研討日期	2024年8月26日10:30-12:20
研討地點	國立臺灣大學社會科學院710會議室
主講題目 Title of the paper	Price disclosure by two-sided platforms
作者 Authors of the paper	Paul Belleflamme , Martin Peitz
文獻出處 Journal, vol.(issue), pp	International Journal of Industrial Organization Volume 67, December 2019, 102529
主講人	Suttiwan Suwannajoi
參加人員	林燕淑、施姵全、高國峯、許至乙、周冰瑤、張瑞雲、王羿傑、曹古駒、Suttiwan Suwannajoi、Bui Dang Long、Ayu Sasni Munte、Micah Mainala、楊雅棠、蔡美伶、洪睿翔
	We consider two-sided platforms with the feature that some users on one or both sides of the market lack information about the price charged to participants on the other side of the market. With positive cross-group external effects, such lack of price information makes demand less elastic. A monopoly platform does not benefit from opaqueness and optimally reveals price information. By contrast, in a two-sided singlehoming duopoly, platforms benefit from opaqueness and, thus, do not have an incentive to disclose price information. In competitive bottleneck markets, results are more nuanced: if one side is fully informed (for exogenous reasons), platforms may decide to inform users on the other side either fully, partially or not at all, depending on the strength of cross-group external effects and the degree of horizontal differentiation.