

Social Preferences

社會偏好

Dictator, Ultimatum & Trust Games

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EE-BGT, Lecture 4

Fairness, Reciprocity & Trust (公平互惠信任)

- ▶ Example: Ultimatum Game (最後通牒談判實驗)
 - ▶ Proposer: makes take-it-or-leave-it offer (提議者)
 - ▶ Responder: accepts or rejects the offer (回應者)
- ▶ Why should we care about this game?
- ▶ People talk about Fairness and Trust
 - ▶ 一般人常把公平和信任掛在嘴邊 vs. Stigler說自利動機最後總是佔上風
- ▶ Stigler (1981): self-interest theory will win.
- ▶ Results = price tag on negative reciprocity
 - ▶ 實驗結果 = 把「報復性正義」標上價格

Political History Example (美國政治史的例子)

- ▶ Federal Convention 1787, Philadelphia
- ▶ "Should new states be 2nd rate states?" George Mason:
 - ▶ "They will have the same pride and other passions which we have, and will either not unite with or will speedily revolt from the Union, if they are not in all respects placed on equal footing with their brethren..."
 - ▶ 新的州民和我們一樣會為自己州感到驕傲自豪。因此，如果他們不能和我們享受同樣的權利，他們若非不願加入，就是加入後很快就會退出
- ▶ Fear of rejection or Fairness? (害怕拒絕 vs. 追求公平)
- ▶ Can we apply this to China-Taiwan relations?

Self-Interest or Not? (人到底是不是自利的?)

- ▶ Self-interest: What you learn in Principles of Economics
(經原第一堂課都會說「人是自利的」)
- ▶ What about altruism? (那「利他」怎麼解釋?)
- ▶ Standard response:
 - ▶ Monetary payoff of your friends enters your utility function
(so you still Maximize Utility) (你的效用函數包括你朋友的報酬/所以還是自利!)
- ▶ Why don't we see this later?
 - ▶ Because the First Welfare Theorem fails without self-interest!
- ▶ Do people really only care about themselves?

Games on Social Preferences (社會偏好的賽局)

- ▶ Prisoners' Dilemma (PD, 囚犯的兩難)
- ▶ Public Goods Game (PG, 自願捐輸賽局)
- ▶ Ultimatum Game (最後通牒談判)
- ▶ Dictator Game: Responder cannot reject (獨裁分配)
- ▶ Trust Game: (互信賽局)
 - ▶ Dictator game where responder invests first to determine pie size. (Investment/Repayment = Trust/Trustworthiness)
 - ▶ Centipede: Multi-stage trust game (蜈蚣賽局)
 - ▶ Gift Exchange: Multiplayer trust game (禮尚往來)

Prisoners' Dilemma (PD) (囚犯的兩難)

	C	D
C	H,H	S,T
D	T,S	L,L

$(T > H > L > S)$

- ▶ Each player pick (每人選擇)
 - ▶ C or D
- ▶ The Dilemma: (兩難的抉擇)
 - ▶ Both cooperate (C) is Pareto dominant
 - ▶ Defect (D) against C better
 - ▶ 雙方合作(都選C)對大家最好，但給定對方合作，你背叛(D)比合作更好
- ▶ Only Equilibrium: (唯一均衡)
 - ▶ (D, D)

Prisoners' Dilemma (PD) (囚犯的兩難)

- ▶ 1-shot games Baseline: (只做一次的基準實驗)
 - ▶ Play C 50% of the time (選擇合作(C)的比例高達50%)
- ▶ Changing payoffs:
 - ▶ Both Lowering T and/or Raising S increases cooperation
 - ▶ (降低背叛的好處T或減少被背叛的損失(也就是提高S!)會促進合作)
- ▶ **Pre-play communication** raises cooperation (事先溝通會促進合作)
- ▶ Random Re-Matching:
 - ▶ Dwindle to only few cooperate
 - ▶ (隨機配對重複做幾次，越來越多人背叛，最後只剩少數還堅持合作)

Public Goods Game (PG) (自願捐輸賽局)

- ▶ N players
- ▶ Invest c_i from personal endowment e_i
 - ▶ Total contribution $c_{all} = \sum_{i=1}^N c_i$
- ▶ Payoff = $e_i - c_i + \frac{m}{N} \cdot c_{all}$
 - ▶ Total contribution multiplied by m , but divided among all
- ▶ Like PD:
 - ▶ Cooperation is good; want to free-ride
 - ▶ Marginal Per Capita Returns (MPCR): S in PD

Public Goods Game (PG) (自願捐輸賽局)

- ▶ 1-shot games Baseline:
 - ▶ Average contribution = 50% (mostly all or none)
- ▶ Changing payoffs:
 - ▶ Raising m (marginal return) raises contribution
- ▶ Pre-play communication raises cooperation
 - ▶ (Random) Re-Matching: Contribution dwindles
- ▶ Add Punishment: Fehr and Grachter (AER 2000)
 - ▶ Punish the least contributor (Few groups punish the most)

Add Punishment: Fehr & Grachter (AER 2000)

- ▶ Punishment induces cooperation
 - ▶ Even though one can free ride other's punishing
- ▶ Cooperation seems to be **Reciprocal**




FIGURE 3B. AVERAGE CONTRIBUTIONS OVER TIME IN THE PARTNER-TREATMENT (SESSION 5)

Pure/Impure Altruism

- ▶ Example:

$$U_i(X) = x_i + \alpha \cdot x_{-i}$$

- ▶ Can explain (C,C) in PD
 - ▶ Homework: Can this explain PG (with/without punishment)?
- ▶ Altruistic giving crowded out if others give
- ▶ Cannot explain **reciprocity**
 - ▶ "I like to do good to those good to me, but do bad to those bad to me."

Inequality-Aversion: Guilty-Envy

$$U_i(X) = x_i - \frac{\alpha}{n-1} \sum_{k \neq i} \max(x_k - x_i, 0) \\ - \frac{\beta}{n-1} \sum_{k \neq i} \max(x_i - x_k, 0)$$

- ▶ Fehr and Schmidt (1999)
 - ▶ $0 \leq \beta \leq 1, \beta \leq \alpha$: Envy stronger than guilt, and explains:
- ▶ PD: Sustain cooperative outcome (C,C)
 - ▶ PG: Heterogeneous contribution (some 0 vs. some positive)
- ▶ Punishments in PG

Classroom Public Goods Game (Principles 08F)

Round	# Donated	Groups	Total	Public	Score	Memo
1	0	30	24	0.89	2.89	Some groups misreport so records do not match Total (collected)
	1	23			1.89	
	2	1			0.89	
2	0	38	22	0.81	2.81	Donation dropped!
	1	10			1.81	
	2	6			0.81	
3	0	15	40	1.48	3.48	A student gave speech to promote donating 1 card.
	1	38			2.48	
	2	1			1.48	
4	0	27	55	2.04	4.04	Same student promoted donating 2 cards among contributors.
	1	6			3.04	
	2	21			2.04	

PD and PG: Conclusion

- ▶ Taiwan Experts in these two games:
- ▶ PD: Chun-Lei Yang (Nanking, formerly at Academia Sinica)
- ▶ PG: Li-Chen Hsu (NCCU), Josie I Chen (NTU)
- ▶ Do these results falsify game theory?
 - ▶ Not quite. They invite for new theory:
 - ▶ Social Preferences (BGT, 2.8)
 - ▶ Limited Strategic Thinking (BGT, Ch.5)
- ▶ Problem with PD/PG: Defect is dominant
 - ▶ Cannot tell altruism from conditional cooperation?!

Ultimatum Game

- ▶ A "Better" Game: Ultimatum Game
 - ▶ Proposer: makes a take-it-or-leave-it offer
 - ▶ Responder: accepts or rejects the offer
- ▶ **Baseline:** 1-shot, anonymous, action
 - ▶ Random re-matching
 - ▶ Strategy Method: Minimum Acceptable Offer (MAO)
- ▶ Strategy Method vs. Specific-Action Method
 - ▶ Is the strategy method too "unnatural"?

Ultimatum Game

- ▶ Basic Results (BGT, Table 2.2, 2.3)
- ▶ **Proposer**
 - ▶ Mode / median: 40-50%
 - ▶ Mean: 30-40%
 - ▶ Almost no below 10% or above 50%
 - ▶ Due to Fairness or Fear of Rejection?
- ▶ **Responder**
 - ▶ Rarely reject offers of 40-50%
 - ▶ 50% rejection rate for offers below 20%

Inequality-Aversion: Guilty-Envy

- ▶ Fehr and Schmidt (1999)

$$U_i(X) = x_i - \frac{\alpha}{n-1} \sum_{k \neq i} \max(x_k - x_i, 0) \\ - \frac{\beta}{n-1} \sum_{k \neq i} \max(x_i - x_k, 0)$$

- ▶ $0 \leq \beta \leq 1, \beta \leq \alpha$: Envy stronger than guilt
- ▶ Explains
- ▶ Ultimatum – Rejections, Fair offers
- ▶ Can Altruism also explain rejection / offers?
 - ▶ No, so Altruism is less parsimonious; inferior to Guilt-Envy!

ERC (Envy, Reciprocity, Competition)

- ▶ Bolton and Ockenfels (2000)

$$U_i(X) = U \left(x_i, \frac{x_i}{\sum_{k=1}^n x_k} \right)$$

- ▶ Care about relative share
- ▶ No individual comparison; Only total comparison
- ▶ Homework: Can this model also explain PD and Ultimatum rejection/offers?
- ▶ What game can distinguish this from G-E?

Dictator Game

- ▶ An Ultimatum Game without rejection
 - ▶ Proposer: makes a dictated allocation decision (and the Responder cannot reject it)
 - ▶ Distinguish Fairness from Fear of Rejection
- ▶ Basic Results: (BGT, Table 2.4)
 - ▶ Lower than Ultimatum, but not zero
- ▶ Offers are more generous than BR
 - ▶ Both Altruism AND Strategic Concerns exist
 - ▶ Proposers hold "pessimistic" belief

Dictator Game: Guilt-Envy

- ▶ Guilt-Envy Prediction for the dictator game:
 - ▶ Give 50-50, or nothing
- ▶ Not consistent with the dictator game results
 - ▶ Homework: Try to "fix" this by adding concavity
- ▶ What are more plausible theories?
 - ▶ ERC: More sophisticated theory of altruism
 - ▶ Fear of rejection + Self-interest
 - ▶ Homework: Show how ERC or fear of rejection can explain dictator game results

Can XYZ... explain these results?

- ▶ X: Methodological Variables
 - ▶ Repetition, Stakes, Anonymity & Double-Blind
- ▶ Y: Demographic Variables
 - ▶ Gender, Race, Academic Major, Age,
 - ▶ Brains, Biology and Beauty
- ▶ Z: Culture
- ▶ XX: Descriptive Variables (Labeling and Context)
- ▶ YY: Structural Variables (Add a move; See below)

X: Methodological Variables

▶ Repetition

- ▶ Experience effect (low offers/rejects) is small
- ▶ Unless played with self-interest robots
- ▶ Is the small effect due to a satiation of emotion?
 - ▶ Try to restart

X: Methodological Variables

► Stakes

- N-month wage: Modest effect on rejections/no effect on offers
- Low rejection rate on 1-year wage (need specific instructions!)
 - Andersen, Ertaç, Gneezy, Hoffman and List (AER 2011)

► Andreoni and Miller (2002):

- Run dictator games with different “exchange rate”
- Behavior under different price of altruism classify people as 1/2 selfish, 1/3 Leontief, 1/6 utilitarian
- Behavior predicts contributions in other Public Goods Games

X: Methodological Variables

- ▶ Anonymity and **Experimenter “Blindness”**
 - ▶ Demand Effect vs. Double-blind Design
- ▶ Within-Subject Design **causes** Demand Effects, but Strategy Method only has Order Effects, since:
 - ▶ Experimenter **designed these** treatments
 - ▶ Within-Subject Design reveal experimenter intentions
 - ▶ Opponent **could have chosen any of these strategies**
 - ▶ Strategy Method does not reveal opponent intentions

X: Methodological Variables

- ▶ Double-blind Dictator Game
 - ▶ Proposers take \$\$ from envelope, seal/mail the rest and leave
 - ▶ Experimenter record \$\$ from envelopes in the mailbox
 - ▶ Responders receive envelope with the remaining \$\$
- ▶ Don't know who left which! (Mean=10%; half gave 0!)
- ▶ Can Ultimatum Game be played out Double-blind?!
 - ▶ Pseudo double-blind: No effect (Bolton and Zwick, GEB 1995)
 - ▶ Do subjects really care about experimenter blindness under negative reciprocity/revenge/fear of rejection?

Y: Demographic Variables (個人特質)

- ▶ Gender: No simple main effect (沒有統一的性別效果)
 - ▶ Female reject less in ultimatum (女性較少拒絕提議)
 - ▶ But punish smartly in 3rd party punishment game (「第三者可懲罰」獨裁分配賽局中對懲罰成本的計算較精明)
- ▶ Race: Few results (political correctness?) (種族: 結果不多, 因為政治不正確的關係嗎?)
 - ▶ White male repay less to Asians in Trust games! (Social status?) (信託賽局中白人男性並未回報亞裔的信任!?)
- ▶ Major: Mixed results on Econ-Majors
 - ▶ 學校科系: 「經濟系效果」不同研究有不同的結果

Y: Demographic Variables (個人特質)

- ▶ Age: Self-interest → strict equality → equity
 - ▶ Kindergartners accept 1 penny 70% (vs. 30-60%)
 - 年紀: 自利 (<5) → 完全的對分(5-7) → 公平偏好(>7)
 - EX: 幼稚園學童接受1 penny的比例高達70% (vs. 30-60%)
- ▶ Brains, Biology and Beauty
 - ▶ Strongness: High-T reject more, offer generously
 - ▶ Many women give >50% to attractive men
 - 大腦, 生理與外貌
 - 勇猛: 睪固酮濃度高者較常拒絕, 但提出的方案也較寬大
 - 帥哥: 面對帥哥, 許多女性提議的分配願意給對方>50%

Z: Culture

- ▶ Methodological Issues (and Solutions):
- ▶ **Stakes**: Equal purchasing power; N-day wage
- ▶ **Language**: Back translation
- ▶ **Experimenter Effects**: Bilingual, seen as equal
 - ▶ Each should run a session in one culture
- ▶ **Confounds**: Match two cultural samples on demographics and measure uncontrollables

Z: Culture

- ▶ Machiguenga Farmers in Peru
 - ▶ Offer average 26%; mode 15%
 - ▶ Social disconnect; no names for non-relatives
- ▶ Henrich et al. (2002): 20 cultural groups
- ▶ Hyperfair offers (that are rejected!)
 - ▶ Ache headhunters of Paraguay and Lamelara whalers of Indonesia
 - ▶ Competitive gift-giving: Accepting a hyperfair offer incurs obligation to repay and is an insult

Z: Culture

- ▶ Two key determinants ($R^2 = 0.68$):
 - ▶ Amount of cooperative activity
 - ▶ Economies of scale in production!
 - ▶ Degree of market integration
- ▶ More cooperative activity and market integration lead to 50-50 sharing norms
 - ▶ Active markets actually reduces self-interest!
- ▶ This is a real culture study...

XX: Descriptive Variables Labeling and Context

- ▶ Self-interest is okay **in the market**:
 - ▶ A buyer-seller story lowers ultimatum offers by 10% but does not affect rejection rates
- ▶ Claiming shared resources creates common ownership:
 - ▶ Both become more generous
- ▶ **Priming**:
 - ▶ Prompting instructions ("What would you do if you were the other side?") increase fear of rejection
 - ▶ General principles of Framing? TBD!

YY: Structural Variables

Identity, Communication, Entitlement:

- ▶ More generous as dictator if recipient is:
 - ▶ Known or Introduced (Bohnet and Frey, AER 1999)
 - ▶ Well-known Charity (American Red Cross) (Eckel and Grossman, GEB 1996)
- ▶ Hoffman et al. (GEB 1994): Contest for Role
 - ▶ **Winning right as dictator** lowers offers by half
 - ▶ **Winning right to propose** lowers offers by 10%, but are rejected more (Disagree Entitlement?!)

YY: Structural Variables

Outside Option:

- ▶ Schotter, Weiss and Zapater (JEBO 1996)
 - ▶ Need to earn above median to play again
- ▶ % of dictators who keep all: 13% → 30%
- ▶ In Ultimatum: Proposers offer 10% less
 - ▶ Responders accept less offers (Action Method)
 - ▶ But have the same MAO (Strategy Method)

YY: Structural Variables

Outside Option:

- ▶ Knez & Camerer (GEB 1995): Self-serving bias
 - ▶ $U(\text{reject}) = (2,3)$ generates multiple focal points
 1. 5-5: Original 50-50
 2. 4.5-5.5: Split 50-50 on remaining 5 = $(2+2.5)-(3+2.5)$
 3. 6.75-3.25: Give Responder one quarter ($=\$0.25$), the minimum to induce acceptance = Propose to give \$3.25
- ▶ 50%(>>10-15%) disagree, but drops after 5 rounds

YY: Structural Variables

Information about Amount being Divided:

- ▶ Camerer and Lowenstein (book chap 1993)
- ▶ Known: Both know pie = \$1, \$3, \$5, \$7 or \$9
- ▶ **Unknown:** Respondent see uniform distribution
 - ▶ Proposer: Mean/median offer = 40-50% for both
 - ▶ Respondent - Known: MAO = 30% (15% rejections)
 - ▶ Respondent - **Unknown:** MAO = \$1.88 (39% rejections)
 - ▶ **Follow-up studies:** Incline to reject as low offer could be fair

YY: Structural Variables

Information about Amount being Divided:

- ▶ Follow-up studies: Incline to reject as low offer could be fair
- ▶ Follow-ups with Know Distribution of Pie Size:
 - ▶ Mitzkewitz and Nagel (IJGT1993)
 - ▶ Rapoport, Sundali and Potter (IJGT1996)
- ▶ Follow-ups which Do not Tell Anything:
 - ▶ Straub and Murnighan (JEBO1995)
 - ▶ Croson (JEBO1996)

YY: Structural Variables

Information about Amount being Divided (cont.)

- ▶ Guth and Huck (Metroeconomica 1997)
 - ▶ Responder knows pie = 16 or 38 with equal chance
 - ▶ Most accept 8 (equal split), but 50% reject 7 or 9
- ▶ Kagel, Kim and Moser (GEB 1996)
 - ▶ Ultimatum: 100 chips valued at 10¢/30¢ each
 - ▶ Proposer knows: 45%(30%) if own chip=30¢(10¢)
 - ▶ Responder knows: 40% reject (when own chip=10¢)

YY: Structural Variables

Information about Amount being Divided (cont.)

- ▶ Abbink et al. (GEB 2001): R knows $u_P(\text{reject})$
 - ▶ Reject more if Proposer will get less (黑白郎君?!)
- ▶ Social Influence/Peer Effect: What others do
 - ▶ Ultimatum: Knez and Camerer (GEB 1995)
 - ▶ Dictators offer more seeing others are offering more
 - ▶ Cason and Mui (J Math Psych 1998)

YY: Structural Variables

Multiperson Game: Competition drive offers

- ▶ Guth, Huck and Ockenfels (EJ 1996): 3-person
- ▶ Guth and Van Damme (J Math Psych 1998)
 - ▶ Affect 3rd bystander vs. Information Asymmetry
- ▶ Roth, Prasnikar, Okuno-Fujiwara and Zamir (AER 1991):
 - ▶ 9 Proposers vs. 1 Respondent
 - ▶ Accept highest among 9 simultaneous offers
 - ▶ 1st round: Highest offer = 95%/2nd: all offer 100%

YY: Structural Variables - Multiperson

- ▶ Guth, Huck and Ockenfels (EJ 1996)
 - ▶ Proposer sees pie = 24.60/12.60 DM; offers x
 - ▶ 1st Responder can reject or offer how to split x
 - ▶ (and play ultimatum with 2nd Responder)
 - ▶ If pie large, 70% offer 8.40 (2/3 of 12.60 to get equal split)
 - ▶ If pie small, 1/6 offer < 8.00
 - ▶ 1st Responder usually accepts and split x with 2nd

Can G-E, ERC, Explain These?

- ▶ **Homework:** How can G-E explain ultimatum game with competing proposers/respondents?
- ▶ **Homework:** How can ERC predict "ignoring allocation to inactive Recipient" (Guth and Van Damme, J Math Psych 98):
 - ▶ Proposer offers (x, y, z) to Two Responders
 - ▶ Active Responder sees $y/z/yz$; accepts or rejects
 - ▶ See y/yz : Offer $y = 30-40\%$, $z = 5-10\%$, 5% reject
 - ▶ See z : Offer $z = 12-15\%$, keep most, 5% reject
- ▶ **Intentions:** Can only choose $(8,2)$ or $(10,0)$?

ERC vs. Guilt-Envy

- ▶ Punishment in PG: ERC fit data less well than G-E
 - ▶ Charness and Rabin (2000): People care about inequality among others; absolute difference still matters: (see below)
- ▶ But, both models assume **Separability**
 - ▶ Are terminal-node payoffs separable from game tree path and unchosen payoffs? (False, but a good approximation?!)
- ▶ Both models do not capture **Reciprocity**
 - ▶ "I like to do good to those good to me, but do bad to those bad to me."

Fairness Equilibrium

- ▶ Psychological Games: Rabin (1993)
- ▶ Normal Form Games; Action: a_1
- ▶ Belief about other's action: b_2
- ▶ Belief about belief: c_1
- ▶ 1's kindness toward 2:

$$f_1(a_1, b_2) = \frac{\pi_2(b_2, a_1) - \pi_2^{\text{fair}}(b_2)}{\pi_2^{\text{max}}(b_2) - \pi_2^{\text{min}}(b_2)}$$

Fairness Equilibrium

- ▶ 1's kindness toward 2:

$$f_1(a_1, b_2) = \frac{\pi_2(b_2, a_1) - \pi_2^{\text{fair}}(b_2)}{\pi_2^{\text{max}}(b_2) - \pi_2^{\text{min}}(b_2)}$$

- ▶ 1's perceived kindness of 2 to 1:

$$\tilde{f}_2(b_2, c_1) = \frac{\pi_1(c_1, b_2) - \pi_1^{\text{fair}}(c_1)}{\pi_1^{\text{max}}(c_1) - \pi_1^{\text{min}}(c_1)}$$

Fairness Equilibrium

- ▶ Player 1's (social) preferences:

$$U_1(a_1, b_2, c_1) = \pi_1(a_1, b_2) + \alpha \cdot \tilde{f}_2(b_2, c_1) \\ + \alpha \cdot \tilde{f}_2(b_2, c_1) \cdot f_1(a_1, b_2)$$

- ▶ Rational expectations: $a_1 = b_1 = c_1$
 - ▶ Example 1: PD
 - ▶ Example 2: Chicken Game
- ▶ Extensive-Form Fairness Equilibrium
 - ▶ Falk and Fischbacher (1998)

ERC, G-E vs. Fairness Equilibrium

Offer	Accept	Reject	Reject	ERC	G-E	Fairness Eq.
Equal	5, 5	0.5, 0.5				
Unequal	8, 2	0.8, 0.2	38%	None	Some	Some
Equal	5, 5	3, 3				
Unequal	8, 2	6, 0	19%	None	None	Some

What Did We Learn From All This?

- ▶ A LOT has been done...
 - ▶ Is there a parsimonious theory to explain all?
- ▶ Every stone has been turned to disprove Social Preference, but failed
 - ▶ People are not strictly self-interest
- ▶ Methods: See how careful they did those!
- ▶ What makes a result interesting?
 - ▶ How can you adopt it in your own design?

Trust

- ▶ How do I know you will hold up your end of the deal?
 - ▶ Legal Contracts, Third-party assurance,
 - ▶ Family solidarity, threats of violence
- ▶ These are costly; **Trust** is cheap!
 - ▶ Lending a truck to strangers in Iowa
 - ▶ Tokyo's lost and found center (72% returned)
- ▶ Firms prefer to lay off rather than cut wages

Trust

- ▶ **Trust** (Social Capital) explains growth
- ▶ Putnam (1995)
 - ▶ "Since trust is so central to a theory of social capital, it would be desirable to have strong behavioral indicators of trends in social trust or misanthropy. **I have discovered no such behavioral measures.**"

Trust Game

- ▶ Investor decides how much to invest
 - ▶ Amount invested is multiplied by m
- ▶ Trustee decides how much to repay investor
- ▶ How much would you invest?
- ▶ How much would you repay?
- ▶ Provides a measure of Social Capital:
 - ▶ Trust: Amount invested
 - ▶ Trustworthiness: Amount returned

Trust Game

- ▶ Berg, Dickhaut and McCabe (1995)
 - ▶ Double-blind; \$10, $m=2$
- ▶ Investor put in about 50% of endowment
- ▶ Trustee repay about 95% of \$ invested
- ▶ Replicate: Invest 40-70%, Repay 110-150%
 - ▶ Various Studies (Lowest: 55% @ corrupt Kenya)
- ▶ Except: Van Huyck, Battalio Walters (1995/2001)
 - ▶ Peasants (invest little) vs. Dictator Landlords (take all)

Trust Game: Why Trust?

- ▶ Is Trustworthiness **Reciprocity** or **Altruism**?
- ▶ **Altruism**: Dictator game offer
- ▶ **Reciprocity**: Difference between
 - ▶ % repay in Trust game and % Dictator game offer
- ▶ Dufwenberg and Gneezy (2000):
 - ▶ 30% vs. 33% (insignificant) - **Altruism** alone?
- ▶ Cox (1999):
 - ▶ 10% more (statistically significant but small)

Trust Game: Direct vs. Indirect

- ▶ Matching Design:

- ▶ Pairs → Foursome → Society

- ▶ Buchan, Croson and Dawes (Am J Socio 2002): $m=3$

- ▶ Trust: 64% → 48% → 39%

- ▶ Trustworthiness: 105% → 57% → 45%

- ▶ Dufwenberg et al. (2000): $m=2$ (no Society)

- ▶ Trust: 60% → 53% → n/a

- ▶ Trustworthiness: 28% → 37% → n/a

Trust Game: Incomplete Information and Culture

- ▶ What if m is uncertain?
- ▶ Dufwenberg et al. (2000): $m=2$ vs. $m=1$ or 3
 - ▶ Trust: 60% $\rightarrow$ 55% (both fixed pairs)
 - ▶ Trustworthiness: 28% $\rightarrow$ 26%

		Countries	Pairs	Foursome	Society
Trust	Trust	US-China	76%	49%	49%
		Japan-Korea	51%	48%	28%
	Trust-worthiness	China-Korea	123%	75%	54%
		US-Japan	84%	39%	33%

- ▶ Culture Effects: Buchan, Croson and Dawes (2002)
 - ▶ US, Korea vs. China (pre-WTO), Japan (#1 trust)
 - ▶ China: Highest Trust/Trustworthiness
 - ▶ Japan: Least Trust/Trustworthiness
 - ▶ US: High Trust/Low Trustworthiness
 - ▶ Korea Low Trust/High Trustworthiness (Why in between?!)

Trust Game: Other Extensions


► History Effect in a Sequential Trust Game:

- Donate 250 (at cost 150) or not
 - See past 6 rounds donation history (donor and receiver)
- ### ► Seinen and Schram (EER 2006)
- 25% → 70% (Show Donation History)
 - More likely to donate if:
 1. Donor donated more in the past
 2. Recipient donated more in the past
 3. Individual differences forecast later donation - 75% correct

Donor No Hist.	Past Donate	Donor History	Receiver History
0%	0/6	2%	24%
21%	1/6	42%	45%
31%	2/6	48%	51%
44%	3/6	65%	60%
58%	4/6	71%	73%
70%	5/6	78%	77%
98%	6/6	85%	94%


Complex Omnibus Trust Game 1

- ▶ McCabe, Rassenti and Smith (GEB 1998)
- ▶ Big Tree Game 1 (2-way Centipede) vs. Game 2




Complex Omnibus Trust Game 1: SPE

- SPE Outcome: **IN-R-P-T** yields payoffs (40, 40)




Complex Omnibus Trust Game 1: SPE

- ▶ SPE Outcome: **IN-R-P-T** yields payoffs (40, 40)
- ▶ Realized in **Private Payoff Information**



Complex Omnibus Trust Game 1: Reciprocal

- ▶ SPE Outcome: **IN-R-P-T** yields payoffs (40, 40)
- ▶ Reciprocal Outcome: **IN-L-T** yields (50, 50)




Complex Omnibus Trust Game 1: Reciprocal

- ▶ SPE Outcome: **IN-R-P-T** yields payoffs (40, 40)
- ▶ Reciprocal Outcome: **IN-L-T** yields (50, 50)

▶ **One-Shot:**

▶ Both Occur!




Complex Omnibus Trust Game 1: Reciprocal

- ▶ SPE Outcome: **IN-R-P-T** yields payoffs (40, 40)
- ▶ Reciprocal Outcome: **IN-L-T** yields (50, 50)


▶ **Partner:**

▶ **Reciprocal!**



Complex Omnibus Trust Game 2

- ▶ SPE Outcome: **IN-R-P-T** yields payoffs (40, 40)
- ▶ Reciprocal Outcome: **IN-L-P-T** yields (50, 50)




Complex Omnibus Trust Game 2

- ▶ SPE Outcome: **IN-R-P-T** yields payoffs (40, 40)
- ▶ Reciprocal Outcome: **IN-L-P-T** yields (50, 50)

▶ **One-Shot:**

▶ Both Occur!




Complex Omnibus Trust Game 2

- ▶ SPE Outcome: **IN-R-P-T** yields payoffs (40, 40)
- ▶ Reciprocal Outcome: **IN-L-P-T** yields (50, 50)

▶ **Partner:**

▶ **Reciprocal!**



Trust Game: Other Extensions

- ▶ Multistage Trust Games: Centipede with terminal=(0,0)
 - ▶ Selfish guys can't mimic nice guys who all pass
- ▶ Ho and Weigelt (MS 2005):
 - ▶ 4 moves; pass doubles pie; strategy approach
 - ▶ 30% (50%) player 1/2s take 95% at first node
- ▶ Rapoport et al. (GEB 2003):
 - ▶ 3 person; 9 nodes; up to \$1,500
 - ▶ 1/3 of the games ended at the first two nodes

Trust at Work: Gift Exchange?

- ▶ Fehr et al.; Fehr and Gächter (JEP 2000)
- ▶ 8 workers and 6 firms
- ▶ Firms offer wage w to worker (suggest e')
- ▶ Workers (if accept) chose effort e
- ▶ Payoffs: Firms earn $(q - w)e$
- ▶ Workers earn $w - c(e)$
 - ▶ $c(.)$ convex on 0.1-1.0
- ▶ What would you choose/offer?

Trust at Work: Gift Exchange?


- ▶ Standard Game Theory Predictions:
 - ▶ Workers will choose minimum effort
 - ▶ Firms offer low wage
- ▶ Gift Exchange (GE, Akerlof, 1982)
 - ▶ Workers reciprocate high wage with high effort
- ▶ Efficient Wages (EW)
 - ▶ High wage creates a job rent of $w - c(e')$ that workers might lose if they are caught shirking
 - ▶ But: Hard to separate GE and EW in the field

Trust at Work: Gift Exchange

- Fehr and Gächter (JEP 2000) support GE

Figure 3

Actual Effort-Rent Relation in the Absence and Presence of Explicit Performance Incentives



Trust at Work: Gift Exchange

- ▶ Other papers show less gift exchange
- ▶ Initial gift exchange vanishes after few hours in the field
- ▶ Gneezy and List (2006), Putting Behavioral Economics to Work: Testing for Gift Exchange in Labor Markets Using Field Experiments, *Econometrica*, 74(5), 1365-1384.
 - ▶ "We experimented with the individual-specific variables found to be important in Landry [et al.] (2006) and found that their inclusion **does not change the qualitative insights.**"

Trust Game: Where We Stand?

- ▶ How robust is gift exchange in the labor market (experimental or empirically)?
- ▶ This is still an active field of research
- ▶ Question: Where does trust come from?
 - ▶ Kosfeld, Heinrichs, Zak, Fischbacher and Fehr (2005), Oxytocin increases Trust in Humans, *Nature*, 435, 2 June 2005, 673-676.

Conclusion

- ▶ Do people respond to incentives?
 - ▶ Yes! But what kind of incentives?
- ▶ External (monetary) Incentives: Payoffs
- ▶ Internal Incentives: Fairness, Altruism, etc.
- ▶ Plenty of experiments on social preferences
 - ▶ Do not blindly propose to run another one!
 - ▶ Check literature first! (BGT, ch.2, Handbook)
- ▶ Parsimonious theory to explain/make new predictions?