研討日期

202391112:10~ 13:50

研討地點

國立臺灣大學社會科學院710會議室

主講題目

Title of the paper

Input price discrimination and horizontal shareholding

作者

Authors of the paper

Youping Li · Jie Shuai

文獻出處

Journal, vol.(issue), pp

Journal of Regulatory Economics (2022) 61:48–66

https://doi.org/10.1007/s11149-021-09444-1

主講人

林燕淑

參加人員

黃鴻、王光正、施全、高國峯、許至乙、彭正浩、鍾暳陵、王羿傑、曹古駒、周冰瑤、Suttiwan SuwannajoiAyu Sasni MunteChisomo Mkwandah、葉定豊、施岳廷、Artah

Antitrust laws in many countries prohibit the setting of differential prices across buyers who compete against each other. In this paper, we consider a setting in which a downstream manufacturer has non-controlling interest in its rival and both buy input from an upstream monopolist. Under price discrimination, a lower price is charged to the manufacturer that holds the rival’s shares, which mitigates the anticompetitive effect of horizontal shareholding. When the ownership structure is endogenized, we find that, relative to uniform pricing, price discrimination discourages the formation of horizontal shareholding which is also socially desirable. The analysis is extended to the case of cross shareholding in which each manufacturer holds shares of its rival and to downstream price competition.