研討日期	2023年4月24日12:40~ 13:50
研討地點	國立臺灣大學社會科學院710會議室
主講題目 Title of the paper	Private and Social Incentives for Vertical Contract Disclosure
作者 Authors of the paper	Qihong Liu and X. Henry Wang
文獻出處 Journal, vol.(issue), pp	MANAGERIAL AND DECISION ECONOMICS Manage. Decis. Econ. 35: 567–573 (2014)
主講人	林燕淑教授
參加人員	黃鴻、林燕淑、高國峯、施姵全、張瑞雲、許至乙、蘇家叡、Suttiwan Suwannajoi、楊雅棠
摘要 Abstract of the paper	We follow the framework in Arya and Mittendorf’s 2011 Rand Journal of Economics paper but extend their analysis by investigating supplier(s)’ equilibrium choices of disclosure or confidentiality regarding their contract terms with the downstream retailers. In the case of a common supplier, we find that the unique subgame perfect Nash equilibrium (SPNE) is for the supplier to choose disclosure. This private incentive is opposite to social incentive, which calls for the regulator to choose confidentiality. In the case of dedicated suppliers, however, there are multiple SPNE due to coordination issues between the suppliers. The case which maximizes social surplus – disclosure – can be supported as a SPNE, together with the case of confidentiality, which maximizes supplier profits at the cost of everyone else. Copyright © 2014 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.