研討日期	2023年5月29日12:20~ 13:50
研討地點	國立臺灣大學社會科學院710會議室
主講題目 Title of the paper	Vertical Separation with Private Contracts
作者 Authors of the paper	Marco Pagnozzi and Salvatore Piccolo
文獻出處 Journal, vol.(issue), pp	The Economic Journal, 122 (March), 173–207. Doi: 10.1111/j.1468-0297.2011.02471.x
主講人	施姵全助理教授
參加人員	林燕淑、王光正、Suttiwan Suwannajoi、楊雅棠、朱宣宥
摘要 Abstract of the paper	We consider a manufacturer’s incentive to sell through an independent retailer, rather than directly to final consumers, when contracts with retailers cannot be observed by competitors. If retailers conjecture that identical competing manufacturers always offer identical contracts (symmetric beliefs), manufacturers choose vertical separation in equilibrium. Even with private contracts, vertically separated manufacturers reduce competition and increase profits by inducing less aggressive behaviour by retailers in the final market. Manufacturers profits may be higher with private than with public contracts. Our results hold both with price and with quantity competition and do not hinge on retailers beliefs being perfectly symmetric. We also discuss various justifications for symmetric beliefs, including incomplete information.