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¥DÁ¿ÃD¥Ø Title of the paper |
Platform
investment and seller competition in two‑sided markets |
§@ªÌ Authors of the paper |
Francesco Angelini,
Massimiliano Castellani, Lorenzo Zirulia |
¤åÄm¥X³B Journal, vol.(issue), pp |
Journal
of Economics Volume 144, pages
1¡V29, (2025) https://doi.org/10.1007/s00712-024-00874-x |
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Mainala¡BAnggoro Prihandoko¡B·¨¶®´Å |
ºKn Abstract of the Paper |
Platforms can create value
within their ecosystems through their investments. In this paper, we model a
monopolistic platform choosing the level of a demand-enhancing investment and
the membership fees that sellers and buyers pay to access the platform. We
find that platform size and quality are large when the degree of product
differentiation among sellers and investment productivity are high. Platform
profit and users¡¦ surplus are aligned. If the platform sells a product under
its brand, incentives to invest are higher, compared to a pure marketplace,
and sellers¡¦ surplus can be larger if the degree of product differentiation
is low. |