研討日期

202491612:10-13:50

研討地點

國立臺灣大學社會科學院710會議室

主講題目

Title of the paper

Tax versus regulations: Polluters’ incentives for loosening industry emission targets

作者

Authors of the paper

Kosuke Hirose, Akifumi Ishihara, Toshihiro Matsumura

文獻出處

Journal, vol.(issue), pp

Energy Economics

Volume 136, August 2024, 107705

https://doi.org/10.1016/j.eneco.2024.107705

主講人

參加人員

全、黃鴻、林燕淑、許至乙、高國峯、彭正浩郭文忠Bui Dang LongAyu Sasni MunteMicah MainalaAnggoro PrihandokoBastian Larour、楊雅棠、蔡美伶、洪睿翔

摘要

Abstract of the Paper

We investigate the political incentives of a polluter in affecting industry emission targets (relaxing emission restrictions) imposed by the government in a monopoly market. Specifically, we compare three typical environmental policies—two command-and-control regulations (an emission cap regulation that restricts total emissions and an emission intensity regulation that restricts emissions per output unit), and an emission tax. We presume a policy to be most robust when a less strict emission target (i.e., an increase in the targeted emission level) imposed by the government on the industry increases the firm’s profit least significantly among the three policies. This is because the firm has the least incentives for affecting emission targets. We find that the emission tax is the most robust if the government aims for a net-zero emission society. However, the emission tax is the least robust if the emission target is not ambitious or the government has weak resolve against political pressures from polluters.