研討日期	2022年11月14日12:40~ 13:350
研討地點	國立臺灣大學社會科學院710會議室
主講題目 Title of the paper	Downstream Competition and Profits under Different Input Price Bargaining Structures
作者 Authors of the paper	Domenico Buccella, Luciano Fanti
文獻出處 Journal, vol.(issue), pp	Journal of Economics (2022) 136:251–268 https://doi.org/10.1007/s00712-021-00772-6
主講人	彭正浩教授
參加人員	黃鴻、林燕淑、王光正、高國峯、張瑞雲、郭文忠、蘇家叡、Suttiwan Suwannajoi、Bui Dang Long、Noya Yukari Siregar、Manuel-Milan Ramsler
摘要 Abstract of the paper	In a vertically related duopoly with input price bargaining, this paper re-examines the downstream firms’ profitability under different market competition degrees. It is shown the rather counterintuitive result that downstream firms earn highest profits with semi-collusion, whose level depends on the upstream bargaining structures, the relative parties’ bargaining power, and the parameters measuring the degree of product differentiation in the downstream market. Concerning social welfare, the key result is that policymakers can tolerate some degree of collusion with decentralized bargaining structures; centralized structures advise for a more procompetitive policy.