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研討日期 |
2024年11月11日12:10-13:50 |
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研討地點 |
國立臺灣大學社會科學院710會議室 |
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主講題目 Title of the paper |
On
Emissions Trading and Market Structure: Cap-and-Trade versus Intensity
Standards |
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作者 Authors of the paper |
Frans
P. de Vries, Bouwe R. Dijkstra, Matthew McGinty |
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文獻出處 Journal, vol.(issue), pp |
Environmental
and Resource Economics Volume 58, pages 665–682, 30 August 2013 |
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主講人 |
施姵全 |
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參加人員 |
林燕淑、施姵全、許至乙、高國峯、 Bui Dang-Long、Ayu Sasni Munte、Micah Mainala、Anggoro Prihandoko、洪睿翔 |
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摘要 Abstract of the Paper |
This
paper examines the interdependence between imperfect competition and emissions
trading. We particularly analyze the long run equilibrium in a two-sector
(‘clean’ and ‘dirty’) model with Cournot competition among firms who face a
fixed cost of production. The clean sector is defined as the sector with the
highest long run cost margin on emissions. We compare the welfare
implications of a cap-and-trade scheme with an emissions trading scheme based
on relative intensity standards. It is shown that a firm’s long run
equilibrium output in the clean or dirty sector does not depend on the
emissions trading format, but only depends on the fixed cost of producing in
the respective sector. Intensity standards can result in clean firms selling
allowances to dirty firms, or dirty firms selling to clean firms. The former
outcome yields higher welfare. It is demonstrated that cap-and-trade
outperforms the intensity-based trading scheme in terms of long run welfare
with free entry and exit. With intensity standards the size of the clean
sector is too large. |