研討日期 |
2022年10月31日 中午12:30~ 13:50 |
研討地點 |
國立臺灣大學社會科學院710會議室 |
主講題目 Title of the paper |
Non-Discriminatory
Pricing, Partial Backward Ownership, and Entry Deterrence |
作者 Authors of the paper |
MatthiasHunold |
文獻出處 Journal,
vol.(issue), pp |
International Journal of
Industrial Organization Volume 70, May 2020,
102615 |
主講人 |
林燕淑 |
參加人員 |
林燕淑、王光正、高國峯、張瑞雲、黃鴻、郭文忠、鍾嘒陵、吳世傑、 蘇家睿、許至乙、Suttiwan Suwannajoi、Latasha Barshilia、 Manuel-Milan
Ramsler |
摘要 Abstract of the paper |
This article demonstrates
that entry deterrence can occur when downstream incumbents hold
non-controlling ownership shares of a supplier that does not
price-discriminate. Such backward ownership implies a rebate on the input
price for the incumbents and a competitive disadvantage for downstream
entrants. An industry can use non-controlling ownership to change the pricing
of a supplier in a way that appears to be accommodating but in fact deters
entry. The supplier benefits from an obligation or a commitment to supply the
customers under equal terms, as this induces profitable sales of ownership
stakes to incumbent downstream firms. |