變局與挑戰—貿易政策與產業組織研究群
研討日期 Date, time	2025-09-22 T 10:30-12:00
研討地點 Location	國立臺灣大學社會科學院710會議室 Room 710, College of Social Science, NTU
主講題目 Title of the paper	Endogenous Costs, Market Competition, and Disclosure
作者 Authors of the paper	Xi Li
文獻出處 Journal, vol.(issue), pp	Marketing Science Volume 44, Issue 2, March 2025, Pages 374–389
主講人 Presenter	Bui-Dang Long
參加人員 Participants	黃鴻，王光正，林燕淑，施姵全，高國峯，許至乙，彭正浩，張瑞雲，林晏如，Bui-Dang Long, 周冰瑤，Micah Mainala，Karl Finke
摘要 Abstract of the Paper	Firms must often decide whether to disclose private information regarding their costs to other market participants. Although extant literature has explored firms’ incentives to disclose exogenous and uncertain costs, little is known about when their endogenous costs should be disclosed. This paper studies the cost-disclosure strategies of competing firms whose inputs are sourced from and endogenously priced by upstream suppliers. We find, first, that cost disclosure affects not only market competition but also the motivations of suppliers in setting their input prices. As such, firms can strategize their disclosure decisions to optimize their procurement costs. Second, we find that firms’ disclosure decisions vary depending on both the nature of the competition and the market structure at hand. That is, when competing firms source from the same supplier or compete on price, they never disclose their costs; in such a case, nondisclosure is strictly better for consumers and welfare compared with disclosure. When competing firms source from different suppliers and compete on quantity, they always disclose; in such a case, disclosure is strictly better for consumers and welfare compared with nondisclosure. We also find that whereas manufacturers’ disclosure incentives are misaligned with those of suppliers, they are largely aligned with the goal of maximizing channel profits. Together, our results underscore the distinct role that endogenous costs play in firms’ disclosure decisions.