研討日期	2022年11月7日上午12:40~ 13:350
研討地點	國立臺灣大學社會科學院710會議室
主講題目 Title of the paper	Investment in Quality Upgrade and Regulation of the Internet
作者 Authors of the paper	Edmond Baranes, Cuong Hung Vuong
文獻出處 Journal, vol.(issue), pp	Journal of Regulatory Economics (2022) 61:1–31 https://doi.org/10.1007/s11149-021-09441-4
主講人	高國峯教授
參加人員	黃鴻、林燕淑、梁文榮、彭正浩、郭文忠、鍾暳陵、許至乙、蘇家叡、Suttiwan Suwannajoi、Bui Dang Long、Noya Yukari Siregar、Manuel-Milan Ramsler
摘要 Abstract of the paper	This paper studies the investment decision by a monopolistic internet service provider (ISP) in different regulatory environments. We consider that the ISP can technically provide separate quality upgrades to two vertically differentiated content providers (CPs). Our results show that if unregulated, the ISP could optimally provide asymmetric quality upgrades to both CPs, in favor of the high-quality CP. This subsequently increases the degree of content differentiation, softening competition between the CPs. Imposing a nondiscrimination regulation that forces the ISP to provide an equal quality upgrade to both CPs, however, reduce the ISP’s investment incentive and social welfare. Furthermore, the social planner provides preferential treatment to the highquality CP if the degree of substitutability is sufficiently low. In contrast, it is socially optimal to prioritize the low-quality CP if the contents are sufficient substitutes, or provide exclusivity if vertical differentiation is high.