研討日期	2023年10月30日12:10~ 13:50
研討地點	國立臺灣大學社會科學院710會議室
主講題目 Title of the paper	Firms’ strategic delegation with heterogeneous consumers
作者 Authors of the paper	Cong Pan, Dong Joon Lee, Kangsik Choi
文獻出處 Journal, vol.(issue), pp	Journal of Economics (2020) 131:199–221 https://doi.org/10.1007/s00712-020-00707-7
主講人	王羿傑副教授
參加人員	黃鴻、林燕淑、郭文忠、許至乙、施姵全、高國峯、彭正浩、周冰瑤、Suttiwan Suwannajoi、Ayu Sasni Munte、Chisomo Mkwandah、朱宣宥、葉定豊、Artah、楊雅棠
	We revisit firms’ strategic delegation in a Cournot game. We consider a market comprising two consumer groups, with either a high or low willingness to pay. In this market, we first consider firms’ identical marginal costs and show that either/ both firms’ owners may strategically abandon the delegation option to avoid price collapse. We find three types of delegation decisions with either/both/no firm delegating in equilibrium. We further consider firms’ asymmetric marginal costs and show that the asymmetric equilibrium wherein only the less efficient firm delegates will exist in a wider parameter range, compared to that wherein only the more efficient firm delegates. Moreover, delegation may enable the less efficient firm to achieve a higher profit than her rival.