研討日期	2024年1月15日10:30-12:20
研討地點	國立臺灣大學社會科學院710會議室
主講題目 Title of the paper	Multi-product bargaining, bundling, and buyer power
作者 Authors of the paper	Markus Dertwinkel-Kalt, Christian Wey
文獻出處 Journal, vol.(issue), pp	Economics Letters Volume 188, March 2020, 108936
主講人	鍾暳陵助理教授
參加人員	黃鴻、林燕淑、施姵全、許至乙、張瑞雲、郭文忠、Bui Dang-long、Suttiwan、Ayu Sasni Munte、Chisomo Mkwandah、Artah、楊雅棠、顏政銘、蘇家叡、Micah、Anggoro、朱宣宥
	We re-consider the bilateral bargaining problem of a multi-product, manufacturer–retailer trading relationship. O’Brien and Shaffer (2005) have shown that the unbundling of contracts leads to downward distorted production levels if seller power is strong, while otherwise the joint profit maximizing quantities are contracted (which is also always the case when bundling contracts are feasible). We show that the unbundling of contracts also leads to downward distorted output levels when the buyer firm has sufficient (Nash) bargaining power (i.e., buyer power). Our result is driven by cost substitutability (diseconomies of scope).