

Theory Reading Group, July 7, 2012

Deleuze, The Fold—Leibniz and the Baroque, Part III Having a Body

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Chapter 8 The Two Floors

- 8 distributive units, final causes, efficient causes, second Nature, resemble (coordinate), preestablished harmony, two floors (folded over twice)
 - 8-1 comprehension of the concept is distributive and not collective... monads stand in the same respect to the world as to the comprehension of their concept: each one on its own basis comprises the entirety of the world. --- Monads are each or every one for itself, white bodies are one, some, or any. 100-1-2---(distributive—the two floor)
---this convergence moves along two diverging paths or according to two entirely different regimes, a regime of expression and a regime of impression, ---a vertical immanent causality ---and a transitive horizontal causality.
 - 8-1-1 final causes (a vertical immanent causality---moral necessity)---concepts of liberty or grace are at stake: "free decrees," final causes and "moral necessity" (the best) 100-2-8
 - 8-1-2 efficient causes (a transitive horizontal causality---hypothetical necessity)-- concepts of nature, with efficient causes, "subaltern maxims" such as physical laws, in which necessity is hypothetical (if one is...so then the other...) 101-1-1
 - 8-1-2-1 the case of infinitesimal calculus---the object; the world---the primary equation of an infinite curvature of inflection---a simple rule of tangents; vectors as concavity---differential relations---that are present in every monad between minute perceptions---a first moment of the object, the object as perceived or the world as expression 101-2
 - 8-1-2-2 maxims or empirical laws of second Nature---(second degree, the second moment of the object, resemble)--- differential equations and integrations that determine ---the efficient causes of perception---the bodies that perception resembles. Such is the second moment of the object, no longer expression, but content. These are no longer decrees, but maxims or empirical laws of second Nature. These are no longer singularities of inflection, but singularities of extremum, because the curve is now related --but only now to coordinates that allow us to determine minima or maxima. 101-3
 - 8-1-2-3 second Nature ---complementary, homogenized--- the differential relations determine a maximum of quantity of being. while in the other the maximum (or minimum) determines the relations in the equation 102-1-7
---Raymond Ruyer (figure---length, planar surface, contour 101-4-8) 102-3-1--- figures are functions that refer to the axes of coordinates, and structures are functionings that refer to relative positions ordered from one to the next, according to states of equilibrium and horizontal linkages, even when there exists a relation of dominance.--- vertical positions--- self-surveiling
 - 8-2 appearance
 - 8-2-1 Gestalttheorie (Gestalt)---forms--- dynamic equilibriums--- perceived

- figures as for physical structures--- a law of minimal tension would explain foveal fixation without assuming special conductors---not to be of a nature that would exceed the order of mechanisms of contact or succession ("thrusts" or "impulsions")
- 8-2-2 D'Arcy Thomson 103-3-1, Raymond Ruyer 102-3-1--- a true form that cannot be reduced to an apparent whole or to a phenomenal field, because it must retain the distinction of its details and its own individuality in the hierarchy in which it enters---(***)ontological difference)
- 8-2-3 subaltern maxims(secondary horizontal linkages) ---secondary horizontal linkages and follow subaltern maxims according to which structures function and figures are ordered or linked. 104-1-1
- 8-2-4 statistics---these are the two levels or two aspects of the calculus 104-2-8-- -, a collective or mass phenomenon 104-2-7--- (laws of extremum and laws of contact, ***classification)---All these laws are like statistics because they pertain to collections, masses, organisms, and no longer to individual beings.104-2-1
- 8-2-5 Above, individual beings and true forms or primal forces; below, masses and derivative forces, figures and structures.104-3-1
- 8-3 appearance, virtual-actual---possible-real (***)one world among an infinity of possible worlds)---matter, body--- phenomenon
- 8-3-1 Why the lower level, which is not a simple appearance? ---It is because the world or the hazy line of the world resembles a virtuality that is actualized in the monads.
- 8-3-2 But the coupling of the virtual-actual does not resolve the problem. 104-4-4 --- The world is a virtuality that is actualized monads or souls, but also a possibility that must be realized in matter or in bodies. 104-5-2
- 8-3-3 the strict sense---a phenomenon--- resemblance---an objective Nature (real world)---The process of actualization operates through distribution, while the process of realization operates by resemblance. 105-2-1
- 8-3-3-1 what is actualized and is realized? 105-2-5 ---final causes, efficient causes
- 8-3-3-2 the world is the Circle, the pure "reserve" of events that are actualized in every self and realized in things one by one(Chinese or Japanese philosophy)--- (self---reserve---Ego---theory of appurtenance) --- withdrawn part 106-2-8
- 8-3-3-3 preestablished harmony (actualized--final causes, realized--efficient causes) is thus presented first of all as an accord between the two regimes.--- preestablished harmony is located between the soul and "its" body. 106-3-15---one (soul) is distributive where the other (body) is collective 106-3-4
- 8-4 appurtenance ---preestablished harmony, (Leibniz) 106-4 ---occasionalism (Malebranche), parallelism (Spinoza), theory of appurtenance (Husserl) --- But what allows us to speak of "the body of a monad" or " its body," since the monad is always an Each, an Every, while the body, always a body--- (collective), is a One?---the union (union=/=correspondence, modification=/=dominate) of the soul and the body
- 8-4-1 Husserl ,the Ego, the Self, sphere of appurtenance, something foreign to me, the other, an objective Nature

- 8-4-1-2 What belongs to me? ---the thought of the self, the cogito---all my predicates include= the zone of the world=special possession, primary matter is what I own as the requirement of having a body
- 8-4-1-3 the body, a body, is what I own---an organic body with which I am immediately "present." that I can use in ----an immediate fashion--- and with which--- I coordinate what is perceived
- 8-4-1-4 a body not being in my monad
- 8-4-1-4-1 Husserl---through (body) aperceptive transposition (cogito, clear, a first Nature---object)---the other-self, the other monad (~=Kant)
- 8-4-1-4-2 Leibniz---the plurality of monads--- everything that exceeds my clear zone or my subdivision and that nevertheless I include, everything that remains dark or obscure in me, resembles the negative image of other monads, because other monads use it to form their own clear zone.---(object=dark or obscure, the negative image, clear=thought)---a community of monads is already in place---zones of clarity (a second Nature, possible, realization, Harmony)---the level of the body=/=the other-self
107-3
- 8-5 I have a body---(the level of the body--- distinction)
- 8-5-1 an extrinsic possession---on the lower level (distinction, inseparability)--- In the very same way Harmony and Union discover the principle of their division: preestablished harmony of the soul and of the body rules their real distinction, while the union determines their inseparability. 108-1-1
- 8-5-2 when I die, my monad is not separated from a body whose parts are happy to become involuted. (2) monad does not perceive in itself without having a body in ---***"resemblance" with what it is perceiving. 108-1
- 8-5-3 virtue of the generality of the order of resemblance---a generic, specific, organic body---the requirement of having a body is quite individual, but not the body that happens to fill it, at least not immediately.108-1-9 ---(God does not endow the soul with a body without furnishing the given body with organs.[body without organs?] 108-2-1)
- 8-6 a body---a generic, specific, organic body ---(the soul, a second Nature, Harmony)
- 8-6-1 What makes an organic, specific, or generic body? --- It is probably made of infinities of present material parts, in conformity with infinite division, in conformity with the nature of masses or collections. 108-2-3
- 8-6-2 animal monads--- that themselves belong to material parts of "my" body, and that are not confused with the monad to which my body belongs.--- These are merely the requisites of my organic, specific, or generic body
- 8-6-3 specific, or generic body---appurtenance---(1) monads (2) have a body (3)the specific requisites of this body (4) belong to parts of this body 108-3
- 8-6-3-1 primal monads--- specific requisites (no body)---naked matter (moles) 114-4-1 ---bare entelechies or substantial forms that only have perceptions 118-3-1---it is because its parts not only grow and shorten. involve and evolve, but also never cease to move about and go away (fluxion).

- 8-6-3-2 second monads--- possess a body---clothed matter (massa, a crowd of monads, a broad sense) 114-4-2 ---animal souls that have memory, feeling, and attention
- 8-6-3-3 tertiary monads--- The soul and the body can always be truly distinguished, but inseparability traces a coming and going between one level and the other. (reasonable monads)
- (***114-4-1,117-2, 118-3-1)---Leibniz often happens to distinguish three classes of monads: bare entelechies or substantial forms that only have perceptions; animal souls that have memory, feeling, and attention; and, finally, reasonable minds. 118-3-1
- 8-6-4 body---the law collections---if my body, the body that belongs to me, is a body according to the law collections. 108-4-1---it is because its parts not only grow and shorten, involve and evolve, but also never cease to move about and go away (fluxion).---(collection---field---gravity, tangents ,vectors of concavity, magnetism, electricity, volatility)
- 8-6-4-1 body--- "pro tempore" requisites (fluxion)--- the theory of appurtenance ---distinguishes ---(1)nonsymmetrical and inverted appurtenances (a body belongs to my monad, some monads belong to parts of my body)---(2) constant or temporary appurtenances (a body belongs constantly to my monad, some monads belong temporarily to my body)
- 8-6-4-2 the theory of appurtenance (tangents --vectors of concavity)--- the revelation of a half-other occurs: the animal in me as a concrete being.--- the other body--- an Alter Ego that does not belong to me: as for the animal (Husserl's aperceptive transposition), ---it is only an "anomaly" of this Other (body).
- 8-6-5 this Other (body, or a crowd of monads)--- Leibniz---the alter ego has already sprung up at an earlier stage of ***phenomenological deduction, and is sufficiently explained ----through ***preestablished harmony 109-2-2
- this Other (some, each, every, each other---preestablished harmony)- -- the animal (topsy-turvy), and first of the little animals inseparable from the fluid parts of my body 109-2-4
- 8-7 (1) naked monad (2) possession (animal monads)---temporary, or provisional appurtenances (fluxion, pro tempore)109-3-4 ---an animal psychology, an animal monadology—dominated, Dominata (distributive units)
- 8-7-1 Beckett's Malone---a naked monad---body, possession?---hook (distributive units)
- 8-7-2 ***having a body, having in place of that of Being--- reincarnations of appurtenance or possession--- species, degrees, relations, and variables of possession--- (the soul, distributive units, dominate, harmony)
- Gabriel Tarde--- he unjustifiable primacy of the verb "to be"
- " I have diverse thoughts" in correlation with " I am thinking."
- 8-7-3 Appurtenance and possession hark back to ---domination. A specific body belongs to my monad, but as long as my monad dominates the monads that belong to the parts of my body 110-3-1--- a cipher of appurtenances--- casuistry 110-2-13

- 8-7-3-1 variable terms and one constant term--- a vague notion--- substantial vinculum--- the vincular relation belongs to it or is " fixed" upon it, ***the constant term will be the dominant monad
- 8-7-3-2 Apparently we can be all the more astonished, because this relation, having other monads for its ***variable terms (hereafter dominated). cannot be a predicate contained in its subject. That is why the relation. not being a predicate, will be called substantial."--- reincarnations---Circle 106-2-1
- 8-7-3-3 substantial--- the subject of the vinculum--- a "subject of adhesion," not of inherence or of inhesion. --- this is an almost insufferable paradox in Leibnizianism. 111-1-8--- the preestablished harmony implies no outer relation among the monads, but only ties regulated on the ***inside--- topology--- unilaterality--- a torsion of the world
- 8-7-3-4 variable terms are concerned, monads are what enter in the relation as "objects," even if for brief moments
- 8-7-3-5 vinculum--- variable terms--- it is what acquires its variables en masse, and by masses. Not that the monads that enter under its rule in themselves lose their own ***individuality (which would imply a miracle) 112-1-4
- 8-7-3-6 Yvon Belaval and Christiane Frimont--- the vinculum takes up its variables in a massive effect and not in their individuality: whence --- the passage ***from optics to acoustics, or from the individual mirror to the collective echo, ---the effects of whisper or swarming that now refer to this new acoustical register. --- homogeneity for the pans that are endlessly being replaced and heterogeneity for the parts that are being coordinated--- Composed of material parts, the organic body is precisely that which possesses the dominant, a body that here finds the determination of its specific unity.
- 8-7-3-7 specific unity--- from optics to acoustics--- an entire cycle of the body and the soul that goes through Every and One 113-1-4 ---(1) each a body---separate (2) each one possesses a body---fixed (3) variable--taken en masse (4) masses---material (5) material make up the organic (6) this body belongs to individual monad—extent— individual unity
- 8-8 reasonable monads (dominate)---the necessary classification of monads
 - 8-8-1 reasonable monads have a zone so wide and so intense that they lend themselves to operations of reflection or deepening that makes them tend toward God.113-2-4 --- projection---active primary force is projected as dominant at a point in the body 113-2-20
 - 8-8-2 reasonable monads are never dominated (individuality) ---animal monads can always be dominated (en masse, clusters, not possess, dominant under this relation, aggregate of material parts, the body of the dominant one, dominate monad possesses)
 - 8-8-3 secondary matter---a broad sense---(1) primary---naked matter---moles--- body (2) secondary---clothed matter---massa---a crowd---figures (statistical of laws of equilibrium)--- structures, textures, fabric, a buoyant surface 114-4, 115-2
 - 8-8-4 the second property(a third species of monad, perceive)--- ***a felt 115-4-6 (inorganic, organic)---substantial components, semisubstance, or

- sort of substantiated--- derivative forces--- these bodies are purely mechanical (laws of extrema), these bodies do not or no longer have any monads. For they would not be bodies. They would only be "phenomena," and yet in this fashion they would be "perceived" by a monad. 116-1-3---actualized phenomena (perceived)--- an inner nature
- 8-8-5 a third species of monad, perceive
--- These are neither dominant nor dominated monads. They might be called defective monads, in the way that one speaks of defective conic sections.
- 8-8-5-1 every monad is an inner unity, but what it is a unit of is not forcibly inside the monad 116-2
- 8-8-5-2 degenerated or defective monads are themselves units of outer movement--- the extrinsic a relation with a surrounding, a successive determination, a mechanical linkage. (degenerate, dead) 116-3-8
- 8-8-5-3 elasticity--- this force becomes only "living" or "dead" in a proportion that conforms to the extrinsic state. 116-4-4 (a felt, conic sections)--- tendencies---several levels
- 8-8-5-4 tendency---monads of the third species are flashing (overflight), twinkling in a way, through the difference of the illuminators and the illuminated.--- recreated in the following instant 117-2-15---(flashing--- notion---an individual, a new harmony--- reincarnation, Circle, two floors , a fold---a projection, project a shadow)
- 8-8-6 public---private
---derivative forces--- species of monads---(whether elastic or plastic)---the terms "state" or "modification" must be understood in the sense of predicate, but as a status or a (public) aspect. 117-3-9
- 8-8-6-1 derivative forces--- a status or a public aspect---the some, a vinculum or in the flash of an instant---plastic (in multitudes)---elastic (in a mass) (1) Primary forces= monads or substance in themselves or of themselves ---(2) Derivative forces are the some, but under a vinculum or in the flash of an instant. 117-3-12
- 8-8-6-2 body---requisition, requisites---belong to a monad removed from its status, from a multitude, and from a mass, in and by itself, as a primary force 118-1-3 --- Whitehead---the publicand the private as phenomenological categories.
- 8-8-6-3 Leibniz the public means the status of monads, their requisition, their in-multitude or in-mass, their derivative state. But the private means their in-themselves of-themselves, their points of view, their primitive condition and their projections. 118-2-1
---- body---monad (two floors)---dissociated, indissociable--- It is not the same body, but these are the same monads--- reasonable (only private, no public status, "public" status only by private means) ---God (as distributive members of a society of spirits for whom is the monarch)
- 8-8-6-4 Leibniz often happens to distinguish three classes of monads: bare entelechies or substantial forms that only have perceptions; animal souls that have memory, feeling, and attention; and, finally, reasonable minds. --- degrees ---dominant, dominated
- 8-8-7 ideal action --- the best

--- a single and same thing --- the (same) World---two distinct expression(body, soul)---one actualizes the world (soul, final causes, inner spontaneity), the other realizes it (body, efficient causes, outer determination)---a singular event of the world, in each case an " ideal cause" will be called the best expressant (if we can determine what "the best" means)

---(distributive units)---the same world, allotment of the two worlds, the in-itself and for-ourselves (not for-itself?)

8-8-8 transcendental actualization and realization (animism and materialism)

8-8-8-1 Kant---two floors--- the upper floor into something empty or inhabited

8-8-8-2 Leibniz--- the two floors are and will remain inseparable; they are really distinct and yet inseparable by dint of a presence of the upper in the lower. The upper floor is folded over the lower floor. One is not acting upon the other, but one belongs to the other, in a sense of a double belonging.--- force is presence and not action.

8-8-8-3 Where is the fold moving? ---The world is actualized in souls. and is realized in bodies. It is therefore folded over twice, first in the souls that actualize it, and again folded in the bodies that realize it, and each time according to a regime of laws that corresponds to the nature of souls or to the determination of bodies.

--- The reality of the body is the realization of phenomena in the body.-

-- a double operation--- What is realized is the fold of the two levels, the vinculum itself or its replacement (event)--- transcendental actualization and realization (animism and materialism)