研討日期 Date |
2023年1月16日上午12:10~ 13:50 |
研討地點 Venue |
國立臺灣大學社會科學院710會議室 |
主講題目 Title of the Paper |
The welfare analysis of
anti-competitiveness in the presence of corporate social responsibility |
作者 Authors of the Paper |
Tsao, Ku-Gi |
文獻出處 Journal,
vol.(issue), pp |
Working paper |
主講人 Speaker |
曹古駒教授 |
參加人員 Participants |
黃鴻、林燕淑、高國峯、張瑞雲、彭正浩、郭文忠、鍾暳陵、蘇家叡、許至乙、Suttiwan Suwannajoi、楊雅棠 |
摘要 Abstract of the Paper |
This article establishes a
duopoly vertical supply chain model, in which a monopoly manufacturer
authorizes the products to two dealers, a CSR dealer, and a PMF dealer, in
the form of the input price. We
analyze the optimal degree of CSR and explore the impact on consumer surplus
and social welfare. The results show that when a manufacturer sets a uniform
price for two dealers, the manufacturer's profit, consumer surplus, and
social welfare will be higher than in the case of discriminatory pricing.
Regardless of whether the manufacturer uses uniform or discriminatory pricing
authorization, the overall industrial profits, consumer surplus, and social
welfare are higher when the CSR dealer belongs to the direct selling store
rather than the franchise store. When a manufacturer adopts uniform pricing
at the direct selling store, it is the highest channel coordination method
for social welfare; but at the same time, CSR will become a tool to
concentrate the market, drive PMF dealers out of the market so that
manufacturers can extract all of the industry profit. |