研討日期	2024年6月24日12:10-13:50
研討地點	國立臺灣大學社會科學院710會議室
主講題目 Title of the paper	Emission taxes vs. environmental standards under partial ownership arrangements
作者 Authors of the paper	Quan Dong, Yang-Ming Chang
文獻出處 Journal, vol.(issue), pp	Research in Economics Volume 74, Issue 3, September 2020, Pages 250-262
主講人	Suwannajoi Suttiwan
參加人員	黃鴻、林燕淑、彭正浩、施姵全、高國峯、許至乙、王羿傑、Suttiwan、Dang-Long、Ayu Sasni Munte、Artah、Micah、楊雅棠、Anggoro、呂明權
	This study considers the strategic relations between emission tax and environmental corporate social responsibility (ECSR) in a Cournot–Bertrand comparison and analyzes two different timings of the games between a tax-then-ECSR (T game) and an ECSR-then-tax (E game). We show that the T game always yields higher emission tax than the E game irrespective of competition modes, but lower ECSR under Cournot competition and higher ECSR when the marginal damage is high under Bertrand competition. We also show that compared with Bertrand competition, Cournot competition yields lower (higher) ECSR in the T (E) game but lower emission tax in the E game and higher emission tax when the product substitutability is low in the T game. We finally show that firms endogenously choose Cournot competition with the commitment of the E game irrespective of marginal damage and product substitutability.