertheless Tilly’s later conceptualization puts it in a different category. In other words, threat means the increased cost of inaction, rather than that of collective action. Threat also originates from the behaviors of government incumbents or polity members, but it stimulates protest not because preexisting political hindrance to collective action is overcome but rather because it spreads a sense of urgency. Movement follows opportunity because a strategic assessment indicates the greater likelihood of success, whereas threat is more psychological since the fear of the worst scenario motivates participation. A classic example is how the US Supreme Court decision in Roe v. Wade in 1973, which struck down all state restrictions on abortion, triggered the prolife movement (Luker 1984, 126–127). The conservatives mobilized their countermovement because they perceived the fundamental value of motherhood was undermined, not because the cost of collective action was radically altered. It follows that threat might emerge without noticeable change in the level of political opportunity, and vice versa. Furthermore, the decline of threat is expected to dampen movement participation, and consequently we can expect movement leaders to deploy strategies to maximize the mobilizing effect of threat.

With the concepts of political opportunity, threat, and strategy, it is possible to construct a modified polity model for Taiwan’s Sunflower Movement. I will argue that (1) the KMT’s abrupt decision to
railroad the CSSTA not only violated regular legislative procedure but also created an acute sense of threat that encouraged movement participation; (2) it also triggered elite realignment by pushing the DPP toward determined opposition to the CSSTA—a favorable shift to the Sunflower Movement; and (3) the occupation of the legislature was facilitated by the internal split within the KMT.

Research Questions and Data
What kinds of opportunity or threat gave rise to this unusual congress occupation? How did elite disunity and the acquisition of influential allies affect the movement’s course? Once a political standoff came into being, what were the strategic responses from the movement and the government? Last, how were the Sunflower leaders able to secure a slightly favorable outcome eventually even though the government remained intransigent? I will examine the twenty-four-day strategic interaction to answer these questions.

The research data come from many sources. I conducted field observations during the protest and I used journalistic reports and various online sources. After the conclusion of the occupation, I conducted in-depth interviews with twenty-two involved persons. My sample includes twelve students, five nongovernmental organization (NGO) workers or volunteers, and five DPP political workers (including one lawmaker). Strategic issues are mostly internal to the movement camp, and hence my interpretation relies more on the unpublished sources of data. I will first contextualize the CSSTA controversy in evolving Taiwan-China relations before analyzing the politics of the movement.

The CSSTA Dispute in Context
During his first presidential term (2008–2012), Ma Ying-jeou’s stated effort to normalize cross-strait relations with China culminated in the signing of the Economic Cooperation Framework Agreement (ECFA) in 2010, a preferential agreement to bilaterally reduce tariff and commercial barriers. The ECFA signified a major political victory for Ma’s government because it showed a more cooperative approach to China was able to secure economic benefits. The DPP’s initial opposition and the subsequent about-face further lent credibility to the KMT’s claim. The ECFA also met the PRC’s declared strategy in “making full use of the mainland’s economic clout” (Keng and Schu-
bert 2010, 289) to lure Taiwan into a closer relationship. Therefore promoting greater economic integration through cooperative cross-strait interaction represented a win-win situation for the KMT and the PRC, effectively marginalizing the DPP.

With the breakthrough of the ECFA, officials on both sides of the Taiwan Strait have been busy negotiating new agreements. As of March 2014, there have been twenty-one agreements that were signed without arousing significant opposition, and the CSSTA was the nineteenth one, which was signed on June 21, 2013. The post-ECFA evolution led to the KMT government’s confidence that the CSSTA’s passage would be successful. With the DPP struggling to shake off the “anti-China” (fengzhong bifan) label, the KMT could reasonably expect weak resistance in the national legislature. The DPP’s official stance on economic agreements with China was that they should conform to the international norms of reciprocity and transparency and mitigate the disadvantages faced by Taiwan’s enterprises (DPP 2014, 35). On June 25, 2013, four days after the CSSTA’s official signing, the KMT and DPP legislators reached an agreement to “review and vote the CSSTA on the article-by-article basis,” which represented the DPP’s official position on this issue. Across the political spectrum, the only outright opposition to the CSSTA came from the Taiwan Solidarity Union (TSU), a pro-independence minority party with only three seats in the Legislative Yuan.4

However, the KMT government clearly underestimated the backlash from civil society, business, and professional interests that would be negatively affected by the CSSTA. The free trade talk with China was conducted in an excessively secretive manner; practically no domestic trade leaders or representatives had been consulted or informed in advance. It was only in the few days before the official signing that the public learned a sweeping liberalization of Taiwan’s service sector was imminent. The details of the sixty-four categories of service industries that would be opened up to Chinese investment and manpower were announced after the treaty was finalized. Hao Mingyi, a staunch Ma Ying-jeou supporter and a leading publisher, initiated the opposition to the CSSTA. According to Hao, allowing Chinese investment in Taiwan’s printing industry without asking China to lift its censorship on published books from Taiwan would wreak havoc on Taiwan’s publishing trade. Later he gave up his position of presidential adviser to protest “the neglect of national security and violation of democracy.” Artists, medical workers, social work-
ers, and hair-dressing and cosmetic professionals then raised other concerns over the CSSTA.

The summer of 2013 witnessed growing opposition from civil society. A coalition composed of leading NGOs on labor, gender, environmental, welfare, and human rights issues, the Democratic Front Against Cross-Strait Trade in Services Agreement (DF), was established on July 28. The DF was led by activist lawyer Lai Zhongqiang, who had been working hard to increase the attention of civil society organizations regarding cross-strait issues since the ECFA became effective. The DF argued for more oversight and transparency over cross-strait negotiations and insisted that civil society organizations should be allowed to play a larger role. It was due to Lai’s legal expertise and the DF’s criticisms that the public came to view the CSSTA as a “black box” (heixiang) process in which public oversight was minimal—a damaging criticism that the KMT incumbents found hard to shake off.

While the DF represented the more established wing of Taiwan’s civil society, activist students set up the Black Island Nation Youth Front (BIY) on September 9, which had launched several disruptive protests at the presidential office and legislature. Taiwan’s student activism was revived in 2008 when the so-called Wild Strawberry Movement emerged to protest human rights violations after the newly installed KMT government rolled out the red carpet for a Chinese envoy in November. Although the Wild Strawberry protesters failed to obtain an official apology, they inspired a new cohort of activist students. Since 2008, many new dissident groups emerged in major colleges, and students have been increasingly involved with social protests over environmental, urban renewal, land expropriation, and media monopoly issues. A nationwide activist student network came into being due to their shared movement participation as well as developments in mobile communication technology and social media websites (Ho 2014a). Hence, although the BIY had fewer than twenty participants at its founding, it was firmly embedded in a growing movement network of Taiwan’s youth.

The DF and BIY’s joint efforts persuaded the national legislature to collect more information before starting to review the CSSTA. From July 2013 to March 2014, twenty public hearings have been held, of which KMT legislators chaired twelve and DPP eight. There was intensive use of legislative tactics by both camps. The KMT attempted to expedite the process by hastily holding three public hearing sessions within eight days, while the DPP cautiously navi-
gated between pressure from the anti-CSSTA camp and its desire to avoid the anti-China charge by chairing a public hearing every two weeks.

"The 30-Second Incident": Threat and Elite Realignment

The final public hearing ended on March 10, and then the CSSTA was ready to be processed by the Internal Administration Committee of the Legislative Yuan. A DPP lawmaker was scheduled to chair the committee on March 12, but the KMT did not accept the idea that the opposition party could set the agenda on the CSSTA’s second reading. So the CSSTA was delayed for one week until the KMT lawmaker Chang Ching-chung became the rotating chair of that committee. On the afternoon of March 17, Chang attempted to mount the podium surrounded by the DPP lawmakers without success. Instead he used a private microphone to announce that the second reading of the CSSTA was finished and ready for the plenary review. In thirty seconds, Chang formally concluded the session, leaving the DPP legislators and reporters bewildered. The KMT’s parliamentary tactics amounted to a flagrant violation of the agreement to “review and vote the CSSTA on an article-by-article basis.” Three DPP legislators decided to stage a hunger strike protest on the afternoon of the following day; however, this was immediately overshadowed by the occupation of the Legislative Yuan several hours later.

Anti-CSSTA activists did not expect the KMT to choose this nuclear option. Prior to Chang’s “30-second incident” on March 17, the DF was planning a booklet on the CSSTA’s threat to Taiwanese economy and society, while the BIY was discussing nationwide campus talks to arouse more students’ attention. Both groups were then struggling to bring more public attention to the CSSTA’s technicalities, which baffled most laypersons. Yet, the KMT’s hurried pushing through inadvertently aroused the spotlight that the CSSTA opponents badly needed.

As a matter of fact, an opinion poll taken one week after finalizing the bilateral talks on the CSSTA in June 2013, indicated that 47.4 percent of respondents thought the treaty disadvantageous and only 24.9 percent considered it advantageous (24.4 percent declined to answer). According to the Taiwan Social Change Survey conducted in late 2013, skepticism over cross-strait economic integration was prevalent: 73.7 percent and 53.9 percent of respondents held negative
attitudes toward “mainland Chinese working in Taiwan” and “Taiwanese going to mainland China for investment or work,” respectively (Fu et al. 2014, 230–231).

More interestingly, Taiwanese people appeared more concerned about the political consequences of tightened economic relations than the Ma Ying-jeou government, whose promotion of CSSTA stressed mostly the economic benefits without reassuring the public regarding popular anxieties about losing political liberties. Respondents were asked which conditions would contribute to a rise in popular support for peaceful unification. In declining order, 54.5 percent chose “closer economic ties with mainland China,” 44.2 percent “the rising international status and influence of the mainland Chinese government,” 15.3 percent “mainland China’s refusal to recognize the sovereignty of the Republic of China,” and finally 7.0 percent chose “the communist one-party rule of mainland China” (Fu et al. 2014, 210–211). Clearly there was a profound sense of uneasiness and victimhood among Taiwanese people.

In retrospect, the “30-second incident” could be seen as a threat that encouraged movement participation. As noted, there was already a sizable share of the public that was skeptical about closer economic ties with China without being involved in the protest activities. The KMT lawmakers’ controversial maneuver seemed to substantiate the image of the CSSTA as an undemocratic “black box.” That Taiwan’s democratic procedure suffered collateral damage in the effort to promote closer cross-strait economic integration lent credibility to the claims of anti-CSSTA activists. It facilitated tapping into a latent segment of the population that was worried about the economic and political consequences but remained detached from the CSSTA issue. Later, one of the Sunflower leaders acknowledged that they should have thanked Chang Ching-chung’s move for bringing the issue national attention.6

Moreover, what happened on March 17 gave rise to an elite realignment, pushing the DPP into firm opposition to the CSSTA. As the main opposition party was torn between the lobbying of anti-CSSTA activists and the electoral imperative to tone down their China skepticism, it decided to insist on an article-by-article review without clearly expressing its own attitude. As a matter of fact, on March 13, the DPP publicized an opinion poll that revealed around 41 percent of respondents were dissatisfied with its anti-China stance.7 Why the DPP leadership decided to release such information amid the growing controversy over the CSSTA is intriguing. It was
widely taken to be a symbolic gesture indicating the DPP’s willingness to make concessions. Hence, it was no surprise that Sunflower activists were highly critical of the DPP’s “ambiguity” prior to the occupation of congress.8

Once the KMT lawmakers had opted to remove the review procedure, the DPP was deprived of its influence in modifying the terms of cross-strait economic integration. As a polity member under assault, the DPP came to support the Sunflower Movement in trying to scrap the CSSTA entirely. During the twenty-four-day seizure of congress, DPP lawmakers took shifts to secure freedom of entry into the plenary conference chamber for the occupiers. The DPP’s Department of Social Movements fielded liaison staff on a rotating basis in order to provide the necessary supplies. On March 21, the DPP also mobilized its supporters nationwide to demonstrate its determination to back up the students’ demands. In short, the KMT’s unexpected legislative maneuver secured an elite ally for the anti-CSSTA movement.

If the 30-second incident ended up as a threat and triggered an elite realignment, it remained to be answered why the KMT lawmakers decided to take this risk. There seemed to be two tactical missteps on the part of KMT leaders. They clearly underestimated public anxiety over closer economic ties with China, and at the same time they wrongly assumed that the DPP was the main obstacle to the passing of the CSSTA. According to the DPP director of Chinese affairs, the KMT government “made too little effort toward boosting public support.” He acknowledged the public attitude could be changed if the government were able to launch a promotional campaign, analogous to that of the ECFA in 2010. Tuan Yi-kang, the DPP lawmaker who chaired the Internal Administration Committee before Chang Ching-chung, was also surprised by the KMT’s hawkish response. In my interview, Tuan admitted that if the KMT had decided to put the CSSTA on review according to the original agreement, it would have been difficult for the DPP to oppose the bill.

The Evolution of the Sunflower Movement
How the anti-CSSTA activists were able to seize the national legislature and thus engender a stalemate depended on a number of short-term political contingencies. The modified polity model pays attention to political opportunity, threat, and strategy-making, particularly in a brief episode of intensive confrontation. Here I will analyze the
twenty-four-day evolution of the Sunflower Movement in five different stages.

**Occupying the Congress, March 18–19**

In response to the KMT’s unexpected rushing of the CSSTA through the legislative agenda the previous day, the DF and BIY activists secretly planned a guerilla-style protest, storming the compound of the Legislative Yuan at 9 p.m. on March 18. As it panned out, roughly fifty protesters were successful in mounting the premise’s walls since the policemen were caught off guard. They gathered in the courtyard and shouted slogans for a while, before breaking into the plenary conference chamber. At 10 p.m., the number of protesters had swelled to around 200 and they decided to hold their ground by erecting makeshift barricades and setting up a leadership core. The news that congress was being occupied was immediately broadcast via Internet, attracting supporters to the area. By midnight, around 2,000 people had gathered on Qingdao East Road and Jinan Road to demonstrate their solidarity (see Figure 1), effectively encircling the policemen who attempted to remove the protesters from inside the legislative building. Bottled water, food, first aid, medicine, and other materials were quickly sent inside by supporters to sustain a potentially prolonged protest. In hindsight, swift and spontaneous logistical reaction made possible the radical act of seizing a government building.

**Figure 1 The Legislative Yuan and Its Environs**
The DF and BIY activists had previously promoted their agenda mainly through institutional channels. They participated in public hearings, staged protest rallies, and lobbied the opposition politicians. In my interviews, the core activists revealed their private pessimism at having exhausted nearly all available channels before the unanticipated turn on March 17. Therefore the KMT lawmakers’ railroading of the CSSTA provided the perfect opportunity for the agreement’s opponents. In the past, the BIY had launched protest rallies in front of the Legislative Yuan several times. Thus, to mount a stronger protest, the activists needed to raise the stakes. A sit-in within the national legislature, rather than outside of it, seemed like a logical step even though it involved law-breaking actions. The core activists reckoned that the KMT lawmakers’ trampling of the rule of law justified their civil disobedience.

There were at least four rounds of scuffles between protesters and policemen until the morning of March 19; however, the police’s efforts to take back the plenary conference chamber failed for several reasons. First, a misleading piece of information led the authorities to deploy most of their police force near the presidential office on that eventful night, leaving the Legislative Yuan weakly defended. Second, the speedy mobilization of supporters outside of the legislative building made the forcible evacuation difficult, if not impossible. The authorities would have had to clear the growing crowd on Jinan Road and Qingdao East Road before securing the occupied chamber. Third, toward midnight, the chairpersons of the opposition DPP and TSU parties and their politicians staged a sit-in protest in the courtyard, which certainly raised the political cost of an aggressive operation by the authorities. Finally and perhaps more importantly, the Legislative Yuan Speaker Wang Jin-pyng’s attitude played a critical role because police action within the legislative building required his approval legally as well as politically. Wang appeared to agree to the police order to evacuate the intruders in the first few hours, but later on he adopted a more neutral position, not allowing more police reinforcements. Why did Wang appear to be accommodating to the radical act of seizing the Legislative Yuan given that there was no evidence he opposed the CSSTA? Since the previous fall, Wang had lodged a legal battle against Ma Ying-jeou to challenge the latter’s decision to revoke his KMT party membership and thereby his leadership in the national legislature. It happened that the result of the first trial was scheduled to be announced on the afternoon of March 19, less than twelve hours after the occupation took place. If Wang
lost the case, he would be immediately deprived of his party membership and the congressional leadership. There was no incentive for Wang to assume a hard-liner’s position since that would have risked his personal reputation and helped his political enemy.

The court awarded Wang Jin-pyng a clear victory in the first round of his lawsuit. By that time, busloads of participants from central and southern Taiwan had arrived and the crowd outside had grown to tens of thousands. Clearly there was no longer the possibility that authorities could nip the Sunflower Movement in the bud as the confrontation between protesters and the government escalated.

Wang’s neutrality was an instance of elite division that created opportunity for the protesters. However, when the latter decided to storm the Legislative Yuan, they had no idea about the outcome of Wang’s pending trial, nor could they have predicted his decision not to evict occupiers forcibly. Most likely, Wang’s hands-off stance was a gambit for his ongoing power struggle with Ma, who had to shoulder greater political responsibility for a paralyzed legislature. If this reasoning is correct, elite disunity per se did not automatically favor contention, but was actually activated by movement strategy.9

**Escalating the Confrontation vs. Nonresponsiveness, March 20–24**

On March 20, the Sunflower leaders formally raised their demands. First they asked Wang Jin-pyng to rescind the conclusion made in the 30-second incident and send the CSSTA back for the article-by-article review. Second, they requested an open dialogue with Ma Ying-jeou on the CSSTA and CSAS issues. The government was given twenty-four hours to consider these demands, which failed to elicit any response from the KMT incumbents. On the evening of March 21, the Sunflower leaders invited supporters to stage a sit-in protest at the KMT party branch offices nationwide to increase pressure on the government. According to journalistic sources, at least eighteen local KMT offices were besieged by protest crowds, some for several days. In major cities such as Taichung, Tainan, and Kaohsiung, thousands attended spontaneous rallies.

The KMT government chose not to respond to this political crisis initially. Ma Ying-jeou required Wang Jin-pyng to deal with the protesters, but the request was rejected by Wang. Then, on March 22, Premier Jiang Yi-huah came to meet the student representatives face to face, but he explicitly refused their demands to withdraw the CSSTA and legislate the CSAS. The next day Ma Ying-jeou con-
vowed a press conference in which he denounced the illegal behavior of the students and stressed the economic advantages of CSSTA.

While Ma and Jiang adopted a hard-line attitude, other KMT heavyweights signaled their relative tolerance. On March 20, Taipei City mayor Hau Lung-pin expressed his respect for “the students’ reasonable demands” and disapproved of forcible eviction as a solution.\(^{10}\) Two days later, New Taipei City mayor Chu Li-luan expressed a similar sentiment, praising the “democratic motives” among students.\(^{11}\) Since Hau and Chu were both potential successors to Ma, their more conciliatory gestures toward the movement reflected deliberate efforts to distance themselves from Ma and Jiang. The apparent split within the KMT leadership not only made it more difficult to resort to police eviction, but also gave more latitude to the Sunflower activists.\(^{12}\)

Seeing that their occupation had failed to bring forth positive responses, the Sunflower protesters decided to escalate tensions. Right after Ma’s press conference, they appealed for the convening of a citizens’ constitutional conference to solve the ongoing political crisis. The calls for students to boycott class (bake) and for a general strike (bagong) were also issued. Outside of the core leadership in the occupied chamber, there was another group of students who attempted to steer the movement onto a more radical course. After several rounds of fruitless negotiations, they secretly decided to target the Executive Yuan, located one block away. At 7 p.m. on March 23, they launched a sit-in there and soon its front square was swarming with thousands of protesters. However, there were participants who broke into the government building unexpectedly, creating an excuse for the official crackdown. Starting at midnight on March 24, the police used batons, shields, and water cannons to disperse the crowd. More than 500 protesters were wounded, and some had severe head injuries. The police arrested and interrogated sixty-one persons. The police spent several hours taking back the Executive Yuan, but the excessive use of force against a peaceful rally, which was vividly captured on mobile phone cameras and quickly spread via the Internet, shocked the public.

**Groping for a Possible Breakthrough vs. Equivocation, March 25–30**

The suppression at the Executive Yuan triggered a leadership crisis in the movement, as radicals and moderates were briefly plunged into a spate of mutual recrimination. Soon after, the Sunflower Movement
was able to rebuild their command structure establishing, on March 25, a thirty-person representative assembly (twenty students and ten NGO activists) and a nine-person decisionmaking group (five students, three professors, and one lawyer), which assumed movement leadership by and large effectively until the end of the occupation.13

The protest on March 23 drew criticism for its attempt to paralyze the executive branch of the government. Moderate KMT leaders, such as Hau Lung-pin, who had called for tolerance a few days before, now stood for law and order. In hindsight, the action stopped further polarization among the KMT leadership—a key resource that would have been helpful to the Sunflower Movement.

Yet, on balance, the result was still greater pressure on Ma and Jiang. The disproportionate use of force to drive away the protesters from the Executive Yuan, on the other hand, backfired, as the government was criticized for “state violence” (guojia baoli). The official attempt to whitewash the degree of violence flew in the face of video images showing people who were battered, bleeding, and unconscious. As a result, the KMT incumbents made a minor concession to the mounting pressure from public opinion. On March 25, the presidential office reversed its previous aloofness by showing willingness to meet student representatives unconditionally. Four days later, Ma held the second press conference in which he opened by praising the Sunflower Movement as “the concrete practice of the youth demonstrating their social concern and democratic participation” and then proceeded to respond to the demands “positively.” Ma claimed to personally support the codification of CSAS, but insisted its legislation could proceed simultaneously with the legal review of CSSTA. As for the citizens’ constitutional conference, Ma asserted that an alternative form of meeting ought to do the job. Nevertheless, he rejected the most important demand to withdraw the CSSTA. On April 1, the Executive Yuan finished a CSAS draft, which was no more than a restatement of the current practice of cross-strait negotiations. Two days later, the government declared a “national conference on economics and trade” (jingmao guoshi huiyi) would be forthcoming, which amounted to a purposeful distortion of what protesters had originally demanded. Clearly the government now practiced a strategy of equivocation, putting on a responsive and humane facade to defuse the pressure without really meeting any of the protesters’ demands.

The Sunflower leaders learned a bitter lesson in the first week. The nationwide sit-in at the KMT party branch offices ran out of
steam in a few days, and only one labor union responded to the call for a general strike. Although thousands of students continued to gather and camp outside the Legislative Yuan, only a few college departments ceased their regular teaching schedules. The incident at the Executive Yuan showed the futility of increasing pressure by occupying another government building. The tactical options for the Sunflower activists were visibly narrowed, and they now had to proceed more cautiously. On March 27, the movement leadership decided to hold a large-scale protest rally. On the same day, they also launched a signature campaign inviting lawmakers from all parties to pledge to legislate the CSAS as their first priority. The student leaders made it clear that they would withdraw from the Legislative Yuan as long as they collected the agreement from more than half of the lawmakers—the first indication by the Sunflower leaders that they were willing to make some concessions.

The signature campaign was designed to drive a wedge between the KMT lawmakers and Ma Ying-jeou. It was hoped that the former would act independently, thus thwarting Ma’s intransigence and gaining the movement new leverage. In tandem with this strategic reorientation, the Sunflower leaders toned down their criticism of KMT lawmakers. Initially, Wang Jyn-ping was also condemned as being equally responsible for the 30-second incident; now, with the new strategy specifically targeting the internal split within the KMT, Wang had to be treated with respect in order to win the support of pro-Wang lawmakers.

On March 30, the rally rolled out much more successfully than expected. The Sunflower leaders had been worried that fewer than 100,000 people would show up and the torrential rain the previous day did not bode well for them. There was discussion as to whether they should scale down their demands by conceding to Ma’s proposal to simultaneously process the CSSTA and CSAS. It turned out to be a sunny Sunday, and 500,000 were estimated to have taken part in this unprecedented event. Right before the concluding speech at 7 p.m., the leaders decided to stick to the original four demands, thus dragging the stalemate into the third week.

*Maintaining the Stalemate vs. Preparing for Crackdown, March 31–April 5*

For the Sunflower leadership, it was as discouraging that a successful mass rally failed to bring out more concessions from the KMT government as it was alarming that the crowd outside the Legislative
Yuan began to shrink afterwards. Tens of thousands of people had gathered and slept in Jinan Road and Qingdao East Road for nearly two weeks, and it was clear many participants were exhausted. With midterm exams coming soon, many students also left and returned to school. On April 1, an avowedly pro-China mafia boss threatened to bring his followers to enter the occupied plenary conference chamber by force, and that menace triggered a temporary surge in crowds to protect the Sunflower protesters. However, that only lasted one day and failed to reenergize the movement’s declining momentum.

The first few days in April witnessed the nadir of movement morale. No KMT lawmaker would come out to sign the pledge to prioritize the CSAS, and popular approval for the occupation declined (see Table 1). Among the core participants, how to manage an orderly and dignified exit became an open topic. The only initiative that came out of the Sunflower leadership in the third week was to hold a “people’s congress” on April 5 and 6, in which more than 1,000 participants joined a deliberative forum on CSAS and the citizens’ constitutional conference. All they could do was prolong the precarious stalemate, and they were no longer to launch any offensives.

Fortunately, spontaneously formed groups somewhat made up the lost momentum in this period. Democracy Kuroshio (minzhu heichao), a student organization primarily from southern Taiwan, started a series of street demonstrations at the local offices of KMT lawmakers from April 4 to 9. A netizen-initiated organization called Appendectomy Project (gelanwei) entered the fray, and they created Internet platforms (a website and app) to collect signatures in an attempt to recall some KMT lawmakers. Beez (xiaomifeng) was a decentralized organization formed on April 3, with more than 100 cells (which they called “beehives”) all over Taiwan. Beez activists staged street speech and singing actions and distributed leaflets.

While there was a creative diversification of movement strategies, the Sunflower leaders were facing the dismal prospect of losing popular support. Table 1 presents the results of opinion surveys from March 21 to April 3. It shows that the failed sit-in protest at the Executive Yuan on March 23 did not reduce public sympathy, yet the successful rally on March 30 was followed by declining support. Clearly public tolerance of the occupation grew thinner as it dragged on.

Seeing the exhaustion of movement vitality and support, the government tried to engineer a favorable atmosphere for an eventual forced evacuation. Changing its previously conciliatory tone, the
KMT incumbents now voiced harsh criticism and warnings. On April 3, the KMT general secretary vehemently denounced the student protest as antidemocratic, and Jiang Yi-hua also criticized the students for being unreasonable in escalating their demands. A dubious piece of news asserted that Wang Jin-pyng claimed the use of police force did not need his approval, but he later denied this. The following day, policemen in full antiriot gear appeared. On April 5, the DPP held an emergency press conference to warn the government not to use force. All these signs indicated that the KMT incumbents were ready for a final showdown with the protesters.

An Exit with Dignity, April 6–10

As the Sunflower Movement was heading toward a tragic denouement, Wang Jin-pyng’s timely intervention tipped the balance in favor of the movement. During the morning of April 6, Wang arrived at the occupied chamber unexpectedly and read a carefully worded announcement. He congratulated the idealistic devotion of student activism and pointed out that a working national legislature needed the ruling party’s tolerance, the opposition party’s wisdom, and the support of the citizens. To solve the present crisis, he pledged not to convene the interparty caucus discussion on the CSSTA before the CSAS law was legislated. After reading his announcement, Wang
made a brief visit to the occupied chamber, paying his respects to the protesters inside. The Sunflower leaders knew of Wang’s visit only one hour in advance, and they quickly decided to adopt a cautious response, “not shouting slogans nor shaking hands with him.”

Wang Jin-pying claimed his intervention became necessary because his efforts in bringing the KMT and DPP congress leaders to a compromise had failed due to their polarized stances. It was also likely that Wang sought to prevent potential bloodshed in the national legislature, which might have damaged his political career. For the Sunflower leadership, Wang was offering a better deal than Ma since his proposal was closer to the movement’s demand to legislate CSAS before reviewing the CSSTA, although there remained the possibility that the KMT lawmakers could again railroad the CSSTA unilaterally without an agreement in the interparty caucus discussion.

With a depleted movement, Wang’s move also forced the Sunflower leaders to respond in a constructive way. Immediately after Wang’s visit, the student leaders held a press conference to hint that a solution was looming. For the next twenty hours, student leaders and NGO activists were busy with internal meetings on how to manage a dignified exit. On the evening of April 7, the Sunflower leaders declared that their occupation would end three days later. Although there were complaints that the decision to withdraw was made without proper consultation and reluctance on the part of some die-hard activists to leave, a cheerful and celebrative farewell rally was held on the evening of April 10 and the Sunflower leaders vowed to continue their anti-CSSTA efforts.

It was true that Sunflower participants needed some time to clean up the plenary conference chamber, which had become an embattled campground for the past three weeks, and they had to manage the logistical problems of stockpiled materials and money donated by supporters. However, the decision to leave on April 10 (Thursday) was also strategic. Since Taiwan’s Legislative Yuan regularly convened plenary meetings on Friday, and KMT incumbents had been airing the possibility of holding the meeting elsewhere due to the occupation, the Sunflower leaders considered leaving a ready-to-use plenary conference chamber before the morning of April 11 to be a strategic choice so that the authorities would not have the excuse to hold it elsewhere.

For the KMT government, Wang’s mediation came as an embarrassment. His endorsement of the demand to legislate the CSAS as a precondition of reviewing the CSSTA ran counter to Ma’s insistence on the simultaneous processing of both. Wang’s move was clearly an
indication of the widening rift among the KMT leadership. Previously Wang and Ma clashed over a number of issues, but their disagreement did not include cross-strait policy. Again, the occupation intensified a preexisting intra-elite split in favor of the students. Wang’s cautiously worded statement indicated his support for more oversight over the negotiation with China—a clear endorsement for the Sunflower Movement’s reprioritized demands since the second week of the protest.

Apparently the KMT caucus did not know of Wang’s intentions in advance, which is why they later condemned Wang as a “traitor to the party.” On April 7 the presidential office released a statement in an attempt to rationalize the conspicuous difference between Ma and Wang. It meekly acknowledged that Wang at least did not oppose putting the CSSTA on review. Consequently, the political rivalry within the ruling party helped the Sunflower Movement in claiming a victorious result: the protesters framed their decision to withdraw from the Legislative Yuan as “a turn from defensive to offensive by leaving the fortress to sow more seeds” (zhuanshou weigong chuguan bozhong). In other words, although they failed in pressuring the government to scrap the free trade bill, they still succeeded in preventing a swift passage of CSSTA and in putting CSAS on the legislative agenda.

Discussion
The above section reconstructs the evolution of the twenty-four-day congress occupation from the perspective of opportunity, threat, and strategy. It is intended as a simplified, though not overly simplistic, model to condense the greatest episode of collective contention in Taiwan’s political history. My analysis highlights the fact that social movements and the government are inevitably engaged in “an iterative strategic dance” (Fligstein and McAdam 2012, 84).

The narrative confirms several observations about the dynamics of such protest, including how repression can backfire and the difficulty of sustaining collective action over time. The KMT government’s decision to play tough with the sit-in protest at the Executive Yuan might have stemmed further radicalization among movement activists, but it came with the cost of being seen as excessively repressive toward a peaceful crowd. That the government backtracked from its initial nonresponsiveness to a slightly more accommodating stance was related to the intensive media coverage of police violence.
The above analysis also indicates the inherent difficulties in maintaining a stalemate over a prolonged period of time. In the initial stage, popular indignation and enthusiasm are still fresh because of the urgent sense of threat; however, as the protest drags on, frustration and exhaustion creep in, which makes the standoff between protesters and the government increasingly unstable. Antiregime protesters need the stalemate in order to conduct political bargaining with the incumbents, yet it is obvious that time usually does not stand on their side. Taiwan’s Sunflower activists did not foresee a twenty-four-day war of attrition when they first stormed the parliamentary complex on March 18. Over the more than three-week period, their mobilizing capacity steadily declined, putting them in a highly vulnerable position. The sense of threat, previously a facilitating factor for movement participation, began to diminish because students had effectively paralyzed the national legislature. In hindsight, the greatest strategic success of the Sunflower Movement consisted in its radical action of occupying the national legislature, which not only secured elite sponsorship by pushing the opposition party to an anti-CSSTA stand, but also engineered an elite split within the ruling party. Political opportunities facilitated protest-making as long as the activists were able to deploy appropriate strategies.

Finally, the strategic perspective confirms that unity is a critical asset in managing a political stalemate. The strife between moderates and radicals within the Sunflower Movement led to the weakly planned sit-in protest at the Executive Yuan. After a brief period of confusion, the movement activists quickly reestablished a leadership structure that succeeded in avoiding further splits until the very end. The KMT incumbents, on the other hand, suffered from their intense infighting. In fact, it was largely due to the personal rivalry between Ma Ying-jeou and Wang Jin-pyng that protesters were able to take hold of the plenary conference chamber on March 18 and also conclude their protest with a claim of success on April 10. Therefore the story of Taiwan’s Sunflower Movement confirms a key finding in the literature of social movement studies: elite disunity is often a precondition of successful protests.

**Conclusion**

The spring of 2014 witnessed a massive antiregime protest in Taiwan. By occupying the Legislative Yuan, the Sunflower Movement generated a political crisis in which protesters were engaged in a sus-
tained standoff with the government. During those eventful twenty-four days, there was speculation about where the stalemate was heading. It was fortunate for Taiwan that bloodshed and polarization were avoided. The occupation ended in a peaceful and orderly manner.

It is difficult to produce a balance sheet for the Sunflower Movement because doing so depends on the time horizon one uses to evaluate its impact. An immediate account on April 10, when the students ended their occupation, indicated a clear success for the Sunflower Movement since it derailed Ma Ying-jeou’s plan for a quick passage of the CSSTA and won support for more supervision over cross-strait negotiation from the KMT leaders.

An intermediate observation six months later seems a bit more complicated. After the Sunflower Movement, Ma Ying-jeou reiterated his personal commitment to hasten the review of CSSTA and government officials resumed the negotiation over a goods trade agreement with China, still without public oversight. Yet, at the time of this writing (October 2014), with the widened rift among the KMT, the entrenched opposition from the DPP, and an upcoming local election, it was highly questionable whether Ma Ying-jeou could risk another 30-second incident without incurring a similar if not greater backlash. Past mobilization and splits within the KMT did serve as an effective constraint on the government.

In this article I attempt to answer the questions of which factors engendered such large-scale protest and how the activists managed to obtain a favorable outcome in spite of the adverse political circumstances. It is true that the KMT’s parliamentary tactic to rush through the CSSTA in the 30-second incident was a gross miscalculation that fueled public anger by manufacturing an instant threat to those who might be concerned but not spurred into action by the CSSTA alone. Thus, by resisting the CSSTA in a high-profile manner, the Sunflower Movement actually struck a chord with many citizens.

Once the congress was occupied, the movement trajectory generated its own developmental logic that was not entirely foreseeable from the preexisting conditions. I have demonstrated that the twenty-four-day course of the Sunflower Movement was punctuated by a series of strategic interactions. Ultimately, the disunity within the ruling party offered a favorable opportunity for Sunflower activists to paralyze the working of the national legislature for more than three weeks and to claim success when they ended their occupation.

Finally, a modified polity model analysis points out why radical protest such as occupying congress is rare. Elites are seldom in such
a disharmonious state as to lend leverage to protesters. Neither do they often make mistakes that corroborate the worst fears that movement activists have struggled to emphasize. It takes a felicitous combination of opportunity, threat, and skillful movement leadership to manufacture a challenge of such magnitude. That these factors are usually not simultaneously present explains the stability of political order even when the incumbents are promoting some highly unpopular policies.

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1. The appellation is fortuitous because a florist sent sunflowers to show his support in the first few days, then the media caught the image and started to label it that way. There were some activists who preferred to call it the March 18 Movement.


4. The anti-CSSTA activists had always suspected the DPP’s position on this controversial pact. On a later press occasion, Wei Yang, a BIY leader, claimed the DPP politicians maintained an “ambiguous” attitude toward the CSSTA before March 18 mainly because some of them had business deals in China. http://goo.gl/fAopYC (accessed July 7, 2014).


9. Actually, anti-CSSTA activists originally planned to stage a sit-in in front of the presidential office in the evening of March 17, but they decided to shift the target to the Legislative Yuan in the afternoon of the following day. Had they proceeded with the earlier plan, the Ma-Wang rivalry could not have become a favorable opportunity for the protesters since there would be less pressure on Wang to intervene in this dispute.


12. In fact, this was not the first time that Hau Lung-ping and Chu Li-luan chose to take sides with social movements in open defiance against Ma Ying-jeou’s leadership. Reflecting the growth of antinuclear voices in the wake of the Fukushima incident, Hau and Chu had been expressing similar remarks since 2012; see Ho (2014b).

13. Incidentally, one of the reasons the Sunflower Movement was able to rebuild its command structure in the aftermath of the Executive Yuan incident was because the radical activists who led the sit-in on March 23 either went into hiding from the police manhunt or were so frustrated that they left the movement for a time. Their exodus, voluntary or not, effectively ended the leadership struggle that plagued the movement during the first few days of the occupation. Consequently the leadership was consolidated within the group of core activists who remained inside the Legislative Yuan throughout the movement.


References


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