研討日期	2023年7月31日10:30~ 12:20
研討地點	國立臺灣大學社會科學院713會議室
主講題目 Title of the paper	Optimal Aftermarket Service Strategy in a Duopoly Market
作者 Authors of the paper	許至乙
文獻出處 Journal, vol.(issue), pp	Working paper
主講人	許至乙博士
參加人員	黃鴻、林燕淑、施姵全、高國峯、張瑞雲、曹古駒、周冰瑤、蘇家叡、Suttiwan Suwannajoi、楊雅棠、Chisomo Mkwandah, Artha、陳廷睿
摘要 Abstract of the paper	We adopt the Hotelling duopoly model to investigate the incentives for two OEMs to open their aftermarket service markets when aftermarket services exist. Under cost symmetry for both manufacturers, we find that when one manufacturer has greater market power in the product market, both manufacturers have an incentive to open their aftermarket service markets, although this would decrease consumer surplus without affecting social welfare. In the case of asymmetric production costs, if the product defect rate is low, the high-cost manufacturer is more likely to open its aftermarket service market than the low-cost manufacturer. Conversely, when the product defect rate is high, the incentive for the high-cost manufacturer to open its aftermarket service market is less. Additionally, in the absence of government regulations or licensing agreements, we utilize the theoretical model to explore why the original equipment manufacturer, holding the product design patent rights, has an incentive to open its product's aftermarket service market without charging licensing fees.