研討日期	2024年5月20日12:10-13:50
研討地點	國立臺灣大學社會科學院710會議室
主講題目 Title of the paper	Welfare Improvement through Partial Passive Ownership in a Stackelberg Model
作者 Authors of the paper	Umiartah Munte
文獻出處 Journal, vol.(issue), pp	Working paper
主講人	周冰瑤
參加人員	黃鴻、林燕淑、王光正、施姵全、許至乙、王羿傑、Suttiwan、Dang-Long、Ayu Sasni Munte、Artah、Micah、楊雅棠、Chisomo、Anggoro、呂明權
	It's widely acknowledged that partial passive ownership (PPO) in horizontal shareholding adversely affects both consumers and society. As PPO increases, firms tend to become more cooperative (anti-competitive), leading to a decrease in total output. This paper emphasizes the critical role of suppliers and the downstream market structure in a vertically related market. In our primary model, we assume the presence of a leader and a follower firm with partial ownership. PPO represents a welfare improvement contingent upon the upstream market structure. When each downstream firm is supplied by an independent supplier, PPO is more likely to enhance welfare. In other words, PPO contributes to welfare improvement when the input price is determined by a dedicated supplier. However, this contradicts our extension when we consider a downstream market comprising two leader firms and a follower firm with partial ownership. In this scenario, where each downstream firm is supplied by an independent supplier, partial ownership adversely affects both consumers and social welfare.