

Budget Constrained Choice with Two Commodities

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(Lecture 5, Micro Theory I)

The Consumer Problem

- We have some powerful tools:
 - Constrained Maximization (Shadow Prices)
 - Envelope Theorem (Changing Environment)
- Can help us understand consumer behavior?
Such as:
 - Maximizing utility, facing a budget constraint
 - Minimizing cost, maintaining certain welfare level

Key Problems to Consider

- Total Price Effect =
- Substitution Effect + Income Effect
- Consumer Problem: How can consumer's Utility Maximization result in demand?
 - Income Effect: How does an increase/decrease in income (budget) affect demand?
- Dual Problem: How is Minimizing Expenditure related to Maximizing Utility?
 - Substitution Effect: How does an increase in commodity price affect compensated demand?

Why do we care about this? Public Policy!

- Taiwan's ministry of defense has to decide whether to buy more fighter jets, or more submarines given a tight budget
- How does the military rank each combination?
- How do they choose which combination to buy?
- How would a price change affect their decision?
- How would a boycott in defense budget affect their decision?

Continuous Demand Function

Consumer with income I faces prices $\vec{p} = (p_1, p_2)$

$$\max_{\vec{x}} \{ U(\vec{x}) \mid \vec{p} \cdot \vec{x} \leq I, \vec{x} \in \mathbb{R}_+^2 \}$$

- Assume: **LNS (local non-satiation)**
 - Then, consumer spends all his/her income!
- $U(\vec{x})$ is continuous, strictly quasi-concave on \mathbb{R}_+^2
 - There is a unique solution $\vec{x}^0 = \vec{x}(\vec{p}, I)$
- Then, by Prop. 2.2-1, $\vec{x}(\vec{p}, I)$ must be continuous.
 - aka Theory of Maximum I (Prop. C.4-1 on p. 581)

Appendix C:

Prop.C.4-1 Theory of Maximum I

- For f continuous, define

$$F(\vec{\alpha}) = \max_{\vec{x}} \{ f(\vec{x}, \vec{\alpha}) \mid \vec{x} \geq 0, \vec{x} \in X(\vec{\alpha}) \subset \mathbb{R}^n, \\ \vec{\alpha} \in A \subset \mathbb{R}^m \}$$

- If (i) for each $\vec{\alpha}$ there is a unique $\vec{x}^*(\vec{\alpha}) = \arg \max_{\vec{x}} \{ f(\vec{x}, \vec{\alpha}) \mid \vec{x} \geq 0, \vec{x} \in X(\vec{\alpha}), \vec{\alpha} \in A \}$
- and (ii) $X(\vec{\alpha})$ is a compact-valued correspondence that is continuous at $\vec{\alpha}^0$
- Then, $\vec{x}^*(\vec{\alpha})$ is continuous at $\vec{\alpha}^0$

Continuous Demand of Prices and Income

- $U(\vec{x})$ is continuous, strictly quasi-concave on \mathbb{R}_+^2

$$F(\vec{\alpha}) = \max_{\vec{x}} \{ U(\vec{x}) \mid \vec{p} \cdot \vec{x} \leq I, \vec{x} \in \mathbb{R}_+^2 \}$$

- If (i) for each $\vec{\alpha}$ there is a unique

$$\vec{x}^0 = \vec{x}(\vec{p}, I)$$

Consumer with income I faces prices $\vec{p} = (p_1, p_2)$

- Then, $\vec{x}(\vec{p}, I)$ must be continuous.

Some Stronger Convenience Assumptions

- Assume:
- $U(\vec{x})$ is continuously differentiable on \mathbb{R}_+^2
 - FOC is gradient vector of utility (& constraints)

- **LNS-plus:**

$$\frac{\partial U}{\partial \vec{x}}(\vec{x}) = \left(\frac{\partial U}{\partial x_1}, \frac{\partial U}{\partial x_2} \right) \gg \vec{0} \text{ for all } \vec{x} \in \mathbb{R}_+^2$$

- MU > 0: Preferences are strictly increasing

- **No corners:** $\lim_{x_j \rightarrow 0} \frac{\partial U}{\partial x_j} = \infty, j = 1, 2$

- Always wants to consume some of everything

Indifference Curve Analysis (Lagrangian Ver.)

A Consumer with income I , facing prices p_1, p_2

$$\max_{\vec{x}} \{ U(\vec{x}) \mid \vec{p} \cdot \vec{x} \leq I, \vec{x} \in \mathbb{R}_+^2 \}$$

Lagrangian is $\mathcal{L} = U + \lambda(I - \vec{p} \cdot \vec{x})$

$$(FOC) \quad \frac{\partial \mathcal{L}}{\partial x_j} = \frac{\partial U}{\partial x_j}(\vec{x}^*) - \lambda p_j = 0, j = 1, 2$$

$$\frac{\frac{\partial U}{\partial x_1}(\vec{x}^*)}{p_1} = \frac{\frac{\partial U}{\partial x_2}(\vec{x}^*)}{p_2} = \lambda$$

Meaning of FOC

1. Same marginal value for last dollar spent on each commodity $\frac{\frac{\partial U}{\partial x_1}(\vec{x}^*)}{p_1} = \frac{\frac{\partial U}{\partial x_2}(\vec{x}^*)}{p_2} = \lambda$
 - Does Taiwan get the same defense MU on fighter jets and submarines?
2. Indifference Curve tangent to Budget Line

$$MRS(\vec{x}^*) = \frac{\frac{\partial U}{\partial x_1}(\vec{x}^*)}{\frac{\partial U}{\partial x_2}(\vec{x}^*)} = \frac{p_1}{p_2}$$

Three Examples

- Quasi-Linear Convex Preference

$$U(\vec{x}) = v(x_1) + \alpha x_2$$

- Cobb-Douglas Preferences

$$U(\vec{x}) = x_1^{\alpha_1} x_2^{\alpha_2}, \alpha_1, \alpha_2 > 0$$

- CES Utility Function


$$U(\vec{x}) = \left(\alpha_1 x_1^{1-\frac{1}{\theta}} + \alpha_2 x_2^{1-\frac{1}{\theta}} \right)^{\frac{1}{1-\frac{1}{\theta}}}$$

Quasi-Linear Convex Utility

$$\max_{\vec{x}} \{ U(\vec{x}) = v(x_1) + \alpha x_2 \mid p_1 x_1 + p_2 x_2 \leq I, x \in \mathbb{R}_+^2 \}$$

- FOC:
$$\frac{\frac{\partial U}{\partial x_1}}{p_1} = \frac{\frac{\partial U}{\partial x_2}}{p_2} = \frac{v'(x_1)}{p_1} = \frac{\alpha}{p_2} (= \lambda)$$
- Implication:
$$\frac{p_1}{p_2} = \frac{v'(x_1)}{\alpha} \quad (\text{MRS}=\text{price})$$
- Note that x_2 is irrelevant...
- What does this mean?

Income Effect



- Vertical Income Expansion Path (at interior)

Cobb-Douglas Preferences

$$\max_{x_1, x_2} U(x_1, x_2) = x_1^{\alpha_1} x_2^{\alpha_2}, \alpha_1 + \alpha_2 = 1$$

$$\text{s.t. } P_{x_1} \cdot x_1 + P_{x_2} \cdot x_2 \leq I = P_{x_1} \cdot \omega_{x_1} + P_{x_2} \cdot \omega_{x_2}$$

$$\mathcal{L} = x_1^{\alpha_1} x_2^{\alpha_2} + \lambda \cdot [I - P_{x_1} \cdot x_1 - P_{x_2} \cdot x_2]$$

FOC: (for interior solutions)

$$\frac{\partial \mathcal{L}}{\partial x_1} = \alpha_1 \cdot \frac{x_2^{\alpha_2}}{x_1^{\alpha_1}} - \lambda \cdot P_{x_1} = 0$$

$$\frac{\partial \mathcal{L}}{\partial x_2} = \alpha_2 \cdot \frac{x_1^{\alpha_1}}{x_2^{\alpha_2}} - \lambda \cdot P_{x_2} = 0$$

$$\frac{\partial \mathcal{L}}{\partial \lambda} = I - P_{x_1} \cdot x_1 - P_{x_2} \cdot x_2 = 0$$

Cobb-Douglas Preferences


- Meaning of FOC: $MRS = \frac{P_{x_1}}{P_{x_2}}$

$$\frac{P_{x_1}}{P_{x_2}} = \frac{\alpha_1}{\alpha_2} \cdot \frac{x_2}{x_1} \quad \Rightarrow \quad x_1 = \frac{\alpha_1}{\alpha_2} \cdot \frac{P_{x_2}}{P_{x_1}} \cdot x_2$$

$$\Rightarrow I = P_{x_1} \cdot x_1 + P_{x_2} \cdot x_2 = \frac{\alpha_1 + \alpha_2}{\alpha_2} \cdot P_{x_2} \cdot x_2$$

$$\Rightarrow x_2^* = \frac{\alpha_2}{\alpha_1 + \alpha_2} \cdot \frac{I}{P_{x_2}}, \quad x_1^* = \frac{\alpha_1}{\alpha_1 + \alpha_2} \cdot \frac{I}{P_{x_1}}$$

Income Effect



- Linear Income Expansion Path...

CES Utility Function

$$U(\vec{x}) = \left(\alpha_1 x_1^{1-\frac{1}{\theta}} + \alpha_2 x_2^{1-\frac{1}{\theta}} \right)^{\frac{1}{1-\frac{1}{\theta}}}$$

$$\mathcal{L} = \left(\alpha_1 x_1^{1-\frac{1}{\theta}} + \alpha_2 x_2^{1-\frac{1}{\theta}} \right)^{\frac{1}{1-\frac{1}{\theta}}} + \lambda \cdot [I^A - P_x \cdot x - P_y \cdot y]$$

- FOC: (for interior solutions)

$$\frac{\partial \mathcal{L}}{\partial x_1} = \alpha_1 x_1^{-\frac{1}{\theta}} \cdot \left(\alpha_1 x_1^{1-\frac{1}{\theta}} + \alpha_2 x_2^{1-\frac{1}{\theta}} \right)^{\frac{1}{\theta-1}} - \lambda \cdot P_{x_1} = 0$$


$$\frac{\partial \mathcal{L}}{\partial x_2} = \alpha_2 x_2^{-\frac{1}{\theta}} \cdot \left(\alpha_1 x_1^{1-\frac{1}{\theta}} + \alpha_2 x_2^{1-\frac{1}{\theta}} \right)^{\frac{1}{\theta-1}} - \lambda \cdot P_{x_2} = 0$$

$$\frac{\partial \mathcal{L}}{\partial \lambda} = I - P_{x_1} \cdot x_1 - P_{x_2} \cdot x_2 = 0$$

CES Utility Function


$$\begin{aligned}\frac{P_{x_1}}{P_{x_2}} &= \frac{\alpha_1}{\alpha_2} \cdot \left(\frac{x_2}{x_1}\right)^{\frac{1}{\theta}} \Rightarrow x_1 = \left(\frac{\alpha_1}{\alpha_2} \cdot \frac{P_{x_2}}{P_{x_1}}\right)^{\theta} \cdot x_2 \\ \Rightarrow I &= P_{x_1} \cdot x_1 + P_{x_2} \cdot x_2 \\ &= \left[\left(\frac{\alpha_1}{\alpha_2}\right)^{\theta} \cdot \left(\frac{P_{x_2}}{P_{x_1}}\right)^{\theta-1} + 1 \right] \cdot P_{x_2} \cdot x_2 \\ \Rightarrow x_2^* &= \frac{\alpha_2^{\theta} P_{x_1}^{\theta-1}}{\alpha_1^{\theta} P_{x_2}^{\theta-1} + \alpha_2^{\theta} P_{x_1}^{\theta-1}} \cdot \frac{I}{P_{x_2}}, \\ x_1^* &= \frac{\alpha_1^{\theta} P_{x_1}^{\theta-1}}{\alpha_1^{\theta} P_{x_2}^{\theta-1} + \alpha_2^{\theta} P_{x_1}^{\theta-1}} \cdot \frac{I}{P_{x_1}}\end{aligned}$$

Income Effect



- Linear Income Expansion Path...
- Cobb-Douglas is a special case of CES! ($\theta = 1$)

Income Effects



Income Effects

- If IEP is steeper than the line joining 0 & x^*
- Then, Slope of IEP at \vec{x}^* = $\frac{\frac{\partial x_2}{\partial I}}{\frac{\partial x_1}{\partial I}} > \frac{x_2^*}{x_1^*}$
- Or,
$$\mathcal{E}(x_2, I) = \frac{I}{x_2} \frac{\partial x_2}{\partial I} > \mathcal{E}(x_1, I) = \frac{I}{x_1} \frac{\partial x_1}{\partial I}$$
- Lemma 2.2-2: Expenditure share weighted average income elasticity = 1
- So, $\mathcal{E}(x_2, I) > 1 > \mathcal{E}(x_1, I)$

Lemma 2.2-2:

Weighted Average Income Elasticity

– (Expenditure-Share Weighted) Average IE = 1

$$k_1 \mathcal{E}(x_1^*, I) + k_2 \mathcal{E}(x_2^*, I) = 1$$

- Where $k_j = \frac{p_j x_j^*}{I}$ is the expenditure share of x_j

Proof:

$$\begin{aligned} p_1 x_1^*(\vec{p}, I) + p_2 x_2^*(\vec{p}, I) &= I \Rightarrow p_1 \frac{\partial x_1^*}{\partial I} + p_2 \frac{\partial x_2^*}{\partial I} = 1 \\ \Rightarrow \underbrace{\left(\frac{p_1 x_1^*}{I} \right)}_{k_1} \underbrace{\frac{I}{x_1^*} \frac{\partial x_1^*}{\partial I}}_{\mathcal{E}(x_1^*, I)} + \underbrace{\left(\frac{p_2 x_2^*}{I} \right)}_{k_2} \underbrace{\frac{I}{x_2^*} \frac{\partial x_2^*}{\partial I}}_{\mathcal{E}(x_2^*, I)} &= 1 \end{aligned}$$

Income and Price Elasticities

- From $p_1 x_1^*(\vec{p}, I) + p_2 x_2^*(\vec{p}, I) = I$, we have:

1. Average Income Effect = 1

$$k_1 \mathcal{E}(x_1^*, I) + k_2 \mathcal{E}(x_2^*, I) = 1$$

- By differentiating with respect to I
- Differentiating with respect to p_i , we have:

2. Demand for all goods has negative average response to a price increase of one good

Income and Price Elasticities

- From $p_1 x_1^*(\vec{p}, I) + p_2 x_2^*(\vec{p}, I) = I$,
 - Differentiating with respect to p_i , we have:

$$\Rightarrow x_i^*(\vec{p}, I) + p_1 \frac{\partial x_1^*}{\partial p_1} + p_2 \frac{\partial x_2^*}{\partial p_1} = 0$$

$$\Rightarrow \underbrace{\left[\frac{p_i x_i^*}{I} \right]}_{k_i} + \underbrace{\left[\frac{p_1 x_1^*}{I} \right]}_{k_1} \underbrace{\frac{p_i}{x_1^*} \frac{\partial x_1^*}{\partial p_i}}_{\mathcal{E}(x_1^*, p_i)} + \underbrace{\left[\frac{p_2 x_2^*}{I} \right]}_{k_2} \underbrace{\frac{p_i}{x_2^*} \frac{\partial x_2^*}{\partial p_i}}_{\mathcal{E}(x_2^*, p_i)} = 0$$

- Demand for all goods has negative average response to a price increase of one good

$$\Rightarrow k_1 \mathcal{E}(x_1^*, p_i) + k_2 \mathcal{E}(x_2^*, p_i) = -k_i < 0$$

Income and Price Elasticities

- From $p_1 x_1^*(\vec{p}, I) + p_2 x_2^*(\vec{p}, I) = I$, we have:

1. **Average IE = 1** $k_1 \mathcal{E}(x_1^*, I) + k_2 \mathcal{E}(x_2^*, I) = 1$

2. Average demand response is negative to price increase of one good

$$k_1 \mathcal{E}(x_1^*, p_i) + k_2 \mathcal{E}(x_2^*, p_i) = -k_i < 0$$

– Using $x_i^*(r\vec{p}, rI) = x_i^*(\vec{p}, I)$, $r > 0$,

- Can obtain $\mathcal{E}(x_1^*, p_i) + \mathcal{E}(x_2^*, p_i) + \mathcal{E}(x_i^*, I) = 0$

3. **Substitute/Complement** if other is price elastic/inelastic & has income elasticity = 1

Income and Price Elasticities

- Why $x_i^*(r\vec{p}, rI) = x_i^*(\vec{p}, I)$, $r > 0$?
- **Money illusion!** Same budget constraint...
- Differentiate with respect to r

$$\Rightarrow p_1 \frac{\partial x_i^*}{\partial p_1} + p_2 \frac{\partial x_i^*}{\partial p_2} + I \frac{\partial x_i^*}{\partial I} = 0$$

Income and Price Elasticities

- Why $x_i^*(r\vec{p}, rI) = x_i^*(\vec{p}, I)$, $r > 0$?
- **Money illusion!** Same budget constraint...
- Differentiate with respect to r & divide by x_i^*

$$\Rightarrow \frac{p_1}{x_i^*} \frac{\partial x_i^*}{\partial p_1} + \frac{p_2}{x_i^*} \frac{\partial x_i^*}{\partial p_2} + \frac{I}{x_i^*} \frac{\partial x_i^*}{\partial I} = 0$$

$$\Rightarrow \mathcal{E}(x_1^*, p_i) + \mathcal{E}(x_2^*, p_i) + \mathcal{E}(x_i^*, I) = 0$$

3. **Substitute/Complement** if other is price elastic/inelastic & has income elasticity = 1

Income and Price Elasticities

- From $p_1 x_1^*(\vec{p}, I) + p_2 x_2^*(\vec{p}, I) = I$, we have:
 1. **Average IE = 1** $k_1 \mathcal{E}(x_1^*, I) + k_2 \mathcal{E}(x_2^*, I) = 1$
 2. **Average demand response is negative to price increase of one good**
$$k_1 \mathcal{E}(x_1^*, p_i) + k_2 \mathcal{E}(x_2^*, p_i) = -k_i < 0$$
 - Using $x_i^*(r\vec{p}, rI) = x_i^*(\vec{p}, I)$, $r > 0$,
 3. **Substitute/Complement** if other is price **elastic/inelastic** & has income elasticity = 1
$$\mathcal{E}(x_1^*, p_i) + \mathcal{E}(x_2^*, p_i) + \mathcal{E}(x_i^*, I) = 0$$

Dual Problem: Minimizing Expenditure

- Consider the least costly way to achieve \bar{U}

$$M(\vec{p}, \bar{U}) = \min_{\vec{x}} \{ \vec{p} \cdot \vec{x} \mid U(\vec{x}) \geq \bar{U} \}$$

- How can you solve this?

$$\mathcal{L} = -\vec{p} \cdot \vec{x} + \lambda(U(\vec{x}) - \bar{U})$$

$$(FOC) \quad \frac{\partial \mathcal{L}}{\partial x_j} = -p_j + \lambda \frac{\partial U}{\partial x_j}(\vec{x}^*) = 0, j = 1, 2$$

$$\frac{p_1}{\frac{\partial U}{\partial x_1}} = \frac{p_2}{\frac{\partial U}{\partial x_2}} = \lambda \Rightarrow \text{Solve for } \underline{\underline{\vec{x}^c(\vec{p}, \bar{U})}}$$

Compensated Demand

Dual Problem: Minimizing Expenditure

- Can view it as the “sister” (dual) problem of:

$$\max_{\vec{x}} \{ U(\vec{x}) \mid \vec{x} \geq \vec{0}, \vec{p} \cdot \vec{x} \leq I \}$$

- Because we have:


- Lemma 2.2-3 Duality Lemma

- LNS holds, $\vec{x}^* \in \arg \max_{\vec{x}} \{ U(\vec{x}) \mid \vec{x} \geq \vec{0}, \vec{p} \cdot \vec{x} \leq I \}$

- Then,

$$U(\vec{x}) \geq U(\vec{x}^*) \Rightarrow \vec{p} \cdot \vec{x} \geq \vec{p} \cdot \vec{x}^*$$

- So, $\vec{x}^* \in \arg \min_{\vec{x}} \{ \vec{p} \cdot \vec{x} \mid \vec{x} \geq \vec{0}, U(\vec{x}) \geq U(\vec{x}^*) \}$



Lemma 2.2-3 Duality Lemma

- LNS holds, $\vec{x}^* \in \arg \max_{\vec{x}} \{U(\vec{x}) \mid \vec{x} \geq \vec{0}, \vec{p} \cdot \vec{x} \leq I\}$ Max U
- Then, $U(\vec{x}) \geq U(\vec{x}^*) \Rightarrow \vec{p} \cdot \vec{x} \geq \vec{p} \cdot \vec{x}^*$
- So, $\vec{x}^* \in \arg \min_{\vec{x}} \{ \vec{p} \cdot \vec{x} \mid \vec{x} \geq \vec{0}, U(\vec{x}) \geq U(\vec{x}^*) \}$ min E

Proof: Consider bundle \vec{x}' such that $\vec{p} \cdot \vec{x}' < I$.

- $N(\vec{x}', \delta) \subset \{ \vec{x} \mid \vec{x} \geq \vec{0}, \vec{p} \cdot \vec{x} \leq I \}$ for some small δ
- LNS $\Rightarrow \exists \vec{x}'' \in N(\vec{x}', \delta)$ such that $\vec{x}'' \succ \vec{x}'$

 So $\vec{p} \cdot \vec{x}' < I \Rightarrow U(\vec{x}') < U(\vec{x}^*)$ (Equivalent!)

Expenditure Function and Value Function

- For utility \bar{U} and price vector \vec{p} , **Expenditure Function** is $M(\vec{p}, \bar{U}) = \min_{\vec{x}} \{ \vec{p} \cdot \vec{x} \mid U(\vec{p}) \geq \bar{U} \}$
- **Claim:** The **Value Function** (maximized utility)
$$V(\vec{p}, I) = \max_{\vec{x}} \{ U(\vec{x}) \mid \vec{p} \cdot \vec{x} \leq I \}$$
- is strictly increasing over I (by LNS).
- Then, for any \bar{U} , there is a unique income M such that $\bar{U} = V(\vec{p}, M)$
- Inverting this, we can solve for $M(\vec{p}, \bar{U})$

Claim: Value Function is Strictly Increasing

- **Claim:** The **Value Function** is strictly increasing

$$V(\vec{p}, I) = \max_{\vec{x}} \{U(\vec{x}) \mid \vec{p} \cdot \vec{x} \leq I\}$$

- **Proof:** If not, there exists $I_1 < I_2$ and \vec{x}_1^*, \vec{x}_2^*
 - such that $U(\vec{x}_1^*) = V(\vec{p}, I_1) \geq V(\vec{p}, I_2) = U(\vec{x}_2^*)$
- LNS yields $\vec{p} \cdot \vec{x}_1^* = I_1 < I_2$, and there exists \vec{x}'
 - such that $U(\vec{x}') > U(\vec{x}_1^*) \geq U(\vec{x}_2^*)$
- In neighborhood $N(\vec{x}_1^*, \delta) \subset \{\vec{x} \mid \vec{x} \geq \vec{0}, \vec{p} \cdot \vec{x} \leq I_2\}$
- But this means \vec{x}' solves $V(\vec{p}, I_2)$ not \vec{x}_2^* . ($\rightarrow \leftarrow$)

Dual Problem: Minimizing Expenditure

- In fact, minimizing expenditure yields:

$$\frac{p_1}{\frac{\partial U}{\partial x_1}} = \frac{p_2}{\frac{\partial U}{\partial x_2}} = \lambda$$

- Maximize Utility's FOC yields:

$$\frac{\frac{\partial U}{\partial x_1}}{p_1} = \frac{\frac{\partial U}{\partial x_2}}{p_2} = \lambda$$

- This close relationship between $\vec{x}^c(\vec{p}, \bar{U})$ and $\vec{x}(\vec{p}, I)$ indicates why they are "sisters"...

Compensated Demand

$\vec{x}^c(\vec{p}, \bar{U})$ solves $M(\vec{p}, \bar{U}) = \min_{\vec{x}} \{ \vec{p} \cdot \vec{x} \mid U(\vec{x}) \leq \bar{U} \}$

- By Envelope Theorem:
- Effect of “Compensated” Price Change is
 - aka **Substitution Effect**...

$$\frac{\partial M}{\partial p_j} = \vec{x}_j^c(\vec{p}, \bar{U})$$

- How much more does Taiwan have to pay if the price of submarines increase (to maintain the same level of defense)?

Elasticity of Substitution (Compensated Demand)

$$\sigma = \mathcal{E} \left(\frac{x_2^c}{x_1^c}, \frac{p_1}{p_2} \right)$$


Consumption ratio change
in response to price change

Claim:

$$\vec{p}^0 \cdot \vec{x} = \vec{p}^0 \cdot \vec{x}^0$$

$$\sigma = \mathcal{E} \left(\frac{x_2^c}{x_1^c}, p_1 \right)$$

$$= \frac{\mathcal{E}(x_2^c, p_1)}{k_1} = - \frac{\mathcal{E}(x_1^c, p_1)}{1 - k_1}, \quad k_1 = \frac{p_1 x_1}{\vec{p} \cdot \vec{x}}$$



Lemma 2.2-4 $\sigma = \mathcal{E}(x_2^c, p_1) - \mathcal{E}(x_1^c, p_1)$

p.502: $\mathcal{E}(y, x) = \frac{x}{y} \cdot \frac{dy}{dx} = x \frac{d}{dx} \ln y = \mathcal{E}(\alpha y, \beta x)$

$$\sigma = \mathcal{E}\left(\frac{x_2^c}{x_1^c}, \frac{p_1}{p_2}\right) = \mathcal{E}\left(\frac{x_2^c}{x_1^c}, p_1\right)$$

$$= p_1 \frac{d}{dp_1} \ln\left(\frac{x_2^c}{x_1^c}\right) = p_1 \frac{d}{dp_1} (\ln x_2^c - \ln x_1^c)$$

$$= p_1 \frac{d}{dp_1} (\ln x_2^c) - p_1 \frac{d}{dp_1} (\ln x_1^c)$$

$$= \mathcal{E}(x_2^c, p_1) - \mathcal{E}(x_1^c, p_1)$$

Prop. 2.2-5

ES & Compensated Price Elasticity

- Relation between **Elasticity of Substitution** and **Compensated Own Price Elasticity**

$$1) \quad \sigma = \mathcal{E} \left(\frac{x_2^c}{x_1^c}, p_1 \right) = \frac{\mathcal{E}(x_2^c, p_1)}{k_1}, \quad k_1 = \frac{p_1 x_1}{\vec{p} \cdot \vec{x}}$$

$\left(\frac{\text{compensated cross price elasticity}}{\text{expenditure share}} \right)$

$$2) \quad \mathcal{E}(x_1^c, p_1) = -(1 - k_1)\sigma$$

Prop. 2.2-5

ES & Compensated Price Elasticity

- On indifference curve, $U(x_1^c(p, \bar{U}), x_2^c(p, \bar{U})) = \bar{U}$
- Hence, $\frac{\partial U}{\partial x_1} \frac{\partial x_1^c}{\partial p_1} + \frac{\partial U}{\partial x_2} \frac{\partial x_2^c}{\partial p_1} = 0$
- By FOC, $\frac{p_1}{\frac{\partial U}{\partial x_1}} = \frac{p_2}{\frac{\partial U}{\partial x_2}} \Rightarrow \underline{p_1 \frac{\partial x_1^c}{\partial p_1} + p_2 \frac{\partial x_2^c}{\partial p_1} = 0}$

$$\begin{aligned} \mathcal{E}(x_1^c, p_1) &= \frac{p_1}{x_1^c} \frac{\partial x_1^c}{\partial p_1} = - \frac{p_2}{x_1^c} \frac{\partial x_2^c}{\partial p_1} \\ &= - \left(\frac{p_2 x_2^c}{p_1 x_1^c} \right) \frac{p_1}{x_2^c} \frac{\partial x_2^c}{\partial p_1} = - \frac{k_2}{k_1} \mathcal{E}(x_2^c, p_1) \end{aligned}$$

$k_j = \frac{p_j x_j^c}{\vec{p} \cdot \vec{x}^c}$

Prop. 2.2-5

ES & Compensated Price Elasticity

- Since $\mathcal{E}(x_1^c, p_1) = -\frac{k_2}{k_1} \mathcal{E}(x_2^c, p_1)$

- Lemma 2.2-4 becomes:

$$\begin{aligned}\sigma &= \mathcal{E}(x_2^c, p_1) - \mathcal{E}(x_1^c, p_1) \\ &= \mathcal{E}(x_2^c, p_1) \cdot \left(1 + \frac{k_2}{k_1}\right) = \frac{\mathcal{E}(x_2^c, p_1)}{k_1} \quad \dots(1)\end{aligned}$$

$$= \mathcal{E}(x_1^c, p_1) \cdot \left(-\frac{k_1}{k_2}\right) \cdot \frac{1}{k_1} = -\frac{\mathcal{E}(x_1^c, p_1)}{k_2}$$

- Hence, $\mathcal{E}(x_1^c, p_1) = -k_2\sigma = -(1 - k_1)\sigma \dots(2)$

Compensated own price elasticity bounded/approx. by ES!

Elasticity of Substitution (Compensated Demand)

- Verify that $\sigma = \theta$ for CES:

- Since $x_1 = \left(\frac{\alpha_1 p_2}{\alpha_2 p_1} \right)^\theta \cdot x_2 \Rightarrow \frac{x_2}{x_1} = \left(\frac{\alpha_2}{\alpha_1} \cdot \frac{p_1}{p_2} \right)^\theta$

$$\Rightarrow \ln \left(\frac{x_2^c}{x_1^c} \right) = \theta (\ln p_1 - \ln p_2 + \ln \alpha_2 - \ln \alpha_1)$$

$$\Rightarrow \sigma = \mathcal{E} \left(\frac{x_2^c}{x_1^c}, p_1 \right) = p_1 \cdot \frac{\partial}{\partial p_1} \left[\ln \left(\frac{x_2^c}{x_1^c} \right) \right]$$

$$= p_1 \cdot \frac{\theta}{p_1} = \theta$$

Summary for Elasticity of Substitution


- 1. $\sigma = \mathcal{E} \left(\frac{x_2^c}{x_1^c}, p_1 \right)$

- 2. $= \frac{\mathcal{E}(x_2^c, p_1)}{k_1}$

$$= - \frac{\mathcal{E}(x_1^c, p_1)}{1 - k_1}$$

$$k_1 = \frac{p_1 x_1}{\vec{p} \cdot \vec{x}}$$

- 3. $\sigma = \theta$ for CES...



Total Price Effect

= Income Effect + Substitution Effect

- For $M(\vec{p}, \bar{U})$ & $x_1(\vec{p}, I)$


- Compensated Demand:

$$x_1^c(\vec{p}, \bar{U}) = x_1(\vec{p}, M(\vec{p}, \bar{U}))$$

$$\frac{\partial x_1^c}{\partial p_1} = \frac{\partial x_1}{\partial p_1} + \frac{\partial x_1}{\partial I} \cdot \frac{\partial M}{\partial p_1}$$

$$\left(\frac{\partial M}{\partial p_1} = x_1 \right)$$

- Slutsky Equation:
$$\underbrace{\frac{\partial x_1}{\partial p_1}}_{A \rightarrow B} = \underbrace{\frac{\partial x_1^c}{\partial p_1}}_{A \rightarrow C} - \underbrace{x_1 \cdot \frac{\partial x_1}{\partial I}}_{C \rightarrow B}$$



Prop. 2.2-6

Decomposition of Own Price Elasticity

- Slutsky Equation:
$$\frac{\partial x_1}{\partial p_1} = \frac{\partial x_1^c}{\partial p_1} - x_1 \cdot \frac{\partial x_1}{\partial I}$$

- Elasticity Version:

$$\frac{p_1}{x_1} \frac{\partial x_1}{\partial p_1} = \frac{p_1}{x_1} \frac{\partial x_1^c}{\partial p_1} - \frac{p_1 x_1}{I} \frac{I}{x_1} \cdot \frac{\partial x_1}{\partial I}$$

- Or,
$$\begin{aligned} \underline{\mathcal{E}(x_1, p_1)} &= \underline{\mathcal{E}(x_1^c, p_1)} - \underline{k_1 \cdot \mathcal{E}(x_1, I)} \\ &= \underline{\underline{-(1 - k_1)\sigma}} - \underline{\underline{k_1 \cdot \mathcal{E}(x_1, I)}} \end{aligned}$$

Substitution Effect

Income Effect

– Own price elasticity = weighted average of elasticity of substitution and income elasticity

Summary of 2.2

- Consumer Problem: Maximize Utility
- Income Effect
- Dual Problem: Minimize Expenditure
- Substitution Effect:
 - = Compensated Price Effect
 - Elasticity of Substitution
- Total Price Effect:
 - = Compensated Price Effect + Income Effect
- Homework: Exercise 2.2-4 (Optional: 2.2-5)

In-Class Homework: Exercise 2.2-2

- Show that the price effect on compensated demand is

$$\frac{\partial M}{\partial p_j}(\vec{p}, \bar{U}) = x_j^c(\vec{p}, \bar{U})$$

- Hint: Convert expenditure minimization into a maximization problem, write down the Lagrangian and use the Envelope Theorem...

In-Class Homework: Exercise 2.2-3

- [Elasticity of Substitution]

a) Show that $\mathcal{E}(y(x), z(x)) = \frac{\frac{d}{dx} \ln y}{\frac{d}{dx} \ln z}$.

b) Use this to show that $\mathcal{E}\left(\frac{1}{y}, \frac{1}{x}\right) = \mathcal{E}(y, x)$

and that $\mathcal{E}\left(\frac{y_2}{y_1}, x\right) = \mathcal{E}(y_2, x) - \mathcal{E}(y_1, x)$

- c) Use these results to prove Lemma 2.2-4.

In-Class Homework: Exercise 2.2-6

- [Parallel Income Expansion Paths]
- A consumer faces price vector p , has income I and utility function $U(\vec{x}) = -\alpha_1 e^{-Ax_1} - \alpha_2 e^{-Ax_2}$
- a) Show that her optimal consumption bundle satisfies the following: $x_2 - x_1 = a + b \ln \frac{p_1}{p_2}$
- b) Depict her Income Expansion Paths.