研討日期	2025年06月02日12:10-13:50
研討地點	國立臺灣大學社會科學院710會議室
主講題目 Title of the paper	The Optimal Information Design for Credence Goods
作者 Authors of the paper	Tsung-Sheng Tsai, Cheng-Tai Wu
文獻出處 Journal, vol.(issue), pp	Working Paper
主講人	吳震台
參加人員	黃鴻、林燕淑、吳震台、蔡崇聖、施姵全、許至乙、王光正、彭正浩、郭文忠、張瑞雲、林晏如、Bui Dang-Long、Ayu Sasni Munte、Micah Mainala、Anggoro Prihandoko、楊雅棠、洪睿翔
摘要 Abstract of the Paper	This paper explores how information can be intentionally structured in markets for credence goods—where consumers lack the ability to verify the appropriateness or quality of a service even after it has been provided. We consider a setting where the service provider (such as a doctor or consultant) not only holds private knowledge about the consumer’s issue but also determines the course of action. Through a game-theoretic model grounded in Bayesian principles, we examine how the design of diagnostic signals affects treatment choices under various incentive and liability conditions. Our analysis reveals that limited liability increases the likelihood of excessive treatment, while certain restrictions on the design of information—like requiring minimal informativeness—can curb inefficiencies. The study ultimately sheds light on how thoughtfully crafted information mechanisms can lead to more efficient outcomes in expert-driven services.