研討日期	2022年11月28日12:40~ 13:350
研討地點	國立臺灣大學社會科學院710會議室
主講題目 Title of the paper	Bundling, Vertical Differentiation, and Platform Competition
作者 Authors of the paper	Keke Sun
文獻出處 Journal, vol.(issue), pp	Rev Netw Econ 2018; 17(1): 1–23
主講人	鍾暳陵助理教授
參加人員	黃鴻、林燕淑、王光正、高國峯、張瑞雲、梁文榮、彭正浩、許至乙、蘇家叡、Suttiwan Suwannajoi、Manuel-Milan Ramsler
摘要 Abstract of the paper	This paper studies the bundling strategies of two firms that each sell a horizontally differentiated platform and a complementary good. When the complementary goods are vertically differentiated, the firm that sells the superior one can commit to a more aggressive pricing strategy through bundling. In the presence of asymmetry in externalities between the two sides in the platform market, bundling may be profitable without foreclosing the rival when platforms implement cross subsidies from the high-externality side (developers) to the lowexternality side (consumers). Bundling has a positive effect on welfare because it allows for better internalization of the indirect network effects and reduces the developer cost of multi-homing, but it also has a negative effect because some consumers consume less-preferred components. Consequently, bundling is socially desirable when platforms are not too differentiated and the vertical differentiation between the complementary goods is high.