研討日期 |
2024年9月16日12:10-13:50 |
研討地點 |
國立臺灣大學社會科學院710會議室 |
主講題目 Title of the paper |
Tax
versus regulations: Polluters’ incentives for loosening industry emission
targets |
作者 Authors of the paper |
Kosuke
Hirose, Akifumi Ishihara, Toshihiro Matsumura |
文獻出處 Journal, vol.(issue), pp |
Energy
Economics Volume
136, August 2024, 107705 |
主講人 |
施姵全 |
參加人員 |
施姵全、黃鴻、林燕淑、許至乙、高國峯、彭正浩、郭文忠、Bui Dang Long、Ayu Sasni Munte、Micah Mainala、Anggoro Prihandoko、Bastian Larour、楊雅棠、蔡美伶、洪睿翔 |
摘要 Abstract of the Paper |
We
investigate the political incentives of a polluter in affecting industry
emission targets (relaxing emission restrictions) imposed by the government
in a monopoly market. Specifically, we compare three typical environmental
policies—two command-and-control regulations (an emission cap regulation that
restricts total emissions and an emission intensity regulation that restricts
emissions per output unit), and an emission tax. We presume a policy to be
most robust when a less strict emission target (i.e., an increase in the
targeted emission level) imposed by the government on the industry increases
the firm’s profit least significantly among the three policies. This is
because the firm has the least incentives for affecting emission targets. We
find that the emission tax is the most robust if the government aims for a
net-zero emission society. However, the emission tax is the least robust if
the emission target is not ambitious or the government has weak resolve
against political pressures from polluters. |