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¥DÁ¿ÃD¥Ø Title of the paper |
Cross‑ownership
in network industries: when less competition implies
less profits or more social welfare |
§@ªÌ Authors of the paper |
Domenico Buccella,
Luciano Fanti, Luca Gori |
¤åÄm¥X³B Journal, vol.(issue), pp |
Journal
of Economics Volume 144, pages
203¡V230, (2025) https://doi.org/10.1007/s00712-024-00888-5 |
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ºKn Abstract of the Paper |
Considering a Cournot duopoly
with network goods, this paper shows some unconventional effects due to
passive unilateral cross-ownership (i.e., one firm holds noncontrolling
shares in the rival firm): the industry profitability of the network duopoly
can be reduced, or social welfare increased, depending on the degree of
compatibility between goods (full, partial, no compatibility). These findings
challenge the conventional results for which cross-holdings improve total
profitability and worsen social welfare. The work eventually pinpoints the
empirical and policy implications of cross-ownership on profits and welfare. |