PS5370 International Political Economy Week 11 Geopolitics and Trade

Hans H. Tung Department of Political Science National Taiwan University

> Spring 2024 May 01, 2024

Outline

1 Economic Effects



2 Politics of Economic Sanctions

Geopolitics and Trade



Russia-Turkey



Russian government ratifies economic sanctions against Turkey

Russian Prime Minister Dmitry Medvedev has signed a decree prohibiting the import of food from Turkey and banning charter flights between the two countries. This is in...

RT.COM

US-Liberia



Politics | Thu Nov 12, 2015 4:05pm EST

Related: WORLD, ELECTION

U.S. lifts economic sanctions against Liberia: White House

WASHINGTON



The United States lifted economic sanctions against Liberia on Thursday as President

Barack Obama cited the country's "tremendous progress" and commitment to democracy since emerging from civil war in 2003, the White House said.





At Clinton fe fundraiser, a senator and

• The definition of economic coercion

Drezner (2003)

- Self-Selected Sanctions
- articulated demand
- Political Conflict and International Trade

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 - Capital Flow Restrictions
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- Trigger: A failed peace deal for ending the civil war in Liberia
- Multilateral Economic Sanctions against South Africa
 - Period: 1986-1991
 - Initiator: US, EC, Japan
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Economic Sanctions, Chinese Style

• Example I: Dalai Lama's US Visit in 2010

Press Conference Remarks by Zhu Weiqun (deputy head of the Communist Party's United Front Work Department)

"If President Obama were to meet with Dalai Lama, without a doubt, this would seriously undermine the political foundation of China-US relations, future cooperations...[and] be counterproductive for the US to weather the storm of the current economic crisis. We will definitely take **corresponding measures**." [emphasis added]


Economic Sanctions, Chinese Style

• Example II: Liu Xiaobo's Nobel Prize (2010)

Press Conference Remarks by Ma Chaoxu (Spokesman of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs)


"In the recent years, Sino-Norway relations have maintained sound development, which is beneficial to the interests of both countries as well as their people. The Nobel Committee's decision to award the Nobel Peace Prize to Liu Xiaobo, however, completely goes against the purpose of the Nobel Peace Prize, and will also **damage the Sino-Norway relations**" [emphasis added]

Chinese Sanction: Dalai Lama Effect-France (Fuchs and Klann, 2013: 169)




Vertical lines indicate meetings with a government member (dashed line) or political leader (solid line)

Chinese Sanction: Dalai Lama Effect-Italy (Fuchs and Klann, 2013: 169)




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Chinese Sanction: Dalai Lama Effect-Chile (Fuchs and Klann, 2013: 169)



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Chinese Sanction: Dalai Lama Effect-Mongolia (Fuchs and Klann, 2013: 169)



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Key Questions about Economic Sanctions

- What are their economic effects?
- Why do countries use them?
- Do they work and why?

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
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Outline

1 Economic Effects


2 Politics of Economic Sanctions

Economic Effects: Offer Curve




- The Target Country *T*'s (Convex) Reciprocal Demand Curve (Offer Curve) for a certain good: $\partial M_T / \partial X_T > 0$, $\partial^2 M_T / \partial X_T^2 > 0$ (Based on Kaempfer and Lowenberg, 2007)
- "Terms of Trade" improve as *T* moves out from the origin along the offer curve

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
Economic Effects: Pre-Sanction Equilibrium






- *W*: The rest of the world (all other countries) (It's offer curve is concave, $\partial^2 X_W / \partial M_W^2 < 0$)
- Assumption: T has a comparative advantage in the good, X_T, and is the only supplier of the good.
- International Trade Equilibrium, E, and Terms of Trade, t₀


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




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
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
Economic Effects: Multilateral Economic Sanction



X Axis

- When multilateral economic sanctions (a total embargo) are imposed, both *T* and *W* are denied opportunities to trade:
 - Back to Autarchy: $E \rightarrow 0$
 - Worsened Terms of Trade: $t_0 \rightarrow t_s, t_t$


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
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
Economic Effects: Unilateral Economic Sanction



X Axis

- When there is only one country that is sanctioning, T can still export X_T.
- W's new offer curve: R (less elastic to X_T)


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Economic Effects: Unilateral Economic Sanction



X Axis

• A New Equilibrium and (Worsened) Terms of Trade, *t*^{*} (worse than *t*₀)

- Economic sanctions are welfare-worsening for both sanctioning and sanctioned countries
- Country Size and Self-Sufficiency
- Curvature (Elasticities) of R's offer curve
- Rents under Multilateral Economic Sanctions
- Who got the rents?
 - Smugglers
 - Leaders of the target states who engage in sanction-busting activities

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
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Rents: Unilateral Economic Sanction



Who Got the Rents under Unilateral Economic Sanctions?

- Non-Sanctioning Countries
- Senders: Import-Competing Producers
- Targets: trans-shipping, smuggling

Economic Effects

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2 Politics of Economic Sanctions

- Unitary-Actor Perspective
- Paradox:

- Why?
 - Self-Selected Sanctions
 - Conflict Expectations and Audience Costs

Economic Effects

Sanctions Paradox (Daniel Drezner)

- Unitary-Actor Perspective
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- Unitary-Actor Perspective
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sanctions will be more common but less successful between adversaries, but less likely while more successful between allies

• Whv?

Self-Selected Sanctions
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• The traditional measure of the level or change in total trade between countries as a result of sanctions is an ambiguous measure of the policy's costs for either side.

• Alternatives:

Kavakli et al. (2020): external and internal substitution.
 Akoto et al. (2020): intra-industry versus inter-industry

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• Three major factors:

- market
 advant
- 2 domestic production capabilities, and
- **B** export portfolio variety.

• Five hypotheses:

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- e) Provide the second secon
- . state taget the manager of common line expected by the target state, the lower the file of board of constance and constants.
- (i) 14. The more concentrated the export portfolio in the target state, the higher the Headback of concitons access. (Reincled)
- (b) The cost second of the particular sector will matter more in the imposition stage than in the threat stage. (Confirmed; imposition stage)

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market power (a combination of export volume and comparative advantage),

2 domestic production capabilities, and

3 export portfolio variety.

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 - **2** H2. The more easily the sender can externally substitute for the target's exports, the higher the likelihood of sanctions success. (Confirmed)

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 - 4 H4. The more concentrated the export portfolio of the target state, the higher the likelihood of sanctions success. (Rejected)

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 - 4 H4. The more concentrated the export portfolio of the target state, the higher the likelihood of sanctions success. (Rejected)
 - **5** H5. The cost associated with a particular sanction will matter more in the imposition stage than in the threat stage. (Confirmed; imposition stage)

- The composition of trade could have important implications for states' ability to adjust to trade interruption. The key feature of intra-industry trade is that a higher bilateral proportion of IIT implies that trade partners could more easily produce domestically (some variant of) commodities for which they currently trade.
- The argument rests not on overall sanction costs but in the leverage such costs inflict upon targets. Although it could be more difficult for the target to replace specific IIT commodities, the very nature of IIT suggests that both trade partners produce more similar commodities. Thus, in the event that sanctions were imposed, the sender would face similarly high costs, suggesting lower leverage.
- Hypothesis: In the absence of intra-industry trade, higher target reliance on trade with senders is associated with a higher likelihood of target acquiesce. This association diminishes toward zero as the proportion of sender-target intra-industry trade increases. (confirmed).
- The paper finds strong support for the expectation that higher target trade dependence on the sender(s) is associated with a higher probability of target acquiescence to sanction threats when dyadic trade is composed primarily of inter-industry trade, but that this association between trade dependence and acquiescence diminishes toward zero as the proportion of bilateral intra-industry trade increases.

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