Manufacturing Loyalty: The Political Mobilization of Labor in Taiwan, 1950 —1986
Ming-sho Ho
Modern China 2010 36: 559
DOI: 10.1177/0097700410379551

The online version of this article can be found at:
http://mcx.sagepub.com/content/36/6/559

Published by:
SAGE
http://www.sagepublications.com

Additional services and information for Modern China can be found at:

Email Alerts: http://mcx.sagepub.com/cgi/alerts

Subscriptions: http://mcx.sagepub.com/subscriptions

Reprints: http://www.sagepub.com/journalsReprints.nav

Permissions: http://www.sagepub.com/journalsPermissions.nav

Citations: http://mcx.sagepub.com/content/36/6/559.refs.html

Ming-sho Ho

Abstract
Authoritarianism expects workers to play the dual role of diligent producers and loyal citizens simultaneously. In extreme cases, workers must demonstrate political commitment in their everyday life. This article analyzes Taiwanese sugar refinery workers to understand the dynamics of political mobilization under the Nationalists. In the name of anti-communism, a series of control mechanisms were installed in nationalized workplaces. Workers were coerced to participate in numerous political rituals. Beneath superficial conformity, workers adopted a rich variety of everyday techniques of resistance to cope with their dependence. The author characterizes workers’ behaviors in terms of ritualism, innovation, and retreatism. These acts of resistance brought about an undisciplined workplace with widespread work avoidance and moonlighting. Over the long haul, the infrastructure of political mobilization remained intact despite the fact that its content became more and more meaningless. Finally, only with the fundamental change in the political environment brought about by democratization did this labor control strategy finally collapse.

Keywords
party-state, worker resistance, political mobilization, Taiwan

1National Taiwan University, Taipei City, Taiwan

Corresponding Author:
Ming-sho Ho, Department of Sociology, National Taiwan University, No. 1, Roosevelt Road, sec 4, Taipei City, 10617, Taiwan
Email: mingshoho@gmail.com
Workers are hired to produce, that is to say, to generate surplus value with their labor power. Workers’ productivity presupposes their compliance; in other words, they need to be educated, socialized, and indoctrinated to a minimum level of conformity before entering the factory gate. In regular capitalism, workers’ compliance is but a means to facilitate the extraction of surplus value from their work. However, there are situations where the demand for workers’ obedience becomes abnormally excessive.

This article discusses the situation in which workers’ political loyalty is more valued than their material output. Under this circumstance, the ruling elites expect workers not only to play the role of diligent producers but also act as loyal citizens in the collective pursuit of a sacred agenda. Political mobilization of labor takes place when some consecrated political ends take priority over the utilitarian business of accumulation. Since industrial workers are a critical component in a modernizing economy, their participation is essential. Many ruling elites do not see these political activities as detrimental to the daily operations in the workplace, though it often turns out otherwise.

The political mobilization of the working class is relatively common in late industrialization. As Gerschenkron (1962) stresses, a state-sponsored “big push” is necessary to mobilize national resources toward the goal of development. The visible hand shepherds infantile industries by protecting the domestic market, offering favorable loans, and subsidizing investment. As a consequence, it rarely refrains from intervening in the workplace. Bendix’s (1963) comparative study of management ideology confirms this observation. In imperial Russia, state-led industrialization was accompanied by Tsarist paternalism that constantly affected the fate of workers. In contrast, the spontaneous and gradual industrialization of England gave rise to the doctrine of laissez-faire and social Darwinism, which justified the misery of the working class as natural and inevitable. Aside from the ideational dimension, the bourgeoisie in late-industrialization is often state-created and thus politically subservient to bureaucrats (Evans, 1982). In many countries, governments have even taken the initiative in creating a vast sector of public enterprises in their catch-up effort. Either way, the result is that ruling elites occupy the commanding heights of the national economy and their administrative reach stretches down to the workshop level.

How do rank-and-file workers react to the political demands imposed on them? Political mobilization usually takes place alongside the repression of left-wing unions, the outlawing of strikes, and the suppression of information so that workers are deprived of meaningful channels of speaking their minds. A superficial observer might conclude that the working class is coaxed and coerced into conformity given the fact that grassroots-based opposition is
nearly nonexistent. Despite the misleading façade of labor quiescence, workers stage a rich repertoire of everyday resistance. Rather than remolding the working class into loyal producers, the politicization of the workplace usually results in widespread cynicism and ritualism.

To understand the dynamics of political mobilization, this article focuses on a special category of the working class in postwar Taiwan, the workers in state-owned enterprises (SOEs). As will be explained more thoroughly below, three reasons warrant a close look at this subject. First, though the SOE workers made up only a minority of all workers, they were deployed in the strategically critical sectors of Taiwan’s economy. In 1966, for example, 11 percent of Taiwan’s employees fell into this category, but their employers possessed 54 percent of the nation’s economic assets (author’s calculation based on the 1966 Survey of Commerce and Industry [gongshang pucha]). Second, the postwar nationalization of colonial industry instantly transformed the status of the fledging working class that emerged under Japanese rule. Without a social revolution, the aristocrats of labor in colonial society became state workers under a mobilizing regime. Last, the penetration of the Guomindang (GMD; Kuomintang) into the growing private sector was persistently thwarted by the resistance of business people. Thus, only state workers experienced the full-blown process of political mobilization.

Modern sugar refineries first appeared in Taiwan in 1901, when the Japanese government sought to make the island a more profitable colony. Under its tutelage, these zaibatsu-controlled factories eclipsed the native-owned sugar mills. At its zenith, Taiwan was among the world’s top sugar producers (Grajdanzev, 1941: 61). Immediately after the Japanese surrender in 1945, the GMD government confiscated these industrial assets as “enemy property.”

With the incorporation of the Taiwan Sugar Corporation (TSC) into the GMD state in 1946, the prewar zaibatsu empire became the centerpiece of state capitalism. Full-scale anti-communist political mobilization was launched in 1950 and continued until the democratic breakthrough in 1987. In that year, the 38-year-long martial law was lifted and that move triggered an immediate wave of labor protests. Beneath the seeming industrial peace and ideological consensus of this long period (1950–1986), workers waged a variety of forms of resistance against the GMD’s political control.

For this study, I interviewed 45 employees in the Beigang, Huwei, Dalin, Nanjing, Suantou, and Shanhua subsidiaries of the TSC, all located in the agricultural heartland of southwestern Taiwan. Most of my interviewees were industrial workers who operated factory machinery and drove vehicles. During the colonial period, Taiwan’s sugar industry had relied on contracted farming to provide sugarcane (Ka, 1995), so only few workers were land tillers.
A minority of my interviewees had been in the ranks of “staff,” which meant that they had been or still were office clerks, engineers, or supervisors.

I met my informants in 2002–2007. The oral history method runs the risk of rationalizing the past according to the present. To minimize possible distortion, I adopted several strategies. First, I focused on the specific features of the political activities involved, rather than asking about the workers’ general impressions of the GMD. Many political campaigns had occurred long ago, and obtaining information regarding workers’ actual experience in those mobilizing moments (e.g., what they did during the required monthly Sun Yat-sen meeting) helped avoid unnecessary entanglement. Second, to better understand the situation several decades ago, I included ten retired workers in the interviewees. Many interviewed workers were second-generation or third-generation TSC employees who grew up in company housing. When possible, I also asked about their childhood experiences.

With one exception, my interviewees were at the bottom tier of the TSC, which meant that they were most of the time being mobilized, rather than mobilizing others. Their experiences revealed the real world of a political architecture wherein the intentions and policies of the top echelon were often opaque or unintelligible to them. Archival research of TSC documents helped clarify the GMD elites’ perspective in guiding political mobilization. In particular, I relied on two TSC publications, Taitang tongxun (TSC Communications, a monthly company periodical) and Taitang yewu gongbao (TSC Gazette, a compilation of official documents). In the following, I abbreviate them as TT and TYG, respectively, and refer to the cited source in the format of “volume. issue. publication year: page number.”

**Leninist Control by Mobilization**

Taiwan’s authoritarian political structure has been characterized as a “party-state regime” (Wakabayashi, 1992: 81–146, Dickson, 1997), or “quasi-Leninism” (Cheng, 1989) because of the scope and depth of political control. After consolidating its hold on Taiwan, the GMD first set up party branches in every nationalized workshop and then built many affiliated organizations, such as labor unions, security offices, and women’s associations to penetrate into workers’ everyday life. The universal implantation of a party-state infrastructure has been an unmistakable characteristic of Leninist control. It gave the GMD an unusual degree of penetrating power that was not possible under military dictatorships in other newly industrializing countries. The relative acquiescence of labor in Taiwan in the high-growth period was in part explained by this unique feature (Deyo, 1989a: 159; Koo, 1989: 573).
The existing literature has paid a great deal of attention to the inhibiting functions of Leninist control. The martial-law regime in Taiwan suppressed dissent and prohibited strikes. GMD party members in the factories constituted a formidable informant network that silenced rank-and-file workers. Token labor unions sponsored by the GMD party branch were a preemptive measure to prevent autonomous organizations from below. In a word, Leninism resulted in a “demobilized working class” (Hsiao, 1992: 155–56), or the “political exclusion of labor” (Deyo, 1989b: 110).

However, such a characterization looks at the repressive dimensions only and underestimates the combat ethos of Leninism, which is aimed at more than preserving the status quo. According to Jowitt (1992: 1–4), the defining feature of Leninism is “charismatic impersonality,” in other words, a willingness to use advanced organizational principles to achieve a sacred mission. Thus, the party organization, the very epitome of Leninism, is simultaneously affective (comradeship) and instrumental (discipline), traditional (leader cult) and rational (commitment to development). Under Leninism, there is a holistic approach to mobilizing workers. Defying the modern public/private distinction, ruling elites seek to deeply penetrate into the non-work life of workers. It took more than working hard to be a model worker, and conformity with the demands of the party-state regarding health habits, recreational activities, and thriftiness was deemed to be essential components of political loyalty. This meant that workers’ off-duty hours were not leisure time to be spent at their discretion, but a vital resource to be devoted to a national purpose. Workers’ dependents were not merely their private companions, but obligatory participants in political activities.

Selznick (1979: 114) argued that Leninism was a powerful organizational weapon because it transformed “a diffuse population into a mobilizable source of power.” Consequently there was no Leninism without the drive to recruit the citizens into campaigns. Political mobilization of labor served as a means to attain national goals as defined by the ruling elites. Workers were called upon to sacrifice their selfish interests, and idealistic patriotism was propagandized. National goals were not a remote ideology, but an everyday reality. Here the description of Hungarian workers also applies to Taiwan’s: “ideology is not just a rationalization, something taught in schools or displayed in the mass media . . . People live in two worlds: an ideological world and a lived world. But they are both real” (Burawoy and Lukács, 1992: 82).

The GMD’s Leninism gave rise to a powerless working class, but not because of their distance and marginalization from the power center; on the contrary, workers were forcibly integrated into a control structure and mobilized against their own will.
State-Owned Enterprises in Postwar Taiwan

Taiwan’s industrial workers in the colonial period (1895–1945) long enjoyed the status of “aristocrats of labor.” The colonial government outlawed native ownership and management of modern corporations for a period of time and took every measure to protect and subsidize zaibatsu-controlled industries. The Taiwanese workers in these modern industries tended to have Japanese fluency, access to company welfare, and job security. The privileged position of sugar refinery workers, for instance, stood in great contrast to the fiercely competitive world of their neighboring villagers who fought for temporary jobs harvesting sugarcane. Sugar refinery workers joked that they were always able to marry the prettiest village girls. Their advantaged situation went unchanged with the regime shift in 1945 (Interview, 2007/6/27).

When the GMD decided to nationalize the colonial industries, it inherited a bloated and inefficient public sector, not only in utilities, but also in the manufacturing and financial sectors.

Although it was a non-socialist state, Taiwan possessed an extraordinarily large SOE sector. Well into the mid-1980s, the public sector took more than half of the assets in the national economy, while producing no more than a quarter (see Table 1). Though there are no reliable data for the 1950s, it is a safe guess that the public sector was much larger prior to the export-oriented growth in the 1960s.

Table 1. The Share of State-Owned Enterprises in Taiwan’s Economy (Percentage)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Assets</th>
<th>Product</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1966</td>
<td>56.4</td>
<td>24.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1971</td>
<td>52.2</td>
<td>15.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1976</td>
<td>53.7</td>
<td>20.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1981</td>
<td>52.2</td>
<td>23.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1986</td>
<td>60.9</td>
<td>17.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1991</td>
<td>46.9</td>
<td>15.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1996</td>
<td>36.5</td>
<td>12.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2001</td>
<td>27.6</td>
<td>11.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: The data are based on the reports of the every-five-years Survey of Commerce and Industry (gongshang pucha). Although there were surveys in 1956 and 1961, they did not provide relevant statistics.
economic assets without creating an equivalent or larger share of product. On the other hand, other scholars have argued that revenue should not be the sole criterion, since Taiwan’s public sector shouldered many social and policy responsibilities, such as social provisioning and fostering industrial growth (Chu, 1997). The postwar evolution of Taiwan’s sugar industry also lends support to the latter perspective. Under the colonial regime, zaibatsu-controlled companies unscrupulously exploited farmers, who were often coerced into providing sugarcane at unfavorable prices. The GMD government installed a new contracting system that allowed sugarcane farmers a greater share of the profit, and thus helped to stabilize rural society.

As a matter of fact, the two interpretations are not mutually incompatible. Social and policy goals cannot be achieved without compromising economic efficiency. The problem for Taiwan’s SOEs is that they were inevitably pulled by these two opposing forces at the same time. No one experienced the two contradictory demands more directly than state workers themselves.

The Sweetness and Powerlessness of State Workers

Under the postwar SOE framework, sugar refinery workers continued to enjoy the enviable status of labor aristocrats. A passage from a former TSC president is instructive in understanding their material circumstances.

If you worked in a sugar refinery, you must have owned a passable house by contemporary standards. You would have had a garden for planting flowers or raising chickens. If a school was not nearby, the refinery would take care of busing your kids. Useful but not luxurious commodities were available in co-operatives. The dining hall was probably the best restaurant in the vicinity so that’s where you treated your visiting friends to food and drink. Besides, there were all kinds of training programs during the off-season idle time for personnel as well as for their wives. That was an isolated environment in which colleagues had once worked together in other plants, or were former acquaintances in a past training program. There was no loneliness here, so people came but never left. (Wang, 1992: 192)

A typical TSC plant operated a primary school for employees’ children. These company-supported schools, until they were eventually incorporated into the public school system in the late 1960s, provided a comparatively good education. A comprehensive high school with both liberal arts and vocational
Modern China 36(6)

courses was set up in 1947 and still is in operation. The TSC’s workers’ children obtained free-of-charge schooling and more importantly, the valuable opportunity to earn a high school degree when admission to public high schools was fiercely competitive (TT 38.6, 1996: 3). Furthermore, company housing included a variety of facilities for bathing, hair-dressing, laundry, book-loaning, movie-screenings, and sports—all a rarity in the outside world. Working for the TSC also brought firsthand knowledge about the hiring of temporary workers, which could be passed along to friends and kinfolk as a personal favor.

Employment in the TSC assumed a quasi-hereditary character as workers’ children grew up in company housing, attending company-funded schools, and afterward obtained a TSC job on their fathers’ introduction. My interviewees often joked that only losers would stay in the sugar factories. In a sense, they were right. If their children could make it to college and get started in a professional career, they would leave for good; otherwise, the TSC never failed to provide a passable safety net for those who failed to climb above their fathers’ social status. In other words, there was practically no chance of downward mobility for the descendents of TSC workers.

However, sugar refinery workers’ privileges came at a costly personal price. Their everyday life was under tight surveillance. First, the security apparatus staged a house-cleaning campaign against the National Resources Commission (NRC) technocrats who managed Taiwan’s SOEs. Many NRC leaders had defected to the communist side, and that made those who remained suspicious and vulnerable. In 1950, the TSC general manager was arrested on the charge of being “a communist spy.” He was summarily executed and his personal properties confiscated. When political terror reigned, rank-and-file workers found themselves in an extremely dire situation. A minor instance of mechanical malfunctioning in the factory could be interpreted as communist sabotage and trigger a thorough investigation by the security personnel. Workers’ daily life was under such meticulous supervision that even their schoolchildren had to be teamed up and guided by factory guards on their way home to avoid “communist abduction” (Interview, 2002/12/27). Repeated campaigns hunting for “communist spies” continued unabated well into the early 1960s.

The GMD installed a special brigade of Security Police (baojing) in every SOE workplace immediately after the 1947 Uprising, in which native Taiwanese rose to challenge the predatory and corrupt rule of the GMD officials and were then brutally suppressed. The Security Police, recruited from among former soldiers, were given sweeping power over the workforce. They had the authority to conduct unannounced and warrantless searches (tuji jiancha) in the factories and dormitories (TYG 3.8, 1950: 121). A 1954 directive ordered
them to monitor people who exhibited “illicit behavior” (suxing buduan), were of “unknown origin” (laili buming), and “acted suspiciously” (xingtong guami) during the periodic household investigations (TYG 7.23, 1954: 180). Given their unchecked authority, it was a small wonder that these policemen were reported to have terrorized and harassed workers from time to time. This observation was confirmed by the frequently repeated orders in the TSC’s records throughout the 1950s to strengthen their discipline.

In addition to rigorous policing, the GMD implanted an intricate security control apparatus. After the mid-1950s, the government’s Bureau of Investigation trained special agents and placed them in every TSC plant. They were responsible for monitoring the day-to-day behavior of workers. To facilitate their broad-ranging tasks of supervision, they built a clandestine network of informants among the workforce (Interview, 2006/4/26). In 1967, the security department reported that it maintained more than 20,000 files with detailed and constantly updated records of every TSC employee’s “family, origin, past experiences, social relations, religious beliefs, and habits” (TT 41.13, 1967: 14–16). White-terror, policing, and security control were certainly vital measures for ensuring a docile workforce, but they were preventive and punitive at best. To turn workers into ardent anti-communists required a series of political mobilization campaigns.

Political Mobilization in Daily Life

During the period of internal struggle within the GMD in the late 1920s, the right-wing faction fashioned an ideology regarding mass movements. The core of this ideology consisted of the notion that workers, peasants, women, and other social groups had to be organized in the mission of national revolution. The party had the obligation “to lead the masses, train them and even prescribe what was in their best interests and that of the nation” (Dirlik, 1975: 46–74). However, throughout its period on the mainland (1918–1949), the GMD failed to implement this vision thoroughly due to civil war, factional strife, and the Japanese invasion. After its withdrawal to Taiwan, however, the time had become ripe to put its ideology into action. During the GMD’s reorganization (1950–1952), it made a concerted effort to penetrate Taiwanese society by establishing subsidiaries units (party branches and public service stations, minzhong fuwushe) staffed with ideologically trained personnel (cadres, commissars, and cell leaders) (Kung, 1998).

The GMD party branch in every TSC workplace functioned as the lynchpin of political mobilization. With these branches as a beachhead, the GMD was able to conduct a series of mobilizational activities. Plant-wide political
indoctrination was institutionalized in the form of monthly Sun Yat-sen meetings (guofu jinian yuehui). Beginning in 1951, attending this meeting became a duty for all TSC employees. A typical monthly meeting began with the ritual of salutation to Sun and reading his will, and then was followed by a one-hour political lecture (TYG 4.13, 1951: 140). In addition, national holidays, like Chiang Kai-shek’s birthday, the presidential Inauguration Day, Youth Day, and Labor Day were duly celebrated with mass rallies, flag-raising, and national anthem singing.

The GMD did not neglect the role of the female family members of the predominantly male workforce. In tandem with the Chinese Women’s Anti-Communist and Anti-Soviet League formed in 1950, the TSC sought to organize workers’ wives and daughters into workplace-based women’s associations (funühui). Following the much propagandized lead of Madame Chiang Soong Mayling, women were mobilized to stitch clothes for the frontline warriors (TT 24.3, 1959: 4).

With the help of party branches and women’s associations, the GMD launched a series of activities to enlist workers’ political participation. Patriotic contribution campaigns were a frequent phenomenon in the earlier period. At various times, workers had to donate their income to support the GMD’s military operations or to demonstrate their solidarity with the global anti-communist allies, such as a naval battle in 1954 (TT 15.17, 1954: 8), the military withdrawal from Yijiangshan Island in 1955 (TT 16.6, 1955: 11), the Hungarian uprising in 1957 (TT 20.1, 1957: 4), the artillery battle in Quemoy in 1958 (TT 24.3, 1959: 3), the Tibetan uprising in 1959 (TT 24.12, 1959: 6), and the refugee wave in Hong Kong in 1962 (TT 30.16, 1962: 4). The government also mobilized workers’ savings to purchase governmental bonds (called Patriotic Public Bonds at that time) (TT 6.10, 1950: 54) as well as TSC company bonds (TT 26.5, 1960: 7). In 1960, a TSC-affiliated kindergarten even decided to contribute its “candy fee” to a military radio program (TT 26.16, 1960: 5).

During the 1950s and 1960s, there were persistent efforts to bring the workplace closer to the military in an attempt to boost workers’ anti-communist enthusiasm. Individual TSC plants often sent workers to entertain soldiers with drama and song (TT 36.4, 1965: 45). The TSC organized lavish farewell parties to honor workers who were conscripted into the military (TT 9.12, 1951: 21). Many TSC plants invited and lionized soldiers credited with brave acts on the battlefield as war heroes (TT 12.9, 1953: 18). In addition, military commissars (political warfare officers) were often guest speakers in the monthly meetings (TT 30.13, 1962: 5). By encouraging military–factory cooperation, the GMD sought to deliver the unambiguous message that there
was organic harmony between the frontline and the home front. In fact, there were even attempts to instill military discipline in workers. Civil defense was a vital concern in the early years as the GMD conferred the status of “national defense industry” on its SOEs. TSC workers regularly took part in civil defense drills. They had to practice military skills and marching in formation, often under the supervision of military officers (TT 24.16, 1959: 7).

In wartime Japan, industrial patriotic organizations, under the slogan “the enterprise as one family” (jīgyō ikka), sought to incorporate workers’ every-day life into a tightly controlled community (Gordon, 1985: 292). A similar ideology of “the factory as one family” (yichang weijia) was thoroughly propagandaized in Taiwan, as evidenced by the ubiquity of this slogan painted on the walls of the TSC refineries. The close integration of work and non-work made the daily life of TSC workers highly regimented. The upbeat music of the “TSC March” was broadcast at company housing at 7:55 every morning to call workers to the plant, while a half hour of calming light music was played after 5 in the afternoon (Interview, 2002/10/16). Some TSC subsidiaries also made it a daily routine for workers to practice morning physical exercise (TT 16.15, 1955: 25). As a result, the daily activities of workers and their family members developed a collective rhythm.

The GMD leadership tried to thoroughly reform workers’ habits. Periodically, the TSC promoted a series of programs in life education to cultivate desirable habits among its workforce. As the documents show, the TSC sponsored a Week of Manners and Hygiene (TT 20.9, 1957: 2), thrift campaigns (TT 10.5, 1952: 15), movements to encourage saving (TT 28.8, 1961: 6), movements for reading (GMD-approved materials, of course) (TT 22.10, 1958:76), and even a patriotic movement to boycott foreign cigarettes (TT 6.15, 1950: 51). In many instances, the TSC virtually assumed the role of a moral authority to urge workers to lead a decent and hardworking life.

Such a paternalistic outlook was exemplified by the role of “instructor of life guidance” (shenghuo zhidao yuan), who oversaw the transition of demobilized soldiers from army to factory. Not surprisingly, it was the TSC’s security agents who undertook the task of “life guidance,” which was simply a disguise for monitoring the ex-soldiers’ behavior (TT 9.14, 1951: 6).

In sum, the GMD regime used well-planned organizational and ritualized devises to ensure state workers’ loyalty. During this period, other sectors of the Taiwanese population underwent roughly the same experience of political mobilization. The fact that the TSC workers chose to maintain their privileges in nationalized industry gave them little immunity to constant demands from above. Voluntarily or not, they had to play the role of anti-communist activists, frugal citizens, and diligent workers. True, workers were universally exploited
in the sense that they lost control over the final product of their labor. But under political mobilization, it would be more accurate to say that workers lost control of their personhood.

**The Hidden World of Workers’ Resistance**

Commentators on Taiwan’s workers have presented a dualistic picture. Workers in the private sector have been said to have been hardworking (Chen, 1994: 284–98) and to have maintained interpersonal harmony in order to attain prosperity (Lee, 2004). The docile and productive working class has been claimed to have been a product of Confucian culture, which laid the foundation for Taiwan’s “economic miracle” (see the critical review in Chan, 1996). On the other hand, state workers have been largely viewed as “inefficient” because of excessive bureaucratism (Hwang, 1988: 313). However, this dualistic perspective fails to recognize that superficial conformity did not mean whole-hearted acceptance. In addition, workers’ attitudes toward work were mostly situational, rather than a uniform cultural trait.

According to Scott (1990), a bifurcation of the front stage from the back stage comes as a necessary corollary to extreme domination since a minor divergence on the part of the weak from the prescribed scenario can be fatal. Much of what has been described in the above section resembles what Scott has called the “public transcript,” or the official definition of a situation that is explicitly sanctioned by the elites. In Taiwan’s case, the GMD tried its best to impose a politically correct scheme upon the workplace. In 1957, the TSC promulgated an instruction by the Ministry of Economic Affairs demanding that the Chinese communists be called “the bandit party” (feidang) or “the gang of bandits led by Mao Zedong and Zhu De” (zhu mao feibang). A detailed plan followed to regulate the naming of communist leaders, army, cadres, and organizations (TYG 12.59, 1957: 398). Under such circumstances, a failure to follow the official designation was no less than an act of political disloyalty. The GMD incumbents certainly knew the danger of deviance from the public transcript. Hence, in 1956, there was a governmental order that forbade not bowing to Sun Yat-sen’s portrait on religious grounds. Offenders were to be immediately corrected by their superiors, or prosecuted (TYG 10.101, 1956: 897).

Nevertheless, beneath the apparent peacefulness on the front stage, workers adopted a rich repertoire of everyday resistance. Although acts of resistance were anonymous, spontaneous, leaderless, and localized, they had the effect of subverting surveillance from above. The GMD’s efforts at political indoctrination were constantly undermined by a lack of enthusiasm among the
rank-and-file. In 1959, a report on the monthly Sun Yat-sen memorial meetings honestly pointed out their shortcomings.

I once read a TSC’s statistical report on the attendance rate of the monthly meetings. It ranged from 70 percent to 30 percent, with the average below 50 percent. During the months of sugar production, attendance was even lower. Most workers were not interested in joining the monthly meeting, and they used all kinds of excuses to be absent. There were broadcast announcements right before the meeting, and roll call and signing-in were used, but their effects were not significant . . . Most of the meetings were so routinized that listeners appeared absent-minded even though speakers were passionate. During the meetings, taking a nap and reading the newspaper were common phenomena among the audience . . . In large refineries, the conference hall was chaotically crowded five minutes before the meetings, and delays were quite frequent. In addition, many workers signed in for their colleagues or forgot to bring their sign-in cards. (TT 24.2, 1959: 23)

This remark reveals that a majority of workers did not whole-heartedly embrace the GMD ideology, and yet adopted various strategies to camouflage their apathy.

Walder (1986) noted two frequent strategies of China’s workers to cope with their dependency: activists sought to win better benefits through desired political performances, while other workers adopted a defensive approach by staying away from politics. While it is arguable that Walder’s characterization is applicable to the Taiwanese case, further elaboration on the types of workers’ resistance would be helpful. Common in China and Taiwan was the fact that material rewards were bestowed for loyalty. In addition, while selfless devotion to the national mission was proclaimed as the ultimate goal, unscrupulous materialism ran rampant. This suggests that cultural values and social means are only loosely coupled, a situation that Robert Merton (1957: 131–60) described as “anomie.”

Merton’s scheme of social deviance is a useful compass for exploring the uncharted and amorphous world of workers’ resistance. Building a successful career so as to provide their family with a better standard of living was a cultural value that motivated Taiwanese state workers. But under political mobilization, the legitimate means to attain this goal was primarily publicly demonstrated political commitment to the dominant ideology. In other words, the social norm here was fundamentally political, rather than economic. Based on a value/norm scheme, Merton constructed the following typology:
1. Conformism (following values and norms)
2. Ritualism (following norms, but not values)
3. Innovation (following values, but not norms)
4. Retreatism (following neither values nor norms)
5. Rebellion (seeking to change values and norms)

Based on their self-reported experience, I was able to classify 36 out of 45 interviewed TSC workers according to this typology, while the remaining 9 workers were not asked about this matter or were unwilling to give information.

**Conformists**

Conformist workers were willing to demonstrate political loyalty in order to obtain better material rewards through job promotion. In other words, they were the ideal type of worker that the regime sought to cultivate. In my sample, around 40 percent could be labeled as conformist—which meant the GMD’s political mobilization was unable to win the whole-hearted allegiance of the majority. A closer look reveals that the percentage of conformists declined in the latter period. One out of two workers who entered the TSC before 1970 became conformists, while the younger cohort had only a roughly 30 percent likelihood of becoming conformists. Obviously, the effect of ideological penetration grew weaker over time.

Conformists viewed their political participation as part of their TSC job. They did not find politicization particularly objectionable. For them, keeping their job simply meant “doing what you were told to do.” One of my interviewees justified his conformism on the grounds of the communist threat (Interview, 2006/3/2), while another claimed that political activities were beneficial and educational for workers (Interview, 2006/9/6). No matter what their rationalization might be, it was clear that most of them understood political mobilization as passé and unsuitable for a democratic society.

Not every conformist ended up being promoted into a desired position; nevertheless, some did and they have remained the most loyal GMD supporters. The story of Yunling is a good illustration. Yunling grew up in a TSC dormitory; when he witnessed his humble parents being humiliated by a haughty subsection chief (kezhang), he made up his mind to climb up the TSC job ladder. In 1960, he seized an opportunity to receive security training by the Investigation Bureau of Taiwan’s government, and upon graduation, he was assigned to the TSC’s Dalin refinery. He was in charge of plant-wide surveillance (then called the Second Office of Personnel Affairs or the Personnel II).
and before retirement, he made it to section chief (zuzhang). Yunling knew that his work was universally resented by his colleagues, but he insisted that he carried out his duty with justice and compassion. He claimed several instances in which he saved some workers guilty of minor misconduct from severe punishment. There was a TV drama that featured the life in the sugar refinery that Yunling kept mentioning. What impressed him most was a scene that depicted a frustrated TSC worker who failed to get promoted even though he was hardworking. Back at home, he vented his anger by drinking and beating his children. In his somber moments, he strongly advised his son to go to college; otherwise he would not be “treated with respect for the rest of his life.” The climax was when the abused son finally saw his father’s suffering and vowed to study hard. Yunling claimed that tears welled up in his eyes every time he watched this drama. Obviously, a successful son like him must have felt a sense of relief when he became a section chief in the TSC.

During my interviews with Yunling, he conceded that not every GMD policy was reasonable; nevertheless, as a beneficiary of the GMD’s patronage, he was highly intolerant of criticism of the party. He insisted that TSC workers who supported the anti-GMD forces acted out of spite because they were either mistreated by their superiors or failed to be promoted (Interview, 2003/10/20, 2005/5/9, 2005/5/18, 2005/11/8, 2006/4/26). Yunling’s judgment summarized the moral reasoning of conformists. Given the fact that ideological conformism was rewarded, only those who failed to receive rewards turned into political dissents, not vice versa. In other words, conformists were complacent, especially when they were successful.

**Ritualists**

Ritualist workers followed their superiors’ political demands without subscribing to the GMD ideology. Many workers experienced the colonial wartime mobilization either as a working adult or indirectly through their fathers who also worked in the sugar refineries, and it was not too demanding for them to adjust themselves to the GMD’s politicized regime. When mobilized to do something against their will, they never failed to comply, but seldom expressed the kind of enthusiasm that their leaders expected. Sometimes they joined political activities because of the free meals, gifts, and entertainment that were offered. For ritualist workers, attending monthly meetings was a welcomed escape from the factory drudgery since the conference halls were always clean and air-conditioned (Interview, 2007/5/18). When asked to donate their money, they simply accepted this requirement because “the money had already been automatically deducted in advance.” In addition, taking part in
these activities served to maintain interpersonal harmony, so that the informants had no reason to speak ill of them (Interview, 2007/5/10).

Mr. Ye, who entered the TSC in 1970, is a prime example of a ritualist (Interview, 2005/12/1, 2005/12/8). He clearly recognized the self-serving behavior among the GMD cadres, but claimed it was “human nature” for those who held power to benefit themselves. For example, when distributing rooms in the company dormitory, those who had political connections were always able to take unfair advantage. Mr. Ye was cynical as well as instrumental when it came to the political rituals. He became a member of the GMD so as not to “be found fault with,” and he hoisted the national flag at his door in case policemen came to harass his family. Mr. Ye started his TSC career in a pig farm and then worked as a sugarcane-planting promotion agent before retirement. Like Yunling, he was a second-generation sugar refinery worker, but he did not share Yunling’s ambition for higher status; instead his ritualism led him to settle for no more than his father’s station in life.

While ritualists followed their leaders’ demands, they sought to exert themselves as little as possible at work. They thought they contributed plenty to the TSC by spending their time in political activities, so there was little reason for them to work hard for productive purposes. As a worker put it, “Though a regular shift was eight hours, if you had a high IQ, you should have been able to finish your work within one or two hours. A person with a lower IQ might need up to four hours. But if a person spent more time than that, he might as well kill himself” (Interview, 2002/11/8).

This sarcastic comment shows how ritualist workers regarded an easy job as their entitlement. The right to be unproductive was in part compensation for their political loyalty. After all, the TSC offered a decent and enviable job and it would be simply foolish to do anything that could jeopardize it.

Conformists and ritualists both followed the political demands of their superiors, the only difference being that the former viewed that as a necessary means to personal advancement while the latter gave up the expectation of a material payoff. As shown in Table 2, the older workers who demonstrated their loyalty tended to believe in its efficacy (10 out of 12), whereas among the younger cohort the ratio dropped significantly (5 out of 11). Clearly, even among seemingly loyal workers, a sense of disillusionment gradually grew. Though political rituals were still duly observed, they were increasingly perceived as meaningless and futile.

**Innovators**

If ritualism was an adaptive strategy by which workers demonstrated their allegiance for defensive purposes, innovation was an assertive strategy of
pursuing workers’ individual interests beyond the benefits provided by the TSC. Innovative workers took a dim view of politics. For them, then and now, it was always the case that leaders talked the talk and they walked the walk. Over time they became apathetic and sought to keep politics at a distance. If possible, they avoided attending TSC-organized campaigns and events.

Innovative workers accepted the cultural value of career success, but not in the terms of the TSC job ladder. For them, the TSC’s company welfare measures were taken as granted, and they strove to earn a better living through participating in the booming informal economy. It has been argued that the largely unregulated world of small- and medium-sized businesses functioned as a safety net to absorb the energies of the politically frustrated Taiwanese (Wang, 2001; Winn, 1994). But here state workers’ private business took the form of resistance to political mobilization. Many TSC workers engaged in a variety of profit-making activities. For example, a worker reported moonlighting by “raising canaries, growing mushrooms, running a grocery store and selling insurance policies” (TT 46.10, 1970: 31). Launching an outside career bestowed a personal sense of independence on these workers since they no longer had to trade their political loyalty for better treatment. Now they could improve their social status through working hard in their spare time, rather than subserviently following their leaders.

Workers in the informal sector relied on their savings, social networks, and above all the willingness to work hard. As these workers focused their attention on their outside careers, they spent less and less energy in their formal jobs and in political activities. They hoarded their labor power for making additional income and were more likely to take a leave when their personal business required it. Undoubtedly, the massive wave of moonlighting harmed the TSC’s profitability, as stressed by an alarmed observer: “Some employees

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Types of Response</th>
<th>Conformism</th>
<th>Before 1970</th>
<th>After 1971</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ritualism</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>8</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Innovation</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Retreatism</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>7</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rebellion</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>36</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 2. A Classification of Taiwan Sugar Corporation (TSC) Workers’ Responses
even wanted to get paid without working. A minor offense consisted of raising pigs and chickens for household consumption, and a more serious one was to make extra income by taking another job. If everyone wanted to take advantage of the public rice bowl, who would have to pay the bill?” (TT 31.5, 1962: 15).

Though some workers made a personal fortune in this fashion, only a few devoted themselves completely to outside careers by giving up their formal job (Interview, 2006/5/18). A TSC position secured one’s basic livelihood, a dependable haven in the high-risk world of the informal sector. Thus a common device was to register their businesses under the names of their wives so that their TSC positions would not be jeopardized (Interview, 2006/8/11). There is an interesting basis for comparison here. Workers in Taiwan’s non-state sector were said to see their employment as a temporary prelude to setting up their own business. For them, there was no future in working for others, and hence their small-scale entrepreneurship was basically a strategy to obtain economic security (Stites, 1985). While both state workers and non-state workers ventured into the informal sector, their motives were totally different. For moonlighting TSC workers, taking an additional job was a risk-taking behavior since their privileged status in the SOEs already satisfied their basic needs. Hence, their innovative strategy was a pursuit of independence outside the politicized workplace.

The story of Yeshen illustrates the case of an innovator (Interview, 2007/6/12, 2007/6/27). He became a GMD member soon after he entered the TSC in 1952, but he claimed he had never voted in the way his political leaders desired. He harbored personal bitterness against the GMD because one of his coworkers, who graduated from a school with a poor reputation and was obviously incompetent, was promoted to become his supervisor because of political connections. After that he had paid little attention to political activities, and instead devoted himself to brokering land sales. Yeshen was assigned with the task of sugarcane promotion, so he was constantly in contact with local farmers. Whenever farmers wanted to sell their land, they would solicit Yeshen’s help and pay him a handling fee since he was trusted and knew the locality well. In addition, since Yeshen always worked outside of sugar refinery, he possessed the discretionary freedom to attend to his own brokerage business even during office hours. According to him, some of his coworkers even made quite a bit of money by brokering loans from local financial institutions—a risky venture that he did not dare to undertake.

In my interview data, innovative workers were underrepresented. There were only three workers who acknowledged having a secondary source of income, but far more were willing to discuss the moonlighting activities of
their coworkers. The reluctance to reveal their business ventures was largely due to the legal restrictions on state workers taking a second job. As a result, innovative strategies were much more popular than the data in Table 2 indicate.

Retreatists

A retreatist worker was as politically disillusioned as an innovative worker, and as economically unproductive as a ritualist. While rejecting ideological indoctrination, these workers did not venture into the growing informal sector, but rather stayed content with what they already had. It was said that in the TSC “non-working was safe whereas working more brought more bad luck” (bu zuo bu cuo, yue zuo yue cuo) (Interview, 2002/11/20). The retreatists were so disenchanted with political mobilization that they perceived the workplace as one of “superficial work (gongzuo biaomianhua), where evaluation was based on seafood (kaoji haixianhua), and promotion on bribery (shengdeng hongbaohua)” (Interview, 2006/8/24).

Retreatist workers were said to steal factory materials and sell them in the black market (Interview, 2002/11/8). Unless they were closely supervised, they gambled during work (Interview, 2002/11/20). Drinking was particularly common among some workers. Those who worked at the TSC’s industrial alcohol factory had virtually unlimited access to free alcohol. The problem of weak factory discipline was recognized by the TSC management, which made repeated attempts to eradicate these vices, but to no avail (TT 22.5, 1958: 8).

Retreatists were not necessarily law-breakers or alcoholics. Many retreatists claimed that they were simply rural folks who did not harbor personal ambition for status or money. Their current employment in the public sector was a blessing itself, as one interviewee put it: “Life was already better when you could lay hold of the chimney in the sugar company” (Interview, 2005/11/15). As a result, they did not aspire to material improvement either by political participation or hard work in private enterprises.

Mr. Huang chose to become a TSC worker because he wanted a stable job “as many other rural folks did” (Interview, 2006/10/24). Prior to that decision, he could have become a veterinarian or a sailor if he finished vocational schooling. Immediately after he entered the TSC in 1950, he was disillusioned to see that all the chances of promotion went to the conformists who worked hard to flatter their superiors. Though retired many years ago, Huang still recalled those happy days when he used to socialize by drinking with his coworkers and local farmers even during working hours. Many times he was
already intoxicated by noon and had to take a nap at home during the afternoon. In the past, the TSC reimbursed its employees by giving out cash directly—a practice that Huang was perfectly content with because it minimized “interference” from his wife. Huang squandered some money gambling, but he was not as badly addicted as some of his coworkers who were forced to apply for early retirement in order to pay their debts out of their pension funds.

Ritualism, innovation, and retreatism all challenged the GMD’s political mobilization strategy without workers having to publicly express their discontent. These forms of everyday resistance had the effect of disrupting factory production. Consequently, the TSC consistently had an overstaffed and low-morale workforce.

In sum, Merton’s theory of deviance provides analytical insight into the hidden world of workers’ resistance. There are two significant things to be gained by employing the Mertonian scheme to understand the Scottish realm of the hidden transcript. First, Walder’s characterization of the activist/defensive strategy sensitizes us to the fact that workers might be oriented toward different goals. Merton’s ritualism/innovation/retreatism further reveals the multifaceted nature of workers’ resistance. In other words, it gives us a more detailed mapping of the largely invisible world of workers’ actual responses.

Second, Merton built his theory in an effort to improve on Durkheim’s sociology of morality. Although Merton focused on American society, where the cult of material success has been so culturally exalted that it generates all kinds of deviant behaviors, the social consequences of excessive moralism could also ironically be found in the workplace organized according to Leninist principles. In Taiwan, the GMD’s insatiable demand for political loyalty had the effect of consecrating workers’ compliance with all kinds of demands (obtaining GMD membership, “voluntary” donations for patriotic purposes, frugal living, etc.) as a moral obligation. Under such a moralized regime, workers’ non-conformity could only appear as deviant, or morally reprehensible.

The Rise of Rebellious Workers

In the early 1970s, as the GMD regime was beset by a series of diplomatic setbacks and an internal succession crisis, some reform measures were taken to revitalize its rule over Taiwan (Huang, 1976). As the GMD opened political channels for some younger Taiwanese and revised its extraction-oriented policy toward the agricultural sector, less well-known reforms were initiated in the SOEs at the same time.
By then, the political environment had changed significantly. The white-terror campaign to uncover pro-communist spies lurking in national industry that characterized the early half of 1950s had come to an end, although the GMD still occasionally used the charge of “communist spies” to arrest dissidents as recently as the late 1970s. As the GMD relied less and less on terror and heavy policing, workers’ fear was much alleviated. In addition, the attempt to mobilize workers became routinized and ritualized by that time.

The GMD regime now wanted political mobilization to be curbed so as not to affect factory production. It was in this period that the monthly Sun Yat-sen memorial meetings were renamed “monthly mobilization meetings,” and their function shifted from political education to discussions of production and industrial safety (Interview, 2007/6/4). Concomittantly, the responsibility of organizing these monthly meetings was transferred from the GMD party branch to the TSC personnel office (Interview, 2007/6/7). Equally notable was the metamorphosis of women’s associations in the TSC. These associations used to serve as a mobilizing vehicle to enlist women’s labor in the fight against the communists; now they became a social club whose recreational activities were regularly underwritten by the company (Interview, 2007/5/4). Anti-communist rhetoric as well as politicized activities such as collective donations and entertaining the troops became conspicuously less frequent. Nevertheless, these developments did not signify the end of political mobilization. The GMD party branch still played a vital role in recruiting membership, propagandizing its ideology, and mobilizing workers’ votes. More importantly, political dissents, no matter how harmless they were, were not tolerated throughout this period. In this regard, the limited reforms in the 1970s were no more than an attempt to streamline the existing regime of political mobilization by abandoning its excessive waste and formalities, rather than to scrap it altogether.

The democratic transition set in motion by the lifting of martial law in 1987 triggered a fundamental change in labor relations in Taiwan’s SOEs. As documented in many studies, political liberalization emboldened Taiwanese workers to engage in a variety of protests (Chu, 1996, 1998; Hsiao, 1992; Ho, 2006). To use Merton’s concept, rebellion as a conscious rejection of dominant values and norms only emerged in this period.

In 1988, a group of TSC workers at the Suantou plant organized an informal association to protest a company policy that required employees to purchase its pork products that were unpopular with outside consumers. These workers were all second-generation TSC employees who attended the same school; as a result they quickly built a mobilizing network nationally. In some
TSC plants, dissident workers successfully gained control of the labor union that used to be manipulated by the GMD party branch (Chen, 1989). Chen Jinming was the best-known leader of the dissidents. Chen later campaigned in the national election in 1989 under the banner of the Worker’s Party, an anti-GMD movement party newly established at that time. Although he received nearly ten thousand votes, he failed to get elected. At the same time, another TSC worker who also played an active role in the opposition built a remarkable political career by assuming the position of county party branch director in the nascent Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) in the late 1980s (Interview, 2007/6/15).

Embracing the political opposition showed that a contingent of Taiwan’s SOE workers harbored no illusions about the past. They embarked on a path that was not commonly chosen by China’s state workers even though they experienced similar control devices. The recent enterprise reforms in China prompted workers there to engage in restorative resistance to defend the old doctrine of public ownership (Chen, 2003). In contrast, the rebellion espoused by Taiwanese workers predated the state’s attempt in the mid-1990s to restructure the public sector. Clearly, an open challenge from below was not possible absent a liberalized political atmosphere.

### Taiwan and China Compared: Two Trajectories of Leninism

Jowitt (1992: 121–58) argued that the routinization of Leninism was inherently problematic. The inevitable loss of original revolutionary zeal led to the widespread use of informal practices and corruption—a situation he called “neo-traditionalism.” In his classical work, Walder (1986) applied this insight to his analysis of the China’s working class. According to him, the syndrome of neo-traditionalism included: 1) organized dependency, in which workers were placed under the economic, political, and personal control of their work-unit (danwei) superiors; 2) virtuocracy, or rule by the virtuous, in which leadership was based upon moral superiority; and 3) principled particularism, in which career promotions and material welfare became a reward for political loyalty. As evaluation of political loyalty is subjective, virtuocracy degenerated into a fierce individualist show of personal loyalty to party leaders and competition for personal favors. In a word, Leninism was the cause and neo-traditionalism was the unexpected, yet accepted result. Revolutionary Leninism aimed to eliminate unjust class inequality; ironically, as a consolidated political regime, it produced a new pattern of subordination.
As the preceding analysis has shown, Taiwan’s Leninist control resulted in milder forms of neo-traditionalist pathologies. While workers were required to demonstrate their political loyalty in the same fashion, they appeared to be less dependent on their leaders. Both in Taiwan and China, Leninism declined as a result of broader societal change engineered by the ruling elites. Taiwan’s political liberalization in the mid-1980s made possible grassroots challenges that succeeded in undermining the party-state hegemony, while China’s market reform around the same time sought to rationalize the over-politicized workplace.

Generally speaking, the two Chinese Leninist Parties diverged in the following three respects.

1. The private sector. In early 1950s, both the GMD and the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) tolerated the existence of private business and used almost identical methods to stimulate industrial production with state assistance (Gold, 1989: 84–85). Later on, the two systems embarked on different paths. Beginning in 1955, the CCP exerted more control over the urban private sector. A series of campaigns eliminated self-employment and private small business. As new joint or collective firms were formed, the state took over total control of China’s economic life (Whyte and Parish, 1984: 28). At the same time that the CCP adopted Soviet-style industrial planning and engineered a socialist transformation, the GMD was under pressure from the United States to liberalize Taiwan’s economy. Consequently, “a booming private enterprise system” (Jacoby, 1966: 138) was created in spite of the lingering military ambition of the GMD leaders, who still dreamed of “expelling the communist bandits from China.”

Over the long haul, Taiwan’s growing private sector constrained the depth of the Leninist penetration of the economy. First, businessmen resented political meddling in their companies so that the effort to establish party cells and labor unions in the private sector had only limited success (Galenson, 1979: 432). Therefore, only state workers experienced the complete life-cycle of political mobilization. Second, small-scale business activities proved to be an outlet for frustrated state workers. As they were allowed to meet their needs through the market, they grew less dependent on their leadership.

2. The ethnic divide. In postwar Taiwan, the ethnic divide between native Taiwanese and immigrant mainlanders has been a salient feature. Governmental policies favored mainlanders at the expense of Taiwanese so that for a certain period “even the poorest Mainlanders enjoyed several advantages over wealthy and formerly powerful Taiwanese” (Gates, 1981: 268). In the early 1950s’ reorganization drive, the GMD made an effort to recruit Taiwanese workers to broaden its mass base. However, traumatized by the
bloody repression in 1947, the majority of Taiwanese did not respond favorably to the GMD’s call. Throughout the heyday of Leninist control in the 1950s and 1960s, mainlanders continued to make up the majority of the GMD members (Kung, 1998: 65). The perception of the GMD as a mainlanders’ party persistently limited the Leninist penetration into the predominantly native workforce (Ho, 2007).

In pre-liberation China, what Perry (1993: 24–31) called the “politics of native place” constituted a significant divide among the working class. In Shanghai, native artisans formed the core workforce, while recent immigrants from northern provinces were largely relegated to the lower stratum. The CCP’s victory in the civil war brought a large contingent of demobilized soldiers and peasants into the industrial heartland, and thus reinforced the native-place cleavage among the working class (Perry, 2002: 252). Notwithstanding the seemingly similar divide by origin, immigrant workers and native workers in Shanghai were equally penetrated by the CCP’s party-state, although they formed different factions during the turmoil of Cultural Revolution, whereas Taiwan’s mainlanders and Taiwanese experienced different degrees of Leninist control, with the latter largely excluded from party-state patronage.

3. Managerial autonomy. In terms of industrial management, the CCP originally imported the Soviet-style system of shop units, production teams, detailed planning, and one-man management (Schurmann, 1966: 247–62). This approach placed managers and engineers over party cadres, and professional expertise over political allegiance. It was soon rejected because China lacked the level of development and education comparable to that in the Soviet Union, which had experienced socialist revolution for more three decades. The protracted civil war blessed the CCP with an abundant supply of cadres with revolutionary zeal, but not sufficient managerial and engineering talent (Schurmann, 1966: 283; Walder, 1986: 118). The elevated status of party cadres vis-à-vis managers and engineers planted the seeds for a radicalized workplace in which politics took command.

In Taiwan, SOE managers apparently enjoyed a larger degree of autonomy from party cadres, who controlled labor unions, security and welfare agencies, and personnel offices. Thus the influence of the GMD staff was largely limited to the non-productive area and rarely encroached upon technical decision-making. In the 1950s white-terror period, a number of top-ranking managers fell victim to one or another anti-communist purge, often staged by GMD cadres. But in these cases, the GMD did not replace the purged managers with cadres. Wade (1990: 247) has argued that the flight of party ideologues, the help from U.S. advisors, and Chiang Kai-shek’s personal support helped to give these managers more latitude in the professional realm. Thus, the phenomenal
rise of Wang Hongwen, who started as a war-veteran-cum-worker and ended up as one of the Gang of Four (Perry and Li, 1997), did not find a parallel in Taiwan. Instead, the GMD’s technocratic orientation allowed the SOE managers a career path into higher executive positions, such as minister of economic affairs or even premier.

To sum up, if we take the evolution of Chinese industry as depicted in Walder (1986) as a baseline, Taiwan’s Leninist control did not result in full-blown neo-traditionalism. Taiwan’s workers turned out to be less dependent on their work units and enjoyed a broader scope of options in coping with the dominance of the party-state. It was not that the GMD “did not try to remake human beings according to a political blueprint in the way fascism or Marxism attempted to” (Hood, 1997: 28–29). In fact, the GMD did envision this goal when its cadres were instructed to carry out political mobilization. The problem for them was that a burgeoning private sector, the ethnic divide, and managerial autonomy thwarted their attempts.

Conclusion

In the Communist Manifesto, Karl Marx characterized the class struggle between workers and their oppressors as “an uninterrupted, now hidden, now open fight.” While scholars of labor movements have usually analyzed workers’ open resistance, hidden forms of class struggle have recently received increasing attention. In analyzing workers’ daily resistance against capitalist discipline, scholars have argued that a rich repertoire of actions lies underneath the surface of industrial quiescence. This article has followed this research agenda by calling attention to the phenomenon of political mobilization and workers’ responses. Under capitalism, workers are exploited to the extent that their labor product is appropriated in the form of surplus value; under Leninist political mobilization, workers are exploited primarily as a political subject rather than a producer in that they are required by the ruling elite to manufacture loyalty. Ruling elites set up a highly regimented factory order to ensure the maximum output of political allegiance that serves both as an end in itself as well as a means to boost industrial production. Nevertheless, in Taiwan, mobilizing elites’ goals were far from fully realized. Workers followed their leadership by taking part in a variety of political campaigns, but bona fide commitment was not a sure thing. Furthermore, workers engaged in multifaceted ways of work avoidance, which severely damaged economic efficiency. In other words, elites’ quest for political order was realized at the same time that their clumsy efforts to stimulate production backfired.
Daily resistance of the weak was largely amorphous and sub rosa, but that does not mean that it is beyond analytical understanding. James Scott’s (1990) exploration into what he called “the infrapolitics of subordinate groups” has greatly increased our understanding of these tiny acts of resistance. In this article, I have used Merton’s scheme to map the invisible world of Taiwan’s sugar refinery workers. Ritualism, innovation, and retreatism were common strategies to cope with their political dependency. These distinctions highlighted the diversified nature of workers’ resistance. Their deviance from the model worker might challenge the norm of political loyalty, or the value of career success, or both at the same time. Nevertheless, all these forms of resistance helped to bring about a workplace with loose discipline.

Finally, workers’ widespread resistance in Taiwan blunted and minimized the elites’ attempt to extract political loyalty from their subjects. Over the years, repeated campaigns became meaningless routines, but workers’ political dependence remained intact. However, the demise of the politically mobilized factory regime could in no way be attributed to workers’ own efforts. At most, the combined effect of workers’ resistance was to make Taiwan’s SOEs much less productive than they should have been, but even the GMD elites were willing to tolerate this as long as they could obtain political security. In East European state socialism, workers’ minuscule acts of resistance eventually chipped away the economic foundation of the communist regime (Kopstein, 1996). Even so, it still took decades before the economic decline had a political impact. The machinery of Leninist political mobilization ran a life cycle of growth and decay, and the bottom-up challenge was rarely effective unless augmented by changes in the political environment at the same time. Only with reform initiatives from above were workers’ protests likely to emerge. In other words, no matter how unpopular, a politically mobilized factory regime was still a formidable Leviathan that demonstrated remarkable tenacity.

Acknowledgments
The author thanks Hagen Koo, Peng Yusheng, and anonymous reviewers for comments and suggestions.

Declaration of Conflicting Interests
The author(s) declared no conflicts of interest with respect to the authorship and/or publication of this article.

Funding
The author(s) disclosed receipt of the following financial support for the research and/or authorship of this article:
This study was made possible by a research grant (NSC 972410H110052MY3) from Taiwan’s National Science Council and the assistance of Huang Yu-hsuan and Huang Chun-hao.

**Notes**

1. The sole exception is Yunling, who supervised personnel matters before his retirement. The following analysis will demonstrate how the decision to collaborate with Leninism facilitated his career advancement.

2. The investigation of Taiwan’s white terror began in the late 1990s, initially as a campaign by the survivors and their families, who demanded compensation from the government. Many official documents were revealed for the first time when the DPP came to power (2000–2008). Despite a decade of historical writing by survivors, official research units, and scholars, the published sources so far are unreliable, if not misleading. The author thanks Chuan-kai Lin for the above information. Nevertheless, there is a consensus that the GMD launched a campaign to round up “communists” in 1949, and the effort tapered off in 1953.

**References**


DIRLIK, ARIF (1975) “Mass movements and the left Kuomintang.” Modern China 1, 1 (Jan.): 46–74.
GRAJDANZEV, ANDREW J. (1941) The Economic Development of Formosa. Shanghai: Kelly and Walsh.


**Biography**

Ming-sho Ho is an associate professor of sociology at National Taiwan University, with research interests in labor, the environment, and social movements. His work has been published in *China Journal, China Quarterly, Environment and Planning A*, and *Mobilization*. He is now researching the historical transformation of the labor regime in Taiwan.