研討日期	2025年02月24日12:10-13:50
研討地點	國立臺灣大學社會科學院710會議室
主講題目 Title of the paper	Optimal Sharing Rule in Group Contests: The Group-Size Paradox Revisited
作者 Authors of the paper	You-Chen Lo, Chen-Yu Pan
文獻出處 Journal, vol.(issue), pp	Working Paper
主講人	潘振宇
參加人員	黃鴻、潘振宇、林燕淑、施姵全、許至乙、高國峯、王光正、彭正浩、張瑞雲、林晏如、Bui Dang-Long、Ayu Sasni Munte、Micah Mainala、Anggoro Prihandoko、楊雅棠、洪睿翔、李易鴻
摘要 Abstract of the Paper	This paper considers a group contest model with an endogenous prize-sharing rule. Group leaders first decide on a prize-sharing rule for their group that specifies the proportion of the prize allocated to group public goods and to private rewards, as well as how group members share these private rewards according to egalitarian and meritocratic rules. In this model, the chosen sharing rule is private information that is observable only to group members. Each group member then chooses their effort simultaneously, taking the effort of other groups as a given. When leaders attempt to maximize winning probability, we show that an equilibrium exists and is unique, and we characterize the optimal sharing rule. Moreover, we demonstrate that the group-size paradox disappears at this equilibrium, and larger groups use more meritocratic private incentives. However, if group leaders are welfare-maximizing, a purely meritocratic private prize distribution results in a novel trade-off between the winning prize value and effort incentives, leading to the group-size paradox.