研討日期	2024年7月29日10:30-12:20
研討地點	國立臺灣大學社會科學院710會議室
主講題目 Title of the paper	Vertical Contracts and Downstream Entry*
作者 Authors of the paper	CHRYSOVALANTOU MILLIOU, EMMANUEL PETRAKIS
文獻出處 Journal, vol.(issue), pp	THE JOURNAL OF INDUSTRIAL ECONOMICS 0022-1821 Volume LXXII March 2024 No. 1
主講人	林晏如
參加人員	王光正、郭文忠、施姵全、許至乙、周冰瑤、曹古駒、 Dang-long、楊雅棠、呂明權、蔡美伶 線上參與者: 林燕淑、Suttiwan、Ayu Sasni Munte、Artah、Micah、Anggoro
	We study the implications of different contractual forms in a market with an incumbent upstream monopolist and free downstream entry. We show that traditional conclusions regarding the desirability of linear contracts radically change when entry in the downstream market is endogenous rather than exogenous. By triggering more entry than two-part tariffs, wholesale price contracts can generate higher aggregate output, consumer surplus, and welfare. In light of this, the upstream monopolist may prefer to trade with wholesale price contracts as well as to give up part of its bargaining power when it is high.