研討日期	2025年01月13日10:30-12:20
研討地點	國立臺灣大學社會科學院710會議室
主講題目 Title of the paper	Being green first: Simultaneous vs. sequential abatement decisions
作者 Authors of the paper	John C. Strandholm , Ana Espinola-Arredondo , Felix Munoz-Garcia
文獻出處 Journal, vol.(issue), pp	Economics Letters Volume 227, June 2023, 111123 https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2023.111123
主講人	林晏如
參加人員	黃鴻、林燕淑、施姵全、林晏如、高國峯、許至乙、張瑞雲、周冰瑤、Ayu Sasni Munte、Micah Mainala、Anggoro Prihandoko、楊雅棠、許尹禎、謝旻軒、郭昀昕、李雲安
摘要 Abstract of the Paper	We investigate the effect of the timing of green technology investment in a polluting duopoly facing environmental regulation. We consider a three-stage game where (i) firms sequentially choose their investment in the first stage, (ii) the regulator sets the optimal emission fee in the second stage, and (iii) the polluting good is produced in the third stage. When free-riding incentives are strong the leader enjoys a first-mover advantage, investing less in abatement than the follower, as in sequential public good games. We also show that sequential investment decisions achieve higher abatement than simultaneous decisions, and identify in which settings such a difference is the largest.