研討日期	2025年06月23日10:30-12:20
研討地點	國立臺灣大學社會科學院710會議室
主講題目 Title of the paper	Bundling, tying, and collusion
作者 Authors of the paper	David Spector
文獻出處 Journal, vol.(issue), pp	International Journal of Industrial Organization Volume 25, Issue 3, June 2007, Pages 575-581 https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ijindorg.2006.06.003
主講人	鍾嘒陵
參加人員	黃鴻、林燕淑、彭正浩、王羿傑、鍾暳陵、曹古駒、周冰瑤、Ayu Sasni Munte、Micah Mainala、楊雅棠
摘要 Abstract of the Paper	Tying a good produced monopolistically with a complementary good produced in an oligopolistic market in which there is room for collusion can be profitable if some buyers of the oligopoly good have no demand for the monopoly good. The reason is that a tie makes part of the demand in the oligopolistic market out of the reach of the tying firm's rivals, which decreases the profitability of deviating from a collusive agreement. Tying may thus facilitate collusion. It may also allow the tying firm to alter market share allocation in a collusive oligopolistic market.