研討日期	2025年03月17日12:10-13:50
研討地點	國立臺灣大學社會科學院710會議室
主講題目 Title of the paper	Mixed oligopoly and raising rivals’ costs
作者 Authors of the paper	Kenneth Fjell, John S. Heywood, Debashis Pal
文獻出處 Journal, vol.(issue), pp	Canadian Journal of Economics
主講人	Micah Mainala
參加人員	黃鴻、林燕淑、施姵全、許至乙、王光正、曹古駒、林晏如、高國峯、Bui Dang-Long、Ayu Sasni Munte、Micah Mainala、Anggoro Prihandoko、楊雅棠、洪睿翔、李易鴻
摘要 Abstract of the Paper	This paper show that the presence of a welfare maximizing public firm in an oligopoly guarantees that no firm has an incentive to raise the costs of domestic private rivals. This represents another example of regulation by participation. There remains an incentive to raise the costs of the public firm and of foreign private rivals. We also explore which firms are most likely to have their costs raised and which firms are most likely to raise rivals' costs.