研討日期	2023年8月7日10:30~ 12:20
研討地點	國立臺灣大學社會科學院713會議室
主講題目 Title of the paper	Environmental Policy in Vertical Markets with Downstream Pollution: Taxes Versus Standards
作者 Authors of the paper	Yang-Ming Chang and Manaf Sellak
文獻出處 Journal, vol.(issue), pp	The B.E. Journal of Economic Analysis & Policy https://doi.org/10.1515/bejeap-2022-0255
主講人	施姵全助理教授
參加人員	黃鴻、林燕淑、王光正、高國峯、張瑞雲、許至乙、彭正浩、郭文忠、王羿傑、曹古駒、周冰瑤、蘇家叡、Suttiwan Suwannajoi、楊雅棠、Chisomo Mkwandah, Artha、陳廷睿、王靖雯
摘要 Abstract of the paper	This paper examines the performance of two environmental regulation policies – emission taxes and absolute standards – in a vertical market where an upstream foreign monopolist sells a specific input to two downstream multiproduct firms that generate pollution in the domestic country. Specifically, we use a three-stage game to analyze and compare the two policies for regulating downstream pollution. In the first stage, the domestic government determines an optimal tariff and sets one of the two instruments (taxes or standards) by maximizing social welfare, in stage two, the upstream foreign monopoly sets its input price, and finally, the downstream domestic firms independently make their output and abatement decisions for profit maximization. We find that total emissions are lower under the absolute standard. Nevertheless, the tax dominates the standard in terms of domestic welfare, consumer surplus, and downstream multiproduct firms’ profits. Thus, the tax equilibrium leads to a win-win-win situation compared to the standard equilibrium. These results show the non-equivalence of emission taxes and absolute standards in regulating downstream pollution. The analyses suggest that a pollution tax is an economically and politically feasible policy.