研討日期	2024年10月21日12:10-13:50
研討地點	國立臺灣大學社會科學院710會議室
主講題目 Title of the paper	Optimal licensing with equity under Cournot competition
作者 Authors of the paper	王羿傑
文獻出處 Journal, vol.(issue), pp	Working paper
主講人	洪睿翔
參加人員	王羿傑、黃鴻、林燕淑、王光正、施姵全、許至乙、彭正浩、 Bui Dang-Long、Ayu Sasni Munte、Micah Mainala、Anggoro Prihandoko、 Bastien Latour、楊雅堂、洪睿翔
摘要 Abstract of the Paper	This study uses the homogeneous Cournot oligopoly model to investigate the optimal licensing contract of the insider patentee. In doing so, we employed two assumptions: (a) the patentee and licensees engage in Cournot competition and (b) the licensing contracts for the patentee are fixed fee, royalty, and equity. The main findings revealed the following: First, when the patentee licenses to all firms in the context of non-drastic innovation and small (middle, large) innovation size, the optimal licensing contract for the patentee is equity (equity, royalty). Second, an optimal equity share will increase not only as the innovation size increases but also as the marginal cost of the licensees rises. Finally, if innovation is non-drastic and the innovation size is small or middle, the social welfare under exclusive licensing will be greater than that under non-exclusive licensing.