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Title of the paper

Cross‑ownership in network industries: when less competition implies less profits or more social welfare

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Authors of the paper

Domenico Buccella, Luciano Fanti, Luca Gori

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Journal, vol.(issue), pp

Journal of Economics

Volume 144, pages 203¡V230, (2025)

https://doi.org/10.1007/s00712-024-00888-5

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Abstract of the Paper

Considering a Cournot duopoly with network goods, this paper shows some unconventional effects due to passive unilateral cross-ownership (i.e., one firm holds noncontrolling shares in the rival firm): the industry profitability of the network duopoly can be reduced, or social welfare increased, depending on the degree of compatibility between goods (full, partial, no compatibility). These findings challenge the conventional results for which cross-holdings improve total profitability and worsen social welfare. The work eventually pinpoints the empirical and policy implications of cross-ownership on profits and welfare.