研討日期	2023年6月19日10:30~ 12:20
研討地點	國立臺灣大學社會科學院710會議室
主講題目 Title of the paper	A timing game in a mixed duopoly
作者 Authors of the paper	孫嘉宏
文獻出處 Journal, vol.(issue), pp	Working paper
主講人	孫嘉宏教授
參加人員	黃鴻、林燕淑、王光正、張瑞雲、高國峯、許至乙、蘇家叡、Suttiwan Suwannajoi、Bui Dang Long、楊雅棠、朱宣宥、王靖雯、周冰瑤、Chisomo、Artah
摘要 Abstract of the paper	This paper investigates a timing game in a mixed duopoly, whereby a relatively inefficient state-owned firm maximizing the linear combination of its profit and social welfare competes against a relatively efficient, profit-maximizing private firm over the timing of entry. We find that the incentives for firms to enter the market depend on the degrees of privatization of a state-owned firm and of the cost asymmetry between the two firms. We also provide welfare analysis by comparing the equilibrium timing of entry with the socially optimal one. Findings show when the two firms’ products are perfect substitutes that the socially optimal timing of both firms entering the market can be achieved if the state-owned firm is fully public.