研討日期	2024年11月18日12:10-13:50
研討地點	國立臺灣大學社會科學院710會議室
主講題目 Title of the paper	Strategic Incentives When Supplying to Rivals With an Application to Vertical Firm Structure
作者 Authors of the paper	Serge Moresi, Marius Schwartz
文獻出處 Journal, vol.(issue), pp	International Journal of Industrial Organization 51 (2017) 137–161, 28 Dec 2016 http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.ijindorg.2016.12.005
主講人	Micah Mainala
參加人員	黃鴻、林燕淑、施姵全、許至乙、高國峯、王光正、郭文忠、王羿傑、 Bui Dang-Long、Ayu Sasni Munte、Micah Mainala、Anggoro Prihandoko、楊雅棠、蔡美伶、洪睿翔
摘要 Abstract of the Paper	Using the export-rivalry model, we examine the welfare impact of two tariff regimes when firms’ vertical structure is endogenously determined via the strategic behavior of each firm. First, with discriminatory tariffs, if the degree of imperfect substitutability is sufficiently low, the rent-shifting effects of vertical separation becomes less important and firms chooses vertical integration to enjoy lower tariffs, and vice versa if the degree of imperfect substitutability is sufficiently high. However, an asymmetrical vertical structure, i.e., low (high)-cost firm chooses vertical separation (integration), emerges only in the uniform tariffs. Thus, the existence of firms’ diverse vertical structure between tariff systems can arise. Second, although firms are better off if they choose vertical separation, each firm chooses vertical integration in the discriminatory tariffs (i.e., prisoners’ dilemma). Third, if firms choose vertical integration in the discriminatory tariffs but vertical separation in the uniform ones, they prefer the uniform tariffs as far as cost differential between firms is not large; and the global welfare is greater in the discriminatory than in the uniform tariffs.