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變局與挑戰—貿易政策與產業組織研究群 |
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研討日期 Date, time |
2025-10-13 T 10:30-12:00 |
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研討地點 Location |
國立臺灣大學社會科學院710會議室 Room
710, College of Social Science, NTU |
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主講題目 Title of the paper |
Timing of Outsourcing
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作者 Authors of the paper |
Chia-Hung Sun |
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文獻出處 Journal, vol.(issue), pp |
Working Paper |
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主講人 Presenter |
孫嘉宏 |
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參加人員 Participants |
黃鴻,孫嘉宏,王光正,王羿傑,林燕淑,施姵全,高國峯,許至乙,林晏如,蕭溙辰,Ayu Sasni Munte, Micah Mainala,Umiartah Munte,Karl Finke |
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摘要 Abstract of the Paper |
This paper develops
a dynamic timing game of outsourcing adoption in vertically related markets.
Two vertically integrated firms, initially producing with in-house inputs,
may outsource to specialized contractors through Nash bargaining over
two-part tariff contracts. We show that outsourcing timing depends critically
on in-house production costs and product market competition. When in-house
costs are low, both firms outsource simultaneously, generating clustering of
adoption and profits below those under no outsourcing, a prisoner’s dilemma.
When in-house costs are high, outsourcing occurs sequentially, with the
leader enjoying a first-mover advantage. We further show that neither higher
product-market competition nor higher in-house costs necessarily induce
earlier outsourcing. Extensions demonstrate that centralized bargaining
accelerates outsourcing relative to decentralized bargaining, while exclusive
input relations delay adoption. Welfare analysis shows that firms typically
outsource too late, as they internalize only private profits and neglect the
impact on consumer surplus and the rival’s profits. |