研討日期

202332712:40~ 13:50

研討地點

國立臺灣大學社會科學院710會議室

主講題目

Title of the paper

Why do Exporters Choose Different Anti-dumping Measures?

作者

Authors of the paper

Kuo-Feng Kaoa and Hiroshi Mukunoki

文獻出處

Journal, vol.(issue), pp

Working paper

 

主講人

高國峯教授

參加人員

黃鴻、林燕淑、王光正、彭正浩、梁文榮、張瑞雲、郭文忠、許至乙、蘇家Suttiwan Suwannajoi、楊雅棠、朱宣、王靖雯

摘要

Abstract of the paper

This paper examines the real-world phenomena in which some dumping firms offer price undertaking while others pay anti-dumping (AD) duty in the same AD case. We use a two-country model to investigate the effect of an AD policy when dumping firms have an option to choose between paying AD duty and committing to a high export price (i.e., price undertaking). If the technology gap between the exporting firms and the market size difference between the two countries are in the middle range, the efficient exporter chooses price undertaking while the less-efficient exporter chooses AD policy duty. Otherwise, the two exporters choose the same AD measure. We also show that the government in country F accepts the price undertaking only if its domestic firm is very efficient.