研討日期	2023年5月8日12:40~ 13:50
研討地點	國立臺灣大學社會科學院710會議室
主講題目 Title of the paper	Exclusive Dealing in the Presence of R&D Investment under Specific Discount Input Prices
作者 Authors of the paper	Dang-Long Bui and Wen-Jung Liang
文獻出處 Journal, vol.(issue), pp	Working paper
主講人	王光正教授
參加人員	黃鴻、林燕淑、張瑞雲、梁文榮、施姵全、高國峯、許至乙、蘇家叡、Suttiwan Suwannajoi、楊雅棠、Bui Dang Long
摘要 Abstract of the paper	We examine the emergence of exclusive dealing and its influences on R&D and welfare by referring to the New York State Attorney General’s complaint against Intel, in which the input supplier offers specific discounts to help the manufacturer win the competition against its rivals in the downstream markets rather than charging a monopoly input price under exclusivity. We obtain the following interesting results. First, exclusive dealing can improve welfare through promoting input supplier’s R&D investment even though it reduces the social R&D investment, if the transport rate is low and the cost parameter of R&D is high. Second, exclusive dealing can occur if the transport rate is low, while the reverse arises otherwise. Third, the input supplier’s R&D investment under exclusivity can be lower than under no exclusivity if the cost parameter of R&D and the transport rate are low, while the reverse arises otherwise.